The local elections in Kwazulu-natal: 26 June 1996

African Affairs

Volumn 96, Issue 384, 1997, Pages 377-398

  Johnston, A M ^a   Johnson, R W ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF KWAZULU NATAL   (South Africa)

^b Helen Suzman Foundation   (South Africa)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

DEVELOPING COUNTRY; ELECTION (1996); ELECTORAL GEOGRAPHY; LOCAL ELECTION;

SOUTH AFRICA, KWAZULU-NATAL;

EID: 0031428624     PISSN: 00019909     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/oxfordjournals.afraf.a007855     Document Type: Article

References (38)

1. For an overview, see F. Cloete, Local Government Transformarion in South Africa (Van Schaik, Pretoria, 1995).
2. For an interpretation of the politics of KwaZulu-Natal see A. M. Johnston, 'The Political World of KwaZulu-Natal' in R. W. Johnson and L. Schlemmer, Launching Democracy: the First Open Election (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1995).
3. In fact, the true figure is three times. The local elections for the whole country had already been put back once before these postponements happened.
4. On the first postponement see A. M. Johnston and J. E. Spence, South Africa's Local Government Elections, Royal Institute of International Affairs, Briefing Paper 27 (London, November 1995), pp. 2-3.
5. For an analysis, see P. Mansfield 'The Structures and the Stakes' KwaZulu-Natal Briefing (2 May 1996) pp. 1-6.
6. See for instance 'ANC claims irregularities in Ulundi registration roll' Business Day (Johannesburg) 16 April 1996.
7. See for example 'Miller tells councils - check the roll again' Sunday Tribune (Durban) 21 April 1996. Peter Miller is the provincial minister of housing and local government in KwaZulu-Natal.
8. These voices included the Democratic Party and the National Party, supported by most newspapers. See for instance 'Leaders have a duty to the people of Natal, Sunday Times (Johannesburg) 14 April 1996.
9. 'Local elections postponed' Mercury (Durban) 7 May 1996.
10. For a discussion and analysis of political violence in KwaZulu-Natal since April 1994 see A. M. Johnston, 'Politics and Violence in KwaZulu-Natal', Journal of Terrorism and Political Violence (Forthcoming).
11. The ANC in KwaZulu-Natal called for a state of emergency before the elections. President Mandela has threatened more than once to subdue unruly tribal chiefs with emergency measures. For a discussion of the difficulties in resolving the conflicts of KwaZulu-Natal by security initiatives alone see A. M. Johnston, 'Security Dilemmas: Confronting the Violence in KwaZulu-Natal', KwaZulu-Natal Briefing (2) May 1996, pp. 17-20.
12. This was also a vindication of the point argued by R. W. Johnson both in Johnson and Schlemmer, Launching Democracy, pp. 341-8, and 'Through a glass darkly: the 1996 contest in the light of 1994' KwaZulu-Natal Briefing (2), May 1996.
13. This was also a vindication of the point argued by R. W. Johnson both in Johnson and Schlemmer, Launching Democracy, pp. 341-8, and 'Through a glass darkly: the 1996 contest in the light of 1994' KwaZulu-Natal Briefing (2), May 1996.
14. For a discussion of the 'free and fair' issue, see A. M. Johnston, 'No, they won't be free and fair' Sunday Tribune (Durban), 23 June 1996.
15. On the division of seats into geographical (ward) representation and proportional (party list) representation, see Cloete, Local Government in Transformation.
16. But see the estimates of electoral turnout in Johnson and Schlemmer, Launching Democracy pp. 303-6.
17. The Shobashobane massacre was the most notorious of several multiple killings around Christmas 1995 in the Port Shepstone area. A total of 76 people died, 19 of them at Shobashobane. The killings led to greatly increased tensions between the IFP and ANC and to intensified security initiatives, including the deployment of more Investigation Task Units of detectives.
18. For details of the system see Mansfield, 'The structures and the stakes'.
19. Shabalala is a good example of what has come to be known as the 'warlord' phenomenon in the politics of KwaZulu-Natal. These individuals control access to land in squatter settlements, and negotiate with government agencies and NGOs for provision of services. They control private coercive forces and are central to prosecuting the IFP's war with the ANC, sometimes in collusion with the regular security forces. Shabalala's expulsion was probably an attempt by the IFP to demonstrate that it is serious about the peace process. On the warlord phenomenon see A. Minaar 'Undisputed kings: warlordism in Natal' in A. Minaar (ed.) Patterns of Violence: Case Studies of Conflict in Natal (Human Sciences Research Council, Pretoria, 1992). On Shabalala's expulsion see 'Feared warlord axed' Sunday Tribune 7 July 1996.
20. Shabalala is a good example of what has come to be known as the 'warlord' phenomenon in the politics of KwaZulu-Natal. These individuals control access to land in squatter settlements, and negotiate with government agencies and NGOs for provision of services. They control private coercive forces and are central to prosecuting the IFP's war with the ANC, sometimes in collusion with the regular security forces. Shabalala's expulsion was probably an attempt by the IFP to demonstrate that it is serious about the peace process. On the warlord phenomenon see A. Minaar 'Undisputed kings: warlordism in Natal' in A. Minaar (ed.) Patterns of Violence: Case Studies of Conflict in Natal (Human Sciences Research Council, Pretoria, 1992). On Shabalala's expulsion see 'Feared warlord axed' Sunday Tribune 7 July 1996.
21. 'A' wards were the formerly white, coloured and Indian local government areas, while the 'B' wards represented formerly black residential areas.
22. A newspaper report quoting IFP sources said that the party had paid R2·5 million to six members of Ian Greer and Associates who worked on the election campaign for two and a half months. Sunday Times 30 June 1996.
23. A survey published in April reported high levels of disillusionment, pessimism and anxiety in KwaZulu-Natal with both central and provincial government. 'Sharper anger and impatience' was recorded towards politicians in KwaZulu-Natal than with their 'national' counterparts. Business Day 20 April 1996.
24. See 'The odd couple brokering South Africa's most unlikely deal' Sunday Times 7 July 1996.
25. For a report on the ANC's organizational weakness, see 'ANC fights to win back turf in local poll wrangle' Sunday Tribune 5 May 1996.
26. The IFP was prescient enough to make the double ballot (i.e. national and provincial) one of its central constitutional demands. It was granted as a concession by the ANC to induce the IFP into taking pan in the April 1994 elections.
27. See Outrage over Ulundi issue' Mercury (Durban) 7 February 1996. The report followed a provocative declaration by KwaZulu-Natal premier Frank Mdlalose that Ulundi would be the capital of the province, come what may. Although the IFP has yet to achieve this, it remains a goal on which its leaders seem quite unwilling to budge.
28. 'KwaZulu violence was downplayed' Business Day 4 July 1996.
29. See for instance 'KwaZulu-Natal braced for the clash of the Titans' Sunday Times 23 June 1996; 'A crucial test' Business Day 24.6.96.
30. See for instance 'KwaZulu-Natal braced for the clash of the Titans' Sunday Times 23 June 1996; 'A crucial test' Business Day 24.6.96.
31. 'Court backs KZN legislation on salaries for chiefs' Mercury 19 June 1996.
32. Improvements in security have included the deploying of specialist teams of detectives to investigate political killings and collusion between the combatants and security forces. Although improved arrest and conviction rates have probably had an effect in calming the province, security policies remain controversial, with the IFP claiming that investigators have ignored incidents in which IFP members were victims.
33. In the wake of the local elections, the IFP did redepoly some senior figures from the national to the provincial legislature. The crucial move, however, would be if Buthelezi himself did so. Indeed, a crucial issue in any peace settlement between the ANC and IFP remains whether to accommodate Buthelezi at provincial or national level. See 'Resignations will open the way for IFP moves back to the province' Business Day, 5 July 1996.
34. On the provincial constitution see N. Claude, 'KwaZulu-Natal's new constitution: no losers ... any winners?' KwaZulu-Natal Briefing (1), March 1996, pp. 1-11 and A. M. Johnston, 'The provincial constitution for KwaZulu-Natal: footnote or turning point', Indicator South Africa, Winter 1996. The constitution was rejected by the Constitutional Court, some of the judges expressing themselves in scathing terms. See 'Judges slam "plan to secede"', Sunday Times, 30 June 1996.
35. On the provincial constitution see N. Claude, 'KwaZulu-Natal's new constitution: no losers ... any winners?' KwaZulu-Natal Briefing (1), March 1996, pp. 1-11 and A. M. Johnston, 'The provincial constitution for KwaZulu-Natal: footnote or turning point', Indicator South Africa, Winter 1996. The constitution was rejected by the Constitutional Court, some of the judges expressing themselves in scathing terms. See 'Judges slam "plan to secede"', Sunday Times, 30 June 1996.
36. On the provincial constitution see N. Claude, 'KwaZulu-Natal's new constitution: no losers ... any winners?' KwaZulu-Natal Briefing (1), March 1996, pp. 1-11 and A. M. Johnston, 'The provincial constitution for KwaZulu-Natal: footnote or turning point', Indicator South Africa, Winter 1996. The constitution was rejected by the Constitutional Court, some of the judges expressing themselves in scathing terms. See 'Judges slam "plan to secede"', Sunday Times, 30 June 1996.
37. Sunday Times 7 July 1996.
38. 'IFP-ANC "merger" reports shot down' Mercury, 8 July 1996.