The official Russian concept of contemporary central Asian Islam: The security dimension

Europe - Asia Studies

Volumn 49, Issue 8, 1997, Pages 1501-1517

  Splidsboel Hansen, Flemming ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF COPENHAGEN   (Denmark)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ISLAMISM; NATIONAL SECURITY; SECURITY THREAT;

ASIA, (CENTRAL); RUSSIAN FEDERATION;

EID: 0031426460     PISSN: 09668136     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/09668139708412512     Document Type: Article

References (171)

1. When using the term 'Central Asia' I refer to the area comprising Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan, as was requested by the presidents of these states, when they met in the Uzbek capital of Tashkent in January 1993.
2. In this study national security will be seen as an interaction between three basic elements - threats, values, and vulnerabilities. The former of these elements, that is, the threat, will be regarded as the principal source causing security policy considerations, since without one or more threats the whole notion of achieving national security would be rendered superfluous. Security theory recognises the existence of five different types of threats: military, economic, ecological, political and societal. These different types of threat share one characteristic-they are all aimed at one or more values; evidently, none of the threats can exist in itself, but is given its existence only when directed at a value. This study will use three types of values: the idea of the state, the institutional expression of the state, and the physical base of the state. Being a prerequisite for the existence of the threat, the value must naturally have as a basic characteristic some degree of vulnerability; if invulnerability were the case, then the threat would be of absolutely no effect. The latter situation is, however, Utopian to the theorists, according to whom the problem of vulnerability is insoluble - one can only hope to change the balance of power between threats and vulnerabilities. This can be done by reducing any of these two components, either separately or simultaneously. When reducing vulnerability the state will seek to improve its defences, thereby minimising the effect of the threat. When focusing on the threat, the state will address the source of the latter and the aim will be to reduce - or completely eliminate-the threat. See B. Buzan, People, States and Fear - An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-cold War Era (New York, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991); B. Buzan, 'Peace Power and Security: Contending Concepts in the Study of International Relations', Journal of Peace Research, 21, 4, 1984; p. 339; J. Mathews, 'Redefining Security', foreign Affairs, 68, 2, 1989, p. 162; C. Murdoch, 'Economic Factors as Objects of Security: Economics, Security and Vulnerability', in K. Knorr et al. (eds), Economic Issues and National Security (Lawrence, Allen Press Inc., 1977), pp. 69-74, and F. Trager et al. 'An Introduction to the Study of National Security', in K. Knorr et al. (eds), National Security and American Society - Theory, Process and Policy (Lawrence, University Press of Kansas, 1973), pp. 39-44.
3. In this study national security will be seen as an interaction between three basic elements - threats, values, and vulnerabilities. The former of these elements, that is, the threat, will be regarded as the principal source causing security policy considerations, since without one or more threats the whole notion of achieving national security would be rendered superfluous. Security theory recognises the existence of five different types of threats: military, economic, ecological, political and societal. These different types of threat share one characteristic-they are all aimed at one or more values; evidently, none of the threats can exist in itself, but is given its existence only when directed at a value. This study will use three types of values: the idea of the state, the institutional expression of the state, and the physical base of the state. Being a prerequisite for the existence of the threat, the value must naturally have as a basic characteristic some degree of vulnerability; if invulnerability were the case, then the threat would be of absolutely no effect. The latter situation is, however, Utopian to the theorists, according to whom the problem of vulnerability is insoluble - one can only hope to change the balance of power between threats and vulnerabilities. This can be done by reducing any of these two components, either separately or simultaneously. When reducing vulnerability the state will seek to improve its defences, thereby minimising the effect of the threat. When focusing on the threat, the state will address the source of the latter and the aim will be to reduce - or completely eliminate-the threat. See B. Buzan, People, States and Fear - An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-cold War Era (New York, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991); B. Buzan, 'Peace Power and Security: Contending Concepts in the Study of International Relations', Journal of Peace Research, 21, 4, 1984; p. 339; J. Mathews, 'Redefining Security', foreign Affairs, 68, 2, 1989, p. 162; C. Murdoch, 'Economic Factors as Objects of Security: Economics, Security and Vulnerability', in K. Knorr et al. (eds), Economic Issues and National Security (Lawrence, Allen Press Inc., 1977), pp. 69-74, and F. Trager et al. 'An Introduction to the Study of National Security', in K. Knorr et al. (eds), National Security and American Society - Theory, Process and Policy (Lawrence, University Press of Kansas, 1973), pp. 39-44.
4. In this study national security will be seen as an interaction between three basic elements - threats, values, and vulnerabilities. The former of these elements, that is, the threat, will be regarded as the principal source causing security policy considerations, since without one or more threats the whole notion of achieving national security would be rendered superfluous. Security theory recognises the existence of five different types of threats: military, economic, ecological, political and societal. These different types of threat share one characteristic-they are all aimed at one or more values; evidently, none of the threats can exist in itself, but is given its existence only when directed at a value. This study will use three types of values: the idea of the state, the institutional expression of the state, and the physical base of the state. Being a prerequisite for the existence of the threat, the value must naturally have as a basic characteristic some degree of vulnerability; if invulnerability were the case, then the threat would be of absolutely no effect. The latter situation is, however, Utopian to the theorists, according to whom the problem of vulnerability is insoluble - one can only hope to change the balance of power between threats and vulnerabilities. This can be done by reducing any of these two components, either separately or simultaneously. When reducing vulnerability the state will seek to improve its defences, thereby minimising the effect of the threat. When focusing on the threat, the state will address the source of the latter and the aim will be to reduce - or completely eliminate-the threat. See B. Buzan, People, States and Fear - An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-cold War Era (New York, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991); B. Buzan, 'Peace Power and Security: Contending Concepts in the Study of International Relations', Journal of Peace Research, 21, 4, 1984; p. 339; J. Mathews, 'Redefining Security', foreign Affairs, 68, 2, 1989, p. 162; C. Murdoch, 'Economic Factors as Objects of Security: Economics, Security and Vulnerability', in K. Knorr et al. (eds), Economic Issues and National Security (Lawrence, Allen Press Inc., 1977), pp. 69-74, and F. Trager et al. 'An Introduction to the Study of National Security', in K. Knorr et al. (eds), National Security and American Society - Theory, Process and Policy (Lawrence, University Press of Kansas, 1973), pp. 39-44.
5. In this study national security will be seen as an interaction between three basic elements - threats, values, and vulnerabilities. The former of these elements, that is, the threat, will be regarded as the principal source causing security policy considerations, since without one or more threats the whole notion of achieving national security would be rendered superfluous. Security theory recognises the existence of five different types of threats: military, economic, ecological, political and societal. These different types of threat share one characteristic-they are all aimed at one or more values; evidently, none of the threats can exist in itself, but is given its existence only when directed at a value. This study will use three types of values: the idea of the state, the institutional expression of the state, and the physical base of the state. Being a prerequisite for the existence of the threat, the value must naturally have as a basic characteristic some degree of vulnerability; if invulnerability were the case, then the threat would be of absolutely no effect. The latter situation is, however, Utopian to the theorists, according to whom the problem of vulnerability is insoluble - one can only hope to change the balance of power between threats and vulnerabilities. This can be done by reducing any of these two components, either separately or simultaneously. When reducing vulnerability the state will seek to improve its defences, thereby minimising the effect of the threat. When focusing on the threat, the state will address the source of the latter and the aim will be to reduce - or completely eliminate-the threat. See B. Buzan, People, States and Fear - An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-cold War Era (New York, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991); B. Buzan, 'Peace Power and Security: Contending Concepts in the Study of International Relations', Journal of Peace Research, 21, 4, 1984; p. 339; J. Mathews, 'Redefining Security', foreign Affairs, 68, 2, 1989, p. 162; C. Murdoch, 'Economic Factors as Objects of Security: Economics, Security and Vulnerability', in K. Knorr et al. (eds), Economic Issues and National Security (Lawrence, Allen Press Inc., 1977), pp. 69-74, and F. Trager et al. 'An Introduction to the Study of National Security', in K. Knorr et al. (eds), National Security and American Society - Theory, Process and Policy (Lawrence, University Press of Kansas, 1973), pp. 39-44.
6. In this study national security will be seen as an interaction between three basic elements - threats, values, and vulnerabilities. The former of these elements, that is, the threat, will be regarded as the principal source causing security policy considerations, since without one or more threats the whole notion of achieving national security would be rendered superfluous. Security theory recognises the existence of five different types of threats: military, economic, ecological, political and societal. These different types of threat share one characteristic-they are all aimed at one or more values; evidently, none of the threats can exist in itself, but is given its existence only when directed at a value. This study will use three types of values: the idea of the state, the institutional expression of the state, and the physical base of the state. Being a prerequisite for the existence of the threat, the value must naturally have as a basic characteristic some degree of vulnerability; if invulnerability were the case, then the threat would be of absolutely no effect. The latter situation is, however, Utopian to the theorists, according to whom the problem of vulnerability is insoluble - one can only hope to change the balance of power between threats and vulnerabilities. This can be done by reducing any of these two components, either separately or simultaneously. When reducing vulnerability the state will seek to improve its defences, thereby minimising the effect of the threat. When focusing on the threat, the state will address the source of the latter and the aim will be to reduce - or completely eliminate-the threat. See B. Buzan, People, States and Fear - An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-cold War Era (New York, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991); B. Buzan, 'Peace Power and Security: Contending Concepts in the Study of International Relations', Journal of Peace Research, 21, 4, 1984; p. 339; J. Mathews, 'Redefining Security', foreign Affairs, 68, 2, 1989, p. 162; C. Murdoch, 'Economic Factors as Objects of Security: Economics, Security and Vulnerability', in K. Knorr et al. (eds), Economic Issues and National Security (Lawrence, Allen Press Inc., 1977), pp. 69-74, and F. Trager et al. 'An Introduction to the Study of National Security', in K. Knorr et al. (eds), National Security and American Society - Theory, Process and Policy (Lawrence, University Press of Kansas, 1973), pp. 39-44.
7. The term 'Central Asian Islam' is used in the broadest meaning possible; thus, Islam in that particular area will be seen '... not only [as] as a code of worship but also [as] a cultural outlook and [as] a set of social conventions: [as] a way of life ...'; see A. Bennigsen et al, Muslims of the Soviet Empire: A Guide (Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1986), p. 3. Applying a set of parameters relevant to the security dimension, I have identified what I consider an absolute minimum of five different schools of thought on this particular issue; the remaining four schools will be analysed in a forthcoming article.
8. See, e.g., K. Dawisha et al., Russia and the New States of Eurasia - The Politics of Upheaval (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 198ff.
9. The relevant agencies are the Security Council, Foreign Intelligence Service and Federal Security Service.
10. Quoted in M. Meshabi, 'Russian Foreign Policy and Security in Central Asia and the Caucasus', Central Asian Survey, 12, 2, 1993, p. 181.
11. In a recent article by Daniil Proektor, security adviser to the Russian government, it is asked whether a comprehensive security concept can be adopted at all, considering that the Russian state has not yet been finally established; see D. Proektor, 'Konturen der russischen Sicherheitspolitik in den neunziger Jahren', Berichte des BIOst, 1995, 5, pp. 7f. This discussion, however, falls beyond the scope of this study.
12. Evgenii Shaposhnikov, then acting secretary of the Russian Security Council, in July 1993, that is, after the adoption of the foreign policy doctrine, warned that Russia still needed to define its notion of security, thereby stressing the importance of the military doctrine; Radio Rossii, 16 July 1993, FBIS-SOV-93-136, 19 July 1993. See also Kozyrev writing in Krasnaya zvezda, 14 January 1994.
13. Evgenii Shaposhnikov, then acting secretary of the Russian Security Council, in July 1993, that is, after the adoption of the foreign policy doctrine, warned that Russia still needed to define its notion of security, thereby stressing the importance of the military doctrine; Radio Rossii, 16 July 1993, FBIS-SOV-93-136, 19 July 1993. See also Kozyrev writing in Krasnaya zvezda, 14 January 1994.
14. Evgenii Shaposhnikov, then acting secretary of the Russian Security Council, in July 1993, that is, after the adoption of the foreign policy doctrine, warned that Russia still needed to define its notion of security, thereby stressing the importance of the military doctrine; Radio Rossii, 16 July 1993, FBIS-SOV-93-136, 19 July 1993. See also Kozyrev writing in Krasnaya zvezda, 14 January 1994.
15. At a meeting of the Russian Security Council in March 1993 El'tsin said that '... any further delay with [the adoption of a military doctrine] is impermissible', making it clear that a foreign policy doctrine was also badly needed; see ITAR-TASS, 3 March 1993, FBIS-SOV-93-040, 3 March 1993.
16. At a meeting of the Russian Security Council in March 1993 El'tsin said that '... any further delay with [the adoption of a military doctrine] is impermissible', making it clear that a foreign policy doctrine was also badly needed; see ITAR-TASS, 3 March 1993, FBIS-SOV-93-040, 3 March 1993.
17. For a description of the general debate preceding the actual formulation of the doctrines, see e.g. S. Crow, 'Competing Blueprints for Russian Foreign Policy', RFE/RL Research Report, 1, 50, 1992; A. Kozyrev, 'Vneshnyaya politika preobrazhayushcheisya Rossii' Vaprosy istorii, 1994, 1; G. Wettig, 'Die neue russische Militärdoktrin', Osteuropa, 44, 4, 1994, pp. 330f. and F. Walter, 'Rußlands "neue" Streitkräfte', Osteuropa, 43, 5, 1993, pp. 417-426 passim.
18. For a description of the general debate preceding the actual formulation of the doctrines, see e.g. S. Crow, 'Competing Blueprints for Russian Foreign Policy', RFE/RL Research Report, 1, 50, 1992; A. Kozyrev, 'Vneshnyaya politika preobrazhayushcheisya Rossii' Vaprosy istorii, 1994, 1; G. Wettig, 'Die neue russische Militärdoktrin', Osteuropa, 44, 4, 1994, pp. 330f. and F. Walter, 'Rußlands "neue" Streitkräfte', Osteuropa, 43, 5, 1993, pp. 417-426 passim.
19. For a description of the general debate preceding the actual formulation of the doctrines, see e.g. S. Crow, 'Competing Blueprints for Russian Foreign Policy', RFE/RL Research Report, 1, 50, 1992; A. Kozyrev, 'Vneshnyaya politika preobrazhayushcheisya Rossii' Vaprosy istorii, 1994, 1; G. Wettig, 'Die neue russische Militärdoktrin', Osteuropa, 44, 4, 1994, pp. 330f. and F. Walter, 'Rußlands "neue" Streitkräfte', Osteuropa, 43, 5, 1993, pp. 417-426 passim.
20. For a description of the general debate preceding the actual formulation of the doctrines, see e.g. S. Crow, 'Competing Blueprints for Russian Foreign Policy', RFE/RL Research Report, 1, 50, 1992; A. Kozyrev, 'Vneshnyaya politika preobrazhayushcheisya Rossii' Vaprosy istorii, 1994, 1; G. Wettig, 'Die neue russische Militärdoktrin', Osteuropa, 44, 4, 1994, pp. 330f. and F. Walter, 'Rußlands "neue" Streitkräfte', Osteuropa, 43, 5, 1993, pp. 417-426 passim.
21. The Collective Security Treaty signed in May 1992 and marking the beginning of this process was soon followed by bilateral treaties on friendship and co-operation; some of these were concluded only a few weeks after the signing of the former. For further details on these treaties and the events mentioned, see below.
22. Segodnya, 20 July 1993.
23. See, e.g. the comments in Krasnaya zvezda, 21 July 1993, directing the reader's attention to some of the problems facing policy makers determined to respond to the '... large-scale attack by Afghan Mujahedeen on Russian border post No. 12 [on July 13]'. One of the flaws of the then existing legal acts was, according to Krasnaya zvezda, the fact that neither the president nor the government had the powers to use troops outside the country. While openly agitating for a new policy-making process, which should first and foremost minimise parliamentary interference, the commentary clearly showed some of the concern caused by Central Asian Islam and, possibly even more important, by the alleged inefficiency characterising the Russian countermeasures.
24. See H. Timmermann, 'Die Außenpolitik Rußlands: Ausdruck der Suche nach einer neuen Identität', Berichte des BIOa, 1993, 20, p. 24 and comments by then Defence Minister Pavel Grachev In Nezavisimaya gazeta, 7 May 1993.
25. See H. Timmermann, 'Die Außenpolitik Rußlands: Ausdruck der Suche nach einer neuen Identität', Berichte des BIOa, 1993, 20, p. 24 and comments by then Defence Minister Pavel Grachev In Nezavisimaya gazeta, 7 May 1993.
26. All quoted from Nezavisimava gazeta, 29 April 1993.
27. Izvestiya, 18 November 1993.
28. See Wettig, p. 335.
29. See Pavel Grachev explaining the main points of the military doctrine in an interview carried by Radio Moscow, 3 November 1993, FBIS-SOV-93-212, 4 November 1993.
30. See Pavel Grachev explaining the main points of the military doctrine in an interview carried by Radio Moscow, 3 November 1993, FBIS-SOV-93-212, 4 November 1993.
31. All quoted from Izvestiya, 18 November 1993.
32. See G. Simon, 'Rußland: Hegemon in Eurasien?', Osteuropa, 44, 5, 1994, p. 423.
33. See comments in Krasnaya zvezda, 5 August 1993.
34. The report is undoubtedly referring to the Central Asian states, Azerbaijan and Russia.
35. Reproduced in Rossiiskaya gazeta, 22 September 1994.
36. Russian scholars often distinguish between 'fundamentalists' and 'extremists'; the former do not employ the instruments of forcible Islamisation and terrorism, as do the latter. See e.g. Evgenii Primakov, Orientalist and then head of the FIS, in ibid. See also Evgenii Primakov (ed.) Ocherki istorii Rossiiskoi Vneshnei Razvedki (Moscow, Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniya, 1996), Vol I, pp. 9f.
37. Russian scholars often distinguish between 'fundamentalists' and 'extremists'; the former do not employ the instruments of forcible Islamisation and terrorism, as do the latter. See e.g. Evgenii Primakov, Orientalist and then head of the FIS, in ibid. See also Evgenii Primakov (ed.) Ocherki istorii Rossiiskoi Vneshnei Razvedki (Moscow, Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniya, 1996), Vol I, pp. 9f.
38. Cf. the FIS report in Rossiiskaya gazeta, 22 September 1994.
39. 26 See Wettig.
40. See the FIS report in Rossiiskaya gazeta, 22 September 1994.
41. The four rounds of inter-Tajik negotiations held in April, June and October 1994 and May 1995 were all preceded by talks between Moscow and representatives of the IRP. Thus, prior to the first round Turadzhonzoda met Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Anatolii Adamishin and Albert Chernishov, also a Deputy Foreign Minister, prior to the other rounds. At the actual negotiations Russia has acted as mediator, thereby in effect acknowledging the position of the IRP, which has headed the opposition delegation at all four rounds. This has been done through either Turadzhonzoda or Abdallah Nuri, Chairman of the IRP.
42. See Kozyrev commenting on the Tajik conflict in Izvestiya, 11 September 1993.
43. See interviews with Georgii Kunadze, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister, Nezavisimaya gazeta, 29 July 1993, and with Kozyrev, Segodnya, 16 September 1993.
44. See interviews with Georgii Kunadze, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister, Nezavisimaya gazeta, 29 July 1993, and with Kozyrev, Segodnya, 16 September 1993.
45. See Nezavisimaya gazeta, 29 July 1993.
46. See, e.g., comments made by a 'high-ranking Russian diplomat'. Interfax, 4 March 1993, FBIS-SOV-93-042, 5 March 1993. The importance attached to the Tajik factor by Moscow is also to be measured from the extent of the Russian involvement.
47. Primakov, Vol I, p. 9.
48. Kozyrev quoted by Kommersant-Daily, 19 January 1994 and Izvesliya, 20 April 1995.
49. Kozyrev quoted by Kommersant-Daily, 19 January 1994 and Izvesliya, 20 April 1995.
50. See interview with Kunadze, Nezavisimaya gazeta, 29 July 1993, and the FIS report cited earlier in Rossiiskaya gazeta. 22 September 1994.
51. See interview with Kunadze, Nezavisimaya gazeta, 29 July 1993, and the FIS report cited earlier in Rossiiskaya gazeta. 22 September 1994.
52. See the FIS report in Rossiiskaya gazeta, 22 September 1994.
53. See, e.g., Dmitrii Nartsissov, an official in the Russian presidency, cited by Radio Moscow in Arabic, 31 May 1992, FBIS-SOV-92-109, 5 June 1992.
54. See, e.g., Dmitrii Nartsissov, an official in the Russian presidency, cited by Radio Moscow in Arabic, 31 May 1992, FBIS-SOV-92-109, 5 June 1992.
55. See, e.g., the Foreign Ministry statement in ITAR-TASS, 25 October 1992, FBIS-SOV-92-207, 26 October 1992, and comments by Kozyrev, Izvesliva, 4 August 1993.
56. See, e.g., the Foreign Ministry statement in ITAR-TASS, 25 October 1992, FBIS-SOV-92-207, 26 October 1992, and comments by Kozyrev, Izvesliva, 4 August 1993.
57. See, e.g., the Foreign Ministry statement in ITAR-TASS, 25 October 1992, FBIS-SOV-92-207, 26 October 1992, and comments by Kozyrev, Izvesliva, 4 August 1993.
58. See the FIS report in Rossiiskaya gazeta, 22 September 1994.
59. See, e.g., Kozyrev, p. 8 and 'Scenario B' in the FIS report in Rossiiskaya gazeta, 22 September 1994.
60. Numbering 387 000 in 1989, the Russian community in Tajikistan is now down to a maximum of 70-80 000 people; see Izvestiya, 16 May 1994.
61. During the spring of 1992 an estimated 100 000 Russians left Tajikistan, most of them in a great hurry and often leaving personal possessions behind; see ibid. The Russians in Tajikistan had responded in a similar way to the riots in February 1990, following which another 100 000 had departed for Russia. During the 1990 riots persistent rumours had it that Afghan Mujahedeen were about to cross the Afghan-Tajik border, and subsequent comments in Russian newspapers expressed the belief that the establishment of an Islamic state was imminent; see Y. Ro'i, 'Central Asian Riots and Disturbances', Central Asian Survey, 10, 3, 1991, p. 35 and Komsolnol'skaya Pravda, 23 March 1991.
62. During the spring of 1992 an estimated 100 000 Russians left Tajikistan, most of them in a great hurry and often leaving personal possessions behind; see ibid. The Russians in Tajikistan had responded in a similar way to the riots in February 1990, following which another 100 000 had departed for Russia. During the 1990 riots persistent rumours had it that Afghan Mujahedeen were about to cross the Afghan-Tajik border, and subsequent comments in Russian newspapers expressed the belief that the establishment of an Islamic state was imminent; see Y. Ro'i, 'Central Asian Riots and Disturbances', Central Asian Survey, 10, 3, 1991, p. 35 and Komsolnol'skaya Pravda, 23 March 1991.
63. During the spring of 1992 an estimated 100 000 Russians left Tajikistan, most of them in a great hurry and often leaving personal possessions behind; see ibid. The Russians in Tajikistan had responded in a similar way to the riots in February 1990, following which another 100 000 had departed for Russia. During the 1990 riots persistent rumours had it that Afghan Mujahedeen were about to cross the Afghan-Tajik border, and subsequent comments in Russian newspapers expressed the belief that the establishment of an Islamic state was imminent; see Y. Ro'i, 'Central Asian Riots and Disturbances', Central Asian Survey, 10, 3, 1991, p. 35 and Komsolnol'skaya Pravda, 23 March 1991.
64. Then Defence Minister Pavel Grachev in an interview carried by Nezavisimaya gazeta, 7 May 1993. Emphasis added.
65. See Kunadze, Nezavisimaya gazeta, 29 July 1993, and the FIS report in Rossiiskaya gazeta, 22 September 1994.
66. See Kunadze, Nezavisimaya gazeta, 29 July 1993, and the FIS report in Rossiiskaya gazeta, 22 September 1994.
67. Krasnaya zvezda, 6 May 1992.
68. See, e.g., Kunadze, Nezavisimaya gazeta, 29 July 1993.
69. See, e.g., Grachev, Nezavisimaya gazeta, 7 May 1993, and Primakov, Vol. I, p. 9.
70. See, e.g., Grachev, Nezavisimaya gazeta, 7 May 1993, and Primakov, Vol. I, p. 9.
71. See, e.g., comments by Adamishin and Kunadze in Rossiiskie vesti, 6 August 1993, and Nezavisimaya gazeta, 29 July 1993. See also Kozyrev, Izvestiya, 4 August 1993.
72. See, e.g., comments by Adamishin and Kunadze in Rossiiskie vesti, 6 August 1993, and Nezavisimaya gazeta, 29 July 1993. See also Kozyrev, Izvestiya, 4 August 1993.
73. See, e.g., comments by Adamishin and Kunadze in Rossiiskie vesti, 6 August 1993, and Nezavisimaya gazeta, 29 July 1993. See also Kozyrev, Izvestiya, 4 August 1993.
74. In the summer of 1994 the Russian government claimed that members of the Chechen opposition had been decapitated in Grozny, the capital of Chechnya; see Politiken (Copenhagen), 13 August 1994.
75. See, e.g., my article, 'The 1991 Chechen Revolution: The Response of Moscow', Central Asian Surgey, 13, 3, 1994, p. 407, note 84.
76. Cf. the scenarios mentioned earlier, and below. Moscow clearly regards Tajikistan and Uzbekistan as the most likely candidates for such a political change.
77. See 'Scenario B' in the FIS report in Rossiiskava gazeta, 22 September 1994.
78. See, e.g., Nartsissov, cited by Radio Moscow in Arabic, 31 May 1992, FBIS-SOV-92-109, 5 June 1992. The scenarios also envisage the withholding of various metals, for instance aluminium from Tajikistan; see Izvestiya, 17 December 1993. See also Gumpel, p. 1025f.
79. See, e.g., Nartsissov, cited by Radio Moscow in Arabic, 31 May 1992, FBIS-SOV-92-109, 5 June 1992. The scenarios also envisage the withholding of various metals, for instance aluminium from Tajikistan; see Izvestiya, 17 December 1993. See also Gumpel, p. 1025f.
80. See, e.g., Nartsissov, cited by Radio Moscow in Arabic, 31 May 1992, FBIS-SOV-92-109, 5 June 1992. The scenarios also envisage the withholding of various metals, for instance aluminium from Tajikistan; see Izvestiya, 17 December 1993. See also Gumpel, p. 1025f.
81. See, e.g., Nartsissov, cited by Radio Moscow in Arabic, 31 May 1992, FBIS-SOV-92-109, 5 June 1992. The scenarios also envisage the withholding of various metals, for instance aluminium from Tajikistan; see Izvestiya, 17 December 1993. See also Gumpel, p. 1025f.
82. See 'Scenario B' in the FIS report in Rossiiskaya gazeta, 22 September 1994.
83. Ibid.
84. ; Kozyrev, p. 8.
85. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 12 November 1993.
86. 'Scenario B' in the FIS report envisages an increase in the number of refugees should the Islamic extremism be further disseminated among the Central Asian Muslims. The report does not, however, venture to suggest any exact numbers, Rossiskaya gazeta, 22 September 1994.
87. Tajikistan may, however, serve as an illustrative example: approximately 80% of the Russians in Tajikistan have departed for Russia, while the remaining 20%, numbering a maximum of 70-80 000 people, are mainly living in the province of Khujand, which has been spared the actual fighting; see W. Buschkow, 'Der Machtkampf in Tadschikistan 1989-1994', Berichte des BIOst, 1995, 4, pp. 31f. Among the non-Russian refugees (totalling approximately 500 000) only a small minority has opted for Russia, but it should be kept in mind that Tajikistan is the Central Asian state furthest from Russia.
88. See the FIS report in Rossiiskaya gazetu, 22 September 1994. Emphasis added.
89. See Izvestiya, 17 December 1993, and below.
90. Nezavisimava gazeta, 29 July 1993. Writing in Nezavisimaya gazeta, 25 August 1994, Radzhab Safarov, Director of the Institute of Politics and Business of the Central Asian States, claimed that the costs should be expected to reach 'at least five million US dollars per kilometre'.
91. Nezavisimava gazeta, 29 July 1993. Writing in Nezavisimaya gazeta, 25 August 1994, Radzhab Safarov, Director of the Institute of Politics and Business of the Central Asian States, claimed that the costs should be expected to reach 'at least five million US dollars per kilometre'.
92. Nezavisimava gazeta, 29 July 1993. Writing in Nezavisimaya gazeta, 25 August 1994, Radzhab Safarov, Director of the Institute of Politics and Business of the Central Asian States, claimed that the costs should be expected to reach 'at least five million US dollars per kilometre'.
93. See, e.g., a joint statement by Andrei Kozyrev and then British Foreign Minister Douglas Hurd, Izvestiya, 14 December 1993, and comments by Nartsissov, Radio Moscow in Arabic, 31 May 1992, FBIS-SOV-92-109, 5 June 1992.
94. See, e.g., a joint statement by Andrei Kozyrev and then British Foreign Minister Douglas Hurd, Izvestiya, 14 December 1993, and comments by Nartsissov, Radio Moscow in Arabic, 31 May 1992, FBIS-SOV-92-109, 5 June 1992.
95. See, e.g., a joint statement by Andrei Kozyrev and then British Foreign Minister Douglas Hurd, Izvestiya, 14 December 1993, and comments by Nartsissov, Radio Moscow in Arabic, 31 May 1992, FBIS-SOV-92-109, 5 June 1992.
96. Ibid.
97. 'Scenario B' in the FIS report in Rossiiskaya gazeta, 22 September 1994.
98. See,e.g., Buzan, People States and Fear. pp. 87-90 passim.
99. See A. Rahr, 'Russia's Future: With or Without Yeltsin', RFE/RL Research Report, 3, 17, 1994, p. 1.
100. Thus, only 54.8% of the electorate went to the polls, while fully 17% of the votes actually cast in single-member constituencies were against all candidates; see V. Tolz, 'Russia's Parliamentary Elections: What Happened and Why', RFEJRL Research Report, 3, 2, 1994, pp. 3f.
101. Thus the Liberal Democratic Party, the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, and the Agrarian Party received a total of nearly 37% of the seats in the State Duma. This number testifies to the growing inclination towards extremism on the part of the Russian electorate, as has been noted in W. Slater, 'Russia', RFE/RL Research Report, 3, 16, 1994, pp. 23-27.
102. Cf. W. Slater et al., 'Russia; A Troubled Future' RFE/RL Research Report, 3, 24, 1994, p. 2.
103. The Liberal Democratic Party is illustrative of this point, as its success in the elections is generally attributed to the way the party addressed the issues of economic hardship and loss of national prestige; see Tolz, 'Russia's Parliamentary Elections', p. 2 and E. Schneider, 'Die russischen Parlamentswahlen 1993 und die neue Verfassung', Berichte den BIOst, 1994, 15, p. 14. When we recall that the scenarios envisage a fall in living standards as a consequence of, inter alia, the streams of Russian refugees leaving Central Asia, then the possible political consequences seem obvious.
104. The Liberal Democratic Party is illustrative of this point, as its success in the elections is generally attributed to the way the party addressed the issues of economic hardship and loss of national prestige; see Tolz, 'Russia's Parliamentary Elections', p. 2 and E. Schneider, 'Die russischen Parlamentswahlen 1993 und die neue Verfassung', Berichte den BIOst, 1994, 15, p. 14. When we recall that the scenarios envisage a fall in living standards as a consequence of, inter alia, the streams of Russian refugees leaving Central Asia, then the possible political consequences seem obvious.
105. Cf. note 51.
106. Cf. note 18.
107. Cf. note 19.
108. Cf. Grachev, Nezavisimava gazeta, 7 May 1993, and Kunadze, Nezavisimaya gazeta, 29 July 1993.
109. Cf. Grachev, Nezavisimava gazeta, 7 May 1993, and Kunadze, Nezavisimaya gazeta, 29 July 1993.
110. See, e.g., Krasnaya zvezda, 5 August 1993. The treaty was reproduced in extenso in Rossiiskaya gazeta, 23 May 1992.
111. See, e.g., Krasnaya zvezda, 5 August 1993. The treaty was reproduced in extenso in Rossiiskaya gazeta, 23 May 1992.
112. ITAR-TASS, 15 May 1992, FBIS-SOV-92-099, 21 May 1992. The signing of the Collective Security Treaty was, in the words of El'tsin, 'the chief result of the summit'.
113. ITAR-TASS, 15 May 1992, FBIS-SOV-92-099, 21 May 1992. The signing of the Collective Security Treaty was, in the words of El'tsin, 'the chief result of the summit'.
114. See, e.g., the comments in Izvestiya, 16 May 1992. The political signal of the treaty was first and foremost one of renewed co-operation between the signatory states.
115. See the interview carried by Russian Television Network, 27 February 1993,
116. FBIS-SOV-93-038, 1 March 1993.
117. See Meshabi, p. 194f.
118. See, e.g., comments by Colonel-General Valerii Patrikeev, then in command of the peacekeeping operation and its 7500 troops, to Radio Ekho Moskvy, 21 May 1994,
119. FBIS-SOV-94-099, 23 May 1994.
120. Patrikeev told Radio Ekho Moslay that he needed an additional 9000 troops in order to defend the border.
121. According to Patrikeev the Russians make up 90% of all the peacekeeping forces; see ITAR-TASS, 19 July 1994, FBIS-SOV-94-139, 20 July 1994.
122. According to Patrikeev the Russians make up 90% of all the peacekeeping forces; see ITAR-TASS, 19 July 1994, FBIS-SOV-94-139, 20 July 1994.
123. See Krasnaya zvezda, 5 August 1993, and Dawisha et al., p. 239. We shall return to the military strength of the Central Asian states later.
124. See Krasnaya zvezda, 5 August 1993, and Dawisha et al., p. 239. We shall return to the military strength of the Central Asian states later.
125. See, e.g., the warning issued by El'tsin in August 1993, when he met the Central Asian leaders to discuss the Tajik conflict, Nezavisimaya gazeta, 10 August 1993.
126. The number of foreign troops stationed in Tajikistan is now said to have reached 25 000, of whom more than 24 000 are Russians; see Buschkow, p. 29f. and p. 30 note 15. The foreign contingent in Tajikistan is made up of troops serving with either the CIS peacekeeping forces, the border troops, or the 201st Russian Motorised Infantry Division.
127. In the opinion of Ivan Korochenya, First Secretary with the CIS administration, the Collective Security Treaty has simply never managed to get off the ground; see Segodnya, 20 April 1995.
128. 86 See. e.g., ITAR-TASS, 25 May 1992, and 30 May 1992, FBIS-SOV-92-101, 26 May 1992, and FBIS-SOV-92-105, 1 June 1992, and Radio Odin, 10 June 1992, FBIS-SOV-92-113, 11 June 1992. See also Meshabi, p. 197.
129. 86 See. e.g., ITAR-TASS, 25 May 1992, and 30 May 1992, FBIS-SOV-92-101, 26 May 1992, and FBIS-SOV-92-105, 1 June 1992, and Radio Odin, 10 June 1992, FBIS-SOV-92-113, 11 June 1992. See also Meshabi, p. 197.
130. 86 See. e.g., ITAR-TASS, 25 May 1992, and 30 May 1992, FBIS-SOV-92-101, 26 May 1992, and FBIS-SOV-92-105, 1 June 1992, and Radio Odin, 10 June 1992, FBIS-SOV-92-113, 11 June 1992. See also Meshabi, p. 197.
131. 86 See. e.g., ITAR-TASS, 25 May 1992, and 30 May 1992, FBIS-SOV-92-101, 26 May 1992, and FBIS-SOV-92-105, 1 June 1992, and Radio Odin, 10 June 1992, FBIS-SOV-92-113, 11 June 1992. See also Meshabi, p. 197.
132. 86 See. e.g., ITAR-TASS, 25 May 1992, and 30 May 1992, FBIS-SOV-92-101, 26 May 1992, and FBIS-SOV-92-105, 1 June 1992, and Radio Odin, 10 June 1992, FBIS-SOV-92-113, 11 June 1992. See also Meshabi, p. 197.
133. 86 See. e.g., ITAR-TASS, 25 May 1992, and 30 May 1992, FBIS-SOV-92-101, 26 May 1992, and FBIS-SOV-92-105, 1 June 1992, and Radio Odin, 10 June 1992, FBIS-SOV-92-113, 11 June 1992. See also Meshabi, p. 197.
134. The treaties with Turkmenistan and Tajikistan were signed in July 1992 and May 1993 respectively. This delay, compared with the signing of the other treaties, was not in any way expressive of a diminishing sense of urgency on the part of the Russians; on the contrary, the conflict in Tajikistan and the geographical location of these two southernmost states made it imperative for Moscow to have them sign the bilateral treaties.
135. The Tajik-Afghan border is approximately 1300 km long, while Turkmenistan's southern border, shared with Iran and Afghanistan, is some 2400 km long.
136. 89 According to Oxtankino, 28 July 1992, the two sides agreed on a transitional period of five-six years, following which Turkmenistan will be providing all the troops, FBIS-SOV-92-146, 29 July 1992.
137. 89 According to Oxtankino, 28 July 1992, the two sides agreed on a transitional period of five-six years, following which Turkmenistan will be providing all the troops, FBIS-SOV-92-146, 29 July 1992.
138. See the comments by Vladislav Shunevich, Commander-in-chief of the Turkmen Border Troops, Rosxiiskaya gazeta, 25 January 1994.
139. See Krasnaya zvezda, 27 May 1993; emphasis added.
140. Ibid. Judging from this article, the exact duration of the transitional period has not been fixed. If, however, agreement has been reached on a specific time limit within which the formation of a national army is to be completed, it is highly questionable whether conditions in Tajikistan will allow this to be carried out.
141. Thus, two years after the signing of the treaty the Tajik forces are still, in the words of Colonel-General Patrikeev. then in command of the peacekeeping operation, 'completely unfit for combat', Segodnya, 20 April 1995.
142. 93 Estimating the number of Russian troops stationed in Central Asia as well as that of the national armies is apparently a difficult exercise, in which serious discrepancies between otherwise highly authoritative sources are found. Listing first the Russian and then the local troops, the approximate numbers seem, however, to be as follows: Kazakhstan - 40 000/40 000; Turkmenistan - 29 000/14 000; Tajikistan - 24 000/11 500; Kyrgyzstan - at least 12 000/12 000; and Uzbekistan - not available/45 000; see Buschkow, p. 29 and p. 30 note 15; The International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1994-1995 (London, Brassey's, 1994), pp. 156-163 passim; Military Technology: The Balance of Military Power-World Defence Almanac 1994-1995, XIX, 1, 1995, pp. 162-194 passim; and Segodnya, 20 April 1995.
143. 93 Estimating the number of Russian troops stationed in Central Asia as well as that of the national armies is apparently a difficult exercise, in which serious discrepancies between otherwise highly authoritative sources are found. Listing first the Russian and then the local troops, the approximate numbers seem, however, to be as follows: Kazakhstan - 40 000/40 000; Turkmenistan - 29 000/14 000; Tajikistan - 24 000/11 500; Kyrgyzstan - at least 12 000/12 000; and Uzbekistan - not available/45 000; see Buschkow, p. 29 and p. 30 note 15; The International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1994-1995 (London, Brassey's, 1994), pp. 156-163 passim; Military Technology: The Balance of Military Power-World Defence Almanac 1994-1995, XIX, 1, 1995, pp. 162-194 passim; and Segodnya, 20 April 1995.
144. 93 Estimating the number of Russian troops stationed in Central Asia as well as that of the national armies is apparently a difficult exercise, in which serious discrepancies between otherwise highly authoritative sources are found. Listing first the Russian and then the local troops, the approximate numbers seem, however, to be as follows: Kazakhstan - 40 000/40 000; Turkmenistan - 29 000/14 000; Tajikistan - 24 000/11 500; Kyrgyzstan - at least 12 000/12 000; and Uzbekistan - not available/45 000; see Buschkow, p. 29 and p. 30 note 15; The International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1994-1995 (London, Brassey's, 1994), pp. 156-163 passim; Military Technology: The Balance of Military Power-World Defence Almanac 1994-1995, XIX, 1, 1995, pp. 162-194 passim; and Segodnya, 20 April 1995.
145. The term 'Overlay' is used to describe the situation arising when one or more external powers make their influence felt to such an extent that the local security dynamic-consisting of threats and vulnerabilities - is no longer discernible; overlay can take place within the borders of an empire, as was the case in the former Soviet Union, or it can be implemented with the consent of all parties involved, which is now the more common form. See Buzan, People, States and Fear, pp. 198 and 219f.
146. Cf. Buschkow, p. 29 and p. 30, note 15. The approximate number of troops serving with each of these three units is 3500, 14 000 and 6500 respectively. The 201st Infantry Division and the border troops, however, to a considerable extent operate as one single unit.
147. See Nezavisimaya gazeta, 1 November 1992. Akhbarsho Iskandarov was also strongly opposed by the Kulyab Militia, then headed by the infamous Sangak Safarov. There was a general understanding, however, that the 201st Infantry Division should not disarm the Kulyab Militia, which actually asked the Russians, only a few days after the signing of the treaty just mentioned, to send more troops to Tajikistan; see the interview with Safarov in Nezavisimaya gazeta, 14 November 1992.
148. See Nezavisimaya gazeta, 1 November 1992. Akhbarsho Iskandarov was also strongly opposed by the Kulyab Militia, then headed by the infamous Sangak Safarov. There was a general understanding, however, that the 201st Infantry Division should not disarm the Kulyab Militia, which actually asked the Russians, only a few days after the signing of the treaty just mentioned, to send more troops to Tajikistan; see the interview with Safarov in Nezavisimaya gazeta, 14 November 1992.
149. According to some sources, the number of opposition troops might be as high as 15 000; see, e.g., Kassenov, p. 18.
150. In a clash taking place on 10 October 1995, for instance, seven members of the Border Forces were killed in an ambush; see Krasnaya zvezda, 12 October 1995.
151. See, e.g., Kommersant-Daily, 24 July 1993.
152. See the comments made by a 'well-informed military source' to ITAR-TASS, 28 July 1994, FBIS-SOV-94- 46, 29 July 1994.
153. See the comments made by a 'well-informed military source' to ITAR-TASS, 28 July 1994, FBIS-SOV-94- 46, 29 July 1994.
154. See, e.g., Izvestiya, 4 August 1993.
155. This has been hinted at by Patrikeev, according to whom the Tajik-Afghan border cannot possibly be sealed; see Izvestiya, 29 July 1994.
156. This was done, for instance, following attacks on Russian border troops in August 1994 and April 1995; see Kozyrev commenting on these attacks in Izvestiya, 26 August 1994, and
157. Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 20 April 1995, respectively.
158. See El'tsin's annual speech to the Russian nation, Rossiiskie vesti 17 February 1995.
159. One of the central tenets of the 'Russian solution' is the formation of a government of national reconciliation, in which, with absolute certainty, the Islamic opposition will not be allowed to have its way; see Moskovskie novosti, 8-15 May 1994.
160. Chernishov, Segodnya, 11 November 1994.
161. See, e.g., Kunadze, Nezavisimaya gazeta, 29 July 1993.
162. Izvestiya, 12 February 1994.
163. Commentators have noted, for example, that following the signing of the May 1993 Russian-Tajik treaty on Friendship and Co-operation President Rakhmonov hardened his attitude towards the opposition; see, e.g., Izvestiva, 17 July 1993.
164. One of the most illustrative examples of the point is the October 1993 struggle for power in Moscow, during which the state-controlled Tajik press was remarkably silent. Following the crisis, it was noted by Russian commentators that '... the Tajik leadership has once more confirmed that it shares the ideology of the Russian opposition'; see Nezavisimaya gazeta, 19 October 1993.
165. See, e.g., a Foreign Ministry statement issued in October 1992 and the final document of the August 1993 Moscow Summit on Tajikistan, Interfax, 24 October 1992/FBIS-SOV-92-2O7, 26 October 1992, and Nezavisimaya gazeta, 10 August 1993, respectively.
166. See, e.g., a Foreign Ministry statement issued in October 1992 and the final document of the August 1993 Moscow Summit on Tajikistan, Interfax, 24 October 1992/FBIS-SOV-92-2O7, 26 October 1992, and Nezavisimaya gazeta, 10 August 1993, respectively.
167. See, e.g., a Foreign Ministry statement issued in October 1992 and the final document of the August 1993 Moscow Summit on Tajikistan, Interfax, 24 October 1992/FBIS-SOV-92-2O7, 26 October 1992, and Nezavisimaya gazeta, 10 August 1993, respectively.
168. See ITAR-TASS, 11 February 1994, FBIS-SOV-94-030, 14 February 1994. Emphasis added.
169. See ITAR-TASS, 11 February 1994, FBIS-SOV-94-030, 14 February 1994. Emphasis added.
170. Cf. note 3.
171. See Kommersant-Daily, 22 August 1995. The agreement was signed by Rakhmonov and Abdallah Nuri, chairman of trie IRP, in Dushanbe and Kabul, respectively.