International trade rules and environmental cooperation under asymmetric information

International Economic Review

Volumn 38, Issue 3, 1997, Pages 605-625

  Ludema, Rodney D ^a   Wooton, Ian ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION; ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS; ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY; INTERNATIONAL TRADE; THEORY; TRADE-ENVIRONMENTAL RELATIONS;

EID: 0031424152     PISSN: 00206598     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2527283     Document Type: Article

References (8)

1. DASGUPTA, P., P. HAMMOND, AND E. MASKIN, "On Imperfect Information and Optimal Pollution Control," Review of Economic Studies 47 (1980), 857-860.
2. FUDENBERG, D. AND J. TIROLE, Game Theory, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992).
3. GATT, International Trade 1990-91, Volume 1 (Geneva: General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 1991).
4. GATT, Basic Instruments and Selected Documents, Supplement No. 39, 1991-92 (Geneva: General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 1992).
5. LUDEMA, R.D. AND I. WOOTON, "Cross-border Externalities and Trade Liberalization: The Strategic Control of Pollution," Canadian Journal of Economics 27 (1994), 950-966.
6. _ AND _, "International Cooperation on Trade and Environmental Policy: Cross-border Externalities with Asymmetric Information," CSIER Working Paper 9301C, The University of Western Ontario, October 1993.
7. SPULBER, D.F., "Optimal Environmental Regulation under Asymmetric Information," Journal of Public Economics 35 (1988), 163-181.
8. WORLD BANK, World Development Report 1992, Development and the Environment (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992).