The 1997 general election in Indonesia

Asian Survey

Volumn 37, Issue 12, 1997, Pages 1181-1196

  Eklöf, Stefan ^a  

^a LUND UNIVERSITY   (Sweden)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

GENERAL ELECTION (1997); SUHARTO; VOTING BEHAVIOUR;

INDONESIA;

EID: 0031421841     PISSN: 00044687     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2645765     Document Type: Article

References (63)

1. Pancasila is, according to the Indonesian constitution, the ideological foundation for the nation. It consists of five principles: belief in one god, a just and civilized humanity, the unity of Indonesia, democracy, and social justice for the Indonesian people. Pancasila has been heavily emphasized by the government since the latter half of the 1970s, and has provided the government with an effective tool for imposing ideological conformity and complicity in Indonesia's political life. See Michael Morfit, "Pancasila Orthodoxy," in Central Government and Local Development in Indonesia, ed. Colin MacAndrews (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1986).
2. The change in the military's representation was done in accordance with the recommendations of the Indonesian Academy of Science (Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia), based on its investigation of the sociopolitical role of the armed forces. It can also be seen in the context of a longer term development in which the military has become less independent and influential as a political force. See Richard Robison, "Organising the Transition: Indonesian Politics in 1993/94," in Indonesia Assessment 1994, ed. Ross H. McLeod (Canberra: Department of Political and Social Change, Research School of Pacific Studies, Australian National University, 1995), pp. 49-54. For the 1992 election results, see Al Baroto, "Indonesia's 1992 General Election: Changes and Continuity," Indonesian Quarterly 20:3 (1992), p. 250; for the 1997 results, see Kompas, June 24, 1997.
3. The change in the military's representation was done in accordance with the recommendations of the Indonesian Academy of Science (Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia), based on its investigation of the sociopolitical role of the armed forces. It can also be seen in the context of a longer term development in which the military has become less independent and influential as a political force. See Richard Robison, "Organising the Transition: Indonesian Politics in 1993/94," in Indonesia Assessment 1994, ed. Ross H. McLeod (Canberra: Department of Political and Social Change, Research School of Pacific Studies, Australian National University, 1995), pp. 49-54. For the 1992 election results, see Al Baroto, "Indonesia's 1992 General Election: Changes and Continuity," Indonesian Quarterly 20:3 (1992), p. 250; for the 1997 results, see Kompas, June 24, 1997.
4. The change in the military's representation was done in accordance with the recommendations of the Indonesian Academy of Science (Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia), based on its investigation of the sociopolitical role of the armed forces. It can also be seen in the context of a longer term development in which the military has become less independent and influential as a political force. See Richard Robison, "Organising the Transition: Indonesian Politics in 1993/94," in Indonesia Assessment 1994, ed. Ross H. McLeod (Canberra: Department of Political and Social Change, Research School of Pacific Studies, Australian National University, 1995), pp. 49-54. For the 1992 election results, see Al Baroto, "Indonesia's 1992 General Election: Changes and Continuity," Indonesian Quarterly 20:3 (1992), p. 250; for the 1997 results, see Kompas, June 24, 1997.
5. For a survey of the earlier party conflicts under the New Order, see Sjamsuddin Haris, "Party Conflicts under the New Order: Patterns and Tendencies," Indonesian Quarterly 17:3 (1989).
6. An excellent survey of Indonesian politics under the New Order is Jamie Mackie and Andrew Maclntyre, "Politics," in Indonesia's New Order: The Dynamics of Socio-Economic Transformation, ed. Hal Hill (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1994).
7. For Golkar, see Leo Suryadinata, Military Ascendancy and Political Culture: A Study of Indonesia's Golkar (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Center for International Studies, 1989).
8. Megawati, however, was also dependent to an extent on support from the government and the military for her rise to the party chairmanship. She was supported by elements in the military, and also received the indirect blessing of President Suharto, although this may only have been short-term political tactics on his part. For Megawati's ascendancy to the PDI chair, see Gerry van Klinken, "Sukarno's Daughter Takes over Indonesia's Democrats" Inside Indonesia 38 (1993), and Institute for the Study of the Flow of Information (ISAI), Megawati Soekarnoputri: Pantang Surut Langkah (Jakarta: Penerbit ISAI 1996), pp. 2-16.
9. Megawati, however, was also dependent to an extent on support from the government and the military for her rise to the party chairmanship. She was supported by elements in the military, and also received the indirect blessing of President Suharto, although this may only have been short-term political tactics on his part. For Megawati's ascendancy to the PDI chair, see Gerry van Klinken, "Sukarno's Daughter Takes over Indonesia's Democrats" Inside Indonesia 38 (1993), and Institute for the Study of the Flow of Information (ISAI), Megawati Soekarnoputri: Pantang Surut Langkah (Jakarta: Penerbit ISAI 1996), pp. 2-16.
10. The most thorough account of the July 27th incident is Alliance of Independent Journalists (AJI), FORUM-ASIA, and ISAI, Jakarta Crackdown (Bangkok: FORUM-ASIA, 1997). The book was originally published jointly in Indonesian by ISAI and AJI and entitled Peristiwa 27 Juli (Jakarta: Penerbit ISAI/AJI, 1997). On the reports of the Komnas HAM, see Suara Karya, September 2, 1996; Jakarta Post, October 16, 1996; and Kompas, September 5, 1997.
11. The most thorough account of the July 27th incident is Alliance of Independent Journalists (AJI), FORUM-ASIA, and ISAI, Jakarta Crackdown (Bangkok: FORUM-ASIA, 1997). The book was originally published jointly in Indonesian by ISAI and AJI and entitled Peristiwa 27 Juli (Jakarta: Penerbit ISAI/AJI, 1997). On the reports of the Komnas HAM, see Suara Karya, September 2, 1996; Jakarta Post, October 16, 1996; and Kompas, September 5, 1997.
12. The most thorough account of the July 27th incident is Alliance of Independent Journalists (AJI), FORUM-ASIA, and ISAI, Jakarta Crackdown (Bangkok: FORUM-ASIA, 1997). The book was originally published jointly in Indonesian by ISAI and AJI and entitled Peristiwa 27 Juli (Jakarta: Penerbit ISAI/AJI, 1997). On the reports of the Komnas HAM, see Suara Karya, September 2, 1996; Jakarta Post, October 16, 1996; and Kompas, September 5, 1997.
13. The most thorough account of the July 27th incident is Alliance of Independent Journalists (AJI), FORUM-ASIA, and ISAI, Jakarta Crackdown (Bangkok: FORUM-ASIA, 1997). The book was originally published jointly in Indonesian by ISAI and AJI and entitled Peristiwa 27 Juli (Jakarta: Penerbit ISAI/AJI, 1997). On the reports of the Komnas HAM, see Suara Karya, September 2, 1996; Jakarta Post, October 16, 1996; and Kompas, September 5, 1997.
14. The most thorough account of the July 27th incident is Alliance of Independent Journalists (AJI), FORUM-ASIA, and ISAI, Jakarta Crackdown (Bangkok: FORUM-ASIA, 1997). The book was originally published jointly in Indonesian by ISAI and AJI and entitled Peristiwa 27 Juli (Jakarta: Penerbit ISAI/AJI, 1997). On the reports of the Komnas HAM, see Suara Karya, September 2, 1996; Jakarta Post, October 16, 1996; and Kompas, September 5, 1997.
15. Forum Keadilan, May 5, 1997, p. 21.
16. Ibid., 5 May 5, 1997, pp. 15-16.
17. Ibid., May 19, 1997, p. 17.
18. Ibid., May 19, 1996, p. 18.
19. This was in reaction to the PDI's successes that came from using Sukarno's picture in its 1987 campaign. See Karen Brooks, "The Rustle of Ghosts: Bung Karno in the New Order," Indonesia 60 (1995), pp. 75-76, 84-89.
20. Forum Keadilan, June 2, 1997, p. 35. Abdurrahman Wahid was also a personal friend of Megawati. He has been at times one of Suharto's severest critics and is a staunch supporter of increased democracy. His political maneuverings at the time of the election are one of the more intriguing aspects of the event. See the analysis by Riswandha Imawan in Suara Merdeka, February 15, 1997.
21. Forum Keadilan, June 2, 1997, p. 35. Abdurrahman Wahid was also a personal friend of Megawati. He has been at times one of Suharto's severest critics and is a staunch supporter of increased democracy. His political maneuverings at the time of the election are one of the more intriguing aspects of the event. See the analysis by Riswandha Imawan in Suara Merdeka, February 15, 1997.
22. The official death toll figures are cited in Jakarta Post, June 3, 1997. For details on the campaign violence, see Forum Keadilan, June 16, 1996, pp. 20-23.
23. The official death toll figures are cited in Jakarta Post, June 3, 1997. For details on the campaign violence, see Forum Keadilan, June 16, 1996, pp. 20-23.
24. See Nicolaas G. Schulte Nordholt, "The Indonesian Elections: A National Ritual" in Man, Meaning, and History, eds. Reimar Schefold et al. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1980); J. Pemberton, "Notes on the 1982 General Election in Solo," Indonesia 41 (1986); Pierre Labrousse, "Chronique d'élections annoncées," Archipel 46 (1993); and R. William Liddle, "A Useful Fiction: Democratic Legitimation in New Order Indonesia," in The Politics of Elections in Southeast Asia, ed. R. H. Taylor (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
25. See Nicolaas G. Schulte Nordholt, "The Indonesian Elections: A National Ritual" in Man, Meaning, and History, eds. Reimar Schefold et al. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1980); J. Pemberton, "Notes on the 1982 General Election in Solo," Indonesia 41 (1986); Pierre Labrousse, "Chronique d'élections annoncées," Archipel 46 (1993); and R. William Liddle, "A Useful Fiction: Democratic Legitimation in New Order Indonesia," in The Politics of Elections in Southeast Asia, ed. R. H. Taylor (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
26. See Nicolaas G. Schulte Nordholt, "The Indonesian Elections: A National Ritual" in Man, Meaning, and History, eds. Reimar Schefold et al. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1980); J. Pemberton, "Notes on the 1982 General Election in Solo," Indonesia 41 (1986); Pierre Labrousse, "Chronique d'élections annoncées," Archipel 46 (1993); and R. William Liddle, "A Useful Fiction: Democratic Legitimation in New Order Indonesia," in The Politics of Elections in Southeast Asia, ed. R. H. Taylor (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
27. See Nicolaas G. Schulte Nordholt, "The Indonesian Elections: A National Ritual" in Man, Meaning, and History, eds. Reimar Schefold et al. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1980); J. Pemberton, "Notes on the 1982 General Election in Solo," Indonesia 41 (1986); Pierre Labrousse, "Chronique d'élections annoncées," Archipel 46 (1993); and R. William Liddle, "A Useful Fiction: Democratic Legitimation in New Order Indonesia," in The Politics of Elections in Southeast Asia, ed. R. H. Taylor (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
28. Reuters, May 29, 1997; Jakarta Post, May 30, 1997.
29. Reuters, May 29, 1997; Jakarta Post, May 30, 1997.
30. Prior to the election, several Indonesian social scientists predicted the vote for Golkar would increase by anywhere from 12% to 20%. See Forum Keadilan, May 19, 1997, p. 20.
31. For the 1997 turn-out figures in the provinces in Java, see ibid., June 16, 1997, pp. 17-18, and Jakarta Post, June 3, 1997.
32. For the 1997 turn-out figures in the provinces in Java, see ibid., June 16, 1997, pp. 17-18, and Jakarta Post, June 3, 1997.
33. Personal communication with PDI politicians in both camps and political analysts, Jakarta, March 1997.
34. South China Morning Post, May 12, 1997. KIPP was formed on the initiative of a group of intellectuals early in 1996 and was intended to be an independent, broadbased popular movement for monitoring the elections. However, the organization was rejected by the government, and it managed to monitor but a few hundred polling stations. See Sri Yanuarti, "Panwaslak dan KIPP: Dilema Pengawas Pemilu di Indonesia," Studio Politika 1 (1996).
35. South China Morning Post, May 12, 1997. KIPP was formed on the initiative of a group of intellectuals early in 1996 and was intended to be an independent, broadbased popular movement for monitoring the elections. However, the organization was rejected by the government, and it managed to monitor but a few hundred polling stations. See Sri Yanuarti, "Panwaslak dan KIPP: Dilema Pengawas Pemilu di Indonesia," Studio Politika 1 (1996).
36. According to the generally reliable provisional election results of June 5, it seemed at first that the PDI would gain only ten seats in the parliament, which would mean that the party would not have enough parliamentarians to be represented in all of the 11 parliament's commissions. A government-backed suggestion to correct this by transferring some thousands of Golkar votes to the PDI was rejected by the PPP, and the suggestion was also criticized by legal experts. In the final result, however, the number of PDI votes in the province of North Sumatra exceeded the provisional result by 64,000 votes, or 19.4%; this enabled the party to get two parliamentary seats instead of one from the province and thus a total of 11 seats in the national parliament. The PPP questioned the vote count, but no satisfactory explanation was given for the large discrepancy between the provisional and final results. See Kompas, June 19, 20, and 22, 1997. The llth seat went to Fatimah Achmad, an experienced PDI politician who a year earlier had led in the organization of the government-backed congress that deposed Megawati from the party leadership.
37. Reuters, June 1, 1997.
38. On the military's role in the 1992 election, see Tempo, June 13, 1992, pp. 30-31. For reactions to Hartono's remark, see several of the articles in Abri Punya Golkar?, 5 ed. Togi Simanjuntak (Jakarta: Penerbit ISAI, 1996).
39. On the military's role in the 1992 election, see Tempo, June 13, 1992, pp. 30-31. For reactions to Hartono's remark, see several of the articles in Abri Punya Golkar?, 5 ed. Togi Simanjuntak (Jakarta: Penerbit ISAI, 1996).
40. For the monoloyalty doctrine in the context of the Indonesian elections, see Cees van Dijk, "The Indonesian General Elections, 1971-92," Indonesia Circle 58 (1992), pp. 59-61.
41. E.g., van Dijk, "The Indonesian General Elections," p. 58, and informants in Yogyakarta and Bali, 1996-97.
42. Tempo Interaktif, 〈http://www.tempo.co.id/min/04/nas3.htm〉, April 18, 1997, and Jakarta Post, May 27, 1997. TVRI has a virtual monopoly on television news broadcasts, as all Indonesian TV channels are required to retransmit TVRI's news programs.
43. Tempo Interaktif, 〈http://www.tempo.co.id/min/04/nas3.htm〉, April 18, 1997, and Jakarta Post, May 27, 1997. TVRI has a virtual monopoly on television news broadcasts, as all Indonesian TV channels are required to retransmit TVRI's news programs.
44. Alexander Irwan and S. H. Edriana, PEMILU Pelanggaran Asas Luber (Jakarta: Sinar Harapan, 1995). Other recent studies documenting violations against the election procedures are Gayle Wenban, "Golkar's Election Victory: Neither Smooth nor Fair," Inside Indonesia 37 (1993); Hans Antlöv, Exemplary Centre, Administrative Periphery (London: Curzon Press, 1995), ch. 9; and Mohamad Zaidun and Aribowo, "Kasus Jawa Timur: Sebuah Potret Pemilu," in Mendemokratiskan PEMILV, ed. Ifdahl Kasim (Jakarta: ELSAM, 1996).
45. Alexander Irwan and S. H. Edriana, PEMILU Pelanggaran Asas Luber (Jakarta: Sinar Harapan, 1995). Other recent studies documenting violations against the election procedures are Gayle Wenban, "Golkar's Election Victory: Neither Smooth nor Fair," Inside Indonesia 37 (1993); Hans Antlöv, Exemplary Centre, Administrative Periphery (London: Curzon Press, 1995), ch. 9; and Mohamad Zaidun and Aribowo, "Kasus Jawa Timur: Sebuah Potret Pemilu," in Mendemokratiskan PEMILV, ed. Ifdahl Kasim (Jakarta: ELSAM, 1996).
46. Alexander Irwan and S. H. Edriana, PEMILU Pelanggaran Asas Luber (Jakarta: Sinar Harapan, 1995). Other recent studies documenting violations against the election procedures are Gayle Wenban, "Golkar's Election Victory: Neither Smooth nor Fair," Inside Indonesia 37 (1993); Hans Antlöv, Exemplary Centre, Administrative Periphery (London: Curzon Press, 1995), ch. 9; and Mohamad Zaidun and Aribowo, "Kasus Jawa Timur: Sebuah Potret Pemilu," in Mendemokratiskan PEMILV, ed. Ifdahl Kasim (Jakarta: ELSAM, 1996).
47. Alexander Irwan and S. H. Edriana, PEMILU Pelanggaran Asas Luber (Jakarta: Sinar Harapan, 1995). Other recent studies documenting violations against the election procedures are Gayle Wenban, "Golkar's Election Victory: Neither Smooth nor Fair," Inside Indonesia 37 (1993); Hans Antlöv, Exemplary Centre, Administrative Periphery (London: Curzon Press, 1995), ch. 9; and Mohamad Zaidun and Aribowo, "Kasus Jawa Timur: Sebuah Potret Pemilu," in Mendemokratiskan PEMILV, ed. Ifdahl Kasim (Jakarta: ELSAM, 1996).
48. The practice of multiple voting has been well-documented in studies of earlier elections. See the references cited in note 27 above. The Komnas HAM also noted that this practice was widespread in 1997. Kompas, June 14, 1997.
49. Irwan and Edriana, PEMILU, pp. 14-28; see also the other studies cited in note 27 above.
50. For the difficulties faced by poll-watchers from the PPP and the PDI in 1992, see Irwan and Edriana, PEMILU, p. 24, and several articles in Tempo, June 13, 1992, pp. 24-27, and July 4, 1992, pp. 23-24.
51. For the difficulties faced by poll-watchers from the PPP and the PDI in 1992, see Irwan and Edriana, PEMILU, p. 24, and several articles in Tempo, June 13, 1992, pp. 24-27, and July 4, 1992, pp. 23-24.
52. Jakarta Post, May 28, 1997. For Suharto's role in Golkar, see Robison, "Organising the Transition," pp. 55-58.
53. Jakarta Post, May 28, 1997. For Suharto's role in Golkar, see Robison, "Organising the Transition," pp. 55-58.
54. Interview with Alexander Irwan, Tempo Interaktif, 〈http://www.tempo.co.id/min/13/ utama4.htm〉, May 29, 1997. See also Irwan and Edriana, PEMILU, p. 26.
55. Interview with Alexander Irwan, Tempo Interaktif, 〈http://www.tempo.co.id/min/13/ utama4.htm〉, May 29, 1997. See also Irwan and Edriana, PEMILU, p. 26.
56. Jakarta Post, June 5, 1997. According to the newspaper, the regent gave away more than 400 oxen after the election.
57. Kompas, May 11, 1997.
58. Irwan and Edriana observed, for example, that, to their knowledge, none of the 462 instances of violations compiled in their study had three years after the election led to legal action. See PEMILU, p. 71.
59. Kompas, June 24, 1997. As of June 24, the PPP claimed it had reported 1,033 cases of violations in the election to the Panwaslak. See PPP Online, 〈http://www.ppp.or.id/pemilu〉.
60. See the analysis by Harold Crouch in AJI/FORUM-ASIA/ISAI, Jakarta Crackdown, pp. 18-19, about the possibility of Megawati standing as a presidential candidate in 1998. The MPR is Indonesia's highest legislative assembly; it gathers every five years to elect the president and vice-president. Suharto, as earlier, will control the appointment of the majority of the assembly's members in 1998, and will almost certainly be reelected for another five-year term as president.
61. According to Arbi Sanit, the government first wanted to see Fatimah Achmad, a senior PDI legislator and party central board member reportedly well-connected within the military, as the party's leader, but she declined. See ISAI, Megawati Soekamoputri, p. 147.
62. Robert Cribb, "Indonesian Political Developments, 1989-1990," in Indonesia Assessment 1990, eds. Hal Hill and Terence Hull (Canberra: Department of Political and Social Change, Research School of Pacific Studies, Australian National University, 1990), p. 24.
63. R. William Liddle, "Politics 1992-1993: Sixth Term Adjustments in the Ruling Formula," in Indonesia Assessment 1993, eds. Chris Manning and Joan Hardjono (Canberra: Department of Political and Social Change, Research School of Pacific Studies, Australian National University, 1993), p. 39.