Regulating digital broadcasting in Europe: The limits of policy convergence

West European Politics

Volumn 20, Issue 4, 1997, Pages 24-42

  Levy, David A L ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

DIGITAL BROADCASTING; EUROPEAN UNION; POLICY CONVERGENCE; TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY;

EUROPE, (WEST);

EID: 0031421508     PISSN: 01402382     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/01402389708425216     Document Type: Article

References (64)

1. See C.J. Bennett, 'Different Processes, One Result: The Convergence of Data Protection Policy in Europe and the United States', Governance 1/4 (Oct. 1988) pp. 415-41, 'What is Policy Convergence and What Causes It?', British Journal of Political Science 21 (1991a) pp.215-33; 'How States Utilize Foreign Evidence', Journal of Public Policy 11/1 (1991) pp 31-54; D. Dolowitz and D. Marsh, 'Who Learns What from Whom: A Review of the Policy Transfer Literature', Political Studies 44 (June 1996) pp.343-57; R. Rose 'What is Lesson-Drawing?' Journal of Public Policy 11/1 (1991) pp.3-30.
2. See C.J. Bennett, 'Different Processes, One Result: The Convergence of Data Protection Policy in Europe and the United States', Governance 1/4 (Oct. 1988) pp. 415-41, 'What is Policy Convergence and What Causes It?', British Journal of Political Science 21 (1991a) pp.215-33; 'How States Utilize Foreign Evidence', Journal of Public Policy 11/1 (1991) pp 31-54; D. Dolowitz and D. Marsh, 'Who Learns What from Whom: A Review of the Policy Transfer Literature', Political Studies 44 (June 1996) pp.343-57; R. Rose 'What is Lesson-Drawing?' Journal of Public Policy 11/1 (1991) pp.3-30.
3. See C.J. Bennett, 'Different Processes, One Result: The Convergence of Data Protection Policy in Europe and the United States', Governance 1/4 (Oct. 1988) pp. 415-41, 'What is Policy Convergence and What Causes It?', British Journal of Political Science 21 (1991a) pp.215-33; 'How States Utilize Foreign Evidence', Journal of Public Policy 11/1 (1991) pp 31-54; D. Dolowitz and D. Marsh, 'Who Learns What from Whom: A Review of the Policy Transfer Literature', Political Studies 44 (June 1996) pp.343-57; R. Rose 'What is Lesson-Drawing?' Journal of Public Policy 11/1 (1991) pp.3-30.
4. See C.J. Bennett, 'Different Processes, One Result: The Convergence of Data Protection Policy in Europe and the United States', Governance 1/4 (Oct. 1988) pp. 415-41, 'What is Policy Convergence and What Causes It?', British Journal of Political Science 21 (1991a) pp.215-33; 'How States Utilize Foreign Evidence', Journal of Public Policy 11/1 (1991) pp 31-54; D. Dolowitz and D. Marsh, 'Who Learns What from Whom: A Review of the Policy Transfer Literature', Political Studies 44 (June 1996) pp.343-57; R. Rose 'What is Lesson-Drawing?' Journal of Public Policy 11/1 (1991) pp.3-30.
5. See C.J. Bennett, 'Different Processes, One Result: The Convergence of Data Protection Policy in Europe and the United States', Governance 1/4 (Oct. 1988) pp. 415-41, 'What is Policy Convergence and What Causes It?', British Journal of Political Science 21 (1991a) pp.215-33; 'How States Utilize Foreign Evidence', Journal of Public Policy 11/1 (1991) pp 31-54; D. Dolowitz and D. Marsh, 'Who Learns What from Whom: A Review of the Policy Transfer Literature', Political Studies 44 (June 1996) pp.343-57; R. Rose 'What is Lesson-Drawing?' Journal of Public Policy 11/1 (1991) pp.3-30.
6. Bennett, 1988, (note 1) p.427.
7. Bennett, 1991a (note 1)pp.221, 224, 225, 229.
8. Commissariat Général du Plan, Les réseaux de la société de l'information Rapport du Groupe présidé par Thierry Mileo (Paris: Editions ASPE Europe 1996) p.35; Lettre de mission to Senator René Trégouel by the Prime Minister, Paris, Jan. 1997.
9. Commissariat Général du Plan, Les réseaux de la société de l'information Rapport du Groupe présidé par Thierry Mileo (Paris: Editions ASPE Europe 1996) p.35; Lettre de mission to Senator René Trégouel by the Prime Minister, Paris, Jan. 1997.
10. Law on experimental trials in the information technology and services domain 1996, Act No 96-299. For the CSA view of the law see La Lettre du CSA 74 (Nov. 1995).
11. The 1997 bill which is discussed here will not become law because of the Socialists' election victory on 1 June 1997. Nevertheless, the bill provides a useful indication of the extent to which it was thought necessary to update French broadcasting policy. See speech by Philippe Douste-Blazy, Minister of Culture in the French Senate, for an overview of the bill's purposes. Journal Officiel, Sénat, Débats Parlementaires, séance du 19 février 1997, pp.852-4.
12. 'If digital is going to work anywhere in Europe, it will be here. We have a proven track record in the successful commercial exploitation of new technology', Lord Inglewood, National Heritage Minister, Speech to Digital Television Group, (London 4 July 19%) DNH Press release 198/96 'UK to Lead Digital Broadcasting Revolution'.
13. Dept of National Heritage, The BBC and the Future of Broadcasting. Memorandum to House of Commons National Heritage Select Committee (London 1997).
14. The previous 'must carry' regime for analogue cable services had been abolished by the 1990 Broadcasting Act.
15. In spite of protestations to the contrary, thus: 'The Government aims to facilitate the launch of digital broadcasting ...This will allow better use to be made of the current analogue broadcasting spectrum in due course. But Government should not play a more prominent role by consciously planning a particular technological or market outcome. It is for the broadcasting industry and the consumer to determine the shape and content of broadcasting services in the future', Dept of National Heritage, 1997.
16. In this respect UK policy was influenced by the US experience of spectrum auctions. In May 1996 a White Paper on management of the radio spectrum was published which outlined plans to use spectrum pricing to help prevent undue congestion. In 1997 one of the first moves of the new Labour Government was to accelerate plans to introduce charges for non-broadcast use of the spectrum.
17. A review of the date for analogue switch off was due as soon as either five years had elapsed from the start of DTT or when 50 per cent of the population were using one or other form of digital TV.
18. During the first 12 year period. The BBC was also allocated an entire digital multiplex on which it was encouraged to provide both existing and new free to air digital services. A multiplex is a block of spectrum (equivalent to an existing UHF channel) which can accommodate between 2-6 digital channels.
19. In June 1997 the ITC announced that it had awarded the licence to British Digital Broadcasting (BDB), a consortium which originally brought together Carlion, Granada TV and BSkyB. BSkyB was required to withdraw as a shareholder (but not as a programme supplier) as a condition of the licence being granted. ITC News Release, 24 June 1997. The EC Competition Commissioner Karel Van Miert had previously expressed fears about the competition implications of BDB's original configuration. European Report (Brussels 7 June 1997). OFTEL opposed the award to BDB arguing that 'the participation of BSkyB either as a consortium member or as a long-term supplier of certain pay TV services, in particular sports programming, raised substantial competition concerns in the pay TV network and conditional access markets'. OFTEL Press Release, 24 June 1997.
20. Article 2, Information and Communication Services Act 1997.
21. P. Chrocziel and J. Dieselhorst, 'Multimedia Legislation in Germany: What is "Broadcasting"?' Computer and Telecommunications Law Review 5(1966) p. 196.
22. Or to their umbrella organisation, the Standing Committee of Land Media Regulators, the DLM. On the question of conditional access, which was also addressed in the Treaty, see below.
23. When Leo Kirch's channel, DF1, started broadcasting in 1996 it had to operate undera 'trial-service' licence from the Bavarian Media Regulator which gave it access to satellite distribution, but only to the Bavarian cable networks. The rival station, Premiere, launched a series of legal actions against DF1 aimed at keeping it off cable networks outside Bavaria.
24. See European Commission, Green Paper on Pluralism and Media Concentration in the Internal Market: An Assessment of the Meed for Community Action. COM (92) 480 (21 Dec. 1992), European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, Follow-up to the Consultation Process Relating to the Green Paper on 'Pluralism and Media Concentration in the Internal Market', COM (94) 353 (5 Oct. 1994) , European Commission, Pluralism and Media Concentration in the Internal Market: Questionnaire No III concerning a possible initiative on media ownership, DG XV unit E/5 (1995).
25. See European Commission, Green Paper on Pluralism and Media Concentration in the Internal Market: An Assessment of the Meed for Community Action. COM (92) 480 (21 Dec. 1992), European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, Follow-up to the Consultation Process Relating to the Green Paper on 'Pluralism and Media Concentration in the Internal Market', COM (94) 353 (5 Oct. 1994) , European Commission, Pluralism and Media Concentration in the Internal Market: Questionnaire No III concerning a possible initiative on media ownership, DG XV unit E/5 (1995).
26. See European Commission, Green Paper on Pluralism and Media Concentration in the Internal Market: An Assessment of the Meed for Community Action. COM (92) 480 (21 Dec. 1992), European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, Follow-up to the Consultation Process Relating to the Green Paper on 'Pluralism and Media Concentration in the Internal Market', COM (94) 353 (5 Oct. 1994) , European Commission, Pluralism and Media Concentration in the Internal Market: Questionnaire No III concerning a possible initiative on media ownership, DG XV unit E/5 (1995).
27. Almost 18 months elapsed between the announcement of a media-ownership review in Jan. 1994 before the government's first proposals were produced (see note following), these then had to be refined before publication of the Broadcasting Bill at the end of 1995.
28. Dept of National Heritage, Media Ownership. The Government's Proposals (London: HMSO 1995) Cm. 2872, pp.11, 17.
29. Ibid., p. 3.
30. P. Humphreys, 'Power and Control in the New Media', Paper to ECPR Workshop on 'New Media and Political Communication', Bern 1997, p.6. On the subject of the CLT/UFA merger, Humphreys writes that 'Germany's most recent ownership rules seem designed to accommodate precisely this kind of "mega-merger".'
31. C.-M Ridder, 'Media politics, diversity and the gatekeeper debate', Intermedia 24/4 (Aug/Sept 1996) pp.24-6.
32. Suggestions that the Jospin Government elected in June 1997 will repeal the Carignon Law, and reinstate the previous 25 per cent limit on ownership of a single channel, would represent a further divergence from the policies adopted in the UK and Germany. Le Monde, 5 and 10 June 1997 It would also oblige Bouygues (with 39 per cent of TF1), Lyonnaise des Eaux (with 34 per cent of M6) and others to reduce their holdings in the audio-visual sector. Les Echos, 10 June 1997.
33. See J.-P Hugot, Rapport fait au nom de la commission des affaires culturelles (Paris: Senat, Feb. 1997) for the government's explanation of the purposes of the bill, a critical assessment of it, and a list of all the satellite channels receivable in France.
34. The UK and France have opposed any EU measure on media pluralism, arguing that under the subsidiarity principle the matter should rest with the member states. DG XVs draft proposals would set single media limits which would prevent any TV or radio company from expanding or taking control or another of the total audience share of the services it would own in the sector would exceed 30 per cent in the area concerned. Cross-media ownership (that is, TV and radio) would be limited to a 10 per cent audience share in the area concerned. See Agence Europe, Europe Daily Bulletin, 3 March 1997 and 21 March 1997.
35. For a full discussion on the gestation of the directive see D.A.L. Levy, 'The Regulation of Digital Conditional Access Systems: A Case Study in European Policy Making', Telecommunications Policy 21/7 (Aug. 1997).
36. DTI, The Regulation of Conditional Access services for Digital Television: Final Consultation Paper on Detailed Implementation Proposals. (London, Nov. 1996) and previous drafts of Jan. and June 1996. The final regulations, DTI, The Advanced Television Standards Regulations 1996 (SI 96/3151) should be read jointly with the Conditional Access Services Class Licence which came into force on 7 Jan. 1997.
37. DTI, The Regulation of Conditional Access services for Digital Television: Final Consultation Paper on Detailed Implementation Proposals. (London, Nov. 1996) and previous drafts of Jan. and June 1996. The final regulations, DTI, The Advanced Television Standards Regulations 1996 (SI 96/3151) should be read jointly with the Conditional Access Services Class Licence which came into force on 7 Jan. 1997.
38. DTI, The Regulation of Conditional Access services for Digital Television: Final Consultation Paper on Detailed Implementation Proposals. (London, Nov. 1996) and previous drafts of Jan. and June 1996. The final regulations, DTI, The Advanced Television Standards Regulations 1996 (SI 96/3151) should be read jointly with the Conditional Access Services Class Licence which came into force on 7 Jan. 1997.
39. OFTEL, The Regulation of Conditional Access for Digital Television Services (March 1997).
40. The German Interstate Treaty, did, however, go beyond the directive in applying the non-discrimination principle to the operation of Electronic Programme Guides as well to conditional-access systems and the Standing Conference of Land Media Authorities (DLM) has produced a ten-point plan for the introduction of digital TV in Germany, which provides some guidance on how they propose to regulate conditional-access services and electronic programme guides. The 1996 Telecommunications Act also included the key non-discrimination principles from the European directive but these have not as yet been applied.
41. Canal Satellite, Télévision par Satellite, and AB SAT.
42. A Socialist amendment to the Broadcasting Bill proposing that 'any company which owns ten per cent or more of the capital in a media company or its subsidiary, should not be able to compete on the public markets', was specifically aimed at the involvement of companies such as Bouygues (TF1), Lyonnaise des Eaux (M6) and Générale des Eaux (Canal Plus) in the media industry. Assemblée Nationale, Compte rendu analytique officiel, 19 mars 1997, 2e séance, pp.43-4.
43. Although it seems likely that the new Socialist government may call into question this alliance between the public broadcaster France TV and TPS. Le Monde, 5 June 1997, Les Echos, 10 June 1997.
44. Although it seems likely that the new Socialist government may call into question this alliance between the public broadcaster France TV and TPS. Le Monde, 5 June 1997, Les Echos, 10 June 1997.
45. Political factors played an even greater role in Spain, where the new Conservative government passed a Digital TV law in April 1997 giving a rival digital TV company. Via Digital, which was backed by the government, the right to decide whether Canal Satelite Digital's (CSD) 80,000 SECA digital decoders should be made compatible with its own, which at that time had not been launched on the market. The measure clearly went beyond the terms of the Directive and was part of a more general government attack on the Prisa Group, which was identified with the opposition Socialists, and was, along with Canal Plus, major investor in CSD. Canal Plus and SECA have lodged a complaint with the Commission against the Spanish government's action. See Agence Europe, 7 June 1997, Le Monde, 7 June 1997; Daily Variety (US) 6 June 1997; Financial Times, 28 June 1997.
46. Political factors played an even greater role in Spain, where the new Conservative government passed a Digital TV law in April 1997 giving a rival digital TV company. Via Digital, which was backed by the government, the right to decide whether Canal Satelite Digital's (CSD) 80,000 SECA digital decoders should be made compatible with its own, which at that time had not been launched on the market. The measure clearly went beyond the terms of the Directive and was part of a more general government attack on the Prisa Group, which was identified with the opposition Socialists, and was, along with Canal Plus, major investor in CSD. Canal Plus and SECA have lodged a complaint with the Commission against the Spanish government's action. See Agence Europe, 7 June 1997, Le Monde, 7 June 1997; Daily Variety (US) 6 June 1997; Financial Times, 28 June 1997.
47. Political factors played an even greater role in Spain, where the new Conservative government passed a Digital TV law in April 1997 giving a rival digital TV company. Via Digital, which was backed by the government, the right to decide whether Canal Satelite Digital's (CSD) 80,000 SECA digital decoders should be made compatible with its own, which at that time had not been launched on the market. The measure clearly went beyond the terms of the Directive and was part of a more general government attack on the Prisa Group, which was identified with the opposition Socialists, and was, along with Canal Plus, major investor in CSD. Canal Plus and SECA have lodged a complaint with the Commission against the Spanish government's action. See Agence Europe, 7 June 1997, Le Monde, 7 June 1997; Daily Variety (US) 6 June 1997; Financial Times, 28 June 1997.
48. Political factors played an even greater role in Spain, where the new Conservative government passed a Digital TV law in April 1997 giving a rival digital TV company. Via Digital, which was backed by the government, the right to decide whether Canal Satelite Digital's (CSD) 80,000 SECA digital decoders should be made compatible with its own, which at that time had not been launched on the market. The measure clearly went beyond the terms of the Directive and was part of a more general government attack on the Prisa Group, which was identified with the opposition Socialists, and was, along with Canal Plus, major investor in CSD. Canal Plus and SECA have lodged a complaint with the Commission against the Spanish government's action. See Agence Europe, 7 June 1997, Le Monde, 7 June 1997; Daily Variety (US) 6 June 1997; Financial Times, 28 June 1997.
49. For a discussion of Europeanisation, see E. Skogerbo, 'External constraints and National Resources. Reflections on the Europeanization of Communications Policy'. Nordicom Review of Nordic Research on Media and Communication 1 (1996) pp.69-80.
50. See L. Cram, 'The European Commission as a Multi-organization: Social Policy and IT Policy in the EU'. Journal of European Public Policy 1/2 (Autumn 1994) pp 195-217 for a description of DGXIII's 'symbiotic relationship' with the IT industry.
51. KPMG, Public Policy Issues arising from Telecommunications and Audiovisual Convergence. (Report for the European Commission) (London 1996).
52. Richardson's description of the role of policy networks is particularly apposite here: 'By drawing other policy actors into the policy process, the Commission may be able to build coalitions in favour of its own notions of desirable policy change. By assisting the formation of networks of "relevant" state and non-state actors, or by "massaging" the way that these networks operate, the Commission can maintain its position as an "independent" policy-making institution and can increase its leverage with the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament. Information and ideas are important building blocks in this process'. J. Richardson, 'Policy-making in the EU: Interests. Ideas and Garbage Cans of Primeval Soup', in idem (ed.) European Union: Power and Policy-Making (London: Routledge 1996) p. 15; V. Schneider, G. Dang-Nguyen and R. Werlc, 'Corporate Actor Networks in European Policy Making: Harmonizing Telecommunications Policy, ' Journal of Common Market Studies 32/4 (Dec. 1994) p.494 comment on how in telecommunications the 'Commission succeeded in transforming an initially national issue into a European one, pushing the Member States towards harmonisation of their policies and, moreover, setting the pace for a constant and convergent development of their legislation into the direction defined by the Commission itself. The Commission harboured similar hopes for its information society programmes.
53. Richardson's description of the role of policy networks is particularly apposite here: 'By drawing other policy actors into the policy process, the Commission may be able to build coalitions in favour of its own notions of desirable policy change. By assisting the formation of networks of "relevant" state and non-state actors, or by "massaging" the way that these networks operate, the Commission can maintain its position as an "independent" policy-making institution and can increase its leverage with the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament. Information and ideas are important building blocks in this process'. J. Richardson, 'Policy-making in the EU: Interests. Ideas and Garbage Cans of Primeval Soup', in idem (ed.) European Union: Power and Policy-Making (London: Routledge 1996) p. 15; V. Schneider, G. Dang-Nguyen and R. Werlc, 'Corporate Actor Networks in European Policy Making: Harmonizing Telecommunications Policy, ' Journal of Common Market Studies 32/4 (Dec. 1994) p.494 comment on how in telecommunications the 'Commission succeeded in transforming an initially national issue into a European one, pushing the Member States towards harmonisation of their policies and, moreover, setting the pace for a constant and convergent development of their legislation into the direction defined by the Commission itself. The Commission harboured similar hopes for its information society programmes.
54. European Commission, Europe and the Global Information Society: Recommendations to the European Council. Report of the High Level Group on the Information Society (The Bangemann Report) (Brussels 26 May 1994).
55. European Commission, Green Paper on the Liberalisation of Telecommunications Infrastructure and Cable TV Networks - Part I : Principle and Timetable (COM(94) 440, 25 Oct. 1994) (Brussels: 1994).
56. OECD, Committee for Information, Computer and Communications Policy, Information Infrastructures: Their Impact and Regulatory requirements (Paris: OECD 1997) OCDE/GD (97)18 pp.7-8.
57. OFTEL, Beyond the Telephone, the Television and the PC (London: OFTEL 1995) p.4.
58. Council for Research, Technology and Innovation, The Information Society: Opportunities, Innovations and Challenges. Assessment and Recommendations (Bonn: Federal Ministry of Education, Science, Research and Technology 1996) Emphasis added p.24.
59. Commissariat Général du Plan. 1996 op. cit. , pp.37-8 , 'II est donc apparu essentiel ... que, sans ignorer leur finalité distincte, législation sur l'audiovisuel et réglementation des télécommunications puissent evoluer dans le sens d'une plus grande convergence. L'entrée dans la société de l'information suppose, à terme, que l'ensemble des nouveaux services multimédias puissent relever d'une réglementation unifiée qui garantisse notamment la neutralité juridique en ce qui concerne les supports'.
60. Journal Officiel, Sénat, Débats Parlementaires, séance du 19 février 1997, p.875.
61. Labour Party, Communicating Britain's Fulure (London: The Labour Party 1995) pp.8-9.
62. R Rose, Lesson Drawing in Public Policy: A Guide to Learning Across Time and Space (City, NJ: Chatham House 1993) p.78 quoted in Dolowiiz et al. 1996 (note 1) p.353.
63. R Rose, Lesson Drawing in Public Policy: A Guide to Learning Across Time and Space (City, NJ: Chatham House 1993) p.78 quoted in Dolowiiz et al. 1996 (note 1) p.353.
64. C. Bennett, 1991a (note 1) p.219.