War making and state power in the contemporary Middle East

International Journal of Middle East Studies

Volumn 29, Issue 3, 1997, Pages 323-340

  Gongora, Thierry ^a  

^a UNIVERSITÉ LAVAL   (Canada)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

DEVELOPING COUNTRY; REGIONAL POLITICS; STATE BUILDING; STATE POWER; WAR;

MIDDLE EAST;

EID: 0031419921     PISSN: 00207438     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0020743800064795     Document Type: Article

References (133)

1. For a recent sample of this literature, one can refer to Bruce D. Porter, War and the Rise of the State: The Military Foundations of Modern Politics (New York: Free Press, 1994); Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and the European States, AD 990-1990 (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990); and Karen A. Rasler and William R. Thompson, War and State Making: The Shaping of the Global Powers (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989).
2. For a recent sample of this literature, one can refer to Bruce D. Porter, War and the Rise of the State: The Military Foundations of Modern Politics (New York: Free Press, 1994); Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and the European States, AD 990-1990 (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990); and Karen A. Rasler and William R. Thompson, War and State Making: The Shaping of the Global Powers (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989).
3. For a recent sample of this literature, one can refer to Bruce D. Porter, War and the Rise of the State: The Military Foundations of Modern Politics (New York: Free Press, 1994); Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and the European States, AD 990-1990 (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990); and Karen A. Rasler and William R. Thompson, War and State Making: The Shaping of the Global Powers (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989).
4. Charles Tilly, "Reflections on the History of European State-Making," in The Formation of National States in Western Europe, ed. Charles Tilly (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1975), 42.
5. See, for instance, Hamied Ansari, Egypt: The Stalled Society (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1986); Mark N. Cooper, The Transformation of Egypt (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982); Patrick O'Brien, The Revolution in Egypt's Economic System: From Private Enterprise to Socialism, 1952-1965 (London: Oxford University Press, 1966), 215; John Waterbury, The Egypt of Nasser and Sadat: The Political Economy of Two Regimes (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1983), 10, 69, 99-100.
6. See, for instance, Hamied Ansari, Egypt: The Stalled Society (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1986); Mark N. Cooper, The Transformation of Egypt (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982); Patrick O'Brien, The Revolution in Egypt's Economic System: From Private Enterprise to Socialism, 1952-1965 (London: Oxford University Press, 1966), 215; John Waterbury, The Egypt of Nasser and Sadat: The Political Economy of Two Regimes (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1983), 10, 69, 99-100.
7. See, for instance, Hamied Ansari, Egypt: The Stalled Society (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1986); Mark N. Cooper, The Transformation of Egypt (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982); Patrick O'Brien, The Revolution in Egypt's Economic System: From Private Enterprise to Socialism, 1952-1965 (London: Oxford University Press, 1966), 215; John Waterbury, The Egypt of Nasser and Sadat: The Political Economy of Two Regimes (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1983), 10, 69, 99-100.
8. See, for instance, Hamied Ansari, Egypt: The Stalled Society (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1986); Mark N. Cooper, The Transformation of Egypt (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982); Patrick O'Brien, The Revolution in Egypt's Economic System: From Private Enterprise to Socialism, 1952-1965 (London: Oxford University Press, 1966), 215; John Waterbury, The Egypt of Nasser and Sadat: The Political Economy of Two Regimes (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1983), 10, 69, 99-100.
9. See, for instance, Elizabeth Picard, "Arab Military in Politics: From Revolutionary Plot to Authoritarian State," in Beyond Coercion: The Durability of the Arab State, ed. Adeed Dawisha and I. William Zartman (London: Croom Helm, 1988), 116-46; and Elizabeth Picard, "State and Society in the Arab World: Towards a New Role for the Security Services?" in The Many Faces of National Security in the Arab World, ed. Bahgat Korany, Paul Noble, and Rex Brynen (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), 258-74.
10. See, for instance, Elizabeth Picard, "Arab Military in Politics: From Revolutionary Plot to Authoritarian State," in Beyond Coercion: The Durability of the Arab State, ed. Adeed Dawisha and I. William Zartman (London: Croom Helm, 1988), 116-46; and Elizabeth Picard, "State and Society in the Arab World: Towards a New Role for the Security Services?" in The Many Faces of National Security in the Arab World, ed. Bahgat Korany, Paul Noble, and Rex Brynen (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), 258-74.
11. Michael N. Barnett, Confronting the Costs of War: Military Power, State, and Society in Egypt and Israel (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992).
12. Joel S. Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1988), 19.
13. Michael Mann, "The Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origins, Mechanisms and Results," in States in History, ed. J. A. Hall (London: Basil Blackwell, 1986), 114.
14. The use of the various indicators was determined more by their availability than by a methodological or theoretical choice. In many cases - for instance, Iraq - statistics on government finances and the size of the public sector are fragmentary or simply not available.
15. For the range of estimates of death, see Anthony H. Cordesman and Abraham R. Wagner, The Lessons of Modern War. Volume II: The Iran-Iraq War (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1990), 3; and Gideon Gera, "The Iraqi-Iranian War," Middle East Contemporary Survey 13 (1988): 219.
16. For the range of estimates of death, see Anthony H. Cordesman and Abraham R. Wagner, The Lessons of Modern War. Volume II: The Iran-Iraq War (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1990), 3; and Gideon Gera, "The Iraqi-Iranian War," Middle East Contemporary Survey 13 (1988): 219.
17. Kamran Mofid, The Economic Consequences of the Gulf War (London: Routledge, 1990), 135.
18. On the importance of the intensity of war making as an intermediary variable, see Karen A. Rasler and William R. Thompson, "War Making and State Making: Governmental Expenditures, Tax Revenues, and Global Wars," American Political Science Review 79 (June 1985): 491-507.
19. Iraq's oil exports in 1980 stood at 2.459 million barrels per day for an annual revenue of $26,136 million; in 1982, oil exports and revenue stood respectively at 861,000 barrels per day and $10,100 million: Eliyahu Kanovsky, "Economic Implications for the Region and the World Oil Market," in The Iran-Iraq War: Impact and Implications, ed. Efraim Karsh (London: Macmillan, 1989), 234-35.
20. On this period of economic reorientation, see Frederick W. Axelgard, "War and Oil: Implications for Iraq's Postwar Role in Gulf Security," in Iraq in Transition, ed. Frederick W. Axelgard (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1986), 9; Dilip Hiro, The Longest War: The Iran-Iraq Conflict (London: Paladin, 1990), 109; Kanovsky, "Economic Implications," 237; and Phebe Marr, The Modern History of Iraq (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1985), 297, 301.
21. On this period of economic reorientation, see Frederick W. Axelgard, "War and Oil: Implications for Iraq's Postwar Role in Gulf Security," in Iraq in Transition, ed. Frederick W. Axelgard (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1986), 9; Dilip Hiro, The Longest War: The Iran-Iraq Conflict (London: Paladin, 1990), 109; Kanovsky, "Economic Implications," 237; and Phebe Marr, The Modern History of Iraq (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1985), 297, 301.
22. On this period of economic reorientation, see Frederick W. Axelgard, "War and Oil: Implications for Iraq's Postwar Role in Gulf Security," in Iraq in Transition, ed. Frederick W. Axelgard (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1986), 9; Dilip Hiro, The Longest War: The Iran-Iraq Conflict (London: Paladin, 1990), 109; Kanovsky, "Economic Implications," 237; and Phebe Marr, The Modern History of Iraq (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1985), 297, 301.
23. On this period of economic reorientation, see Frederick W. Axelgard, "War and Oil: Implications for Iraq's Postwar Role in Gulf Security," in Iraq in Transition, ed. Frederick W. Axelgard (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1986), 9; Dilip Hiro, The Longest War: The Iran-Iraq Conflict (London: Paladin, 1990), 109; Kanovsky, "Economic Implications," 237; and Phebe Marr, The Modern History of Iraq (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1985), 297, 301.
24. ⊂th Regional Congress and its subsequent report, see Shahram Chubin and Charles Tripp, Iran and Iraq at War (London: I. B. Taurus, 1988), 112; Jonathan Crusoe, "Economic Outlook: Guns and Butter, Phase Two?" in Iraq in Transition, 45-46; and Hiro, The Longest War, 93.
25. ⊂th Regional Congress and its subsequent report, see Shahram Chubin and Charles Tripp, Iran and Iraq at War (London: I. B. Taurus, 1988), 112; Jonathan Crusoe, "Economic Outlook: Guns and Butter, Phase Two?" in Iraq in Transition, 45-46; and Hiro, The Longest War, 93.
26. ⊂th Regional Congress and its subsequent report, see Shahram Chubin and Charles Tripp, Iran and Iraq at War (London: I. B. Taurus, 1988), 112; Jonathan Crusoe, "Economic Outlook: Guns and Butter, Phase Two?" in Iraq in Transition, 45-46; and Hiro, The Longest War, 93.
27. Marr, Modern History of Iraq, 302; Robert Springborg, "Infitah, Agrarian Transformation, and Elite Consolidation in Contemporary Iraq," The Middle East Journal 40 (Winter 1986): 37.
28. Marr, Modern History of Iraq, 302; Robert Springborg, "Infitah, Agrarian Transformation, and Elite Consolidation in Contemporary Iraq," The Middle East Journal 40 (Winter 1986): 37.
29. Robert S. Mason, "The Economy," in Iraq: A Country Study, ed. H. C. Metz (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990), 158-59.
30. Ofra Bengio, "Iraq," Middle East Contemporary Survey 8 (1983-84): 476; and Marion Farouk-Sluglett, Peter Sluglett, and Joe Stork, "Not Quite Armageddon: Impact of the War on Iraq," Merip Reports 125/126 (July-September 1984): 30.
31. Ofra Bengio, "Iraq," Middle East Contemporary Survey 8 (1983-84): 476; and Marion Farouk-Sluglett, Peter Sluglett, and Joe Stork, "Not Quite Armageddon: Impact of the War on Iraq," Merip Reports 125/126 (July-September 1984): 30.
32. Marion Farouk-Sluglett and Peter Sluglett, Iraq since 1958: From Revolution to Dictatorship (London: KPI, 1987), 266; Robert Mason, "The Economy," 148.
33. Marion Farouk-Sluglett and Peter Sluglett, Iraq since 1958: From Revolution to Dictatorship (London: KPI, 1987), 266; Robert Mason, "The Economy," 148.
34. Ofra Bengio, "Iraq," Middle East Contemporary Survey 11 (1987): 425.
35. IbId., 431-32; Jonathan Crusoe, "Iraq," The Middle East Review (1989): 76.
36. IbId., 431-32; Jonathan Crusoe, "Iraq," The Middle East Review (1989): 76.
37. Bengio, "Iraq," 11:433; Mason, "The Economy," 128.
38. Bengio, "Iraq," 11:433; Mason, "The Economy," 128.
39. On reports of earlier privatizations, see Crusoe, "Economic Outlook," 47; and Fred H. Lawson, "Divergent Modes of Economic Liberalization in Syria and Iraq," in Privatization and Liberalization in the Middle East, ed. Iliya Harik and Denis J. Sullivan (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992), 126.
40. On reports of earlier privatizations, see Crusoe, "Economic Outlook," 47; and Fred H. Lawson, "Divergent Modes of Economic Liberalization in Syria and Iraq," in Privatization and Liberalization in the Middle East, ed. Iliya Harik and Denis J. Sullivan (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992), 126.
41. Kiren Aziz Chaudhry, "Economic Liberalization in Oil-Exporting Countries: Iraq and Saudi Arabia," in Privatization and Liberalization, 145.
42. Crusoe, "Iraq," 76.
43. Bengio, "Iraq," 11:431; and idem, "Iraq," Middle East Contemporary Survey 12 (1988): 517-18.
44. Bengio, "Iraq," 11:431; and idem, "Iraq," Middle East Contemporary Survey 12 (1988): 517-18.
45. Bengio, "Iraq," 11:431; Lawson, "Divergent Modes of Economic Liberalization," 126-29; and Mason, "The Economy," 130.
46. Bengio, "Iraq," 11:431; Lawson, "Divergent Modes of Economic Liberalization," 126-29; and Mason, "The Economy," 130.
47. Bengio, "Iraq," 11:431; Lawson, "Divergent Modes of Economic Liberalization," 126-29; and Mason, "The Economy," 130.
48. Chaudhry, "Economic Liberalization," 155.
49. On the "guns-and-butter" policy adopted in Iran in 1982-83, see Chubin and Tripp, Iran and Iraq at War, 126; and Patrick Clawson, "Islamic Iran's Economic Politics and Prospects," Middle East Journal 42 (Summer 1988): 382.
50. On the "guns-and-butter" policy adopted in Iran in 1982-83, see Chubin and Tripp, Iran and Iraq at War, 126; and Patrick Clawson, "Islamic Iran's Economic Politics and Prospects," Middle East Journal 42 (Summer 1988): 382.
51. Dilip Hiro, Iran under the Ayatollahs (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1985), 209, 215; and Eric Hooglund, "The Gulf War and the Islamic Republic," Merip Reports 125/126 (July-September 1984): 36.
52. Dilip Hiro, Iran under the Ayatollahs (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1985), 209, 215; and Eric Hooglund, "The Gulf War and the Islamic Republic," Merip Reports 125/126 (July-September 1984): 36.
53. After recovering from the revolution, Iran's oil industry reached a peak of exports and revenue for the war years in 1983, with exports of 1.816 million barrels per day and annual revenue of $19,225 million; afterwards, exports and revenues declined. See Kanovsky, "Economic Implications," 244-45.
54. See Clawson, "Islamic Iran's Economic Politics," 375, 383; Hiro, The Longest War, 175-76; and Angus MacPherson, "The Economy," in Iran: A Country Study, 148, 150, 154.
55. See Clawson, "Islamic Iran's Economic Politics," 375, 383; Hiro, The Longest War, 175-76; and Angus MacPherson, "The Economy," in Iran: A Country Study, 148, 150, 154.
56. See Clawson, "Islamic Iran's Economic Politics," 375, 383; Hiro, The Longest War, 175-76; and Angus MacPherson, "The Economy," in Iran: A Country Study, 148, 150, 154.
57. Anoushiravan Ehteshami, After Khomeini: The Iranian Second Republic (London: Routledge, 1995), 83, 95.
58. Ibid., 95-96.
59. David Menashri, "Iran," Middle East Contemporary Survey 10 (1986): 337.
60. David Menashri, Iran: A Decade of War and Revolution (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1990), 358.
61. Clawson, "Islamic Iran's Economic Politics," 378-79.
62. Ehteshami, After Khomeini, 96. In a rare assessment of taxation in Iraq during the war, analysts came to a similar conclusion: "[T]ax collection procedures have reportedly been tightened up, but at the same time many tax rates have been reduced"; Farouk-Sluglett et al., "Not Quite Armageddon," 28.
63. Ehteshami, After Khomeini, 96. In a rare assessment of taxation in Iraq during the war, analysts came to a similar conclusion: "[T]ax collection procedures have reportedly been tightened up, but at the same time many tax rates have been reduced"; Farouk-Sluglett et al., "Not Quite Armageddon," 28.
64. Clawson, "Islamic Iran's Economic Politics," 378.
65. The relationship between the contending priorities of rearmament and economic reconstruction changed over the postwar years. At first, in 1988, it seemed that rearmament would take precedence over economic reconstruction in the allocation of government resources. However, the situation changed after 1990, when the Iraqi military threat receded in the wake of the 1991 Gulf War, and the government felt the need to bolster a weak economic recovery with its development expenditure; see Ehteshami, After Khomeini, 146-47, 169-71.
66. Ibid., 101. On Rafsanjani's commitment to economic liberalization, see also Shireen T. Hunter, "Iran after Khomeini," Washington Papers 156 (1992): 81-82.
67. Ibid., 101. On Rafsanjani's commitment to economic liberalization, see also Shireen T. Hunter, "Iran after Khomeini," Washington Papers 156 (1992): 81-82.
68. On the postwar economic reforms in Iran, see Ehteshami, After Khomeini, 104-25; for broader surveys of liberalization and privatization in the Middle East, see Henri J. Barkey, ed., The Politics of Economic Reform in the Middle East (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992); and Harik and Sullivan, ed., Privatization and Liberalization.
69. On the postwar economic reforms in Iran, see Ehteshami, After Khomeini, 104-25; for broader surveys of liberalization and privatization in the Middle East, see Henri J. Barkey, ed., The Politics of Economic Reform in the Middle East (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992); and Harik and Sullivan, ed., Privatization and Liberalization.
70. On the postwar economic reforms in Iran, see Ehteshami, After Khomeini, 104-25; for broader surveys of liberalization and privatization in the Middle East, see Henri J. Barkey, ed., The Politics of Economic Reform in the Middle East (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992); and Harik and Sullivan, ed., Privatization and Liberalization.
71. Following the limited war with Israel in Lebanon in 1982, Syria's military expenditure increased by 43 percent over 1982-85, After 1985, Syria had increasing difficulty in sustaining its defense effort. For example, in 1986, 48 percent of central-government expenditure was allocated to the military, but military expenditure in real terms decreased in comparison to the previous year. By 1989, although 70 percent of central-government expenditure was allocated to defense, military expenditure in real terms was 46 percent lower than in 1985; see Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (hereafter ACDA), World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers (Washington, D.C.: ACDA, 1990), 83. On the doctrine of strategic parity, see, for instance, Ahmed S. Khalidi and Hussein Agha, "The Syrian Doctrine of Strategic Parity," in The Middle East in Global Perspective, ed. J. Kipper (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1991), 186-218.
72. Following the limited war with Israel in Lebanon in 1982, Syria's military expenditure increased by 43 percent over 1982-85, After 1985, Syria had increasing difficulty in sustaining its defense effort. For example, in 1986, 48 percent of central-government expenditure was allocated to the military, but military expenditure in real terms decreased in comparison to the previous year. By 1989, although 70 percent of central-government expenditure was allocated to defense, military expenditure in real terms was 46 percent lower than in 1985; see Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (hereafter ACDA), World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers (Washington, D.C.: ACDA, 1990), 83. On the doctrine of strategic parity, see, for instance, Ahmed S. Khalidi and Hussein Agha, "The Syrian Doctrine of Strategic Parity," in The Middle East in Global Perspective, ed. J. Kipper (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1991), 186-218.
73. On the Syrian economy and governmental finances, see ibid., 208-10; Rhonda Boris, "The Economy," in Syria: A Country Study, ed. Thomas Calleo (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988), 120-22, 165-67; and Eliyahu Kanovsky, "What's Behind Syria's Current Economic Problems?" Middle East Contemporary Survey 8 (1983-84): 284-85, 296-97. On the reluctance of Moscow to support Syria's policy of strategic parity, see Efraim Karsh, The Soviet Union and Syria: The Asad Years (London: Routledge, 1988), 88-89; and Anthony H. Cordesman and Abraham R. Wagner, The Lessons of Modern War. Volume I: The Arab-Israeli Conflicts, 1973-1989 (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1990), 277. In 1983, after the war in Lebanon, the subsidies of Arab oil states to Syria reached about $1.3 billion; these subsidies were down to $800 million in 1986 and $500 million in 1988; see Yosef Olmert, "Syria," Middle East Contemporary Survey 7 (1982-83): 820; and idem, "The Arab Republic of Syria," Middle East Contemporary Survey 12 (1988): 733.
74. On the Syrian economy and governmental finances, see ibid., 208-10; Rhonda Boris, "The Economy," in Syria: A Country Study, ed. Thomas Calleo (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988), 120-22, 165-67; and Eliyahu Kanovsky, "What's Behind Syria's Current Economic Problems?" Middle East Contemporary Survey 8 (1983-84): 284-85, 296-97. On the reluctance of Moscow to support Syria's policy of strategic parity, see Efraim Karsh, The Soviet Union and Syria: The Asad Years (London: Routledge, 1988), 88-89; and Anthony H. Cordesman and Abraham R. Wagner, The Lessons of Modern War. Volume I: The Arab-Israeli Conflicts, 1973-1989 (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1990), 277. In 1983, after the war in Lebanon, the subsidies of Arab oil states to Syria reached about $1.3 billion; these subsidies were down to $800 million in 1986 and $500 million in 1988; see Yosef Olmert, "Syria," Middle East Contemporary Survey 7 (1982-83): 820; and idem, "The Arab Republic of Syria," Middle East Contemporary Survey 12 (1988): 733.
75. On the Syrian economy and governmental finances, see ibid., 208-10; Rhonda Boris, "The Economy," in Syria: A Country Study, ed. Thomas Calleo (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988), 120-22, 165-67; and Eliyahu Kanovsky, "What's Behind Syria's Current Economic Problems?" Middle East Contemporary Survey 8 (1983-84): 284-85, 296-97. On the reluctance of Moscow to support Syria's policy of strategic parity, see Efraim Karsh, The Soviet Union and Syria: The Asad Years (London: Routledge, 1988), 88-89; and Anthony H. Cordesman and Abraham R. Wagner, The Lessons of Modern War. Volume I: The Arab-Israeli Conflicts, 1973-1989 (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1990), 277. In 1983, after the war in Lebanon, the subsidies of Arab oil states to Syria reached about $1.3 billion; these subsidies were down to $800 million in 1986 and $500 million in 1988; see Yosef Olmert, "Syria," Middle East Contemporary Survey 7 (1982-83): 820; and idem, "The Arab Republic of Syria," Middle East Contemporary Survey 12 (1988): 733.
76. On the Syrian economy and governmental finances, see ibid., 208-10; Rhonda Boris, "The Economy," in Syria: A Country Study, ed. Thomas Calleo (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988), 120-22, 165-67; and Eliyahu Kanovsky, "What's Behind Syria's Current Economic Problems?" Middle East Contemporary Survey 8 (1983-84): 284-85, 296-97. On the reluctance of Moscow to support Syria's policy of strategic parity, see Efraim Karsh, The Soviet Union and Syria: The Asad Years (London: Routledge, 1988), 88-89; and Anthony H. Cordesman and Abraham R. Wagner, The Lessons of Modern War. Volume I: The Arab-Israeli Conflicts, 1973-1989 (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1990), 277. In 1983, after the war in Lebanon, the subsidies of Arab oil states to Syria reached about $1.3 billion; these subsidies were down to $800 million in 1986 and $500 million in 1988; see Yosef Olmert, "Syria," Middle East Contemporary Survey 7 (1982-83): 820; and idem, "The Arab Republic of Syria," Middle East Contemporary Survey 12 (1988): 733.
77. On the Syrian economy and governmental finances, see ibid., 208-10; Rhonda Boris, "The Economy," in Syria: A Country Study, ed. Thomas Calleo (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988), 120-22, 165-67; and Eliyahu Kanovsky, "What's Behind Syria's Current Economic Problems?" Middle East Contemporary Survey 8 (1983-84): 284-85, 296-97. On the reluctance of Moscow to support Syria's policy of strategic parity, see Efraim Karsh, The Soviet Union and Syria: The Asad Years (London: Routledge, 1988), 88-89; and Anthony H. Cordesman and Abraham R. Wagner, The Lessons of Modern War. Volume I: The Arab-Israeli Conflicts, 1973-1989 (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1990), 277. In 1983, after the war in Lebanon, the subsidies of Arab oil states to Syria reached about $1.3 billion; these subsidies were down to $800 million in 1986 and $500 million in 1988; see Yosef Olmert, "Syria," Middle East Contemporary Survey 7 (1982-83): 820; and idem, "The Arab Republic of Syria," Middle East Contemporary Survey 12 (1988): 733.
78. On the Syrian economy and governmental finances, see ibid., 208-10; Rhonda Boris, "The Economy," in Syria: A Country Study, ed. Thomas Calleo (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988), 120-22, 165-67; and Eliyahu Kanovsky, "What's Behind Syria's Current Economic Problems?" Middle East Contemporary Survey 8 (1983-84): 284-85, 296-97. On the reluctance of Moscow to support Syria's policy of strategic parity, see Efraim Karsh, The Soviet Union and Syria: The Asad Years (London: Routledge, 1988), 88-89; and Anthony H. Cordesman and Abraham R. Wagner, The Lessons of Modern War. Volume I: The Arab-Israeli Conflicts, 1973-1989 (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1990), 277. In 1983, after the war in Lebanon, the subsidies of Arab oil states to Syria reached about $1.3 billion; these subsidies were down to $800 million in 1986 and $500 million in 1988; see Yosef Olmert, "Syria," Middle East Contemporary Survey 7 (1982-83): 820; and idem, "The Arab Republic of Syria," Middle East Contemporary Survey 12 (1988): 733.
79. On the Syrian economy and governmental finances, see ibid., 208-10; Rhonda Boris, "The Economy," in Syria: A Country Study, ed. Thomas Calleo (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988), 120-22, 165-67; and Eliyahu Kanovsky, "What's Behind Syria's Current Economic Problems?" Middle East Contemporary Survey 8 (1983-84): 284-85, 296-97. On the reluctance of Moscow to support Syria's policy of strategic parity, see Efraim Karsh, The Soviet Union and Syria: The Asad Years (London: Routledge, 1988), 88-89; and Anthony H. Cordesman and Abraham R. Wagner, The Lessons of Modern War. Volume I: The Arab-Israeli Conflicts, 1973-1989 (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1990), 277. In 1983, after the war in Lebanon, the subsidies of Arab oil states to Syria reached about $1.3 billion; these subsidies were down to $800 million in 1986 and $500 million in 1988; see Yosef Olmert, "Syria," Middle East Contemporary Survey 7 (1982-83): 820; and idem, "The Arab Republic of Syria," Middle East Contemporary Survey 12 (1988): 733.
80. On the ability of Syria to sustain its defense effort through foreign aid until the mid-1980s, see Patrick Clawson, Unaffordable Ambitions: Syria's Military Build-up and Economic Crisis (Washington, D.C.: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1989).
81. Steven Heydemann, "The Political Logic of Economic Rationality: Selective Stabilization in Syria," in The Politics of Economic Reform, 16.
82. ⊂th," Merip Reports 134 (July-August 1985): 5.
83. Ibid., 6; see also Boris, "The Economy," 160.
84. Ibid., 6; see also Boris, "The Economy," 160.
85. These proportions were calculated from data in the IMF's Government Finance Statistics Yearbook (1992); 516; and Government Finance Statistics Yearbook 8 (1984): 766.
86. These proportions were calculated from data in the IMF's Government Finance Statistics Yearbook (1992); 516; and Government Finance Statistics Yearbook 8 (1984): 766.
87. Raymond A. Hinnebusch, "The Political Economy of Economic Liberalization in Syria," International Journal of Middle East Studies 27 (August 1995): 318.
88. See the assessments in ibid.: 313, 317-18; and in Volker Perthes, "The Syrian Private Industrial and Commercial Sectors and the State," International Journal of Middle East Studies 24 (May 1992): 211.
89. See the assessments in ibid.: 313, 317-18; and in Volker Perthes, "The Syrian Private Industrial and Commercial Sectors and the State," International Journal of Middle East Studies 24 (May 1992): 211.
90. For analysts who consider the 1967 War as a turning point leading toward an economic liberalization, see, for example, Waterbury, The Egypt of Nasser and Sadat; Cooper, The Transformation of Egypt; and Ansari, Egypt: The Stalled Society.
91. For analysts who consider the 1967 War as a turning point leading toward an economic liberalization, see, for example, Waterbury, The Egypt of Nasser and Sadat; Cooper, The Transformation of Egypt; and Ansari, Egypt: The Stalled Society.
92. For analysts who consider the 1967 War as a turning point leading toward an economic liberalization, see, for example, Waterbury, The Egypt of Nasser and Sadat; Cooper, The Transformation of Egypt; and Ansari, Egypt: The Stalled Society.
93. Barnett, Confronting the Costs of War, 223.
94. Ibid., 224.
95. Cordesman and Wagner, The Lessons of Modern War. Volume I, 14, 350.
96. Nadav Safran, From War to War: The Arab-Israeli Confrontation, 1948-1967 (New York: Pegasus, 1969), 349.
97. Percentages calculated from estimates of losses in Cordesman and Wagner, The Lessons of Modern War. Volume I, 150; and data on Syria's arsenal in The Military Balance (1982-83), 62.
98. Percentages calculated from estimates of losses in Cordesman and Wagner, The Lessons of Modern War. Volume I, 150; and data on Syria's arsenal in The Military Balance (1982-83), 62.
99. Cordesman and Wagner, The Lessons of Modern War. Volume II, 452.
100. The weak-state thesis should also be qualified when one considers the military mobilization ratio achieved by states such as Syria and Iraq in the 1980s, in spite of the alleged lack of legitimacy of their regimes and of communal or ethnic cleavages; their performance in putting men under arms is comparable to that of European states involved in total wars; see, for instance, Charles Tilly, "War and State Power," Middle East Report 171 (July-August 1991): 40.
101. J. C. Hurewitz, "The Beginnings of Military Modernization in the Middle East: A Comparative Analysis," Middle East Journal 22 (Spring 1968): 144-58.
102. On war making and state making in Muhammad Ali's Egypt, see ibid., 145-48; Afaf Lutfi al-Sayyid Marsot, Egypt in the Reign of Muhammad Ali (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984); and David B. Ralston, Importing the European Army (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1990), 79-97.
103. On war making and state making in Muhammad Ali's Egypt, see ibid., 145-48; Afaf Lutfi al-Sayyid Marsot, Egypt in the Reign of Muhammad Ali (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984); and David B. Ralston, Importing the European Army (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1990), 79-97.
104. On war making and state making in Muhammad Ali's Egypt, see ibid., 145-48; Afaf Lutfi al-Sayyid Marsot, Egypt in the Reign of Muhammad Ali (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984); and David B. Ralston, Importing the European Army (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1990), 79-97.
105. On the mobilization of men and resources in Egypt during World War I, see J. C. B. Richmond, Egypt 1798-1952: Her Advance Towards a Modern Identity (London: Methuen & Co., 1977), 173-74; Marcel Roubicek, Early Modern Arab Armies (Jerusalem: Franciscan Printing Press, 1977), 30; and P. J. Vatikiotis, The History of Modern Egypt, 4th ed. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), 254-55.
106. On the mobilization of men and resources in Egypt during World War I, see J. C. B. Richmond, Egypt 1798-1952: Her Advance Towards a Modern Identity (London: Methuen & Co., 1977), 173-74; Marcel Roubicek, Early Modern Arab Armies (Jerusalem: Franciscan Printing Press, 1977), 30; and P. J. Vatikiotis, The History of Modern Egypt, 4th ed. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), 254-55.
107. On the mobilization of men and resources in Egypt during World War I, see J. C. B. Richmond, Egypt 1798-1952: Her Advance Towards a Modern Identity (London: Methuen & Co., 1977), 173-74; Marcel Roubicek, Early Modern Arab Armies (Jerusalem: Franciscan Printing Press, 1977), 30; and P. J. Vatikiotis, The History of Modern Egypt, 4th ed. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), 254-55.
108. The following argumentation should not be construed as a monocausal explanation of the decline of statism and the rise of liberalism in the Middle East. Obviously these developments resulted from a convergence of factors, such as the crisis of rentier economies in the 1980s and the shortcomings of stateled development and import-substituting industrialization. The emphasis is laid here on the contribution of war making for two reasons. First, it is a significant result in contrast to the historical pattern found in the European past, where war making was associated with the progress of state interventionism. Second, it is to compensate for the current literature on liberalization in the Middle East, which does not sufficiently take war making into account as a contributing variable to the process of liberalization, probably because war making is not a conventional variable in theories of political economy.
109. In constant 1979 dollar values, the ACDA's figures show an increase in Syrian military expenditure from $402 million in 1971 to $1.999 billion in 1980; World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1971-1980 (Washington, D.C.: ACDA, 1983), 68. Estimates of the cost of maintaining the Syrian contingent in Lebanon ranged from $1 million to $3 million per day.
110. Kanovsky, "Syria's Current Economic Problems," 294-95.
111. Elizabeth Picard, "La Syrie de 1946 à 1979," in La Syrie d'aujourd'hui, ed. André Raymond (Paris: CNRS/CEROAC, 1980), 182.
112. See Boris, "The Economy," 166; and Pedro Ramet, The Soviet-Syrian Relationship Since 1955: A Troubled Alliance (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1990), 114.
113. See Boris, "The Economy," 166; and Pedro Ramet, The Soviet-Syrian Relationship Since 1955: A Troubled Alliance (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1990), 114.
114. Ibid., 101, 141.
115. See Boris, "The Economy," 121; and Michel Chatelus, "La croissance économique: mutation des structures et dynamisme du déséquilibre," in La Syrie d'aujourd'hui, 268.
116. See Boris, "The Economy," 121; and Michel Chatelus, "La croissance économique: mutation des structures et dynamisme du déséquilibre," in La Syrie d'aujourd'hui, 268.
117. High estimates of Iran's foreign debt by 1987-88 put it at around $5 billion or $6 billion; see, for example, Chubin and Tripp, Iran and Iraq at War, 129; and John Sigler, "The Legacy of the Iran-Iraq War," in Iran at the Crossroads: Global Relations in a Turbulent Decade, ed. Miron Rezun (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1990), 148. In contrast, by the end of the war Iraq had $37 billion to $50 billion in civilian and military debts to Eastern bloc and Western creditors, in addition to the $30 billion to $40 billion received from Arab states of the Gulf; see Benoit Parisot, "La situation économique et financière de l'Irak à la mi-1990," Maghreb-Machrek 130 (October-December 1990): 37.
118. High estimates of Iran's foreign debt by 1987-88 put it at around $5 billion or $6 billion; see, for example, Chubin and Tripp, Iran and Iraq at War, 129; and John Sigler, "The Legacy of the Iran-Iraq War," in Iran at the Crossroads: Global Relations in a Turbulent Decade, ed. Miron Rezun (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1990), 148. In contrast, by the end of the war Iraq had $37 billion to $50 billion in civilian and military debts to Eastern bloc and Western creditors, in addition to the $30 billion to $40 billion received from Arab states of the Gulf; see Benoit Parisot, "La situation économique et financière de l'Irak à la mi-1990," Maghreb-Machrek 130 (October-December 1990): 37.
119. High estimates of Iran's foreign debt by 1987-88 put it at around $5 billion or $6 billion; see, for example, Chubin and Tripp, Iran and Iraq at War, 129; and John Sigler, "The Legacy of the Iran-Iraq War," in Iran at the Crossroads: Global Relations in a Turbulent Decade, ed. Miron Rezun (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1990), 148. In contrast, by the end of the war Iraq had $37 billion to $50 billion in civilian and military debts to Eastern bloc and Western creditors, in addition to the $30 billion to $40 billion received from Arab states of the Gulf; see Benoit Parisot, "La situation économique et financière de l'Irak à la mi-1990," Maghreb-Machrek 130 (October-December 1990): 37.
120. See, for example, Menashri, Iran: A Decade of War, 8; Joseph A. Kechichian and Houman Sadri, "National Security," in Iran: A Country Study, 283; and Nikola B. Schahgaldian, The Iranian Military under the Islamic Republic (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corp., 1987), 54.
121. See, for example, Menashri, Iran: A Decade of War, 8; Joseph A. Kechichian and Houman Sadri, "National Security," in Iran: A Country Study, 283; and Nikola B. Schahgaldian, The Iranian Military under the Islamic Republic (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corp., 1987), 54.
122. See, for example, Menashri, Iran: A Decade of War, 8; Joseph A. Kechichian and Houman Sadri, "National Security," in Iran: A Country Study, 283; and Nikola B. Schahgaldian, The Iranian Military under the Islamic Republic (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corp., 1987), 54.
123. See Hiro, The Longest War, 176. On the Revolutionary Guards, see Kenneth Katzman, The Warriors of Islam: Iran's Revolutionary Guard (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1993), 101.
124. See Hiro, The Longest War, 176. On the Revolutionary Guards, see Kenneth Katzman, The Warriors of Islam: Iran's Revolutionary Guard (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1993), 101.
125. See Schahgaldian, The Iranian Military, 54-55; Menashri, Iran: A Decade of War, 390; and idem, "Iran," Middle East Contemporary Survey 11 (1987): 404, 420. It seems that by attempting to manage centrally the war-mobilization effort in the last phase of the war, the Iranian authorities alienated the local representatives of the regime who had played such an essential role in war mobilization in previous years.
126. See Schahgaldian, The Iranian Military, 54-55; Menashri, Iran: A Decade of War, 390; and idem, "Iran," Middle East Contemporary Survey 11 (1987): 404, 420. It seems that by attempting to manage centrally the war-mobilization effort in the last phase of the war, the Iranian authorities alienated the local representatives of the regime who had played such an essential role in war mobilization in previous years.
127. See Schahgaldian, The Iranian Military, 54-55; Menashri, Iran: A Decade of War, 390; and idem, "Iran," Middle East Contemporary Survey 11 (1987): 404, 420. It seems that by attempting to manage centrally the war-mobilization effort in the last phase of the war, the Iranian authorities alienated the local representatives of the regime who had played such an essential role in war mobilization in previous years.
128. See Jacob Goldberg, "The Saudi Arabian Kingdom," Middle East Contemporary Survey 9 (1984-85): 588-94; and idem, "Saudi Arabia," Middle East Contemporary Survey 13 (1989): 574-79.
129. See Jacob Goldberg, "The Saudi Arabian Kingdom," Middle East Contemporary Survey 9 (1984-85): 588-94; and idem, "Saudi Arabia," Middle East Contemporary Survey 13 (1989): 574-79.
130. Barnett, Confronting the Costs of War, 216; Waterbury, The Egypt of Nasser and Sadat, 69. In this specific case, the increase in state power was due to the circumstances of the war, the presence of assets that could be seized in retaliation for the military intervention of Britain and France in Egypt; this cause had nothing to do with the argument presented here, which concerns the impact of the need to mobilize resources for war and not the contingent outcomes of wars.
131. Barnett, Confronting the Costs of War, 216; Waterbury, The Egypt of Nasser and Sadat, 69. In this specific case, the increase in state power was due to the circumstances of the war, the presence of assets that could be seized in retaliation for the military intervention of Britain and France in Egypt; this cause had nothing to do with the argument presented here, which concerns the impact of the need to mobilize resources for war and not the contingent outcomes of wars.
132. Robert L. Tignor, State, Private Enterprise, and Economic Change in Egypt, 1918-1952 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984), 238-39.
133. Mohammed Ayoob, The Third World Security Predicament: State Making, Regional Conflict, and the International System (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1995).