Privatization and development

Review of Development Economics

Volumn 1, Issue 3, 1997, Pages 337-354

  Bös, Dieter ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BONN   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

DEVELOPMENT THEORY; ECONOMIC REFORM; PRIVATISATION; THEORY;

EID: 0031417510     PISSN: 13636669     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-9361.00023     Document Type: Article

References (23)

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