Identifying participants in a price-fixing conspiracy: Output & market share tests reexamined

Review of Industrial Organization

Volumn 12, Issue 2, 1997, Pages 279-290

  Karaaslan, Mehmet E ^a  

^a ALFRED UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Antitrust; Collusion; Dominant firm; Market share test; Output test; Predatory pricing

Indexed keywords

CARTEL AGREEMENT; DOMINANT FIRM MODEL; INDUSTRY PRICE; MARKET SHARE TEST; PRICE FIXING; SIMULATION MODEL;

EID: 0031407870     PISSN: 0889938X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1007774525678     Document Type: Article

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