Communal dining and the Chinese famine of 1958-1961

Economic Development and Cultural Change

Volumn 46, Issue 1, 1998, Pages 1-34

  Chang, Gene Hsin ^a   Wen, Guanzhong James ^b  

^a CHINESE UNIVERSITY OF HONG KONG   (Hong Kong)

^b TRINITY COLLEGE   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COMMUNITY DINING; ECONOMIC PLANNING; FAMINE; FOOD SUPPLY; HISTORICAL STUDY;

CHINA;

EID: 0031398286     PISSN: 00130079     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/452319     Document Type: Review

References (100)

1. Statement of May 13, 1959, by Lord Boyd Orr, quoted in Basil Ashton, Kenneth Hill, Alan Piazza, and Robin Zeitz, "Famine in China, 1958-61," Population and Development Review 10, no. 4 (December 1984): 630.
2. Ibid.
3. Amartya Sen indicated that, lacking information about the event, he could not discuss the event on any solid ground until 1980, when valid, though still scattered, information about the famine was first revealed by some Chinese economists. See Amartya Sen, "The Causation and Prevention of Famines: A Reply," Journal of Peasant Studies 21, no. 1 (October 1993): 29-40.
4. For instance, the latest edition of Encyclopaedia Britannica lists all the major famines starting with ancient Egypt up to the mid-1980s, including many earlier Chinese famines. Surprisingly, it does not mention the Chinese famine of 1958-61, despite the fact that it caused the highest death toll in recorded human history. Some books specializing in famine published as recently as 1988 mention it only in passing. See G. A. Harrison, ed., Famine (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988).
5. For instance, the latest edition of Encyclopaedia Britannica lists all the major famines starting with ancient Egypt up to the mid-1980s, including many earlier Chinese famines. Surprisingly, it does not mention the Chinese famine of 1958-61, despite the fact that it caused the highest death toll in recorded human history. Some books specializing in famine published as recently as 1988 mention it only in passing. See G. A. Harrison, ed., Famine (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988).
6. Ashton et al.; Xizhe Peng, "Demographic Consequences of the Great Leap Forward in China's Provinces," Population and Development Review 13 (1987): 639-70; and Penny Kane, Famine in China: 1959-61 (New York: St. Martin's, 1988).
7. Ashton et al.; Xizhe Peng, "Demographic Consequences of the Great Leap Forward in China's Provinces," Population and Development Review 13 (1987): 639-70; and Penny Kane, Famine in China: 1959-61 (New York: St. Martin's, 1988).
8. See Ashton et al.; and Kane; see also Dwight H. Perkins and Shahid Yusuf, Rural Development in China (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press for the World Bank, 1984); and Kenneth R. Walker, Food Grain Procurement and Consumption in China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984).
9. See Ashton et al.; and Kane; see also Dwight H. Perkins and Shahid Yusuf, Rural Development in China (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press for the World Bank, 1984); and Kenneth R. Walker, Food Grain Procurement and Consumption in China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984).
10. Amartya Sen, "Development: Which Way Now?" Economic Journal 93 (December 1983): 745-62.
11. Justin Yifu Lin, "Collectivization and China's Agricultural Crisis in 1959-1961," Journal of Political Economy 98 (1990): 1228-52. Although the title of his paper is somewhat misleading, judging from the main points, Lin's focus is not on the cause of the famine but on the underlying cause of the marked changes in productivity of the Chinese farming sector during the period 1952-88. Lin suggests the possible relationship between the elimination of the withdrawal rights and the collapse of the total factor productivity and its resurgence when such rights were restored. He bases his conclusions in the light of the new empirical findings by Guanzhong James Wen ("The Current Land Tenure System and Its Impact on Long Term Performance of Farming Sector: The Case of Modern China" [Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, 1989]).
12. Justin Yifu Lin, "Collectivization and China's Agricultural Crisis in 1959-1961," Journal of Political Economy 98 (1990): 1228-52. Although the title of his paper is somewhat misleading, judging from the main points, Lin's focus is not on the cause of the famine but on the underlying cause of the marked changes in productivity of the Chinese farming sector during the period 1952-88. Lin suggests the possible relationship between the elimination of the withdrawal rights and the collapse of the total factor productivity and its resurgence when such rights were restored. He bases his conclusions in the light of the new empirical findings by Guanzhong James Wen ("The Current Land Tenure System and Its Impact on Long Term Performance of Farming Sector: The Case of Modern China" [Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, 1989]).
13. Peng, p. 662.
14. Chris Bramall, In Praise of Maoist Economic Planning (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), p. 333.
15. See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Jingji Dashiji (Important economic events of the Peoples' Republic of China) (Beijing: Beijing Press, 1985).
16. See various issues of the People's Daily from April through October.
17. One mu = 1/6 acre. See the People's Daily (September 5, 1958).
18. Ibid.
19. People's Daily (July 23, 1958).
20. See Yibo Bo, Review of Several Major Policy Decisions and Events (Beijing: Chinese Communist Party School Press, 1991). As one of the most important decision makers in the Central Planning Committee and the State Council in charge of economic affairs, Yibo Bo was deeply involved in the design of many economic policies and largely responsible for their implementations from the early 1950s to the mid-1980s. His memoirs, published in China in 1991, revealed to the public some important data and documents directly relevant to the events.
21. People's Daily (July 23, 1958).
22. People's Daily (August 11, 1958).
23. Suinian Liu, "The Proposal and Implementation of the Policy: 'Adjustment, Consolidation, Substantiation, and Improvement,' " Party History Studies (Dangshi Yanjiu) 2 (1980): 21. Also see Bo, p. 690.
24. At the height of the campaign, the total number of farmers engaged in various activities related to backyard furnace production rose to 90 million, more than 40% of the total rural labor force. The majority of them were young and strong. See Kane (n. 5 above), p. 47.
25. William Hinton, Shenfan (London: Pan with Seeker & Warburg, 1983), pp. 214-15.
26. Bo, p. 749.
27. The total rural population in 1958 was 552 million. Thus it implies that each commune had approximately 23,000 members.
28. Chu-yuan Cheng, China's Economic Development (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1982), p. 100. Also see Bo, pp. 753-56.
29. See Bo, pp. 754-55.
30. Ibid., p. 749.
31. Ibid.
32. Gengjin Wang, Yang Xun, Wang Ziping, Liang Xiaodong, and Yang Guanshan, Xiangcun Shanshi Nian (Thirty years in the countryside) (Beijing: Rural Readings Press, 1989), p. 191.
33. Ibid.
34. People's Daily (September 16-20, 1958).
35. For instance, by November, in Shifang County and Wulong County in Sichuan, free food was provided in the communal dining halls to all county residents. See Shifang County Annual (Chengdu: Sichuan University Press, 1988), pp. 1-46-1-47; and Wulong County Annual (Chengdu: Sichuan People's Press, 1994), p. 159. At the end of October 1958, for instance, among 5,254 communes in the provinces of Henan, Hebei, Liaoning, Anhui, and Shandong, 61.3% planned to provide free food (including both staple and nonstaple food), 21% to provide free staple food only (mainly grain), 15% to provide free food and free clothing, 2.7% to provide free food, housing, transportation, funerals, medicare, schooling, weddings, and entertainment. See Bo (n. 16 above), p. 750; also see Kane (n. 5 above), p. 50, about the Henan case.
36. For instance, by November, in Shifang County and Wulong County in Sichuan, free food was provided in the communal dining halls to all county residents. See Shifang County Annual (Chengdu: Sichuan University Press, 1988), pp. 1-46-1-47; and Wulong County Annual (Chengdu: Sichuan People's Press, 1994), p. 159. At the end of October 1958, for instance, among 5,254 communes in the provinces of Henan, Hebei, Liaoning, Anhui, and Shandong, 61.3% planned to provide free food (including both staple and nonstaple food), 21% to provide free staple food only (mainly grain), 15% to provide free food and free clothing, 2.7% to provide free food, housing, transportation, funerals, medicare, schooling, weddings, and entertainment. See Bo (n. 16 above), p. 750; also see Kane (n. 5 above), p. 50, about the Henan case.
37. For instance, by November, in Shifang County and Wulong County in Sichuan, free food was provided in the communal dining halls to all county residents. See Shifang County Annual (Chengdu: Sichuan University Press, 1988), pp. 1-46-1-47; and Wulong County Annual (Chengdu: Sichuan People's Press, 1994), p. 159. At the end of October 1958, for instance, among 5,254 communes in the provinces of Henan, Hebei, Liaoning, Anhui, and Shandong, 61.3% planned to provide free food (including both staple and nonstaple food), 21% to provide free staple food only (mainly grain), 15% to provide free food and free clothing, 2.7% to provide free food, housing, transportation, funerals, medicare, schooling, weddings, and entertainment. See Bo (n. 16 above), p. 750; also see Kane (n. 5 above), p. 50, about the Henan case.
38. These are recorded in many recent reports. One record can be seen in Xinjin County (Sichuan) Annual (Chengdu: Sichuan People's Press, 1989), pp. 86-87.
39. Han Suyin, My House Has Two Doors (London: Jonathan Cape, 1980), p. 242.
40. Wang et al., p. 178.
41. Sulamith Heins Potter and Jack M. Potter, China's Peasants - the Anthropology of a Revolution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
42. See Mao's speech in the Zhengzhou meeting, February 1959. It is quoted in Bo, pp. 820-21.
43. In December 1958, Mao's secretary, Tian Jiaying, observed starvation in Sichuan. See Zhisui Li, The Private Life of Chairman Mao (Chinese edition) (Taipei: Li Zhisui and China Times Publishing, 1994), p. 271. (The English version was published by Random House in 1994.) Bramall (n. 10 above) also discussed evidence of widespread famine deaths in Sichuan in chap. 9 of his book.
44. Wang et al. (n. 28 above), p. 193.
45. Ibid. In Banqiao Township, Anhui, three-quarters of the commune members experienced intensive hunger and had to escape to cities to beg for food.
46. Bo reported that the "spring starvation" (Chun Huang) was extensive in rural areas and food shortages were extremely severe in cities during the first half of 1959 (p. 869).
47. Dali Yang, Catastrophe and Reform in China: State, Rural Society, and Institutional Change since the Great Leap Famine (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1996), chap. 3.
48. Xinyang Prefecture Annual (Xinyang Diqu Zhi) (Beijing: Sanlian Bookstore Publisher, 1992), p. 95.
49. Based on the interview with Xiaopeng Luo, an officer in the Economic Reform Research Institute, Beijing, who participated in the investigation of the "Xinyang incident" 17 years later. Luo is currently a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Agricultural Economics at the University of Minnesota.
50. This is illustrated by a 7% reduction in 1958 compared with that of 1957. See Kane (n. 5 above), p. 51; and Bo (n. 16 above), p. 868; also see Zhongguo Nongye de Guanghui Chengjiu: 1949-1984 (Glorious achievement of Chinese agriculture: 1949-1984) (Beijing: Chinese Agricultural Publisher, 1987), p. 86.
51. The grain sown area was reduced from 1.9 billion mu in 1958 to 1.7 billion mu in 1959. Statistical Yearbook of China (Chinese version; hereafter SYOC) (Beijing: Chinese Statistical Publisher, 1984), p. 138.
52. SYOC (Beijing: Chinese Statistical Publisher, 1991), p. 589.
53. From Qing Sa, "Some Memories of Dadiwan," October, no. 5 (October 1988); and Zhaojun Wang, Thong Nanhai de Douzheng (Taipei: Congshu Publisher, 1994).
54. From Qing Sa, "Some Memories of Dadiwan," October, no. 5 (October 1988); and Zhaojun Wang, Thong Nanhai de Douzheng (Taipei: Congshu Publisher, 1994).
55. Bo, p. 925.
56. A survey in Haicheng county conducted by Hu Yaobang, who became the general secretary of the party 20 years later, indicated that no peasants wanted to stay in the communal dining halls. See ibid., pp. 927-29.
57. In addition, available food could come from sources other than current production, such as grain imports or previous stockpiles.
58. Entitlement failure, such as the Great Bengal famine of 1942-43, was a distributional failure. See Amartya Sen, Poverty and Famine: An Essay on Entitlement and Deprivation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), pp. 52-83.
59. Every year a part of the procured grain was resold to rural areas specializing in nongrain production or having chronic grain shortages. The figure of net procurement takes into account this grain resale.
60. Grain per capita is defined as follows: for urban residents, the figure was the grain ration received from the government; for rural residents, the figure included grain ration from the collectives (excluding seed and feed consumption), plus grain harvested from their private plots.
61. This point was made in Ashton et al. (n. 1 above). Abandonment of children in the famine was reported in Wang et al. (n. 28 above), pp. 194 and 197.
62. A simple calculation, multiplying the excess in death rate in 1958 by the population base, yields 700,000 abnormal deaths.
63. Ashton et al., p. 619.
64. For instance, Xinjin County Annual (Chengdu: Sichuan People's Press, 1989), p. 87, recorded that the food shortage in communal dining halls caused the population decline. Also, see Kaixian County Annual (Chengdu: Sichuan University Press, 1990), pp. 62, 124 for the famine and death tolls. The communal dining famine death in Xinyang, Henan in March 1959 is recorded in Xinyang Region Annual (Beijing: Sanlian Bookstore Publisher, 1992), p. 95. The evidence in Fengyang, Anhui, is provided in Wang et al.: "Since 1958, especially 1959 and 1960, there was large amount of abnormal deaths" (p. 187). Zengbu, Canton, reported that starvation and malnutrition started shortly after the autumn harvest in 1958. The peasants ate all the rice for half of the year within 20 days in the communal dining halls (Potter and Potter [n. 35 above], p. 73). Bramall (n. 10 above) provided demographic evidence that famine started in Sichuan in 1958.
65. For instance, Xinjin County Annual (Chengdu: Sichuan People's Press, 1989), p. 87, recorded that the food shortage in communal dining halls caused the population decline. Also, see Kaixian County Annual (Chengdu: Sichuan University Press, 1990), pp. 62, 124 for the famine and death tolls. The communal dining famine death in Xinyang, Henan in March 1959 is recorded in Xinyang Region Annual (Beijing: Sanlian Bookstore Publisher, 1992), p. 95. The evidence in Fengyang, Anhui, is provided in Wang et al.: "Since 1958, especially 1959 and 1960, there was large amount of abnormal deaths" (p. 187). Zengbu, Canton, reported that starvation and malnutrition started shortly after the autumn harvest in 1958. The peasants ate all the rice for half of the year within 20 days in the communal dining halls (Potter and Potter [n. 35 above], p. 73). Bramall (n. 10 above) provided demographic evidence that famine started in Sichuan in 1958.
66. For instance, Xinjin County Annual (Chengdu: Sichuan People's Press, 1989), p. 87, recorded that the food shortage in communal dining halls caused the population decline. Also, see Kaixian County Annual (Chengdu: Sichuan University Press, 1990), pp. 62, 124 for the famine and death tolls. The communal dining famine death in Xinyang, Henan in March 1959 is recorded in Xinyang Region Annual (Beijing: Sanlian Bookstore Publisher, 1992), p. 95. The evidence in Fengyang, Anhui, is provided in Wang et al.: "Since 1958, especially 1959 and 1960, there was large amount of abnormal deaths" (p. 187). Zengbu, Canton, reported that starvation and malnutrition started shortly after the autumn harvest in 1958. The peasants ate all the rice for half of the year within 20 days in the communal dining halls (Potter and Potter [n. 35 above], p. 73). Bramall (n. 10 above) provided demographic evidence that famine started in Sichuan in 1958.
67. See Li (n. 37 above), p. 271; and Bo (n. 16 above), p. 869.
68. Suinian Liu and Qungan Wu, China's Socialist Economy: An Outline History (1949-84) (Beijing: Beijing Review Press, 1986). Also see Lin (n. 8 above), p. 1236; and Minquan Liu, "Exit Right, Retaliatory Shirking and the Agricultural Crisis in China," Journal of Comparative Economics 17 (1993): 551.
69. Suinian Liu and Qungan Wu, China's Socialist Economy: An Outline History (1949-84) (Beijing: Beijing Review Press, 1986). Also see Lin (n. 8 above), p. 1236; and Minquan Liu, "Exit Right, Retaliatory Shirking and the Agricultural Crisis in China," Journal of Comparative Economics 17 (1993): 551.
70. Walker (n. 6 above), p. 147. The official weather data were derived from both national weather reports and surveys of crop output in local areas. One referee questioned the reliability of the weather data in 1958. He was concerned with the problem that local cadres tended to exaggerate natural disasters so that they could blame weather for lower yields caused by other reasons. Such a concern, however, was not valid for the years 1958 and 1959. If this concern were valid, the actual areas affected by bad weather could have been even smaller, which would be inconsistent with the hypotheses of bad weather.
71. See Lin.
72. The grain output figure for 1958 reported by the Chinese government was initially as high as 375 million tons (Xinhua Banyue Kan [New China semimonthly journal], no. 8 [1959], pp. 51-54).
73. Later the figure was adjusted to 250 million tons (ibid., no. 17 [1959], pp. 19-24). The figure was further revised to 200 million tons in official statistics publications after 1979 (see all issues of the SYOC since 1980). Although this figure may not be precise, it is widely accepted among economists as the best estimate.
74. See explanation of this item in SYOC from 1991 (n. 46 above), p. 489.
75. The grain stockpile was reduced by 11.8 million tons over the 3-year period from 1958 to 1960 (Liu [n. 19 above]). This draw constituted an additional grain supply to residents during this period.
76. Bramall, table 10.1, p. 307.
77. High grain procurement caused thousands of famine deaths in some counties in Guangxi provinces in 1956. See Zheng Yi, Red Monument (Taiwan: Huaying Cultural Publisher, 1993).
78. For instance, see the works by Ashton et al. (n. 1 above); Kane (n. 5 above); and Peng (n. 5 above).
79. Bo (n. 16 above), p. 749.
80. Wang et al. (n. 28 above), pp. 180-81.
81. See ibid., p. 191.
82. Peng, p. 664.
83. See Fasheng Zhao, chief ed., Dangdai Zhongguo de Liangshi Gongzuo (Contemporary China's grain work), 2 vols. (Beijing: Zhongguo Shehui Kexue Chubanshe, 1988), 1:109, quoted in Yang (n. 41 above), chap. 3. Another independent source, based on a survey of peasants in Henan, found that the daily grain intake for a peasant easily tripled when he was allowed to eat as much as he wished. This was indicated by Xiaopeng Luo in a personal interview with him. See n. 43.
84. Potter and Potter (n. 35 above), p. 73.
85. D. Gale Johnson, The People's Republic of China: 1978-1990 (San Francisco: ICS, 1990), pp. 6-7.
86. Muqiao Xue, "Lesson from Last Year's Great Leap Forward [1959]," cited in "Review of the Economic Work in the Past Twenty Years in Accordance with Practical Experience," in Selected Economic Essays of Xue Muqiao (Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe, 1974), p. 174.
87. Muqiao Xue, "Lesson from Last Year's Great Leap Forward [1959]," cited in "Review of the Economic Work in the Past Twenty Years in Accordance with Practical Experience," in Selected Economic Essays of Xue Muqiao (Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe, 1974), p. 174.
88. The rural grain supply in 1958 was 158.3 million tons (table 1).
89. Carl Riskin, "Feeding China," in Endemic Hunger, vol. 3 of The Political Economy of Hunger, ed. Jean Drèze and Amartya Sen (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991).
90. Bo (n. 16 above), p. 761.
91. Wang et al. (n. 28 above), p. 184.
92. China had 26 provinces during that period. Tibet is not in the table because data are missing.
93. They are Li Jingquan (Sichuan), Zhou Lin (Guizhou), Zeng Xisheng (Anhui), Wu Zhipu (Henan), Zhang Zhongliang (Gansu), and Shu Tong (Shandong). The radicalism of the leadership of some key famine provinces is extensively discussed in Yang.
94. Mao frequently visited Hunan and gave instructions to local officials during the crisis period.
95. People's Daily (September 23, 1959).
96. The data are from Nongye Jitihua Zhongyao Wenjian Huibian (Collection of important documents on agricultural collectivization) (Beijing: Central Party Academy Press, 1984), 2:297. These figures refer to the end of 1959, so they are slightly different from the data cited by Peng (n. 5 above), p. 664.
97. See Peng, p. 664.
98. In December 1958, Mao's secretary, Tian Jiaying, after his return from Sichuan, reported to Mao that starvation had already started in Sichuan. See Li (n. 37 above), p. 274.
99. Yang (n. 41 above), table 3.2 and fig. 3.3.
100. See Sen, "Development" (n. 7 above), pp. 758-59.