Oil workers and oil communities in Africa: Nigerian women and grassroots environmentalism

Labour, Capital and Society

Volumn 30, Issue 1, 1997, Pages 66-89

  Turner, Terisa E ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF GUELPH   (Canada)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ENVIRONMENTALISM; GENDER ROLE; OIL INDUSTRY; SOCIAL MOVEMENT;

AFRICA;

EID: 0031397795     PISSN: 07061706     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (56)

1. Acknowledgements: I would like to thank Daniel Ihonvbere for allowing me to use his 1992 fieldnotes on community actions against oil companies in Nigeria. I thank my students in the Politics of Africa courses at the University of Guelph, especially Sara Vance, Leanne Hagglund, Carol Dauda, Leigh Brownhill and Lara Babbie. I am deeply grateful to Craig Benjamin for his critical input and collaboration. I appreciate the Social Science and Humanities Research Council's contribution to funding research for this study.
2. Terisa E. Turner and Craig Benjamin. "Not in Our Nature: The Male Deal and Corporate Solutions to the Debt-Nature Crisis." Review 18:2, Spring 1995, p. 211.
3. Craig Benjamin and Terisa E. Turner. Environmentalism in Crisis: Restructuring, Resistance and Husbanding Nature. RR1 Lanark, Ontario, K0G1K0: rhiZone, 1997 (ISBN: 1-89699901-8).
4. Terisa E. Turner. "Multinational Corporations and the Instability of the Nigerian State," Review of African Political Economy. No. 5, June 1976, pp. 63-79; Terisa E. Terisa. "Nigeria: Imperialism, Oil Technology and the Comprador State." in Petter Nore and Terisa Turner, ed. Oil and Class Struggle. London: Zed Press, 1980, pp. 199-223.
5. Terisa E. Turner. "Multinational Corporations and the Instability of the Nigerian State," Review of African Political Economy. No. 5, June 1976, pp. 63-79; Terisa E. Terisa. "Nigeria: Imperialism, Oil Technology and the Comprador State." in Petter Nore and Terisa Turner, ed. Oil and Class Struggle. London: Zed Press, 1980, pp. 199-223.
6. Terisa E. Turner, Wahu M. Kaara and Leigh S. Brownhill, "Social reconstruction in rural Africa: a gendered class analysis of women's resistance to cash crop production in Kenya," forthcoming, 1997.
7. Human Rights Watch/Africa, Nigeria: "Permanent transition" Current Violations of Human Rights in Nigeria. New York: Human Rights Watch, Vol. 8, No. 3(A), September 1996, p. 15.
8. CO520/37 of October 11. 1906 - In the Supreme Court of Southern Nigeria. At the Assizes holden at Agbor from August to November, 1906, cited in D. C. Obadike, "Exploitation of labour: waged and forced," in Toyin Falola, editor, Britain and Nigeria: Exploitation or Development. London: Zed, 1987, p. 152.
9. CO520/37 of October 11. 1906 - In the Supreme Court of Southern Nigeria. At the Assizes holden at Agbor from August to November, 1906, cited in D. C. Obadike, "Exploitation of labour: waged and forced," in Toyin Falola, editor, Britain and Nigeria: Exploitation or Development. London: Zed, 1987, p. 152.
10. J. Van Allen. '"Sitting on a Man:' Colonialism and the Lost Political Institutions of Igbo Women." Canadian Journal of African Studies, 6, 2, 1972, pp. 165-181.
11. Georgina Waylen. Gender in Third World Politics. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 1996, p. 63, citing Van Allen, 1976.
12. Margory Perham. Native Administration in Nigeria. London: Oxford University Press, 1937, p. 208.
13. J.L Hanna. "Dance, Protest and Women's 'Wars:' Cases from Nigeria and the United States," in G. West and R. L. Blumberg, eds., Women and social protest. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990, pp. 338-340.
14. Terisa E. Turner and M. O. Oshare. "Women's uprisings against the Nigerian oil industry in the 1980s," Canadian Journal of Development Studies. XIV, 3, Oct. 1993:329-357.
15. Disrobing by women in public is considered a serious and permanent curse on those to whom the women expose themselves. The curse is related to mothering, agricultural productivity and fertility in general. It is used by women in Kenya, Trinidad, South Africa, Nigeria and probably internationally. No man would wish to bear the lifetime curse organized by a throng of naked women. Any foreign man subjected to this curse would lose his credibility (potency) and would be effectively neutralized. Turner and Oshare, Ibid.
16. The Ogharefe community along with villagers throughout Nigeria's oilbelt suffered acutely from skin rashes, stomach ailments and other health problems associated with hundreds of 24-hour a day natural gas flares and the discharge of Oil production water' into the environment. Hunting had deteriorated as a result of the gas fires and heavy oil traffic. Corrugated iron roofs dissolved under the impact of ash from gas flares. Productive fishing ponds and agricultural land had been reduced sharply by oil company expansion. Hutchful, Eboe, "Texaco's Funiwa-5 Oil Well Blow-out, Rivers State, Nigeria," Journal of African Marxists. 7, March 1985, pp. 53-55.
17. In a negotiation meeting to end the 1986 women's uprising "it was discovered that certain things were being done [by the oil companies] for the community from which only the Ovie [local ruler] and his chiefs were benefitting without the knowledge of the people. For example, the Ovie had recently submitted the names of four persons to the Petrochemicals' Project Manager to be employed without telling his people. When this and other revelations were made at the meeting, the people felt cheated and queried this action of the Ovie and his Chiefs." M. O Oshare. "The Ekpan women's uprising of August 1986," University of Jos, Sociology Department, mimeo, 1986.
18. William D. Graf. The Nigerian State: political economy, state class and political system in the post-colonial era. London: James Curry, 1988, p. 219.
19. In 1995, Owens Wiwa, a medical doctor and brother to Ken Saro-Wiwa, described the oil industry impact: "[The] Ogoni environment is devastated. ... [There are] A lot of respiratory diseases - high incidence of asthma, cancer, bronchitis and ... also some bizarre skin diseases and a high level of miscarriages which is [a situation] quite different from other areas in Nigeria that are not producing oil. And the land Ogoni is a small place, about 404 square miles, 12 miles by 32, and [of this territory there are] large expanses of land that nothing grows on because of the oil spillages that have happened, because of oil blow outs, [and] gas flares all over Ogoniland. Owens Wiwa. "A Testimony," transcript of 23 minute video prepared by Greenpeace on behalf of the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP). Owens Wiwa, 1 December 1995, p. 1.
20. Lara Babbie. "An Interview with Diana Wiwa, International Representative of MOSOP and the Federation of Ogoni Women's Associations, and Ken Saro-Wiwa's Sister-in-Law," October 13, 1996. Transcript by Sarah Vance, Ontario Public Interest Research Group. Guelph: University of Guelph, 1996, p. 14; Ken Saro-Wiwa. A month and a day: a detention diary. London: Penguin Books, 1995.
21. Lara Babbie. "An Interview with Diana Wiwa, International Representative of MOSOP and the Federation of Ogoni Women's Associations, and Ken Saro-Wiwa's Sister-in-Law," October 13, 1996. Transcript by Sarah Vance, Ontario Public Interest Research Group. Guelph: University of Guelph, 1996, p. 14; Ken Saro-Wiwa. A month and a day: a detention diary. London: Penguin Books, 1995.
22. Seven points in MOSOP's 1990 Bill of Rights are political control of Ogoni affairs by Ogoni people, the right to the control and use of a fair proportion of Ogoni economic resources for Ogoni development, adequate and direct representation as a right in all Nigerian national institutions, the use and development of Ogoni languages in Ogoni territory, the full development of Ogoni culture, the right to religious freedom, and the right to protect the Ogoni environment and ecology from further degradation. In what Saro-Wiwa called "a ripple effect," neighbouring communities also issued manifestos with their demands. All communities including the Izon (Ijaw) Ethnic Nationality, the Ogbia community in Oloibiri, the Igbide, the Im and the Uzere demanded hundreds of millions of dollars in reparations. Deborah Robinson and World Council of Churches. Ogoni: the struggle continues. Geneva: World Council of Churches, 1996, p. 19; Richard Boele. Ogoni: report of the UNPO mission to investigate the situation of the Ogoni of Nigeria February 17-26, 1995. The Hague: Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization, p. 18; Melissa Crow and Human Rights Watch/Africa. Nigeria: the Ogoni crisis, a case-study of military repression in Southeastern Nigeria. New York: Human Rights Watch, Vol. 7, No. 5, July 1995, p. 33, citing an interview with Dr. Dima Denni-Fiberesima, vice-president of the Ijaw National Congress, Port Harcourt, February 28, 1995; Andrew Rowell. Shell-shocked: the Environmental and Social Costs of Living with Shell in Nigeria. Amsterdam: Greenpeace International, 1994, pp. 16-17.
23. Seven points in MOSOP's 1990 Bill of Rights are political control of Ogoni affairs by Ogoni people, the right to the control and use of a fair proportion of Ogoni economic resources for Ogoni development, adequate and direct representation as a right in all Nigerian national institutions, the use and development of Ogoni languages in Ogoni territory, the full development of Ogoni culture, the right to religious freedom, and the right to protect the Ogoni environment and ecology from further degradation. In what Saro-Wiwa called "a ripple effect," neighbouring communities also issued manifestos with their demands. All communities including the Izon (Ijaw) Ethnic Nationality, the Ogbia community in Oloibiri, the Igbide, the Im and the Uzere demanded hundreds of millions of dollars in reparations. Deborah Robinson and World Council of Churches. Ogoni: the struggle continues. Geneva: World Council of Churches, 1996, p. 19; Richard Boele. Ogoni: report of the UNPO mission to investigate the situation of the Ogoni of Nigeria February 17-26, 1995. The Hague: Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization, p. 18; Melissa Crow and Human Rights Watch/Africa. Nigeria: the Ogoni crisis, a case-study of military repression in Southeastern Nigeria. New York: Human Rights Watch, Vol. 7, No. 5, July 1995, p. 33, citing an interview with Dr. Dima Denni-Fiberesima, vice-president of the Ijaw National Congress, Port Harcourt, February 28, 1995; Andrew Rowell. Shell-shocked: the Environmental and Social Costs of Living with Shell in Nigeria. Amsterdam: Greenpeace International, 1994, pp. 16-17.
24. Seven points in MOSOP's 1990 Bill of Rights are political control of Ogoni affairs by Ogoni people, the right to the control and use of a fair proportion of Ogoni economic resources for Ogoni development, adequate and direct representation as a right in all Nigerian national institutions, the use and development of Ogoni languages in Ogoni territory, the full development of Ogoni culture, the right to religious freedom, and the right to protect the Ogoni environment and ecology from further degradation. In what Saro-Wiwa called "a ripple effect," neighbouring communities also issued manifestos with their demands. All communities including the Izon (Ijaw) Ethnic Nationality, the Ogbia community in Oloibiri, the Igbide, the Im and the Uzere demanded hundreds of millions of dollars in reparations. Deborah Robinson and World Council of Churches. Ogoni: the struggle continues. Geneva: World Council of Churches, 1996, p. 19; Richard Boele. Ogoni: report of the UNPO mission to investigate the situation of the Ogoni of Nigeria February 17-26, 1995. The Hague: Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization, p. 18; Melissa Crow and Human Rights Watch/Africa. Nigeria: the Ogoni crisis, a case-study of military repression in Southeastern Nigeria. New York: Human Rights Watch, Vol. 7, No. 5, July 1995, p. 33, citing an interview with Dr. Dima Denni-Fiberesima, vice-president of the Ijaw National Congress, Port Harcourt, February 28, 1995; Andrew Rowell. Shell-shocked: the Environmental and Social Costs of Living with Shell in Nigeria. Amsterdam: Greenpeace International, 1994, pp. 16-17.
25. Seven points in MOSOP's 1990 Bill of Rights are political control of Ogoni affairs by Ogoni people, the right to the control and use of a fair proportion of Ogoni economic resources for Ogoni development, adequate and direct representation as a right in all Nigerian national institutions, the use and development of Ogoni languages in Ogoni territory, the full development of Ogoni culture, the right to religious freedom, and the right to protect the Ogoni environment and ecology from further degradation. In what Saro-Wiwa called "a ripple effect," neighbouring communities also issued manifestos with their demands. All communities including the Izon (Ijaw) Ethnic Nationality, the Ogbia community in Oloibiri, the Igbide, the Im and the Uzere demanded hundreds of millions of dollars in reparations. Deborah Robinson and World Council of Churches. Ogoni: the struggle continues. Geneva: World Council of Churches, 1996, p. 19; Richard Boele. Ogoni: report of the UNPO mission to investigate the situation of the Ogoni of Nigeria February 17-26, 1995. The Hague: Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization, p. 18; Melissa Crow and Human Rights Watch/Africa. Nigeria: the Ogoni crisis, a case-study of military repression in Southeastern Nigeria. New York: Human Rights Watch, Vol. 7, No. 5, July 1995, p. 33, citing an interview with Dr. Dima Denni-Fiberesima, vice-president of the Ijaw National Congress, Port Harcourt, February 28, 1995; Andrew Rowell. Shell-shocked: the Environmental and Social Costs of Living with Shell in Nigeria. Amsterdam: Greenpeace International, 1994, pp. 16-17.
26. Wiwa, p. 13.
27. Letter from David Williams, Shell International Petroleum Company Limited, Regional Liaison, to Dr van Walt van Praag, Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization, General Secretary, May 28, 1993, cited in Crow, p. 11.
28. Boele, p. 23.
29. Wiwa, pp. 13-14.
30. Wiwa, pp. 13-14.
31. Robinson, p. 93.
32. Those killed were Albert T. Badey, Edward Kobani, Samuel Orage and Theophilus Orage. All were senior politicians and had served in previous governments for Rivers State. Edward Kobani had earlier resigned from the presidency of MOSOP because of its decision to boycott the June 12, 1993 elections.
33. Chairman, Rivers State Internal Security (RSIS), Memo: "RSIS Operations: Law and Order in Ogoni, etc." To His Excellency the Military Administrator Rivers State, Port Harcourt: Rivers State Internal Security Task Force, Government House, May 12, 1994. This leaked document has been photocopied and circulated widely within the non-governmental organization, journalist and activist communities. It was reproduced in Deborah Robinson and World Council of Churches. Ogoni: the struggle continues. Geneva: World Council of Churches, 1996, Appendix.
34. One report stated that on 22 May 1994 "The Internal Security Task Force begins a systematic operation throughout Ogoniland. As the soldiers raid villages, Ogoni are killed, wounded, raped and see their villages looted and burned. The soldiers arrest hundreds of Ogoni. Thousands flee their villages. The operation kills over 1,000 Ogoni while many more die of exposure and disease while hiding in the bush." Robinson, p. 94.
35. The Shell Petroleum Development Company employed some 3,000 workers in the eastern division, centred on Port Harcourt. In 1993 it employed some 1,500 security officers of various kinds, allegedly to 'protect' these workers. The funds to pay for this security were taken from Shell's community development budget. Rowell, ibid.
36. Robinson, p. 93. The oil companies made their announcement on 24 January 1994.
37. Robinson, p. 94.
38. The military cancelled the presidential election results on 23 June 1993 despite strong evidence that Mashood Abiola had been elected. This move by Babangida sparked massive demonstrations in cities throughout Nigeria. It provoked international condemnation. Babangida stepped down as military president to be replaced by an unconstitutional interim regime headed by Ernest Shonekan. Shonekan was subsequently forced to resign by Defense Minister Sani Abacha who installed himself as head of state just after urban insurrections and the October 1993 oil strike threw the country into turmoil. S. Mahmud. "The Failed Transition to Civilian Rule in Nigeria: Its Implications for Democracy and Human Rights," Africa Today. Fall 1993, p. 91.
39. Terisa Turner. "Iranian Oilworkers in the 1978-79 Revolution," in Nore and Turner, pp. 272-292.
40. In early July 1994 the umbrella group, the Nigerian Labour Congress (NLC), threatened a general strike unless all trade union and political detainees were released by July 19. The NLC also demanded the opening of media outlets closed by the military. Platt's Oilgram News. "All Industry Set to Halt in Nigeria Strike - Upstream Union Walkout Would Have Sweeping Impact." July 12,1994, p. 1/5.
41. Ibid. The junior staff are organized in the National Union of Petroleum and Natural Gas Workers (NUPENG), while the senior staff are organized in the Petroleum and Natural Gas Senior Staff Association of Nigeria (PENG ASSEN).
42. Chief Albert K. Horsfall, Executive Chairman, Ompadec. "Oil Minerals Producing Communities in Conflict with Oil Companies: Which Way Forward?" Paper delivered at a seminar organized by the Petroleum and Natural Gas Senior Staff Association of Nigeria, Port Harcourt: March 24-25, 1994.
43. According to Robinson, p. 13, "...Ompadec is riddled with fraud and is very corrupt; there is a double awarding of contracts and at inflated costs. The board of Ompadec was dissolved by the federal government on 22 February 1996 and a sole administrator was appointed in its place. No official reasons were given for this action."
44. The international media insisted that Nigeria's oil strike was aimed primarily and even exclusively at Abiola's release. In fact, both oil unions stated that they were not primarily motivated by the desire to back Abiola as head of state. Platt's Oilgram News reported that "Oil workers unions declared their strike was not in any case conditional on his [Abiola's] release. " "Nigeria Strife Goes On; General Strike Possible," Platt's Oilgram News. August 3, 1994, p. 5.
45. The international media insisted that Nigeria's oil strike was aimed primarily and even exclusively at Abiola's release. In fact, both oil unions stated that they were not primarily motivated by the desire to back Abiola as head of state. Platt's Oilgram News reported that "Oil workers unions declared their strike was not in any case conditional on his [Abiola's] release. " "Nigeria Strife Goes On; General Strike Possible," Platt's Oilgram News. August 3, 1994, p. 5.
46. "Labor Minister Samuel Ogbemudia warned that the government will launch an offensive dubbed, 'Find, Fix & Finish," against the leadership of the striking oil workers' unions, who seem to be still in control despite the fact that they were dissolved by the authorities." Platt's Oilgram News. August 30, 1994, p. 5.
47. The regime extended significant benefits to the foreign oil companies including promises of privatization, leasing the four oil refineries to foreign operators and a switch from joint ventures to production sharing contracts which are very much more profitable to the international firms. The production sharing contracts include a reduction from 85 to 50 per cent in the profits tax, while companies pay 100 per cent of operating costs. "Nigeria: Joint Ventures Part of the Past - Money Woes Mean Production Sharing is the Policy," Plait's Oilgram News. October 18, 1994, p. 1; Platt's Oilgram News. June 7, 1993.
48. The regime extended significant benefits to the foreign oil companies including promises of privatization, leasing the four oil refineries to foreign operators and a switch from joint ventures to production sharing contracts which are very much more profitable to the international firms. The production sharing contracts include a reduction from 85 to 50 per cent in the profits tax, while companies pay 100 per cent of operating costs. "Nigeria: Joint Ventures Part of the Past - Money Woes Mean Production Sharing is the Policy," Plait's Oilgram News. October 18, 1994, p. 1; Platt's Oilgram News. June 7, 1993.
49. Polly Ghazi and Cameron Duodu. "How Shell Tried to Buy Berettas for Nigerians: Document Details Oil Giant's Request for $500,000 of 'Upgraded Weapons' for Police," The Observer. London: 11 February 1996; Ontario Public Interest Research Group, "Shell's Purchasing of Arms in Nigeria: Letters and Documents." Guelph: University of Guelph, 1996.
50. The Ogoni Nine who were hanged on 10 November 1995 by the Abacha regime in Nigeria are Ken Saro-Wiwa, Dr. Barinem Kiobel, John Kpuinen, Baribor Bera, Saturday Dobee, Felix Nuate, Nordu Eawo, Paul Levura, and Daniel Gbokoo.
51. The World Council of Churches team which visited the area in February 1996 was told that "many young people are without fear and even want to give their life, if necessary, in the struggle to realize the goals for which Ken strived." An Ogoni elder said of Ken Saro-Wiwa's murder that "they have killed our headman, we can all now die." Robinson, p. 55.
52. "Since decisions are actually being made at the bottom anyway, it wasn't too difficult for them [in MOSOP] to continue that." Wiwa, p. 11. The opposite was the case in the oil strike. "One observer said the dissolution of the leadership of the unions had dealt a fatal blow to the strike. 'The struggle against the government was too centralized,' he said. "The big names were all in Lagos and the government was able to isolate the central body.'" "Pengassen Calls Off Strike as of 6 September, Nupeng: 'No way' - Nigerian Strike Ends" & "Nupeng Balking - Division Seen with Pengassan," Platt's Oilgram News. September 7, 1994, p. 1.
53. Student activists told Human Rights Watch that they were offered up to ten thousand naira plus a basic salary to join the "Youth Organization of Oil Producing Communities." Clerics affiliated with MOSOP have exposed "The Indigenous Council for Peace, Reconciliation and Recovery in Ogoni" for being in the pay of the government. Human Rights Watch/Africa. June 18, 1996, p. 41.
54. "Ogoni Renew Efforts Against Shell," Drillbits & Tailings. 2 (1) January 7, 1997, p. 1. Drillbits@moles.org and www.moles.org.
55. Ibid., p. 2.
56. Ibid, p. 8.