Optimal Contracts for Central Bankers: Inflation versus Money Supply and Exchange Rate Targets

Open Economies Review

Volumn 8, Issue 1, 1997, Pages 5-29

  Panizza, Ugo ^a  

^a JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Central banking; Inflation; Monetary policy; Time consistency

Indexed keywords

CENTRAL BANK; CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT; ECONOMIC POLICY; MONETARY POLICY;

EID: 0031393036     PISSN: 09237992     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1008235414010     Document Type: Article

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