Legal Principles Revisited

Iowa Law Review

Volumn 82, Issue 3, 1997, Pages 867-890

  Moore, Michael S ^a,b,c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA   (United States)

^b Department of Law ^*

^c UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA   (United States)

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EID: 0031376242     PISSN: 00210552     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (117)

1. Larry Alexander & Ken Kress, Against Legal Principles, in Law and Interpretation 279 (Andrei Marmor ed., 1995), reprinted in 82 Iowa L. Rev. 739 (1997).
2. Larry Alexander & Ken Kress, Against Legal Principles, in Law and Interpretation 279 (Andrei Marmor ed., 1995), reprinted in 82 Iowa L. Rev. 739 (1997).
3. Id. at 287-92, reprinted in 82 Iowa L. Rev. 739, 747-52 (1997).
4. In chronological order: Christopher Columbus Langdell, A Summary Of The Law of Contracts (2d ed., Boston, Little Brown 1880); Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right of Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193 (1890); Morris Cohen, The Place of Logic in the Law, 29 Harv. L. Rev. 622 (1912); Joseph W. Bingham, What is the Law?, 11 Mich. L. Rev. 1 (1912); Joseph W. Bingham, The Nature of Legal Rights and Duties, 12 Mich. L. Rev. 1 (1913); Benjamin Cardozo, The Judicial Process (1923); Edward Levi, An Introduction to Legal Reasoning (1949); Lon Fuller, Purpose and Natural Law, 3 Nat. L.F. 68 (1956); Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1959).
5. In chronological order: Christopher Columbus Langdell, A Summary Of The Law of Contracts (2d ed., Boston, Little Brown 1880); Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right of Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193 (1890); Morris Cohen, The Place of Logic in the Law, 29 Harv. L. Rev. 622 (1912); Joseph W. Bingham, What is the Law?, 11 Mich. L. Rev. 1 (1912); Joseph W. Bingham, The Nature of Legal Rights and Duties, 12 Mich. L. Rev. 1 (1913); Benjamin Cardozo, The Judicial Process (1923); Edward Levi, An Introduction to Legal Reasoning (1949); Lon Fuller, Purpose and Natural Law, 3 Nat. L.F. 68 (1956); Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1959).
6. In chronological order: Christopher Columbus Langdell, A Summary Of The Law of Contracts (2d ed., Boston, Little Brown 1880); Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right of Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193 (1890); Morris Cohen, The Place of Logic in the Law, 29 Harv. L. Rev. 622 (1912); Joseph W. Bingham, What is the Law?, 11 Mich. L. Rev. 1 (1912); Joseph W. Bingham, The Nature of Legal Rights and Duties, 12 Mich. L. Rev. 1 (1913); Benjamin Cardozo, The Judicial Process (1923); Edward Levi, An Introduction to Legal Reasoning (1949); Lon Fuller, Purpose and Natural Law, 3 Nat. L.F. 68 (1956); Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1959).
7. In chronological order: Christopher Columbus Langdell, A Summary Of The Law of Contracts (2d ed., Boston, Little Brown 1880); Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right of Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193 (1890); Morris Cohen, The Place of Logic in the Law, 29 Harv. L. Rev. 622 (1912); Joseph W. Bingham, What is the Law?, 11 Mich. L. Rev. 1 (1912); Joseph W. Bingham, The Nature of Legal Rights and Duties, 12 Mich. L. Rev. 1 (1913); Benjamin Cardozo, The Judicial Process (1923); Edward Levi, An Introduction to Legal Reasoning (1949); Lon Fuller, Purpose and Natural Law, 3 Nat. L.F. 68 (1956); Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1959).
8. In chronological order: Christopher Columbus Langdell, A Summary Of The Law of Contracts (2d ed., Boston, Little Brown 1880); Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right of Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193 (1890); Morris Cohen, The Place of Logic in the Law, 29 Harv. L. Rev. 622 (1912); Joseph W. Bingham, What is the Law?, 11 Mich. L. Rev. 1 (1912); Joseph W. Bingham, The Nature of Legal Rights and Duties, 12 Mich. L. Rev. 1 (1913); Benjamin Cardozo, The Judicial Process (1923); Edward Levi, An Introduction to Legal Reasoning (1949); Lon Fuller, Purpose and Natural Law, 3 Nat. L.F. 68 (1956); Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1959).
9. In chronological order: Christopher Columbus Langdell, A Summary Of The Law of Contracts (2d ed., Boston, Little Brown 1880); Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right of Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193 (1890); Morris Cohen, The Place of Logic in the Law, 29 Harv. L. Rev. 622 (1912); Joseph W. Bingham, What is the Law?, 11 Mich. L. Rev. 1 (1912); Joseph W. Bingham, The Nature of Legal Rights and Duties, 12 Mich. L. Rev. 1 (1913); Benjamin Cardozo, The Judicial Process (1923); Edward Levi, An Introduction to Legal Reasoning (1949); Lon Fuller, Purpose and Natural Law, 3 Nat. L.F. 68 (1956); Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1959).
10. In chronological order: Christopher Columbus Langdell, A Summary Of The Law of Contracts (2d ed., Boston, Little Brown 1880); Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right of Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193 (1890); Morris Cohen, The Place of Logic in the Law, 29 Harv. L. Rev. 622 (1912); Joseph W. Bingham, What is the Law?, 11 Mich. L. Rev. 1 (1912); Joseph W. Bingham, The Nature of Legal Rights and Duties, 12 Mich. L. Rev. 1 (1913); Benjamin Cardozo, The Judicial Process (1923); Edward Levi, An Introduction to Legal Reasoning (1949); Lon Fuller, Purpose and Natural Law, 3 Nat. L.F. 68 (1956); Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1959).
11. In chronological order: Christopher Columbus Langdell, A Summary Of The Law of Contracts (2d ed., Boston, Little Brown 1880); Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right of Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193 (1890); Morris Cohen, The Place of Logic in the Law, 29 Harv. L. Rev. 622 (1912); Joseph W. Bingham, What is the Law?, 11 Mich. L. Rev. 1 (1912); Joseph W. Bingham, The Nature of Legal Rights and Duties, 12 Mich. L. Rev. 1 (1913); Benjamin Cardozo, The Judicial Process (1923); Edward Levi, An Introduction to Legal Reasoning (1949); Lon Fuller, Purpose and Natural Law, 3 Nat. L.F. 68 (1956); Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1959).
12. In chronological order: Christopher Columbus Langdell, A Summary Of The Law of Contracts (2d ed., Boston, Little Brown 1880); Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right of Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193 (1890); Morris Cohen, The Place of Logic in the Law, 29 Harv. L. Rev. 622 (1912); Joseph W. Bingham, What is the Law?, 11 Mich. L. Rev. 1 (1912); Joseph W. Bingham, The Nature of Legal Rights and Duties, 12 Mich. L. Rev. 1 (1913); Benjamin Cardozo, The Judicial Process (1923); Edward Levi, An Introduction to Legal Reasoning (1949); Lon Fuller, Purpose and Natural Law, 3 Nat. L.F. 68 (1956); Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1959).
13. See Alexander & Kress, supra note 1, at 280-85, reprinted in 82 Iowa L. Rev. 739, 740-45 (1997).
14. The legal philosopher I discuss is a fictional creature whom I happen to call "Dworkin." The fictional Dworkin represents the best that can be made of the writings during the period 1963 through 1978 of an actual philosopher also named Dworkin. The actual beliefs of the real Ronald Dworkin, except insofar as they are verbatim the text of these writings, will be beside the point. I have chosen 1978 as my cut-off point for text because, like Joseph Raz, see generally Dworkin: A New Link in the Chain, 74 Cal. L. Rev. 1103 (1986), I see significant enough changes in the writings of the real Ronald Dworkin that I am loathe to attribute all such beliefs to just one person, even a fictional one. Cf. Larry Alexander & Michael Bayles, Hercules or Proteus: The Many Theses of Ronald Dworkin, 5 Soc. Theory & Prac. 267 (1980).
15. The legal philosopher I discuss is a fictional creature whom I happen to call "Dworkin." The fictional Dworkin represents the best that can be made of the writings during the period 1963 through 1978 of an actual philosopher also named Dworkin. The actual beliefs of the real Ronald Dworkin, except insofar as they are verbatim the text of these writings, will be beside the point. I have chosen 1978 as my cut-off point for text because, like Joseph Raz, see generally Dworkin: A New Link in the Chain, 74 Cal. L. Rev. 1103 (1986), I see significant enough changes in the writings of the real Ronald Dworkin that I am loathe to attribute all such beliefs to just one person, even a fictional one. Cf. Larry Alexander & Michael Bayles, Hercules or Proteus: The Many Theses of Ronald Dworkin, 5 Soc. Theory & Prac. 267 (1980).
16. See generally H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (1961). For a comparison of Hart's project with that of Dworkin, see generally Michael Moore, Introduction to Legal Classics Edition of the Concept of Law (1991).
17. See generally H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (1961). For a comparison of Hart's project with that of Dworkin, see generally Michael Moore, Introduction to Legal Classics Edition of the Concept of Law (1991).
18. As Dworkin nicely puts it, the internal question of what is law is not an academic puzzle to be taken out of the cupboard on rainy days, but an eminently practical question on which all lawyers must take some position. See Ronald Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. Chi. L. Rev. 14 (1967).
19. H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 593, 615 (1958).
20. Hart was careful not to limit his data to the linguistic usage of the word "law." He saw himself to be, in part, a sociologist, looking at legal practices to ascertain the concept of law implicit in them. Hart, supra note 6, at 17.
21. Here I exclude a nonmoral, but also nondescriptive, task which Hart saw for jurisprudence, namely, telling us what concept of law we ought to employ for reasons of good theory construction in social science. See Moore, supra note 6.
22. My fictional "Dworkin" thus does not take the interpretive turn taken by the actual Dworkin of the 1980s. See Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire 49-53 (1986); see also Michael S. Moore, The Interpretive Turn in Modern Theory: A Turn for the Worse?, 41 Stan. L. Rev. 871 (1989) (discussing the real Dworkin's interpretive turn). I put aside the interpretive turn here because it would claim that both descriptive and normative jurisprudence should be combined into an "interpretive jurisprudence" that is at once descriptive and normative. For reasons articulated in The Interpretive Turn, supra, this is not a good idea.
23. My fictional "Dworkin" thus does not take the interpretive turn taken by the actual Dworkin of the 1980s. See Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire 49-53 (1986); see also Michael S. Moore, The Interpretive Turn in Modern Theory: A Turn for the Worse?, 41 Stan. L. Rev. 871 (1989) (discussing the real Dworkin's interpretive turn). I put aside the interpretive turn here because it would claim that both descriptive and normative jurisprudence should be combined into an "interpretive jurisprudence" that is at once descriptive and normative. For reasons articulated in The Interpretive Turn, supra, this is not a good idea.
24. Dworkin, supra note 7, at 25-28.
25. Alexander & Kress, supra note 1, at 280-81, reprinted in 82 Iowa L. Rev. 739, 740-41 (1997).
26. See, e.g., Special Issue: Legal Philosophy, 81 Yale L.J. 799, 999-1053 (1972).
27. Frederick Suppe, The Structure of Scientific Theories 80-86 (2d ed. 1977).
28. This is where I interpret the historical Dworkin to have ended up, with his distinctions between "concepts" (the obvious stuff) and "conceptions" (the unobvious, and thus disputed stuff), and between "pre-interpretive" data (the obvious stuff) and "interpretations" (the unobvious stuff). See Dworkin, supra note 11, at 65-66.
29. Alexander & Kress, supra note 1, at 281 n.6, reprinted in 82 Iowa L. Rev. 739, 741 n.6 (1997).
30. Id. at 281; reprinted in 82 Iowa L. Rev. 739, 740-41 (1997).
31. Id. at 281; reprinted in 82 Iowa L. Rev. 739, 740-41 (1997).
32. This Kantian view of moral standards is briefly described in Michael S. Moore, Authority, Law, and Razian Reasons, 62 S. Cal. L. Rev. 827, 846-48 (1989).
33. These metaphors have been culled from the work of Rolf Sartorius and Ronald Dworkin by Michael S. Moore, Book Review, Metaphysics, Epistemology, and Legal Theory, 60 S. Cal. L. Rev. 453 (1987).
34. I shall discuss infra at notes 81-85 why the relationship between rules and principles must be that the former are implied by the latter. I also discuss this in Moore, supra note 20, at 474; Michael S. Moore, A Theory of Criminal Law Theories, 10 Tel Aviv U. Stud. L. 115 (Daniel Friedmann ed., 1990) [hereinafter Moore, A Theory]; Michael S. Moore, Causation and the Excuses, 73 Cal. L. Rev. 1091, 1094 (1985).
35. I shall discuss infra at notes 81-85 why the relationship between rules and principles must be that the former are implied by the latter. I also discuss this in Moore, supra note 20, at 474; Michael S. Moore, A Theory of Criminal Law Theories, 10 Tel Aviv U. Stud. L. 115 (Daniel Friedmann ed., 1990) [hereinafter Moore, A Theory]; Michael S. Moore, Causation and the Excuses, 73 Cal. L. Rev. 1091, 1094 (1985).
36. I shall discuss infra at notes 81-85 why the relationship between rules and principles must be that the former are implied by the latter. I also discuss this in Moore, supra note 20, at 474; Michael S. Moore, A Theory of Criminal Law Theories, 10 Tel Aviv U. Stud. L. 115 (Daniel Friedmann ed., 1990) [hereinafter Moore, A Theory]; Michael S. Moore, Causation and the Excuses, 73 Cal. L. Rev. 1091, 1094 (1985).
37. Parallel to this relationship in law between principles and rules is the relationship in science between experimental laws and scientific theories. For a discussion of this relationship, as well as of the difficulties in making more precise the idea of semantic generality, see Ernest Nagel, The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation 37-42 (1961).
38. Dworkin, supra note 7, at 23-29.
39. Riggs v. Palmer, 22 N.E. 188 (N.Y. 1889).
40. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d. 69 (N.J. 1960).
41. Alexander & Kress, supra note 1, at 289-90, reprinted in 82 Iowa L. Rev. 739, 749-50 (1997).
42. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).
43. Hart, supra note 8, at 614.
44. Dworkin, supra note 11, 95-96.
45. Alexander & Kress, supra note 1, at 310-26, reprinted in 82 Iowa L. Rev. 739, 769-85 (1997).
46. A point seen clearly by many contemporary commentators on Dworkin. See, e.g., Theodore M. Benditt, Law as Rule and Principle: Problems in Legal Philosophy 74-82 (1978).
47. It is in this sense that Holmes's famous aphorism - "hard cases make bad law" - is to be understood. I discuss such "hard cases" at length in Michael S. Moore, The Semantics of Judging, 54 S. Cal. L. Rev. 151 (1981).
48. See id. at 246-47.
49. Michael S. Moore, Precedent, Induction, and Ethical Generalization, in Precedent in Law 183-216 (Laurence Goldstein ed., 1987).
50. Id. at 201.
51. I used to call these "easy, easy cases." See Moore, supra note 32, at 279.
52. The argument is fleetingly raised in Dworkin, supra note 7, at 20-22. It is fully developed in Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 1057, 1083-93 (1975).
53. The argument is fleetingly raised in Dworkin, supra note 7, at 20-22. It is fully developed in Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 1057, 1083-93 (1975).
54. Bertrand Russell's argument for why we should let properties into our ontology is that since we have to let in some universals - namely, relations - anyway, we might as well let in all properties. See generally Bertrand Russell, The Problems of Philosophy (1912).
55. Dworkin, supra note 7, at 22.
56. It might also be tempting to think that no separate normative argument need here be given, in addition to the normative argument given to answer the normative version of the second question. After all, if judges are morally obligated to use principles to resolve all three kinds of cases, this is an obligation that comes to them qua judges - as part and parcel of the judicial role. It must, therefore, be a legal obligation of judges, because legal obligations are just moral obligations with respect to a legal rule. And if such principles are legally obligatory on judges, then they are law in the internal sense Dworkin's internal sort of jurisprudence uses. Although such an argument is available, I prefer to put less weight on the single function of judicial obligation since a richer characterization is available.
57. Dworkin, supra note 37, at 1063.
58. Ronald Dworkin, Is There No Right Answer?, 53 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1 (1978). discuss the "right answer" thesis in detail in Moore, supra note 20, at 475-483.
59. Ronald Dworkin, Is There No Right Answer?, 53 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1 (1978). I discuss the "right answer" thesis in detail in Moore, supra note 20, at 475-483.
60. For Kant's version of this, see Lewis White Beck, A Commentary on Kant's Critique of Practical Reason (1960).
61. As Justice Arabian of the California Supreme Court said in one of my seminars for judges: "Legal rights are not like planets; they exist if our practices demand they do."
62. Dworkin, supra note 7, at 31-45; Dworkin, supra note 37, at 1061-62.
63. Alexander & Kress, supra note 1, at 296, reprinted in 82 Iowa L. Rev. 739, 756 (1997). This normative identification of retroactivity with the upsetting of reliance is surprising in that Kress, in his earlier work, is sensitive to the point. See Kenneth J. Kress, Legal Reasoning and Coherence Theories: Dworkin's Rights Thesis, Retroactivity, and the Linear Order of Decisions, 72 Cal. L. Rev. 369, 398-400 (1984).
64. Alexander & Kress, supra note 1, at 296, reprinted in 82 Iowa L. Rev. 739, 756 (1997). This normative identification of retroactivity with the upsetting of reliance is surprising in that Kress, in his earlier work, is sensitive to the point. See Kenneth J. Kress, Legal Reasoning and Coherence Theories: Dworkin's Rights Thesis, Retroactivity, and the Linear Order of Decisions, 72 Cal. L. Rev. 369, 398-400 (1984).
65. Even the formal point is subject to Kress's earlier argument based on what he calls the "ripple effect." See Kress, supra note 46, at 398.
66. Michael S. Moore, Law as a Functional Kind, in Natural Law Theories (R. George ed., 1993).
67. Id.
68. For a convincing exposition of Bentham's concern with notice, see Gerald J. Postema, Bentham and the Common Law Tradition 192 (1986).
69. Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law 63, 65 (1969).
70. Langdell, supra note 3, at 52-52; Cohen, supra note 3, at 622.
71. Langdell, supra note 3, at 52; Cohen, supra note 3, at 630.
72. Rolf E. Sartorius, Individual Conduct and Social Norms: A Utilitarian Account of Social Union and the Rule of Law 37 (1975).
73. Dworkin, supra note 7, at 23.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Ronald M. Dworkin, Social Rules and Legal Theory, 81 Yale L.J. 855, 857 (1972).
78. Id. at 877.
79. See Richard Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. Legal Stud. 29 (1972).
80. See Moore, Causation and the Excuses, supra note 21, at 1100-01, and Moore, A Theory, supra note 21, at 125-26, for this use of Duhem's underdetermination thesis.
81. See Moore, Causation and the Excuses, supra note 21, at 1100-01, and Moore, A Theory, supra note 21, at 125-26, for this use of Duhem's underdetermination thesis.
82. Even in science, where experiments can narrow (but never eliminate) the possibilities of acceptable theory, underdetermination presents a long-noticed problem giving rise to non-moral but perhaps aesthetic virtues of theory construction. See, e.g., Paul Thagard, Conceptual Revolutions? (1992).
83. This argument is implicit in Dworkin, supra note 37, at 1057. Rather remarkably, Dworkin announces the conclusion of this argument, but he fails to make the normative argument for that conclusion. For a beginning in that direction, see Moore, A Theory, supra note 21, at 1112-28.
84. Posner, supra note 61, at 39-40.
85. Alexander & Kress, supra note 1, at 303 n.96, reprinted in 82 Iowa L. Rev. 739, 762 n.96 (1997).
86. Alexander and Kress equivocate apparently because they are tempted by a flat metaphysical denial that legal principles exist, even if the ways in which we practice law demand that they do. Id. For another example of this kind of descriptive skepticism, see Mark K. Temin, Toward an Account of The Truth of Propositions of Law, 49 U. Cin. L. Rev. 341 (1980). By not addressing the descriptive version of Dworkin's claim here, Alexander and Kress fail to undermine a compelling feature of Dworkin's account, and that is the seamlessness of the law that it depicts. In contrast to the view that judges do one of two quite different things when they decide cases (follow the obvious law or resort to nonlegal morality), or the view that statutes or case holdings have determinate domains, Frank Easterbrook, Statutes Domains, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 533, 533-34 (1983), Dworkin's seamless web view of law and univocal mode of judicial reasoning look very attractive and familiar.
87. Alexander and Kress equivocate apparently because they are tempted by a flat metaphysical denial that legal principles exist, even if the ways in which we practice law demand that they do. Id. For another example of this kind of descriptive skepticism, see Mark K. Temin, Toward an Account of The Truth of Propositions of Law, 49 U. Cin. L. Rev. 341 (1980). By not addressing the descriptive version of Dworkin's claim here, Alexander and Kress fail to undermine a compelling feature of Dworkin's account, and that is the seamlessness of the law that it depicts. In contrast to the view that judges do one of two quite different things when they decide cases (follow the obvious law or resort to nonlegal morality), or the view that statutes or case holdings have determinate domains, Frank Easterbrook, Statutes Domains, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 533, 533-34 (1983), Dworkin's seamless web view of law and univocal mode of judicial reasoning look very attractive and familiar.
88. Alexander & Kress, supra note 1, at 293-94 n.74, reprinted in 82 Iowa L. Rev. 739, 753-54 n.74 (1997).
89. H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 203 (2d ed. 1994); H.L.A. Hart, Reply, in Issues in Contemporary Legal Philosophy (R. Gavison ed., 1987).
90. H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 203 (2d ed. 1994); H.L.A. Hart, Reply, in Issues in Contemporary Legal Philosophy (R. Gavison ed., 1987).
91. Hart, supra note 8 at 613; H.L.A. Hart, Book Review, Fuller: The Morality of Law, 78 Harv. L. Rev. 1281, 1288 (1965).
92. Hart, supra note 8 at 613; H.L.A. Hart, Book Review, Fuller: The Morality of Law, 78 Harv. L. Rev. 1281, 1288 (1965).
93. I put aside Fuller's incredible faith that coherence has an inevitable affinity with goodness. Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law: A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 630, 636 (1958). Although the historical Dworkin castigated Fuller early on for this faith, Ronald Dworkin, The Elusive Morality of Law, 10 Vill. L. Rev. 631 (1965), Dworkin himself has proved remarkably optimistic that a coherent extension of past legal material yields a vision of how things should be.
94. I put aside Fuller's incredible faith that coherence has an inevitable affinity with goodness. Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law: A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 630, 636 (1958). Although the historical Dworkin castigated Fuller early on for this faith, Ronald Dworkin, The Elusive Morality of Law, 10 Vill. L. Rev. 631 (1965), Dworkin himself has proved remarkably optimistic that a coherent extension of past legal material yields a vision of how things should be.
95. Lawrence Alexander, Constrained by Precedent, 63 S. Cal. L. Rev. 3, 9-13 (1989).
96. This argument is developed in Moore, supra note 34, at 185-87.
97. The best known critics of equality are Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (1986); Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 537 (1982).
98. The best known critics of equality are Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (1986); Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 537 (1982).
99. Alexander, supra note 72, at 9-13.
100. Id. at 5-7.
101. Id.
102. This is my reworking of the argument Alexander and Kress make, supra note 1, at 301-07, reprinted in 82 Iowa L. Rev. 739, 761-67 (1997).
103. Id. at 305, reprinted in 82 Iowa L. Rev. 739, 764-65 (1997).
104. See supra text accompanying notes 51-53.
105. For abbreviatory legal definitions, see Alf Ross, Tû-tû, 70 Harv. L. Rev. 812, 821 (1957). For operational definitions of theoretical terms in science, see P.W. Bridgman, The Logic of Modern Physics (1927).
106. For abbreviatory legal definitions, see Alf Ross, Tû-tû, 70 Harv. L. Rev. 812, 821 (1957). For operational definitions of theoretical terms in science, see P.W. Bridgman, The Logic of Modern Physics (1927).
107. Ross, supra note 81.
108. On the latter point, see Moore, supra note 32, at 232-42.
109. The same holds for reductive analyses in science: being able to derive a theory from an experimental law eliminates the power of the theory to generate new predictions and laws. See Suppe, supra note 15, at 11, 18-21.
110. Cohen, supra note 3, at 635-36.
111. Dworkin implicitly endorses my argument here in his talk about the "gravitational force" of past cases. See generally Dworkin, supra note 37.
112. This admission is necessary because equality, in Alexander and Kress's minimalist analysis, is nothing but the logical generality of moral standards, standards that apply to all members of a given class.
113. I explore one example of the concern with the degree of moral mistakeness in Moore, Torture and the Balance of Evils, 23 Isr. L. Rev. 280, 313-14 (1989). There, I argue that the degree to which an action is wrong affects the level of good consequences that may justify the doing of such an action, even to an agent-relative moralist like myself.
114. Alexander, supra note 72, at 9-13.
115. Alexander & Kress, supra note 1, at 326-27, reprinted in 82 Iowa L. Rev. 739, 785-86 (1997).
116. Id. at 326, reprinted in 82 Iowa L. Rev. 739, 785 (1997).
117. See supra text accompanying notes 47-49.