The politics of business associations in the developing world

Journal of Developing Areas

Volumn 32, Issue 1, 1997, Pages 71-96

  Lucas, John ^a  

^a BUCKNELL UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

BUSINESS ASSOCIATION; DEVELOPMENT ROLE; POLITICAL ECONOMY; STATE-SOCIETY RELATIONS;

EID: 0031368897     PISSN: 0022037X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (146)

1. Stephan Haggard, Pathways from the Periphery: The Politics of Growth in the Newly Industrializing Countries (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990). Recently Haggard has qualified this position, and proposed that the business-government relationship be viewed as an "ongoing negotiation." See Stephan Haggard, "Business, Politics, and Policy in Northeast and Southeast Asia," in Business and Government in Industrialising Asia, ed. Andrew MacIntyre (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994).
2. Stephan Haggard, Pathways from the Periphery: The Politics of Growth in the Newly Industrializing Countries (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990). Recently Haggard has qualified this position, and proposed that the business-government relationship be viewed as an "ongoing negotiation." See Stephan Haggard, "Business, Politics, and Policy in Northeast and Southeast Asia," in Business and Government in Industrialising Asia, ed. Andrew MacIntyre (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994).
3. Andrew MacIntyre, "Business, Government, and Development: Northeast and Southeast Asian Comparisons," in MacIntyre, Business and Government in Industrialising Asia, p. 6.
4. See for instance the special issue of World Development on patrimonialism in Africa (vol. 22, March 1994); and Thomas Callaghy, "Political Passions and Economic Interests," in Hemmed In: Responses to Economic Decline, ed. by Thomas Callaghy and John Ravenhill (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994).
5. See for instance the special issue of World Development on patrimonialism in Africa (vol. 22, March 1994); and Thomas Callaghy, "Political Passions and Economic Interests," in Hemmed In: Responses to Economic Decline, ed. by Thomas Callaghy and John Ravenhill (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994).
6. Richard Doner, as cited in Gary Hawes and Hong Liu's "Explaining the Dynamics of the Southeast Asian Political Economy," World Politics 45 (October 1993): 629-60.
7. In fact, several scholars have reinterpreted the success of the Northeast Asian "strong states" to highlight the role played by coalitions with the private sector. See, for example, David Friedman, The Misunderstood Miracle: Industrial Development and Political Change in Japan (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988).
8. Richard Doner, "Limits of State Strength: Toward an Institutionalist View of Economic Development," World Politics 44 (April 1992): 431.
9. Evans's notion of autonomy differs somewhat from how the term is usually understood. He uses autonomy to designate "coherence," not independence or isolation from social forces.
10. Peter Evans, "The State as Problem and Solution: Predation, Embedded Autonomy, and Structural Change," in The Politics of Economic Adjustment, ed. Stephan Haggard and Robert Kaufman (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992), p. 151.
11. Ben Schneider and Sylvia Maxfield, "Business, the State, and Economic Performance in Developing Countries," in Business and the State in Developing Countries, ed. Sylvia Maxfield and Ben Schneider (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997).
12. John Lucas, "State and Society in Nigeria: A Study of Business Associations in Kano" (Ph.D. diss., Indiana University, 1993).
13. Andrew MacIntyre, Business-Government Relations in Industrialising East Asia: South Korea and Thailand in Comparative Perspective (Brisbane: Center for the Study of Australia-Asia Relations, Griffith University, 1990). Another example can be found in Colombia, where the president's alleged ties to drug traffickers came under fire from the peak business associations. See "Colombia's Economy Unsettled by Crisis Involving President," New York Times, 5 May 1996.
14. Andrew MacIntyre, Business-Government Relations in Industrialising East Asia: South Korea and Thailand in Comparative Perspective (Brisbane: Center for the Study of Australia-Asia Relations, Griffith University, 1990). Another example can be found in Colombia, where the president's alleged ties to drug traffickers came under fire from the peak business associations. See "Colombia's Economy Unsettled by Crisis Involving President," New York Times, 5 May 1996.
15. Sandbrook argues that strong bureaucracies are a function of disciplining agents within the society, usually a strong bourgeoisie. See Richard Sandbrook, The Politics of Africa's Economic Recovery (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
16. Jose Edgardo Campos and Hilton L. Root, The Key to the Asian Miracle: Making Shared Growth Credible (Washington DC: Brookings Institute, 1996), pp. 101-3.
17. Merilee Grindle, "Policy Content and Context in Implementation," in Politics and Policy Implementation in the Third World, ed. Merilee Grindle (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980).
18. Peter Evans, Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995), pp. 63-65.
19. Richard Doner, Driving a Bargain: Automobile Industrialization and Japanese Firms in Southeast Asia (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), pp. 242-45. See also Paul Hutchcroft, "Booty Capitalism: Business-Government Relation in the Philippines," in Business and Government in Industrialising Asia., ed. MacIntyre; and Cheng Tian Kuo, Global Competitiveness and Industrial Growth in the Philippines (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1995).
20. Richard Doner, Driving a Bargain: Automobile Industrialization and Japanese Firms in Southeast Asia (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), pp. 242-45. See also Paul Hutchcroft, "Booty Capitalism: Business-Government Relation in the Philippines," in Business and Government in Industrialising Asia., ed. MacIntyre; and Cheng Tian Kuo, Global Competitiveness and Industrial Growth in the Philippines (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1995).
21. Richard Doner, Driving a Bargain: Automobile Industrialization and Japanese Firms in Southeast Asia (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), pp. 242-45. See also Paul Hutchcroft, "Booty Capitalism: Business-Government Relation in the Philippines," in Business and Government in Industrialising Asia., ed. MacIntyre; and Cheng Tian Kuo, Global Competitiveness and Industrial Growth in the Philippines (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1995).
22. Anek Laothamatas, Business Associations and the New Political Economy of Thailand (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1992), pp. 102-8.
23. Charles E. Lindblom, Politics and Markets: The World's Political Economic Systems (New York: Basic Books, 1977), p. 197.
24. Claus Offe, "Two Logics of Collective Action," in Disorganized Capitalism: Contemporary Transformations of Work and Politics, by Claus Offe, ed. John Keane (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1985), esp. p. 213.
25. Nigel Harris, "New Bourgeoisies?" Journal of Development Studies 24 (April 1988): 237-49.
26. Bianchi for instance has argued that Turkish associations are more effective than Egyptian associations as a result of a more developed capitalist class. See Robert Bianchi, "Businessmen's Associations in Egypt and Turkey," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 482 (November 1985): 157.
27. Richard Doner and Ernest Wilson III, "Business Interest Associations in Developing Countries" (paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Political Science Association, Washington, DC, September 1988).
28. Evans, Embedded Autonomy.
29. Stephan Haggard and Robert R. Kaufman, The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995), p. 55.
30. Wyn Grant, "Introduction," in Business Interests, Organizational Development, and Private Interest Government, ed. Wyn Grant (New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1987), p. 1. See also Wolfgang Streeck and Philippe C. Schmitter, eds., Private Interest Government: Beyond Market and State (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1985).
31. Wyn Grant, "Introduction," in Business Interests, Organizational Development, and Private Interest Government, ed. Wyn Grant (New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1987), p. 1. See also Wolfgang Streeck and Philippe C. Schmitter, eds., Private Interest Government: Beyond Market and State (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1985).
32. Streeck and Schmitter's research in Western Europe shows that private-interest government arrangements are widespread in industrial countries. Research on Japan and America has shown that trade associations provide a number of collective goods for members, including standard setting, data collection, research and development, insurance, loans, and public relations. See Leonard H. Lynn and Timothy McKeown, Trade Associations in America and Japan (Washington DC: American Enterprise Institute, 1988).
33. Laothamatas, Business Associations and the New Political Economy, p. 91. Laothamatas also notes how the fiscal crisis of the state in the 1980s forced it to rely more on associations for the implementation of development projects (see ibid., p. 81). See also Richard Doner and Ansil Ramsay, "Competitive Clientelism and Economic Governance: The Case of Thailand," in Business and the State in Developing Countries, ed. Maxfield and Schneider, pp. 272-73.
34. Laothamatas, Business Associations and the New Political Economy, p. 91. Laothamatas also notes how the fiscal crisis of the state in the 1980s forced it to rely more on associations for the implementation of development projects (see ibid., p. 81). See also Richard Doner and Ansil Ramsay, "Competitive Clientelism and Economic Governance: The Case of Thailand," in Business and the State in Developing Countries, ed. Maxfield and Schneider, pp. 272-73.
35. Laothamatas, Business Associations and the New Political Economy, p. 91. Laothamatas also notes how the fiscal crisis of the state in the 1980s forced it to rely more on associations for the implementation of development projects (see ibid., p. 81). See also Richard Doner and Ansil Ramsay, "Competitive Clientelism and Economic Governance: The Case of Thailand," in Business and the State in Developing Countries, ed. Maxfield and Schneider, pp. 272-73.
36. David Himbara, Kenyan Capitalists, the State, and Development (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1994), esp. pp. 94 and 194.
37. Some of these are described in John Lucas, "The State, Civil Society, and Regional Elites: A Study of Three Associations in Kano, Nigeria," African Affairs 93 (Winter 1994): 21-38.
38. Peter, Katzenstein has been an advocate of corporatist arrangements in the smaller European states. See Peter Katzenstein, Corporatism and Change: Austria, Switzerland, and the Politics of Industry (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984).
39. For another critique of corporatism in the developing world, see Mick Moore and Ladi Hamalai, "Economic Liberalization, Political Pluralism, and Business Associations in Developing Countries," World Development 21 (December 1993): esp. pp. 1899-1901.
40. This could be seen as a problem as well as an opportunity. Sullivan, for instance, has argued that corporatist controls represent one of the most serious impediments to an effective system of business representation. See John Sullivan, "Democratization and Business Interests," in Economic Reform and Democracy, ed. Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995).
41. Robert Bianchi, Unruly Corporatism: Associational Life in Twentieth-Century Egypt (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 173.
42. Leigh A. Payne, Brazilian Industrialists and Democratic Change (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994).
43. John Rapley, Ivoirien Capitalism: African Entrepreneurs in Côte d'Ivoire (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1993).
44. Stanley Kochanek, Interest Groups and Development: Business and Politics in Pakistan (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1983).
45. Andrew MacIntyre, Business and Politics in Indonesia (North Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1991). In some sectors (such as textiles) rival associations were created as well. See pp. 125 and 246.
46. Harris, "New Bourgeoisies."
47. See the Spring 1995 issue of Daedalus (vol. 124), especially Vincent Cable, "The Diminished Nation-State: A Study in the Loss of Economic Power," pp. 23-54; Susan Strange, "The Defective State," pp. 55-74; and Vivien Schmidt, "The New World Order, Incorporated: The Rise of Business and the Decline of the Nation-State," pp. 75-106.
48. See the Spring 1995 issue of Daedalus (vol. 124), especially Vincent Cable, "The Diminished Nation-State: A Study in the Loss of Economic Power," pp. 23-54; Susan Strange, "The Defective State," pp. 55-74; and Vivien Schmidt, "The New World Order, Incorporated: The Rise of Business and the Decline of the Nation-State," pp. 75-106.
49. See the Spring 1995 issue of Daedalus (vol. 124), especially Vincent Cable, "The Diminished Nation-State: A Study in the Loss of Economic Power," pp. 23-54; Susan Strange, "The Defective State," pp. 55-74; and Vivien Schmidt, "The New World Order, Incorporated: The Rise of Business and the Decline of the Nation-State," pp. 75-106.
50. See the Spring 1995 issue of Daedalus (vol. 124), especially Vincent Cable, "The Diminished Nation-State: A Study in the Loss of Economic Power," pp. 23-54; Susan Strange, "The Defective State," pp. 55-74; and Vivien Schmidt, "The New World Order, Incorporated: The Rise of Business and the Decline of the Nation-State," pp. 75-106.
51. It is also conceivable that globalization could increase the power of government by putting resources into state coffers (as it did during the 1970s, when large amounts of money were lent to governments in Asia, Latin America, and Africa) and thus providing an alternative to domestic investors. Since the 1980s, however, the trend has been more in the direction of capital flows that bypass the government in favor of the private sector (as is the case in the growth of stock markets and direct foreign investment in developing countries). Furthermore, the policy preferences of these external investors are frequently opposed to state intervention. I am grateful to an anonymous external JDA reviewer for raising this issue.
52. Peter Evans has recorded an example of how local entrepreneurs involved in the Brazilian and Indian computer industries cultivated alliances with international partners in a way that freed them from their previous reliance on government support. Evans feels that this may be a mistake in the long run. See Evans, Embedded Autonomy, chap. 8.
53. In 1996, the Center for International Private Enterprise (CIPE) allocated program funds of over US $5,000,000 to more than 20 countries.
54. Crawford Young, The African Colonial State in Comparative Perspective (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994).
55. Haggard, Pathways from the Periphery.
56. Mark Clifford, Troubled Tiger: Businessmen, Bureaucrats, and Generals in South Korea (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1994), pp. 40, 318.
57. Jung-En Woo, Race to the Swift: State and Finance in Korean Industrialization (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), p. 111; and Carter J. Eckert, "The South Korean Bourgeoisie: A Class in Search of Hegemony," in State and Society in Contemporary Korea, ed. Hagen Koo (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993), pp. 107-8.
58. Jung-En Woo, Race to the Swift: State and Finance in Korean Industrialization (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), p. 111; and Carter J. Eckert, "The South Korean Bourgeoisie: A Class in Search of Hegemony," in State and Society in Contemporary Korea, ed. Hagen Koo (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993), pp. 107-8.
59. Karl Fields, "Strong States and Business Organization in Korea and Taiwan," in Business and the State in Developing Countries, ed. Maxfield and Schneider, p. 138.
60. Jong-Chan Rhee, The State and Industry in South Korea: The Limits of the Authoritarian State (New York: Routledge, 1994), pp. 103, 137; Jung-En Woo, Race to the Swift, p. 200.
61. Jong-Chan Rhee, The State and Industry in South Korea: The Limits of the Authoritarian State (New York: Routledge, 1994), pp. 103, 137; Jung-En Woo, Race to the Swift, p. 200.
62. Cheng-Tian Kuo, Global Competitiveness and Industrial Growth in Taiwan and the Philippines (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1995).
63. Yun Han Chu, "The Realignment of Business-Government Relations and Regime Transition in Taiwan," in Business and Government in Industrialising Asia, ed. MacIntyre.
64. MacIntyre, Business-Government Relations in Industrialising East Asia.
65. Fred Riggs, Thailand: The Modernization of a Bureaucratic Polity (Honolulu, HI: East-West Center Press, 1966).
66. Laothamatas, Business Associations and the New Political Economy, pp. 94-102.
67. Campos and Root, Key to the Asian Miracle, pp. 92-97; Anek Laothamatas, "From Clientelism to Partnership: Business-Government Relations in Thailand," in Business and Government in Industrializing Asia; ed. MacIntyre; Robert J. Muscat, The Fifth Tiger: A Study of Thai Development Policy (Armonk NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1994), pp. 183-84.
68. Campos and Root, Key to the Asian Miracle, pp. 92-97; Anek Laothamatas, "From Clientelism to Partnership: Business-Government Relations in Thailand," in Business and Government in Industrializing Asia; ed. MacIntyre; Robert J. Muscat, The Fifth Tiger: A Study of Thai Development Policy (Armonk NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1994), pp. 183-84.
69. Campos and Root, Key to the Asian Miracle, pp. 92-97; Anek Laothamatas, "From Clientelism to Partnership: Business-Government Relations in Thailand," in Business and Government in Industrializing Asia; ed. MacIntyre; Robert J. Muscat, The Fifth Tiger: A Study of Thai Development Policy (Armonk NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1994), pp. 183-84.
70. Doner and Ramsay, "Competitve Clientelism and Economic Governance," p. 268.
71. Haggard and Kaufman, Political Economy of Democratic Transitions, pp. 243-48.
72. Doner and Ramsay, "Competitive Clientelism and Economic Governance," pp. 272-73; Ansil Ramsay, "The Political Economy of Sugar in Thailand," Pacific Affairs 60 (Summer 1987): 248-70.
73. Doner and Ramsay, "Competitive Clientelism and Economic Governance," pp. 272-73; Ansil Ramsay, "The Political Economy of Sugar in Thailand," Pacific Affairs 60 (Summer 1987): 248-70.
74. Campos and Root, Key to Asian Miracle, pp. 97-99.
75. Richard Robison, Indonesia: The Rise of Capital (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1986).
76. MacIntyre, Business and Politics in Indonesia.
77. Philippe C. Schmitter, Interest Conflict and Political Change in Brazil (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1971), pp. 194-203; Kurt Weyland, Democracy without Equity: Failures of Reform in Brazil (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1996), pp. 63-65; Payne, Brazilian Industrialists and Democratic Change, pp. 113-14.
78. Philippe C. Schmitter, Interest Conflict and Political Change in Brazil (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1971), pp. 194-203; Kurt Weyland, Democracy without Equity: Failures of Reform in Brazil (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1996), pp. 63-65; Payne, Brazilian Industrialists and Democratic Change, pp. 113-14.
79. Philippe C. Schmitter, Interest Conflict and Political Change in Brazil (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1971), pp. 194-203; Kurt Weyland, Democracy without Equity: Failures of Reform in Brazil (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1996), pp. 63-65; Payne, Brazilian Industrialists and Democratic Change, pp. 113-14.
80. Schmitter provides a telling example in Interest Conflict and Political Change in Brazil, pp. 302-5. For other examples see Weyland, Democracy without Equity.
81. Schmitter provides a telling example in Interest Conflict and Political Change in Brazil, pp. 302-5. For other examples see Weyland, Democracy without Equity.
82. Payne, Brazilian Industrialists and Democratic Change, pp. 16-38, 61-67.
83. Ben R. Schneider, "Big Business and the Politics of Economic Reform: Confidence and Concertation in Brazil and Mexico," in Business and the State in Developing Countries, ed. Maxfield and Schneider.
84. The most important of these are CONCANACO (National Chamber of Commerce), CONCAMIN (National Federation of Chambers of Industries), and CANACINTRA (National Chamber of Industries). See Dale Story, Industry, the State, and Public Policy in Mexico (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1986); Roderic Camp, Entrepreneurs and Politics in Twentieth Century Mexico (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989).
85. The most important of these are CONCANACO (National Chamber of Commerce), CONCAMIN (National Federation of Chambers of Industries), and CANACINTRA (National Chamber of Industries). See Dale Story, Industry, the State, and Public Policy in Mexico (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1986); Roderic Camp, Entrepreneurs and Politics in Twentieth Century Mexico (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989).
86. Luis Felipe Bravo Mena, "COPARMEX and Mexican Politics," in Monograph Series no. 20, Government and Private Sector in Mexico, ed. Sylvia Maxfield and Ricardo Anzaldua Montoya (San Diego: Center for US-Mexican Studies, University of California, 1987).
87. Robert Kaufman, Carlos Bazdresch, and Blanca Heredia, "Mexico: Radical Reform in a Dominant Party System," in Voting for Reform: Democracy, Political Liberalization, and Economic Adjustment, ed. Stephan Haggard and Steven Webb (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), esp. pp. 364 and 398; Blanca Heredia, "Mexican Business and the State: The Political Economy of a Muddled Transition," in Business and Democracy in Latin America, ed. Ernest Bartell and Leigh Payne (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1995). Ben Schneider lists the main business representative in these negotiations as CMHN rather than CCE, but given the overlap in the leadership of the two organizations, this distinction might not be significant. See Schneider, "Big Business and the Politics of Economic Reform."
88. Robert Kaufman, Carlos Bazdresch, and Blanca Heredia, "Mexico: Radical Reform in a Dominant Party System," in Voting for Reform: Democracy, Political Liberalization, and Economic Adjustment, ed. Stephan Haggard and Steven Webb (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), esp. pp. 364 and 398; Blanca Heredia, "Mexican Business and the State: The Political Economy of a Muddled Transition," in Business and Democracy in Latin America, ed. Ernest Bartell and Leigh Payne (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1995). Ben Schneider lists the main business representative in these negotiations as CMHN rather than CCE, but given the overlap in the leadership of the two organizations, this distinction might not be significant. See Schneider, "Big Business and the Politics of Economic Reform."
89. Robert Kaufman, Carlos Bazdresch, and Blanca Heredia, "Mexico: Radical Reform in a Dominant Party System," in Voting for Reform: Democracy, Political Liberalization, and Economic Adjustment, ed. Stephan Haggard and Steven Webb (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), esp. pp. 364 and 398; Blanca Heredia, "Mexican Business and the State: The Political Economy of a Muddled Transition," in Business and Democracy in Latin America, ed. Ernest Bartell and Leigh Payne (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1995). Ben Schneider lists the main business representative in these negotiations as CMHN rather than CCE, but given the overlap in the leadership of the two organizations, this distinction might not be significant. See Schneider, "Big Business and the Politics of Economic Reform."
90. Schneider reports that business association leaders were initially enthusiastic about the Alliance, while most business people were ambivalent. See Schneider, "Big Business and the Politics of Economic Reform," p. 204.
91. Among the policies that were either defeated or substantially modified were proposals to redistribute land, regulate foreign capital, and extend government control over privately held industries. See Jorge A. Hidrobo, Power and Industrialization in Ecuador (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1992); Catherine M. Conaghan, Restructuring Domination: Industrialists and the State in Ecuador (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1988).
92. Among the policies that were either defeated or substantially modified were proposals to redistribute land, regulate foreign capital, and extend government control over privately held industries. See Jorge A. Hidrobo, Power and Industrialization in Ecuador (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1992); Catherine M. Conaghan, Restructuring Domination: Industrialists and the State in Ecuador (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1988).
93. The association (CONFIEP) had been formed in 1984. See Catherine Conaghan and James Malloy, Unsettling Statecraft: Democracy and Neoliberalism in the Central Andes (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1995); Francisco Durand, Business and Politics in Peru: The State and the National Bourgeoisie (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1994).
94. The association (CONFIEP) had been formed in 1984. See Catherine Conaghan and James Malloy, Unsettling Statecraft: Democracy and Neoliberalism in the Central Andes (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1995); Francisco Durand, Business and Politics in Peru: The State and the National Bourgeoisie (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1994).
95. This was the Bolivian Federation of Private Entrepreneurs, or CEPB. See Catherine Conaghan, "The Private Sector and the Public Transcript," in Business and Democracy in Latin America, ed. Bartell and Payne.
96. David G. Becker, "Business Associations in Latin America: The Venezuelan Case," Comparative Political Studies 23 (April 1990); Carlos Edward Juarez, "The Political Economy of Policy Reform in Colombia: Technocratic Bureaucracy and Business-Government Relations, 1966-1992" (Ph.D. diss., University of California at Los Angeles, Los Angeles, CA, 1995).
97. David G. Becker, "Business Associations in Latin America: The Venezuelan Case," Comparative Political Studies 23 (April 1990); Carlos Edward Juarez, "The Political Economy of Policy Reform in Colombia: Technocratic Bureaucracy and Business-Government Relations, 1966-1992" (Ph.D. diss., University of California at Los Angeles, Los Angeles, CA, 1995).
98. For a sampling of the best current work see Tom Forrest, The Advance of African Capital: The Growth of Nigerian Private Enterprise (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1994); Bruce Berman and Colin Leys, eds., African Capitalists in African Development (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1994); Himbara, Kenyan Capitalists, the State, and Development; Rapley, Ivoirien Capitalism.
99. For a sampling of the best current work see Tom Forrest, The Advance of African Capital: The Growth of Nigerian Private Enterprise (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1994); Bruce Berman and Colin Leys, eds., African Capitalists in African Development (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1994); Himbara, Kenyan Capitalists, the State, and Development; Rapley, Ivoirien Capitalism.
100. For a sampling of the best current work see Tom Forrest, The Advance of African Capital: The Growth of Nigerian Private Enterprise (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1994); Bruce Berman and Colin Leys, eds., African Capitalists in African Development (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1994); Himbara, Kenyan Capitalists, the State, and Development; Rapley, Ivoirien Capitalism.
101. For a sampling of the best current work see Tom Forrest, The Advance of African Capital: The Growth of Nigerian Private Enterprise (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1994); Bruce Berman and Colin Leys, eds., African Capitalists in African Development (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1994); Himbara, Kenyan Capitalists, the State, and Development; Rapley, Ivoirien Capitalism.
102. In Kenya, the Kenyan Associations of Manufacturers opposed this move. See Himbara, Kenyan Capitalists, the State, and Development, p. 67. For information on Senegal, see Sheldon Gellar, Senegal: An African Nation between Islam and the West (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1982), esp. p. 34; and Catherine Boone, Merchant Capital and the Roots of State Power in Senegal, 1930-1985 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), esp. pp. 166-97. For Côte d'Ivoire, see Rapley, Ivoirien Capitalism, pp. 69-70. For Nigeria, see Thomas J. Biersteker, Multinationals, the State, and Control of the Nigerian Economy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987), pp. 65-69.
103. In Kenya, the Kenyan Associations of Manufacturers opposed this move. See Himbara, Kenyan Capitalists, the State, and Development, p. 67. For information on Senegal, see Sheldon Gellar, Senegal: An African Nation between Islam and the West (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1982), esp. p. 34; and Catherine Boone, Merchant Capital and the Roots of State Power in Senegal, 1930-1985 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), esp. pp. 166-97. For Côte d'Ivoire, see Rapley, Ivoirien Capitalism, pp. 69-70. For Nigeria, see Thomas J. Biersteker, Multinationals, the State, and Control of the Nigerian Economy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987), pp. 65-69.
104. In Kenya, the Kenyan Associations of Manufacturers opposed this move. See Himbara, Kenyan Capitalists, the State, and Development, p. 67. For information on Senegal, see Sheldon Gellar, Senegal: An African Nation between Islam and the West (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1982), esp. p. 34; and Catherine Boone, Merchant Capital and the Roots of State Power in Senegal, 1930-1985 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), esp. pp. 166-97. For Côte d'Ivoire, see Rapley, Ivoirien Capitalism, pp. 69-70. For Nigeria, see Thomas J. Biersteker, Multinationals, the State, and Control of the Nigerian Economy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987), pp. 65-69.
105. In Kenya, the Kenyan Associations of Manufacturers opposed this move. See Himbara, Kenyan Capitalists, the State, and Development, p. 67. For information on Senegal, see Sheldon Gellar, Senegal: An African Nation between Islam and the West (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1982), esp. p. 34; and Catherine Boone, Merchant Capital and the Roots of State Power in Senegal, 1930-1985 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), esp. pp. 166-97. For Côte d'Ivoire, see Rapley, Ivoirien Capitalism, pp. 69-70. For Nigeria, see Thomas J. Biersteker, Multinationals, the State, and Control of the Nigerian Economy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987), pp. 65-69.
106. In Kenya, the Kenyan Associations of Manufacturers opposed this move. See Himbara, Kenyan Capitalists, the State, and Development, p. 67. For information on Senegal, see Sheldon Gellar, Senegal: An African Nation between Islam and the West (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1982), esp. p. 34; and Catherine Boone, Merchant Capital and the Roots of State Power in Senegal, 1930-1985 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), esp. pp. 166-97. For Côte d'Ivoire, see Rapley, Ivoirien Capitalism, pp. 69-70. For Nigeria, see Thomas J. Biersteker, Multinationals, the State, and Control of the Nigerian Economy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987), pp. 65-69.
107. Himbara, Kenyan Capitalists, the State, and Development; and Lucas, "State and Society in Nigeria."
108. Himbara, Kenyan Capitalists, the State, and Development; and Lucas, "State and Society in Nigeria."
109. World Bank, Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1989), esp. pp. 5-10.
110. See Lucas, "State and Society in Nigeria"; Ladi Hamalai, "Government-Business Relations and Economic Liberalisation in Nigeria" (Ph.D. diss., Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex, England, 1993).
111. See Lucas, "State and Society in Nigeria"; Ladi Hamalai, "Government-Business Relations and Economic Liberalisation in Nigeria" (Ph.D. diss., Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex, England, 1993).
112. See Moore and Hamalai, "Economic Liberalization, Political Pluralism, and Business Associations in Developing Countries," p. 1903.
113. Hamalai, "Government-Business Relations and Economic Liberalisation in Nigeria," pp. 240-41.
114. My own research in Kano found that business associations were effective in securing reforms in the telephone system, disbanding a corrupt system of mobile law courts, protecting property rights of traders in a local market, and preventing the seizing of assets of local Lebanese merchants.
115. Based on interviews by author with businessmen in Lagos, March 1997.
116. Gellar, Senegal: An African Nation between Islam and the West; Boone, Merchant Capital.
117. Gellar, Senegal: An African Nation between Islam and the West; Boone, Merchant Capital.
118. The following is based on Samba Ka and Nicolas van de Walle, "Senegal: Stalled Reform in a Dominant Party System," in Voting for Reform, ed. Haggard and Webb.
119. The Mourides are an Islamic brotherhood known for its entrepreneurial orientation.
120. Sheldon Gellar, Senegal: An African Nation between Islam and the West, 2d ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1995).
121. Some of this research can be found in Bruce Heilman and John Lucas's "A Social Movement for African Capitalism? A Comparison of Business Associations in Two African Cities," African Studies Review 40 (September 1997): 141-71.
122. Tor Skalnes, The Politics of Economic Reform in Zimbabwe: Continuity and Change in Development (New York: St. Martin's, 1995).
123. Note that I am lumping together two different arguments here: that market economies are associated with democracy, and that more developed economies are associated with democracy. For the former argument, see Lindblom, Politics and Markets', for the latter argument see Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics (New York: Doubleday, 1960).
124. Note that I am lumping together two different arguments here: that market economies are associated with democracy, and that more developed economies are associated with democracy. For the former argument, see Lindblom, Politics and Markets', for the latter argument see Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics (New York: Doubleday, 1960).
125. Payne, Brazilian Industrialists and Democratic Change.
126. Business support for the 1964 coup in Brazil is one exception. See ibid., pp. 16-38.
127. Michael Bratton, "Beyond the State: Civil Society and Associational Life in Africa," World Politics 41 (April 1989): 407-30.
128. This seems to be the position of Andrew MacIntyre in his "Introduction" to his Business and Government in Industrialising Asia.
129. To the examples described earlier, one might also add Turkey, Egypt, and Thailand. See Bianchi, "Businessmen's Associations in Egypt and Turkey"; Laothamatas, Business Associations and the New Political Economy.
130. To the examples described earlier, one might also add Turkey, Egypt, and Thailand. See Bianchi, "Businessmen's Associations in Egypt and Turkey"; Laothamatas, Business Associations and the New Political Economy.
131. See Payne, Brazilian Industrialists and Democratic Change; Chu, "Realignment of Business-Government Relations and Regime Transition in Taiwan"; Chung-in Moon, "Changing Patterns of Business-Government Relations in South Korea," in Business and Government in Industrialising Asia, ed. MacIntyre; Hamalai, "Government-Business Relations and Economic Liberalisation in Nigeria."
132. See Payne, Brazilian Industrialists and Democratic Change; Chu, "Realignment of Business-Government Relations and Regime Transition in Taiwan"; Chung-in Moon, "Changing Patterns of Business-Government Relations in South Korea," in Business and Government in Industrialising Asia, ed. MacIntyre; Hamalai, "Government-Business Relations and Economic Liberalisation in Nigeria."
133. See Payne, Brazilian Industrialists and Democratic Change; Chu, "Realignment of Business-Government Relations and Regime Transition in Taiwan"; Chung-in Moon, "Changing Patterns of Business-Government Relations in South Korea," in Business and Government in Industrialising Asia, ed. MacIntyre; Hamalai, "Government-Business Relations and Economic Liberalisation in Nigeria."
134. See Payne, Brazilian Industrialists and Democratic Change; Chu, "Realignment of Business-Government Relations and Regime Transition in Taiwan"; Chung-in Moon, "Changing Patterns of Business-Government Relations in South Korea," in Business and Government in Industrialising Asia, ed. MacIntyre; Hamalai, "Government-Business Relations and Economic Liberalisation in Nigeria."
135. Jamaica is another example of this. See Michele Garrity and Louis A. Picard, "Organized Interests, the State, and the Public Policy Process: An Assessment of Jamaican Business Associations," Journal of Developing Areas 25 (April 1991): 369-93.
136. Bianchi, "Businessmen's Associations in Egypt and Turkey"; Moore and Hamalai, "Economic Liberalism, Political Pluralism, and Business Associations in Developing Countries"; Laothamatas, Business Associations and the New Political Economy; Camp, Entrepreneurs and Politics in Twentieth Century Mexico.
137. Bianchi, "Businessmen's Associations in Egypt and Turkey"; Moore and Hamalai, "Economic Liberalism, Political Pluralism, and Business Associations in Developing Countries"; Laothamatas, Business Associations and the New Political Economy; Camp, Entrepreneurs and Politics in Twentieth Century Mexico.
138. Bianchi, "Businessmen's Associations in Egypt and Turkey"; Moore and Hamalai, "Economic Liberalism, Political Pluralism, and Business Associations in Developing Countries"; Laothamatas, Business Associations and the New Political Economy; Camp, Entrepreneurs and Politics in Twentieth Century Mexico.
139. Bianchi, "Businessmen's Associations in Egypt and Turkey"; Moore and Hamalai, "Economic Liberalism, Political Pluralism, and Business Associations in Developing Countries"; Laothamatas, Business Associations and the New Political Economy; Camp, Entrepreneurs and Politics in Twentieth Century Mexico.
140. Robert Dahl makes a similar argument to justify authoritarian elements of political parties. See Robert Dahl, After the Revolution, 2d ed. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1990).
141. Stanley Kochanek, Business and Politics in India (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974).
142. For discussions of the weakness of business associations in India, see Robert Hunt, "Business Associations and the Small Manufacturing Sector in India," in Volunteers and Voluntary Associations in Development, ed. David H. Smith and Frederick Elkin (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1981); and Krishnan Lal Sharma, Voluntary Business Associations in Organizational Frame (Punjab: Punjab University Press, 1981).
143. For discussions of the weakness of business associations in India, see Robert Hunt, "Business Associations and the Small Manufacturing Sector in India," in Volunteers and Voluntary Associations in Development, ed. David H. Smith and Frederick Elkin (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1981); and Krishnan Lal Sharma, Voluntary Business Associations in Organizational Frame (Punjab: Punjab University Press, 1981).
144. Himbara, Kenyan Capitalists, the State, and Development, pp. 94-95. The Kano State Foundation and the Kano Traders' Multipurpose Cooperative Society are two examples from Nigeria. See Lucas, "State, Civil Society, and Regional Elites."
145. Himbara, Kenyan Capitalists, the State, and Development, pp. 94-95. The Kano State Foundation and the Kano Traders' Multipurpose Cooperative Society are two examples from Nigeria. See Lucas, "State, Civil Society, and Regional Elites."
146. Lindblom, Politics and Markets.