Combating right-wing political extremism in Israel: Critical appraisal

Terrorism and Political Violence

Volumn 9, Issue 4, 1997, Pages 82-105

  Cohen‐Almagor, Raphael ^a,b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF HAIFA   (Israel)

^b The Van Leer Jerusalem Institute   (Israel)

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EID: 0031350481     PISSN: 09546553     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/09546559708427431     Document Type: Article

References (57)

1. The period was of détente between the East and the West blocks and Kahane's violent activities against Russian diplomats and agencies were conceived, at some point, as a danger to the very delicate framework of relationships between the two super-powers. Cf. Cohen-Almagor, 'Vigilant Jewish Fundamentalism: From the JDL to Kach (or 'Shalom Jews, Shalom Dogs')', Terrorism and Political Violence (hereafter TPV) 4/1 (1992) pp.44-66.
2. I use the terms 'Palestinian' and 'Arab' as synonyms. Most Arabs living in Israel in its Green Line (pre-Six Day War of 1967) borders and in the occupied territories identify themselves as Palestinians.
3. For a discussion of some of these measures see Cohen-Almagor, 'Fighting Against Kahanism in Israel: Retrospect and Appraisal', The Anglo-American Law Review 22/4 (1993) pp.447-74.
4. In March 1992, the Company Registrar refused to register the Yeshiva of Jewish Idea at Kfar Tapuach (file no. 58-018-814). The decision was based on section 3 of the Company Law-1980 which holds, inter alia, that a company will not be registered if its goals deny the democratic character of the State of Israel, or if reasonable basis exists to assume that the company would serve as a cover-up for illegal actions. Benjamin Zeev appealed against the decision to the District Court which reversed the Company Registrar's decision. The Company Registrar appealed in turn to the Supreme Court which partly accepted the appeal and partly reversed it. Cf. C.A. 1282/93. The Company Registrar v. Benjamin Zeev Kahane and Others (was not published).
5. In November 1990, a gunman shot an old Palestinian couple immediately after the news concerning Kahane's assassination were conveyed to his family and friends. In November 1992 four teenage members of the 'Kahane Is Alive' movement threw a hand-grenade in the Butcher Market in the Old City of Jerusalem to denote two years to Kahane's murder. As a result, Abd Al-Rasek Adkidak, a 72-year-old Palestinian merchant, was killed and seven others were wounded.
6. In addition to 'The Sword of David' a number of right-wing extremist organizations were involved in violent activities that probably had some kind of affiliation to either 'Kach' or 'Kahane Is Alive'. These were 'Dov' (short in Hebrew for Suppression of Traitors); 'Lechi (Worriers for the Liberty of Israel) 1994'; and 'Eyal' (short for Jewish Belligerent Organization). After Prime Minister Rabin's assassination it was discovered that Eyal was sponsored by the SHABAC, Israel Internal Security Forces. There were grounds to assume that some activists took part in more than one organization.
7. Cf. Zvi Zinger, 'The secret war against the extreme right', Yedioth Ahronoth, 9 Sept. 1994, p.3 (Political Supplement).
8. The Penal Law, Laws of the State of Israel, Chapter Eight, Article One, Section 136 (3) (4) of Special Vol: Penal Law, 5737-1977.
9. Cf. The Official Gazette 24 (29 Sept. 1948).
10. For discussion on the different measures Israel resorted to in its fight against Kahanism see Cohen-Almagor, The Boundaries of Liberty and Tolerance: The Struggle Against Kahanism in Israel (Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida 1994), chaps. 9, 11-13. See also Robert I. Friedman, The False Prophet (London: Faber & Faber 1990).
11. For discussion on the different measures Israel resorted to in its fight against Kahanism see Cohen-Almagor, The Boundaries of Liberty and Tolerance: The Struggle Against Kahanism in Israel (Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida 1994), chaps. 9, 11-13. See also Robert I. Friedman, The False Prophet (London: Faber & Faber 1990).
12. E.A. 2805/92. 'Kach'v Chairperson of the CEC to the 13th Knesset (was not published), and E.A. 2858/92. 'Kahane Is Alive' Movement v. Chairperson of the CEC to the 13th Knesset. P.D. (Piskei Din, Judgments of the Supreme Court) 46 (iii) p.541.
13. Michael Ben-Yair's opinion letter of 10 March 1994 to Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin.
14. Karl Popper urges that we should claim any movement preaching intolerance places itself outside the law, and that we should consider incitement to intolerance and persecution as criminal, in the same way as we should consider incitement to murder or to the revival of the slave trade as criminal. Cf. K.R. Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul 1957) Vol.I, p.265. See also Onora O'Neill, 'Lifeboat Earth', in Charles R. Beitz et al (eds), International Ethics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 1985) pp.262-81, esp. at 263.
15. Karl Popper urges that we should claim any movement preaching intolerance places itself outside the law, and that we should consider incitement to intolerance and persecution as criminal, in the same way as we should consider incitement to murder or to the revival of the slave trade as criminal. Cf. K.R. Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul 1957) Vol.I, p.265. See also Onora O'Neill, 'Lifeboat Earth', in Charles R. Beitz et al (eds), International Ethics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 1985) pp.262-81, esp. at 263.
16. The consequentialist approach is especially prevalent on matters of free speech. Some liberals, however, would extend its reasoning to cover actions as well as expressions. For illustrations of this approach see, for instance, John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Oxford: OUP 1971); T.M. Scanlon, 'A Theory of Freedom of Expression', in R.M. Dworkin (ed.), The Philosophy of Law (Oxford: OUP 1977) pp.153-71; Anthony Skillen, 'Freedom of Speech', in Keith Graham (ed.), Contemporary Political Philosophy (Cambridge: CUP 1982) pp.139-59; Frederick Schauer, Free Speech: A Philosophical Enquiry (New York: Cambridge University Press 1982); Lee C. Bollinger, The Tolerant Society (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1986); and Norman Dorsen, 'Is There A Right to Stop Offensive Speech? The Case of the Nazis at Skokie', in Larry Gostin (ed.), Civil Liberties in Conflict (London: Routledge 1988) pp. 122-35.
17. The consequentialist approach is especially prevalent on matters of free speech. Some liberals, however, would extend its reasoning to cover actions as well as expressions. For illustrations of this approach see, for instance, John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Oxford: OUP 1971); T.M. Scanlon, 'A Theory of Freedom of Expression', in R.M. Dworkin (ed.), The Philosophy of Law (Oxford: OUP 1977) pp.153-71; Anthony Skillen, 'Freedom of Speech', in Keith Graham (ed.), Contemporary Political Philosophy (Cambridge: CUP 1982) pp.139-59; Frederick Schauer, Free Speech: A Philosophical Enquiry (New York: Cambridge University Press 1982); Lee C. Bollinger, The Tolerant Society (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1986); and Norman Dorsen, 'Is There A Right to Stop Offensive Speech? The Case of the Nazis at Skokie', in Larry Gostin (ed.), Civil Liberties in Conflict (London: Routledge 1988) pp. 122-35.
18. The consequentialist approach is especially prevalent on matters of free speech. Some liberals, however, would extend its reasoning to cover actions as well as expressions. For illustrations of this approach see, for instance, John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Oxford: OUP 1971); T.M. Scanlon, 'A Theory of Freedom of Expression', in R.M. Dworkin (ed.), The Philosophy of Law (Oxford: OUP 1977) pp.153-71; Anthony Skillen, 'Freedom of Speech', in Keith Graham (ed.), Contemporary Political Philosophy (Cambridge: CUP 1982) pp.139-59; Frederick Schauer, Free Speech: A Philosophical Enquiry (New York: Cambridge University Press 1982); Lee C. Bollinger, The Tolerant Society (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1986); and Norman Dorsen, 'Is There A Right to Stop Offensive Speech? The Case of the Nazis at Skokie', in Larry Gostin (ed.), Civil Liberties in Conflict (London: Routledge 1988) pp. 122-35.
19. The consequentialist approach is especially prevalent on matters of free speech. Some liberals, however, would extend its reasoning to cover actions as well as expressions. For illustrations of this approach see, for instance, John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Oxford: OUP 1971); T.M. Scanlon, 'A Theory of Freedom of Expression', in R.M. Dworkin (ed.), The Philosophy of Law (Oxford: OUP 1977) pp.153-71; Anthony Skillen, 'Freedom of Speech', in Keith Graham (ed.), Contemporary Political Philosophy (Cambridge: CUP 1982) pp.139-59; Frederick Schauer, Free Speech: A Philosophical Enquiry (New York: Cambridge University Press 1982); Lee C. Bollinger, The Tolerant Society (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1986); and Norman Dorsen, 'Is There A Right to Stop Offensive Speech? The Case of the Nazis at Skokie', in Larry Gostin (ed.), Civil Liberties in Conflict (London: Routledge 1988) pp. 122-35.
20. The consequentialist approach is especially prevalent on matters of free speech. Some liberals, however, would extend its reasoning to cover actions as well as expressions. For illustrations of this approach see, for instance, John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Oxford: OUP 1971); T.M. Scanlon, 'A Theory of Freedom of Expression', in R.M. Dworkin (ed.), The Philosophy of Law (Oxford: OUP 1977) pp.153-71; Anthony Skillen, 'Freedom of Speech', in Keith Graham (ed.), Contemporary Political Philosophy (Cambridge: CUP 1982) pp.139-59; Frederick Schauer, Free Speech: A Philosophical Enquiry (New York: Cambridge University Press 1982); Lee C. Bollinger, The Tolerant Society (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1986); and Norman Dorsen, 'Is There A Right to Stop Offensive Speech? The Case of the Nazis at Skokie', in Larry Gostin (ed.), Civil Liberties in Conflict (London: Routledge 1988) pp. 122-35.
21. The consequentialist approach is especially prevalent on matters of free speech. Some liberals, however, would extend its reasoning to cover actions as well as expressions. For illustrations of this approach see, for instance, John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Oxford: OUP 1971); T.M. Scanlon, 'A Theory of Freedom of Expression', in R.M. Dworkin (ed.), The Philosophy of Law (Oxford: OUP 1977) pp.153-71; Anthony Skillen, 'Freedom of Speech', in Keith Graham (ed.), Contemporary Political Philosophy (Cambridge: CUP 1982) pp.139-59; Frederick Schauer, Free Speech: A Philosophical Enquiry (New York: Cambridge University Press 1982); Lee C. Bollinger, The Tolerant Society (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1986); and Norman Dorsen, 'Is There A Right to Stop Offensive Speech? The Case of the Nazis at Skokie', in Larry Gostin (ed.), Civil Liberties in Conflict (London: Routledge 1988) pp. 122-35.
22. H.C. 253/64. Sabri Jeryis v. Haifa District Commissioner. P.D. 18 (iv) p.673.
23. Ibid., p.679.
24. H.C. 253/64. Sabri Jeryis v. Haifa District Commissioner, p.679. For further discussion see E. A. 1/65. Yeredor v. Chairperson of the Central Committee for the Elections to the Sixth Knesset. P.D. 19 (iii) pp.365, 369-70, 385.
25. H.C. 253/64, at 681. Justice Zvi Berenson concurred, saying that he had nothing to add to his colleagues' judgments. For further discussion see Cohen-Almagor, 'Disqualification of Lists in Israel (1948-1984): Retrospect and Appraisal', Law and Philosophy. 13/1 (1994) pp.43-95.
26. These were Baruch Marsel, Noam Federman, Ben-Zion Gopstein, Baruch Ben-Yoseph, Eyal Noked, Shmuel Ben-Yishai, Shmuel Ben-Yaakov, Avraham Schaar, and Michael Ben-Horin.
27. In Gaza Strip it is called Administrative Detention Order (Temporary Provision, Gaza Area, No. 941), 1988.
28. I L.S.I. 7.
29. For a thorough discussion of this issue see Cohen-Almagor, 'Administrative Detention in Israel and its Employment as a Means of Combating Political Extremism', New York International Law Review 9/2 (1996) pp.1-25.
30. Doron Meiri, 'Kach police in action', Yedioth Ahronoth, 20 July 1994, p.13. Some of the details mentioned in the newspaper were manifested on Channel 1 of Israeli television in its Weekly Review of 29 July 1994.
31. Channel 1, Weekly Review of 29 July 1994. See also Yedioth Ahronoth, 29 July 1994, p.10.
32. Channel 1, Weekly Review of 29 July 1994. See also Yedioth Ahronoth, 29 July 1994, p.10.
33. Attorney Amir Zolty's letter, 23 Nov. 1994.
34. Cf. 'His Wife', Yedioth Ahronoth, 5 Sept. 1994, Rosh Ha'shana (New Year) Supplement, pp. 14-22, at p.20.
35. Studies indicate a positive correlation between education and toleration. Cf. Samuel Stouffer, Community, Conformity, and Civil Liberties (New York: Doubleday 1955); James W. Prothro and Charles M. Grigg, 'Fundamental Principles of Democracy', Journal of Politics 22/2 (1960) pp.275-94; David G. Lawrence, 'Procedural Norms and Tolerance: A Reassessment', APSR 70/1 (1976) pp.80-100; John L. Sullivan, James E. Piereson and George E. Marcus, 'A Reconceptualization of Political Tolerance', APSR 73/3 (1979) pp.781-94; and John L. Sullivan, James E. Piereson, George E. Marcus and Stanley Feldman, 'The Sources of Political Tolerance', APSR 75/1 (1981) pp.92-106.
36. Studies indicate a positive correlation between education and toleration. Cf. Samuel Stouffer, Community, Conformity, and Civil Liberties (New York: Doubleday 1955); James W. Prothro and Charles M. Grigg, 'Fundamental Principles of Democracy', Journal of Politics 22/2 (1960) pp.275-94; David G. Lawrence, 'Procedural Norms and Tolerance: A Reassessment', APSR 70/1 (1976) pp.80-100; John L. Sullivan, James E. Piereson and George E. Marcus, 'A Reconceptualization of Political Tolerance', APSR 73/3 (1979) pp.781-94; and John L. Sullivan, James E. Piereson, George E. Marcus and Stanley Feldman, 'The Sources of Political Tolerance', APSR 75/1 (1981) pp.92-106.
37. Studies indicate a positive correlation between education and toleration. Cf. Samuel Stouffer, Community, Conformity, and Civil Liberties (New York: Doubleday 1955); James W. Prothro and Charles M. Grigg, 'Fundamental Principles of Democracy', Journal of Politics 22/2 (1960) pp.275-94; David G. Lawrence, 'Procedural Norms and Tolerance: A Reassessment', APSR 70/1 (1976) pp.80-100; John L. Sullivan, James E. Piereson and George E. Marcus, 'A Reconceptualization of Political Tolerance', APSR 73/3 (1979) pp.781-94; and John L. Sullivan, James E. Piereson, George E. Marcus and Stanley Feldman, 'The Sources of Political Tolerance', APSR 75/1 (1981) pp.92-106.
38. Studies indicate a positive correlation between education and toleration. Cf. Samuel Stouffer, Community, Conformity, and Civil Liberties (New York: Doubleday 1955); James W. Prothro and Charles M. Grigg, 'Fundamental Principles of Democracy', Journal of Politics 22/2 (1960) pp.275-94; David G. Lawrence, 'Procedural Norms and Tolerance: A Reassessment', APSR 70/1 (1976) pp.80-100; John L. Sullivan, James E. Piereson and George E. Marcus, 'A Reconceptualization of Political Tolerance', APSR 73/3 (1979) pp.781-94; and John L. Sullivan, James E. Piereson, George E. Marcus and Stanley Feldman, 'The Sources of Political Tolerance', APSR 75/1 (1981) pp.92-106.
39. Studies indicate a positive correlation between education and toleration. Cf. Samuel Stouffer, Community, Conformity, and Civil Liberties (New York: Doubleday 1955); James W. Prothro and Charles M. Grigg, 'Fundamental Principles of Democracy', Journal of Politics 22/2 (1960) pp.275-94; David G. Lawrence, 'Procedural Norms and Tolerance: A Reassessment', APSR 70/1 (1976) pp.80-100; John L. Sullivan, James E. Piereson and George E. Marcus, 'A Reconceptualization of Political Tolerance', APSR 73/3 (1979) pp.781-94; and John L. Sullivan, James E. Piereson, George E. Marcus and Stanley Feldman, 'The Sources of Political Tolerance', APSR 75/1 (1981) pp.92-106.
40. This is a reformulation of an example given in chapter 4 of The Boundaries of Liberty and Tolerance (note 10). In the book I speak of denial of the right of immigration. Will Kymlicka convinced me that it is more appropriate to speak of denial of citizenship.
41. Cf. John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press 1993) pp.24, 64, 129, 144.
42. For further discussion on the distinction between tactical and principled compromise see The Boundaries of Liberty and Tolerance (note 10) esp. ch.2.
43. Rawls, Political Liberalism (note 29) pp.30, 62, 213, 217. See also Rawls's, A Theory of Justice (note 14) p.220.
44. Rawls, Political Liberalism (note 29) pp.30, 62, 213, 217. See also Rawls's, A Theory of Justice (note 14) p.220.
45. Section 19(1)(e) of the Canadian Immigration Act enables the country to refuse admission to people who are suspected to be engaged in acts of espionage or subversion against democratic governments, institutions or processes. See Brian Gorlick, 'The Exclusion of "Security Risks" as a Form of Immigration Control: Law and Process in Canada - Part II', Immigration and Nationality Law & Practice 5/4 (1991) pp.109-15.
46. Section 16 of the Australian Migration Act 1958-1966 outlines the various classes of persons who will be treated as prohibited immigrants.
47. Under section 5(1) of the New Zealand Undesirable Immigrants Exclusion Act (1919), the Attorney General has a broad statutory mandate to prohibit the landing of any person when she or he is satisfied that the person is not normally resident in New Zealand, and she or he is disloyal, or is likely by her or his presence to threaten the good of the country.
48. Generally, laws of many democracies grounded four reasons on which foreigners are declared prohibited immigrants. Those are: national security, indigence, public health and criminality.
49. I am not claiming that democracies must always open their borders for immigrants. Democracies can, and do, set quotas on immigration and may decide that for some reasons they are not willing to admit immigrants to their territory. I refer here to the right of democracies to limit immigration on the grounds of immigrants' beliefs. It is implied that only in very special cases which involve groups rather than individuals this should serve as grounds for restricting immigration. On different justifications that were set to limit immigration and means to control it, see Peter B. Maggs and Luke T. Lee, 'North African Migrants Under Western European Law', Texas International Law Journal 11 (1976) pp.225-50; Hugo Storey, 'The Right to Family Life and Immigration Case Law at Strasbourg', International and Comparative Law Quarterly 39 (1990) pp.328-44; and Nana Mallet, 'Deterring Asylum Seekers: German and Danish Law on Political Asylum - Part I', Immigration and Nationality Law & Practices 5/4 (1991) pp.115-22.
50. I am not claiming that democracies must always open their borders for immigrants. Democracies can, and do, set quotas on immigration and may decide that for some reasons they are not willing to admit immigrants to their territory. I refer here to the right of democracies to limit immigration on the grounds of immigrants' beliefs. It is implied that only in very special cases which involve groups rather than individuals this should serve as grounds for restricting immigration. On different justifications that were set to limit immigration and means to control it, see Peter B. Maggs and Luke T. Lee, 'North African Migrants Under Western European Law', Texas International Law Journal 11 (1976) pp.225-50; Hugo Storey, 'The Right to Family Life and Immigration Case Law at Strasbourg', International and Comparative Law Quarterly 39 (1990) pp.328-44; and Nana Mallet, 'Deterring Asylum Seekers: German and Danish Law on Political Asylum - Part I', Immigration and Nationality Law & Practices 5/4 (1991) pp.115-22.
51. I am not claiming that democracies must always open their borders for immigrants. Democracies can, and do, set quotas on immigration and may decide that for some reasons they are not willing to admit immigrants to their territory. I refer here to the right of democracies to limit immigration on the grounds of immigrants' beliefs. It is implied that only in very special cases which involve groups rather than individuals this should serve as grounds for restricting immigration. On different justifications that were set to limit immigration and means to control it, see Peter B. Maggs and Luke T. Lee, 'North African Migrants Under Western European Law', Texas International Law Journal 11 (1976) pp.225-50; Hugo Storey, 'The Right to Family Life and Immigration Case Law at Strasbourg', International and Comparative Law Quarterly 39 (1990) pp.328-44; and Nana Mallet, 'Deterring Asylum Seekers: German and Danish Law on Political Asylum - Part I', Immigration and Nationality Law & Practices 5/4 (1991) pp.115-22.
52. Cf. Rawls, A Theory of Justice (note 14) pp.216-21, at p.219.
53. Ibid., p.218.
54. Cf. Haggai Segal, Dear Brothers (New York: Beit-Shamai Publications 1988) p.181.
55. Aviva Shabi, 'In Tel-Mond I established the redemption movement', Yedioth Ahronoth, 6 Jan. 1989, p. 13 (Political Supplement).
56. Cohen-Almagor, The Boundaries of Liberty and Tolerance (note 10) p.252.
57. On 30 Oct. 1993 two political activists distributed stickers carrying that message in a place called Or Akiva. Judge Amiram Sharon's verdict was three months in jail; six months conditional sentences in jail, and a fine of 1,500 Shekels each. Cf. Criminal file 152/94 State of Israel v. Gil Sharon and Ahuva Vaanunu, Hadera Magistrate's Court.