Adam Ferguson and the paradox of progress and decline

History of Political Thought

Volumn 18, Issue 4, 1997, Pages 677-706

  Hill, Lisa ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0031330105     PISSN: 0143781X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
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References (280)

1. Not Ferguson's term, of course (it was coined this century by Michael Polanyi); rather he employed the phrase 'the result of human action, but not the execution of any human design' to account for social order (Adam Ferguson, An Essay on the History of Civil Society, ed. Duncan Forbes (Edinburgh, 1967) (hereafter Essay) p. 122). For further discussion of Ferguson's model see R. Hamowy, The Scottish Enlightenment and the Theory of Spontaneous Order (Carbondale, 1987); and F.A. Hayek, 'The Results of Human Actions but not of Human Design', Studies in Philosophy, Politics and Economics (London, 1967), p. 97.
2. Not Ferguson's term, of course (it was coined this century by Michael Polanyi); rather he employed the phrase 'the result of human action, but not the execution of any human design' to account for social order (Adam Ferguson, An Essay on the History of Civil Society, ed. Duncan Forbes (Edinburgh, 1967) (hereafter Essay) p. 122). For further discussion of Ferguson's model see R. Hamowy, The Scottish Enlightenment and the Theory of Spontaneous Order (Carbondale, 1987); and F.A. Hayek, 'The Results of Human Actions but not of Human Design', Studies in Philosophy, Politics and Economics (London, 1967), p. 97.
3. Not Ferguson's term, of course (it was coined this century by Michael Polanyi); rather he employed the phrase 'the result of human action, but not the execution of any human design' to account for social order (Adam Ferguson, An Essay on the History of Civil Society, ed. Duncan Forbes (Edinburgh, 1967) (hereafter Essay) p. 122). For further discussion of Ferguson's model see R. Hamowy, The Scottish Enlightenment and the Theory of Spontaneous Order (Carbondale, 1987); and F.A. Hayek, 'The Results of Human Actions but not of Human Design', Studies in Philosophy, Politics and Economics (London, 1967), p. 97.
4. A phrase suggested by the title of an article by Robert Heilbroner in which he argues for a similar dualism in Adam Smith's work (R.L. Heilbroner, 'The Paradox of Progress: Decline and Decay in the Wealth of Nations', Journal of the History of Ideas, 34 (1973), pp. 243-62).
5. Essay, pp. 122-3.
6. Adam Ferguson, 'Of the Principle of Moral Estimation: A Discourse Between David Hume, Robert Clerk, and Adam Smith: An Unpublished MS by Adam Ferguson', Journal of the History of Ideas, 21 (1960), pp. 222-32, p. 232; Adam Ferguson, Institutes of Moral Philosophy (hereafter Institutes) (New York, 1978), p. 87.
7. Adam Ferguson, 'Of the Principle of Moral Estimation: A Discourse Between David Hume, Robert Clerk, and Adam Smith: An Unpublished MS by Adam Ferguson', Journal of the History of Ideas, 21 (1960), pp. 222-32, p. 232; Adam Ferguson, Institutes of Moral Philosophy (hereafter Institutes) (New York, 1978), p. 87.
8. Adam Ferguson, Principles of Moral and Political Science (Edinburgh, 1792) (hereafter Principles) II, pp. 425, 381; Principles, I, pp. 237, 250.
9. Adam Ferguson, Principles of Moral and Political Science (Edinburgh, 1792) (hereafter Principles) II, pp. 425, 381; Principles, I, pp. 237, 250.
10. Essay, pp. 140-4; Institutes, pp. 24-5; Principles, I, pp. 27-8; Adam Ferguson, The History of the Progress and Termination of the Roman Republic (London, 1834) (hereafter History), p. 449.
11. Essay, pp. 140-4; Institutes, pp. 24-5; Principles, I, pp. 27-8; Adam Ferguson, The History of the Progress and Termination of the Roman Republic (London, 1834) (hereafter History), p. 449.
12. Essay, pp. 140-4; Institutes, pp. 24-5; Principles, I, pp. 27-8; Adam Ferguson, The History of the Progress and Termination of the Roman Republic (London, 1834) (hereafter History), p. 449.
13. Essay, pp. 140-4; Institutes, pp. 24-5; Principles, I, pp. 27-8; Adam Ferguson, The History of the Progress and Termination of the Roman Republic (London, 1834) (hereafter History), p. 449.
14. Institutes, p. 126.
15. Essay, pp. 123-4; 'Of the Separation of the Departments and Tasks Resulting from the Progress of Arts in Society', unpublished essay by Adam Ferguson, Kochi University Review, ed. Yasuo Amoh, no. 29 (July 1987), pp. 71-85, p. 84; Essay, pp. 168-9, 176.
16. Essay, pp. 123-4; 'Of the Separation of the Departments and Tasks Resulting from the Progress of Arts in Society', unpublished essay by Adam Ferguson, Kochi University Review, ed. Yasuo Amoh, no. 29 (July 1987), pp. 71-85, p. 84; Essay, pp. 168-9, 176.
17. Essay, pp. 123-4; 'Of the Separation of the Departments and Tasks Resulting from the Progress of Arts in Society', unpublished essay by Adam Ferguson, Kochi University Review, ed. Yasuo Amoh, no. 29 (July 1987), pp. 71-85, p. 84; Essay, pp. 168-9, 176.
18. Essay, pp. 121-3, 168-70, 182; Principles, I, pp. 207-8; Principles, II, p. 509. In the case of language, for example, 'no single genius, however vast, is equal to the invention of a language' (Principles, I, pp. 42-5).
19. Essay, pp. 121-3, 168-70, 182; Principles, I, pp. 207-8; Principles, II, p. 509. In the case of language, for example, 'no single genius, however vast, is equal to the invention of a language' (Principles, I, pp. 42-5).
20. Essay, pp. 121-3, 168-70, 182; Principles, I, pp. 207-8; Principles, II, p. 509. In the case of language, for example, 'no single genius, however vast, is equal to the invention of a language' (Principles, I, pp. 42-5).
21. Essay, pp. 121-3, 168-70, 182; Principles, I, pp. 207-8; Principles, II, p. 509. In the case of language, for example, 'no single genius, however vast, is equal to the invention of a language' (Principles, I, pp. 42-5).
22. Essay, pp. 205-7. Unlike Smith and Millar, with their 'Four Stages' means of subsistence schema, Ferguson adopts a three-stage paradigm in which categories are based on social structure. These are 'savage', 'barbarous' and 'polished' and refer to the level of laws, government, 'proficiency in liberal and mechanical arts, in literature and in commerce' (Essay, p. 205). For his own purposes, Ferguson is correct to base his categories on social, as opposed to economic, forms because his emphasis is with social and political, rather than economic, conditions (D. MacRae, 'Adam Ferguson; Sociologist', New Society, 24 (1966), pp. 792-4, p. 794). 'Civilization', by its nature, 'belongs rather to the effects of law and political establishment, on the forms of society, than to any state merely of lucrative possession of wealth' (Principles, I, p. 252). The terms 'polished' and 'civilized' are not merely about proficiency or refinement in arts and commerce, scholarship or manners, as with Smith and Millar, but refer more importantly to 'effective political condition' and citizenship or 'civic spirit', hence John Pocock's designation of Ferguson's analysis as 'perhaps the most Machiavellian of the Scottish disquisitions of this theme' (see J.G.A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment (Princeton, 1975), p. 499; D. Kettler, 'History and Theory in Ferguson's Essay on the History of Civil Society: A Reconsideration', Political Theory, 5 (1977), pp. 437-60, p. 451). Curiously, Ferguson seems to adopt Smith's and Millar's Four Stage 'means of subsistence' schema (hunting, pastoral, agricultural and commercial) in the Institutes (pp. 28- 30). But it is unlikely that this represents a departure from the tri-stadial model. The discussion focuses narrowly on technologies and modes of 'subsistence', and there is no suggestion that such modes of subsistence define the 'ages' to which he vaguely alludes in these passages. Ferguson continued to insist as late as the Principles that his categories were political and social rather than economic (Principles, I, p. 252). It is entirely possible for a nation to be 'polished' or 'civilized' without necessarily being 'commercial' (Essay, pp. 199-200).
23. Essay, pp. 205-7. Unlike Smith and Millar, with their 'Four Stages' means of subsistence schema, Ferguson adopts a three-stage paradigm in which categories are based on social structure. These are 'savage', 'barbarous' and 'polished' and refer to the level of laws, government, 'proficiency in liberal and mechanical arts, in literature and in commerce' (Essay, p. 205). For his own purposes, Ferguson is correct to base his categories on social, as opposed to economic, forms because his emphasis is with social and political, rather than economic, conditions (D. MacRae, 'Adam Ferguson; Sociologist', New Society, 24 (1966), pp. 792-4, p. 794). 'Civilization', by its nature, 'belongs rather to the effects of law and political establishment, on the forms of society, than to any state merely of lucrative possession of wealth' (Principles, I, p. 252). The terms 'polished' and 'civilized' are not merely about proficiency or refinement in arts and commerce, scholarship or manners, as with Smith and Millar, but refer more importantly to 'effective political condition' and citizenship or 'civic spirit', hence John Pocock's designation of Ferguson's analysis as 'perhaps the most Machiavellian of the Scottish disquisitions of this theme' (see J.G.A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment (Princeton, 1975), p. 499; D. Kettler, 'History and Theory in Ferguson's Essay on the History of Civil Society: A Reconsideration', Political Theory, 5 (1977), pp. 437-60, p. 451). Curiously, Ferguson seems to adopt Smith's and Millar's Four Stage 'means of subsistence' schema (hunting, pastoral, agricultural and commercial) in the Institutes (pp. 28- 30). But it is unlikely that this represents a departure from the tri-stadial model. The discussion focuses narrowly on technologies and modes of 'subsistence', and there is no suggestion that such modes of subsistence define the 'ages' to which he vaguely alludes in these passages. Ferguson continued to insist as late as the Principles that his categories were political and social rather than economic (Principles, I, p. 252). It is entirely possible for a nation to be 'polished' or 'civilized' without necessarily being 'commercial' (Essay, pp. 199-200).
24. Essay, pp. 205-7. Unlike Smith and Millar, with their 'Four Stages' means of subsistence schema, Ferguson adopts a three-stage paradigm in which categories are based on social structure. These are 'savage', 'barbarous' and 'polished' and refer to the level of laws, government, 'proficiency in liberal and mechanical arts, in literature and in commerce' (Essay, p. 205). For his own purposes, Ferguson is correct to base his categories on social, as opposed to economic, forms because his emphasis is with social and political, rather than economic, conditions (D. MacRae, 'Adam Ferguson; Sociologist', New Society, 24 (1966), pp. 792-4, p. 794). 'Civilization', by its nature, 'belongs rather to the effects of law and political establishment, on the forms of society, than to any state merely of lucrative possession of wealth' (Principles, I, p. 252). The terms 'polished' and 'civilized' are not merely about proficiency or refinement in arts and commerce, scholarship or manners, as with Smith and Millar, but refer more importantly to 'effective political condition' and citizenship or 'civic spirit', hence John Pocock's designation of Ferguson's analysis as 'perhaps the most Machiavellian of the Scottish disquisitions of this theme' (see J.G.A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment (Princeton, 1975), p. 499; D. Kettler, 'History and Theory in Ferguson's Essay on the History of Civil Society: A Reconsideration', Political Theory, 5 (1977), pp. 437-60, p. 451). Curiously, Ferguson seems to adopt Smith's and Millar's Four Stage 'means of subsistence' schema (hunting, pastoral, agricultural and commercial) in the Institutes (pp. 28- 30). But it is unlikely that this represents a departure from the tri-stadial model. The discussion focuses narrowly on technologies and modes of 'subsistence', and there is no suggestion that such modes of subsistence define the 'ages' to which he vaguely alludes in these passages. Ferguson continued to insist as late as the Principles that his categories were political and social rather than economic (Principles, I, p. 252). It is entirely possible for a nation to be 'polished' or 'civilized' without necessarily being 'commercial' (Essay, pp. 199-200).
25. Essay, pp. 205-7. Unlike Smith and Millar, with their 'Four Stages' means of subsistence schema, Ferguson adopts a three-stage paradigm in which categories are based on social structure. These are 'savage', 'barbarous' and 'polished' and refer to the level of laws, government, 'proficiency in liberal and mechanical arts, in literature and in commerce' (Essay, p. 205). For his own purposes, Ferguson is correct to base his categories on social, as opposed to economic, forms because his emphasis is with social and political, rather than economic, conditions (D. MacRae, 'Adam Ferguson; Sociologist', New Society, 24 (1966), pp. 792-4, p. 794). 'Civilization', by its nature, 'belongs rather to the effects of law and political establishment, on the forms of society, than to any state merely of lucrative possession of wealth' (Principles, I, p. 252). The terms 'polished' and 'civilized' are not merely about proficiency or refinement in arts and commerce, scholarship or manners, as with Smith and Millar, but refer more importantly to 'effective political condition' and citizenship or 'civic spirit', hence John Pocock's designation of Ferguson's analysis as 'perhaps the most Machiavellian of the Scottish disquisitions of this theme' (see J.G.A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment (Princeton, 1975), p. 499; D. Kettler, 'History and Theory in Ferguson's Essay on the History of Civil Society: A Reconsideration', Political Theory, 5 (1977), pp. 437-60, p. 451). Curiously, Ferguson seems to adopt Smith's and Millar's Four Stage 'means of subsistence' schema (hunting, pastoral, agricultural and commercial) in the Institutes (pp. 28- 30). But it is unlikely that this represents a departure from the tri-stadial model. The discussion focuses narrowly on technologies and modes of 'subsistence', and there is no suggestion that such modes of subsistence define the 'ages' to which he vaguely alludes in these passages. Ferguson continued to insist as late as the Principles that his categories were political and social rather than economic (Principles, I, p. 252). It is entirely possible for a nation to be 'polished' or 'civilized' without necessarily being 'commercial' (Essay, pp. 199-200).
26. Essay, pp. 205-7. Unlike Smith and Millar, with their 'Four Stages' means of subsistence schema, Ferguson adopts a three-stage paradigm in which categories are based on social structure. These are 'savage', 'barbarous' and 'polished' and refer to the level of laws, government, 'proficiency in liberal and mechanical arts, in literature and in commerce' (Essay, p. 205). For his own purposes, Ferguson is correct to base his categories on social, as opposed to economic, forms because his emphasis is with social and political, rather than economic, conditions (D. MacRae, 'Adam Ferguson; Sociologist', New Society, 24 (1966), pp. 792-4, p. 794). 'Civilization', by its nature, 'belongs rather to the effects of law and political establishment, on the forms of society, than to any state merely of lucrative possession of wealth' (Principles, I, p. 252). The terms 'polished' and 'civilized' are not merely about proficiency or refinement in arts and commerce, scholarship or manners, as with Smith and Millar, but refer more importantly to 'effective political condition' and citizenship or 'civic spirit', hence John Pocock's designation of Ferguson's analysis as 'perhaps the most Machiavellian of the Scottish disquisitions of this theme' (see J.G.A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment (Princeton, 1975), p. 499; D. Kettler, 'History and Theory in Ferguson's Essay on the History of Civil Society: A Reconsideration', Political Theory, 5 (1977), pp. 437-60, p. 451). Curiously, Ferguson seems to adopt Smith's and Millar's Four Stage 'means of subsistence' schema (hunting, pastoral, agricultural and commercial) in the Institutes (pp. 28- 30). But it is unlikely that this represents a departure from the tri-stadial model. The discussion focuses narrowly on technologies and modes of 'subsistence', and there is no suggestion that such modes of subsistence define the 'ages' to which he vaguely alludes in these passages. Ferguson continued to insist as late as the Principles that his categories were political and social rather than economic (Principles, I, p. 252). It is entirely possible for a nation to be 'polished' or 'civilized' without necessarily being 'commercial' (Essay, pp. 199-200).
27. Essay, pp. 205-7. Unlike Smith and Millar, with their 'Four Stages' means of subsistence schema, Ferguson adopts a three-stage paradigm in which categories are based on social structure. These are 'savage', 'barbarous' and 'polished' and refer to the level of laws, government, 'proficiency in liberal and mechanical arts, in literature and in commerce' (Essay, p. 205). For his own purposes, Ferguson is correct to base his categories on social, as opposed to economic, forms because his emphasis is with social and political, rather than economic, conditions (D. MacRae, 'Adam Ferguson; Sociologist', New Society, 24 (1966), pp. 792-4, p. 794). 'Civilization', by its nature, 'belongs rather to the effects of law and political establishment, on the forms of society, than to any state merely of lucrative possession of wealth' (Principles, I, p. 252). The terms 'polished' and 'civilized' are not merely about proficiency or refinement in arts and commerce, scholarship or manners, as with Smith and Millar, but refer more importantly to 'effective political condition' and citizenship or 'civic spirit', hence John Pocock's designation of Ferguson's analysis as 'perhaps the most Machiavellian of the Scottish disquisitions of this theme' (see J.G.A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment (Princeton, 1975), p. 499; D. Kettler, 'History and Theory in Ferguson's Essay on the History of Civil Society: A Reconsideration', Political Theory, 5 (1977), pp. 437-60, p. 451). Curiously, Ferguson seems to adopt Smith's and Millar's Four Stage 'means of subsistence' schema (hunting, pastoral, agricultural and commercial) in the Institutes (pp. 28- 30). But it is unlikely that this represents a departure from the tri-stadial model. The discussion focuses narrowly on technologies and modes of 'subsistence', and there is no suggestion that such modes of subsistence define the 'ages' to which he vaguely alludes in these passages. Ferguson continued to insist as late as the Principles that his categories were political and social rather than economic (Principles, I, p. 252). It is entirely possible for a nation to be 'polished' or 'civilized' without necessarily being 'commercial' (Essay, pp. 199-200).
28. Essay, pp. 205-7. Unlike Smith and Millar, with their 'Four Stages' means of subsistence schema, Ferguson adopts a three-stage paradigm in which categories are based on social structure. These are 'savage', 'barbarous' and 'polished' and refer to the level of laws, government, 'proficiency in liberal and mechanical arts, in literature and in commerce' (Essay, p. 205). For his own purposes, Ferguson is correct to base his categories on social, as opposed to economic, forms because his emphasis is with social and political, rather than economic, conditions (D. MacRae, 'Adam Ferguson; Sociologist', New Society, 24 (1966), pp. 792-4, p. 794). 'Civilization', by its nature, 'belongs rather to the effects of law and political establishment, on the forms of society, than to any state merely of lucrative possession of wealth' (Principles, I, p. 252). The terms 'polished' and 'civilized' are not merely about proficiency or refinement in arts and commerce, scholarship or manners, as with Smith and Millar, but refer more importantly to 'effective political condition' and citizenship or 'civic spirit', hence John Pocock's designation of Ferguson's analysis as 'perhaps the most Machiavellian of the Scottish disquisitions of this theme' (see J.G.A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment (Princeton, 1975), p. 499; D. Kettler, 'History and Theory in Ferguson's Essay on the History of Civil Society: A Reconsideration', Political Theory, 5 (1977), pp. 437-60, p. 451). Curiously, Ferguson seems to adopt Smith's and Millar's Four Stage 'means of subsistence' schema (hunting, pastoral, agricultural and commercial) in the Institutes (pp. 28-30). But it is unlikely that this represents a departure from the tri-stadial model. The discussion focuses narrowly on technologies and modes of 'subsistence', and there is no suggestion that such modes of subsistence define the 'ages' to which he vaguely alludes in these passages. Ferguson continued to insist as late as the Principles that his categories were political and social rather than economic (Principles, I, p. 252). It is entirely possible for a nation to be 'polished' or 'civilized' without necessarily being 'commercial' (Essay, pp. 199-200).
29. Essay, pp. 205-7. Unlike Smith and Millar, with their 'Four Stages' means of subsistence schema, Ferguson adopts a three-stage paradigm in which categories are based on social structure. These are 'savage', 'barbarous' and 'polished' and refer to the level of laws, government, 'proficiency in liberal and mechanical arts, in literature and in commerce' (Essay, p. 205). For his own purposes, Ferguson is correct to base his categories on social, as opposed to economic, forms because his emphasis is with social and political, rather than economic, conditions (D. MacRae, 'Adam Ferguson; Sociologist', New Society, 24 (1966), pp. 792-4, p. 794). 'Civilization', by its nature, 'belongs rather to the effects of law and political establishment, on the forms of society, than to any state merely of lucrative possession of wealth' (Principles, I, p. 252). The terms 'polished' and 'civilized' are not merely about proficiency or refinement in arts and commerce, scholarship or manners, as with Smith and Millar, but refer more importantly to 'effective political condition' and citizenship or 'civic spirit', hence John Pocock's designation of Ferguson's analysis as 'perhaps the most Machiavellian of the Scottish disquisitions of this theme' (see J.G.A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment (Princeton, 1975), p. 499; D. Kettler, 'History and Theory in Ferguson's Essay on the History of Civil Society: A Reconsideration', Political Theory, 5 (1977), pp. 437-60, p. 451). Curiously, Ferguson seems to adopt Smith's and Millar's Four Stage 'means of subsistence' schema (hunting, pastoral, agricultural and commercial) in the Institutes (pp. 28- 30). But it is unlikely that this represents a departure from the tri-stadial model. The discussion focuses narrowly on technologies and modes of 'subsistence', and there is no suggestion that such modes of subsistence define the 'ages' to which he vaguely alludes in these passages. Ferguson continued to insist as late as the Principles that his categories were political and social rather than economic (Principles, I, p. 252). It is entirely possible for a nation to be 'polished' or 'civilized' without necessarily being 'commercial' (Essay, pp. 199-200).
30. Essay, pp. 205-7. Unlike Smith and Millar, with their 'Four Stages' means of subsistence schema, Ferguson adopts a three-stage paradigm in which categories are based on social structure. These are 'savage', 'barbarous' and 'polished' and refer to the level of laws, government, 'proficiency in liberal and mechanical arts, in literature and in commerce' (Essay, p. 205). For his own purposes, Ferguson is correct to base his categories on social, as opposed to economic, forms because his emphasis is with social and political, rather than economic, conditions (D. MacRae, 'Adam Ferguson; Sociologist', New Society, 24 (1966), pp. 792-4, p. 794). 'Civilization', by its nature, 'belongs rather to the effects of law and political establishment, on the forms of society, than to any state merely of lucrative possession of wealth' (Principles, I, p. 252). The terms 'polished' and 'civilized' are not merely about proficiency or refinement in arts and commerce, scholarship or manners, as with Smith and Millar, but refer more importantly to 'effective political condition' and citizenship or 'civic spirit', hence John Pocock's designation of Ferguson's analysis as 'perhaps the most Machiavellian of the Scottish disquisitions of this theme' (see J.G.A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment (Princeton, 1975), p. 499; D. Kettler, 'History and Theory in Ferguson's Essay on the History of Civil Society: A Reconsideration', Political Theory, 5 (1977), pp. 437-60, p. 451). Curiously, Ferguson seems to adopt Smith's and Millar's Four Stage 'means of subsistence' schema (hunting, pastoral, agricultural and commercial) in the Institutes (pp. 28- 30). But it is unlikely that this represents a departure from the tri-stadial model. The discussion focuses narrowly on technologies and modes of 'subsistence', and there is no suggestion that such modes of subsistence define the 'ages' to which he vaguely alludes in these passages. Ferguson continued to insist as late as the Principles that his categories were political and social rather than economic (Principles, I, p. 252). It is entirely possible for a nation to be 'polished' or 'civilized' without necessarily being 'commercial' (Essay, pp. 199-200).
31. Principles, I, p. 313. Elsewhere Ferguson reiterates that genuine progress emanates exclusively from an endogenous cause; it 'proceed(s) from a principle of advancement in the subject itself' (Principles, I, pp. 190-1). See also 'Of Nature and Art', The Unpublished Essays of Adam Ferguson, ed. Winifred Philip (3 vols., Argull, 1986), Vol. 3, pp. 150-1.
32. Principles, I, p. 313. Elsewhere Ferguson reiterates that genuine progress emanates exclusively from an endogenous cause; it 'proceed(s) from a principle of advancement in the subject itself' (Principles, I, pp. 190-1). See also 'Of Nature and Art', The Unpublished Essays of Adam Ferguson, ed. Winifred Philip (3 vols., Argull, 1986), Vol. 3, pp. 150-1.
33. Principles, I, p. 313. Elsewhere Ferguson reiterates that genuine progress emanates exclusively from an endogenous cause; it 'proceed(s) from a principle of advancement in the subject itself' (Principles, I, pp. 190-1). See also 'Of Nature and Art', The Unpublished Essays of Adam Ferguson, ed. Winifred Philip (3 vols., Argull, 1986), Vol. 3, pp. 150-1.
34. Principles, I, p. 236.
35. Ibid., p. 207.
36. A.O. Hirschman, The Passions and the Interests (New Jersey, 1977), pp. 32-7.
37. Smith thought that '(t)he objects of avarice and ambition differ only in their greatness' (Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, ed. D.D. Raphael and A.L. MacFie (Oxford, 1976), III.6.7, p. 174) and defines ambition more narrowly as the desire for eminence, of 'real superiority, of leading and directing the judgements and conduct of other people' (ibid., VII.iv.25, p. 336).
38. Smith thought that '(t)he objects of avarice and ambition differ only in their greatness' (Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, ed. D.D. Raphael and A.L. MacFie (Oxford, 1976), III.6.7, p. 174) and defines ambition more narrowly as the desire for eminence, of 'real superiority, of leading and directing the judgements and conduct of other people' (ibid., VII.iv.25, p. 336).
39. Principles, I, p. 207. Ferguson adopted the narrower sense of ambition in his earlier works and used only the broader, moral sense in his later work, The Principles (J.A. Bernstein, 'Adam Ferguson and the Idea of Progress', Studies in Burke and His Time, 19 (2) (1978), pp. 99-118, pp. 105-6). Progressive instincts are certainly at work in the Essay but they are not yet labelled ambition. By the Principles 'ambition' becomes a generalized desire for excellence which may be expressed beneficently, consciously and socially on the one hand, as well as personally, self-interestedly and unconsciously on the other (Principles, I, pp. 236-9).
40. Principles, I, p. 207. Ferguson adopted the narrower sense of ambition in his earlier works and used only the broader, moral sense in his later work, The Principles (J.A. Bernstein, 'Adam Ferguson and the Idea of Progress', Studies in Burke and His Time, 19 (2) (1978), pp. 99-118, pp. 105-6). Progressive instincts are certainly at work in the Essay but they are not yet labelled ambition. By the Principles 'ambition' becomes a generalized desire for excellence which may be expressed beneficently, consciously and socially on the one hand, as well as personally, self-interestedly and unconsciously on the other (Principles, I, pp. 236-9).
41. Principles, I, p. 207. Ferguson adopted the narrower sense of ambition in his earlier works and used only the broader, moral sense in his later work, The Principles (J.A. Bernstein, 'Adam Ferguson and the Idea of Progress', Studies in Burke and His Time, 19 (2) (1978), pp. 99-118, pp. 105-6). Progressive instincts are certainly at work in the Essay but they are not yet labelled ambition. By the Principles 'ambition' becomes a generalized desire for excellence which may be expressed beneficently, consciously and socially on the one hand, as well as personally, self-interestedly and unconsciously on the other (Principles, I, pp. 236-9).
42. Principles, I, p. 235; see also Adam Ferguson, 'Of Things That Are or May Be', Unpublished Essays, ed. Philip, Vol. 3, p. 113.
43. Principles, I, p. 235; see also Adam Ferguson, 'Of Things That Are or May Be', Unpublished Essays, ed. Philip, Vol. 3, p. 113.
44. Essay, pp. 8, 123, 205-7; Principles, I, pp. 190, 313.
45. Essay, pp. 8, 123, 205-7; Principles, I, pp. 190, 313.
46. For Ferguson, Rome is 'a signal example of the vicissitudes to which prosperous nations are exposed . . . To know it well is to know mankind' (History, p. 2).
47. Essay, pp. 211, 237-9; Principles, II, p. 153.
48. Essay, pp. 211, 237-9; Principles, II, p. 153.
49. Essay, pp. 186-7. See also History, p. 468.
50. Essay, pp. 186-7. See also History, p. 468.
51. Essay, pp. 217-20.
52. Ibid., p. 240.
53. Ibid., p. 255. The separation of the statesman/warrior function worried Ferguson enormously. Apart from degeneration in statesmen, military specialization also led to a general decline in public virtue, hence his insistence on the superiority of a citizen militia. It is a theme which runs through all his works. He published two pamphlets on the subject in 1761, both of which excited considerable attention; they were entitled: Reflections Previous to the Establishment of a Militia and The History of the Proceedings in the Case of Margaret, Commonly Called Peg, Only Lawful Sister of John Bull, Esq. In them he argued for the right of Scotland to have its own militia. See also Ferguson, 'Of the Separation of the Departments'.
54. Ibid., p. 255. The separation of the statesman/warrior function worried Ferguson enormously. Apart from degeneration in statesmen, military specialization also led to a general decline in public virtue, hence his insistence on the superiority of a citizen militia. It is a theme which runs through all his works. He published two pamphlets on the subject in 1761, both of which excited considerable attention; they were entitled: Reflections Previous to the Establishment of a Militia and The History of the Proceedings in the Case of Margaret, Commonly Called Peg, Only Lawful Sister of John Bull, Esq. In them he argued for the right of Scotland to have its own militia. See also Ferguson, 'Of the Separation of the Departments'.
55. Essay, pp. 240-1.
56. Ibid., p. 271. See also Principles, I, pp. 34-5.
57. Ibid., p. 271. See also Principles, I, pp. 34-5.
58. Essay, pp. 276-7. See also History, p. 468.
59. Essay, pp. 276-7. See also History, p. 468.
60. Essay, p. 278.
61. Essay, p. 110.
62. D. Kettler, The Social and Political Thought of Adam Ferguson (Indiana, 1965), p. 130.
63. Bernstein,'Adam Ferguson and the Idea of Progress'.
64. W.C. Lehmann, 'Review of P. Salvucci's "Adam Ferguson: Sociologica e Filosofia Politica"', History and Society, Vol. 13 (1974), pp. 163-81.
65. Jean Willke is an exception here; her unpublished doctoral thesis was discovered by the author towards the end of writing this piece and the approaches share much in common. See J. Willke, 'The Historical Thought of Adam Ferguson', Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation (Washington DC, 1962).
66. Ferguson writes that the 'suggestion of final causes, or of an arrangement in the works of nature' cannot be accounted for in explanations involving 'mechanism' alone (Principles, I, p. 312). See also Principles, I, pp. vii, 53, 180; Principles, II, p. 27; Essay, pp. 55, 90-1.
67. Ferguson writes that the 'suggestion of final causes, or of an arrangement in the works of nature' cannot be accounted for in explanations involving 'mechanism' alone (Principles, I, p. 312). See also Principles, I, pp. vii, 53, 180; Principles, II, p. 27; Essay, pp. 55, 90-1.
68. Ferguson writes that the 'suggestion of final causes, or of an arrangement in the works of nature' cannot be accounted for in explanations involving 'mechanism' alone (Principles, I, p. 312). See also Principles, I, pp. vii, 53, 180; Principles, II, p. 27; Essay, pp. 55, 90-1.
69. Ferguson writes that the 'suggestion of final causes, or of an arrangement in the works of nature' cannot be accounted for in explanations involving 'mechanism' alone (Principles, I, p. 312). See also Principles, I, pp. vii, 53, 180; Principles, II, p. 27; Essay, pp. 55, 90-1.
70. Ferguson quotes Marcus Aurelius in the Principles as the finest expositor ever of religious piety, noting that 'such sentiments of a sublime religion may be justly considered as the highest attainments of created intelligence'. The writings of both Marcus and Epictetus are deemed the 'most sublime' (Principles, I, p. 312). For specific references to Epictetus see for example, Institutes, p. 158; Essay, pp. 38,55; Principles, II, pp. 359- 60, Principles, I, p. 7. For Marcus Aurelius: Principles, II, p. 356; Principles, I, pp. 310, 312. The latter attained a species of 'god-like eminence' (Principles, I, pp. 331-2) and was considered the 'most perfectly virtuous' (Principles, I, p. 336). An awareness of Stoicism probably came to Ferguson via Shaftesbury and Hutcheson (G. Bryson, Man and Society, The Scottish Enquiry of the Eighteenth Century (Princeton, 1945), p. 55; Principles, I, p. 8). Though Ferguson singled out Marcus Aurelius and Epictetus particularly, he admired all the Stoic philosophers. See, for example, History, p. 170; Principles, I, pp. 7-8; See also J. Small, 'Biographical Sketch of Adam Ferguson', in Edinburgh Review, Vol.75, no. 255 (1867), pp. 48-85. For further discussion of Ferguson's Stoicism see, for example, N. Waszek, Man's Social Nature: A Topic of the Scottish Enlightenment in its Historical Setting (Frankfurt, 1986), Ch. 5.
71. Ferguson quotes Marcus Aurelius in the Principles as the finest expositor ever of religious piety, noting that 'such sentiments of a sublime religion may be justly considered as the highest attainments of created intelligence'. The writings of both Marcus and Epictetus are deemed the 'most sublime' (Principles, I, p. 312). For specific references to Epictetus see for example, Institutes, p. 158; Essay, pp. 38,55; Principles, II, pp. 359- 60, Principles, I, p. 7. For Marcus Aurelius: Principles, II, p. 356; Principles, I, pp. 310, 312. The latter attained a species of 'god-like eminence' (Principles, I, pp. 331-2) and was considered the 'most perfectly virtuous' (Principles, I, p. 336). An awareness of Stoicism probably came to Ferguson via Shaftesbury and Hutcheson (G. Bryson, Man and Society, The Scottish Enquiry of the Eighteenth Century (Princeton, 1945), p. 55; Principles, I, p. 8). Though Ferguson singled out Marcus Aurelius and Epictetus particularly, he admired all the Stoic philosophers. See, for example, History, p. 170; Principles, I, pp. 7-8; See also J. Small, 'Biographical Sketch of Adam Ferguson', in Edinburgh Review, Vol.75, no. 255 (1867), pp. 48-85. For further discussion of Ferguson's Stoicism see, for example, N. Waszek, Man's Social Nature: A Topic of the Scottish Enlightenment in its Historical Setting (Frankfurt, 1986), Ch. 5.
72. Ferguson quotes Marcus Aurelius in the Principles as the finest expositor ever of religious piety, noting that 'such sentiments of a sublime religion may be justly considered as the highest attainments of created intelligence'. The writings of both Marcus and Epictetus are deemed the 'most sublime' (Principles, I, p. 312). For specific references to Epictetus see for example, Institutes, p. 158; Essay, pp. 38,55; Principles, II, pp. 359- 60, Principles, I, p. 7. For Marcus Aurelius: Principles, II, p. 356; Principles, I, pp. 310, 312. The latter attained a species of 'god-like eminence' (Principles, I, pp. 331-2) and was considered the 'most perfectly virtuous' (Principles, I, p. 336). An awareness of Stoicism probably came to Ferguson via Shaftesbury and Hutcheson (G. Bryson, Man and Society, The Scottish Enquiry of the Eighteenth Century (Princeton, 1945), p. 55; Principles, I, p. 8). Though Ferguson singled out Marcus Aurelius and Epictetus particularly, he admired all the Stoic philosophers. See, for example, History, p. 170; Principles, I, pp. 7-8; See also J. Small, 'Biographical Sketch of Adam Ferguson', in Edinburgh Review, Vol.75, no. 255 (1867), pp. 48-85. For further discussion of Ferguson's Stoicism see, for example, N. Waszek, Man's Social Nature: A Topic of the Scottish Enlightenment in its Historical Setting (Frankfurt, 1986), Ch. 5.
73. Ferguson quotes Marcus Aurelius in the Principles as the finest expositor ever of religious piety, noting that 'such sentiments of a sublime religion may be justly considered as the highest attainments of created intelligence'. The writings of both Marcus and Epictetus are deemed the 'most sublime' (Principles, I, p. 312). For specific references to Epictetus see for example, Institutes, p. 158; Essay, pp. 38,55; Principles, II, pp. 359-60, Principles, I, p. 7. For Marcus Aurelius: Principles, II, p. 356; Principles, I, pp. 310, 312. The latter attained a species of 'god-like eminence' (Principles, I, pp. 331-2) and was considered the 'most perfectly virtuous' (Principles, I, p. 336). An awareness of Stoicism probably came to Ferguson via Shaftesbury and Hutcheson (G. Bryson, Man and Society, The Scottish Enquiry of the Eighteenth Century (Princeton, 1945), p. 55; Principles, I, p. 8). Though Ferguson singled out Marcus Aurelius and Epictetus particularly, he admired all the Stoic philosophers. See, for example, History, p. 170; Principles, I, pp. 7-8; See also J. Small, 'Biographical Sketch of Adam Ferguson', in Edinburgh Review, Vol.75, no. 255 (1867), pp. 48-85. For further discussion of Ferguson's Stoicism see, for example, N. Waszek, Man's Social Nature: A Topic of the Scottish Enlightenment in its Historical Setting (Frankfurt, 1986), Ch. 5.
74. Ferguson quotes Marcus Aurelius in the Principles as the finest expositor ever of religious piety, noting that 'such sentiments of a sublime religion may be justly considered as the highest attainments of created intelligence'. The writings of both Marcus and Epictetus are deemed the 'most sublime' (Principles, I, p. 312). For specific references to Epictetus see for example, Institutes, p. 158; Essay, pp. 38,55; Principles, II, pp. 359- 60, Principles, I, p. 7. For Marcus Aurelius: Principles, II, p. 356; Principles, I, pp. 310, 312. The latter attained a species of 'god-like eminence' (Principles, I, pp. 331-2) and was considered the 'most perfectly virtuous' (Principles, I, p. 336). An awareness of Stoicism probably came to Ferguson via Shaftesbury and Hutcheson (G. Bryson, Man and Society, The Scottish Enquiry of the Eighteenth Century (Princeton, 1945), p. 55; Principles, I, p. 8). Though Ferguson singled out Marcus Aurelius and Epictetus particularly, he admired all the Stoic philosophers. See, for example, History, p. 170; Principles, I, pp. 7-8; See also J. Small, 'Biographical Sketch of Adam Ferguson', in Edinburgh Review, Vol.75, no. 255 (1867), pp. 48-85. For further discussion of Ferguson's Stoicism see, for example, N. Waszek, Man's Social Nature: A Topic of the Scottish Enlightenment in its Historical Setting (Frankfurt, 1986), Ch. 5.
75. Ferguson quotes Marcus Aurelius in the Principles as the finest expositor ever of religious piety, noting that 'such sentiments of a sublime religion may be justly considered as the highest attainments of created intelligence'. The writings of both Marcus and Epictetus are deemed the 'most sublime' (Principles, I, p. 312). For specific references to Epictetus see for example, Institutes, p. 158; Essay, pp. 38,55; Principles, II, pp. 359- 60, Principles, I, p. 7. For Marcus Aurelius: Principles, II, p. 356; Principles, I, pp. 310, 312. The latter attained a species of 'god-like eminence' (Principles, I, pp. 331-2) and was considered the 'most perfectly virtuous' (Principles, I, p. 336). An awareness of Stoicism probably came to Ferguson via Shaftesbury and Hutcheson (G. Bryson, Man and Society, The Scottish Enquiry of the Eighteenth Century (Princeton, 1945), p. 55; Principles, I, p. 8). Though Ferguson singled out Marcus Aurelius and Epictetus particularly, he admired all the Stoic philosophers. See, for example, History, p. 170; Principles, I, pp. 7-8; See also J. Small, 'Biographical Sketch of Adam Ferguson', in Edinburgh Review, Vol.75, no. 255 (1867), pp. 48-85. For further discussion of Ferguson's Stoicism see, for example, N. Waszek, Man's Social Nature: A Topic of the Scottish Enlightenment in its Historical Setting (Frankfurt, 1986), Ch. 5.
76. Ferguson quotes Marcus Aurelius in the Principles as the finest expositor ever of religious piety, noting that 'such sentiments of a sublime religion may be justly considered as the highest attainments of created intelligence'. The writings of both Marcus and Epictetus are deemed the 'most sublime' (Principles, I, p. 312). For specific references to Epictetus see for example, Institutes, p. 158; Essay, pp. 38,55; Principles, II, pp. 359- 60, Principles, I, p. 7. For Marcus Aurelius: Principles, II, p. 356; Principles, I, pp. 310, 312. The latter attained a species of 'god-like eminence' (Principles, I, pp. 331-2) and was considered the 'most perfectly virtuous' (Principles, I, p. 336). An awareness of Stoicism probably came to Ferguson via Shaftesbury and Hutcheson (G. Bryson, Man and Society, The Scottish Enquiry of the Eighteenth Century (Princeton, 1945), p. 55; Principles, I, p. 8). Though Ferguson singled out Marcus Aurelius and Epictetus particularly, he admired all the Stoic philosophers. See, for example, History, p. 170; Principles, I, pp. 7-8; See also J. Small, 'Biographical Sketch of Adam Ferguson', in Edinburgh Review, Vol.75, no. 255 (1867), pp. 48-85. For further discussion of Ferguson's Stoicism see, for example, N. Waszek, Man's Social Nature: A Topic of the Scottish Enlightenment in its Historical Setting (Frankfurt, 1986), Ch. 5.
77. Ferguson quotes Marcus Aurelius in the Principles as the finest expositor ever of religious piety, noting that 'such sentiments of a sublime religion may be justly considered as the highest attainments of created intelligence'. The writings of both Marcus and Epictetus are deemed the 'most sublime' (Principles, I, p. 312). For specific references to Epictetus see for example, Institutes, p. 158; Essay, pp. 38,55; Principles, II, pp. 359- 60, Principles, I, p. 7. For Marcus Aurelius: Principles, II, p. 356; Principles, I, pp. 310, 312. The latter attained a species of 'god-like eminence' (Principles, I, pp. 331-2) and was considered the 'most perfectly virtuous' (Principles, I, p. 336). An awareness of Stoicism probably came to Ferguson via Shaftesbury and Hutcheson (G. Bryson, Man and Society, The Scottish Enquiry of the Eighteenth Century (Princeton, 1945), p. 55; Principles, I, p. 8). Though Ferguson singled out Marcus Aurelius and Epictetus particularly, he admired all the Stoic philosophers. See, for example, History, p. 170; Principles, I, pp. 7-8; See also J. Small, 'Biographical Sketch of Adam Ferguson', in Edinburgh Review, Vol.75, no. 255 (1867), pp. 48-85. For further discussion of Ferguson's Stoicism see, for example, N. Waszek, Man's Social Nature: A Topic of the Scottish Enlightenment in its Historical Setting (Frankfurt, 1986), Ch. 5.
78. Ferguson quotes Marcus Aurelius in the Principles as the finest expositor ever of religious piety, noting that 'such sentiments of a sublime religion may be justly considered as the highest attainments of created intelligence'. The writings of both Marcus and Epictetus are deemed the 'most sublime' (Principles, I, p. 312). For specific references to Epictetus see for example, Institutes, p. 158; Essay, pp. 38,55; Principles, II, pp. 359- 60, Principles, I, p. 7. For Marcus Aurelius: Principles, II, p. 356; Principles, I, pp. 310, 312. The latter attained a species of 'god-like eminence' (Principles, I, pp. 331-2) and was considered the 'most perfectly virtuous' (Principles, I, p. 336). An awareness of Stoicism probably came to Ferguson via Shaftesbury and Hutcheson (G. Bryson, Man and Society, The Scottish Enquiry of the Eighteenth Century (Princeton, 1945), p. 55; Principles, I, p. 8). Though Ferguson singled out Marcus Aurelius and Epictetus particularly, he admired all the Stoic philosophers. See, for example, History, p. 170; Principles, I, pp. 7-8; See also J. Small, 'Biographical Sketch of Adam Ferguson', in Edinburgh Review, Vol.75, no. 255 (1867), pp. 48-85. For further discussion of Ferguson's Stoicism see, for example, N. Waszek, Man's Social Nature: A Topic of the Scottish Enlightenment in its Historical Setting (Frankfurt, 1986), Ch. 5.
79. Ferguson quotes Marcus Aurelius in the Principles as the finest expositor ever of religious piety, noting that 'such sentiments of a sublime religion may be justly considered as the highest attainments of created intelligence'. The writings of both Marcus and Epictetus are deemed the 'most sublime' (Principles, I, p. 312). For specific references to Epictetus see for example, Institutes, p. 158; Essay, pp. 38,55; Principles, II, pp. 359- 60, Principles, I, p. 7. For Marcus Aurelius: Principles, II, p. 356; Principles, I, pp. 310, 312. The latter attained a species of 'god-like eminence' (Principles, I, pp. 331-2) and was considered the 'most perfectly virtuous' (Principles, I, p. 336). An awareness of Stoicism probably came to Ferguson via Shaftesbury and Hutcheson (G. Bryson, Man and Society, The Scottish Enquiry of the Eighteenth Century (Princeton, 1945), p. 55; Principles, I, p. 8). Though Ferguson singled out Marcus Aurelius and Epictetus particularly, he admired all the Stoic philosophers. See, for example, History, p. 170; Principles, I, pp. 7-8; See also J. Small, 'Biographical Sketch of Adam Ferguson', in Edinburgh Review, Vol.75, no. 255 (1867), pp. 48-85. For further discussion of Ferguson's Stoicism see, for example, N. Waszek, Man's Social Nature: A Topic of the Scottish Enlightenment in its Historical Setting (Frankfurt, 1986), Ch. 5.
80. Ferguson quotes Marcus Aurelius in the Principles as the finest expositor ever of religious piety, noting that 'such sentiments of a sublime religion may be justly considered as the highest attainments of created intelligence'. The writings of both Marcus and Epictetus are deemed the 'most sublime' (Principles, I, p. 312). For specific references to Epictetus see for example, Institutes, p. 158; Essay, pp. 38,55; Principles, II, pp. 359- 60, Principles, I, p. 7. For Marcus Aurelius: Principles, II, p. 356; Principles, I, pp. 310, 312. The latter attained a species of 'god-like eminence' (Principles, I, pp. 331-2) and was considered the 'most perfectly virtuous' (Principles, I, p. 336). An awareness of Stoicism probably came to Ferguson via Shaftesbury and Hutcheson (G. Bryson, Man and Society, The Scottish Enquiry of the Eighteenth Century (Princeton, 1945), p. 55; Principles, I, p. 8). Though Ferguson singled out Marcus Aurelius and Epictetus particularly, he admired all the Stoic philosophers. See, for example, History, p. 170; Principles, I, pp. 7-8; See also J. Small, 'Biographical Sketch of Adam Ferguson', in Edinburgh Review, Vol.75, no. 255 (1867), pp. 48-85. For further discussion of Ferguson's Stoicism see, for example, N. Waszek, Man's Social Nature: A Topic of the Scottish Enlightenment in its Historical Setting (Frankfurt, 1986), Ch. 5.
81. Ferguson quotes Marcus Aurelius in the Principles as the finest expositor ever of religious piety, noting that 'such sentiments of a sublime religion may be justly considered as the highest attainments of created intelligence'. The writings of both Marcus and Epictetus are deemed the 'most sublime' (Principles, I, p. 312). For specific references to Epictetus see for example, Institutes, p. 158; Essay, pp. 38,55; Principles, II, pp. 359- 60, Principles, I, p. 7. For Marcus Aurelius: Principles, II, p. 356; Principles, I, pp. 310, 312. The latter attained a species of 'god-like eminence' (Principles, I, pp. 331-2) and was considered the 'most perfectly virtuous' (Principles, I, p. 336). An awareness of Stoicism probably came to Ferguson via Shaftesbury and Hutcheson (G. Bryson, Man and Society, The Scottish Enquiry of the Eighteenth Century (Princeton, 1945), p. 55; Principles, I, p. 8). Though Ferguson singled out Marcus Aurelius and Epictetus particularly, he admired all the Stoic philosophers. See, for example, History, p. 170; Principles, I, pp. 7-8; See also J. Small, 'Biographical Sketch of Adam Ferguson', in Edinburgh Review, Vol.75, no. 255 (1867), pp. 48-85. For further discussion of Ferguson's Stoicism see, for example, N. Waszek, Man's Social Nature: A Topic of the Scottish Enlightenment in its Historical Setting (Frankfurt, 1986), Ch. 5.
82. Ferguson quotes Marcus Aurelius in the Principles as the finest expositor ever of religious piety, noting that 'such sentiments of a sublime religion may be justly considered as the highest attainments of created intelligence'. The writings of both Marcus and Epictetus are deemed the 'most sublime' (Principles, I, p. 312). For specific references to Epictetus see for example, Institutes, p. 158; Essay, pp. 38,55; Principles, II, pp. 359- 60, Principles, I, p. 7. For Marcus Aurelius: Principles, II, p. 356; Principles, I, pp. 310, 312. The latter attained a species of 'god-like eminence' (Principles, I, pp. 331-2) and was considered the 'most perfectly virtuous' (Principles, I, p. 336). An awareness of Stoicism probably came to Ferguson via Shaftesbury and Hutcheson (G. Bryson, Man and Society, The Scottish Enquiry of the Eighteenth Century (Princeton, 1945), p. 55; Principles, I, p. 8). Though Ferguson singled out Marcus Aurelius and Epictetus particularly, he admired all the Stoic philosophers. See, for example, History, p. 170; Principles, I, pp. 7-8; See also J. Small, 'Biographical Sketch of Adam Ferguson', in Edinburgh Review, Vol.75, no. 255 (1867), pp. 48-85. For further discussion of Ferguson's Stoicism see, for example, N. Waszek, Man's Social Nature: A Topic of the Scottish Enlightenment in its Historical Setting (Frankfurt, 1986), Ch. 5.
83. Ferguson quotes Marcus Aurelius in the Principles as the finest expositor ever of religious piety, noting that 'such sentiments of a sublime religion may be justly considered as the highest attainments of created intelligence'. The writings of both Marcus and Epictetus are deemed the 'most sublime' (Principles, I, p. 312). For specific references to Epictetus see for example, Institutes, p. 158; Essay, pp. 38,55; Principles, II, pp. 359- 60, Principles, I, p. 7. For Marcus Aurelius: Principles, II, p. 356; Principles, I, pp. 310, 312. The latter attained a species of 'god-like eminence' (Principles, I, pp. 331-2) and was considered the 'most perfectly virtuous' (Principles, I, p. 336). An awareness of Stoicism probably came to Ferguson via Shaftesbury and Hutcheson (G. Bryson, Man and Society, The Scottish Enquiry of the Eighteenth Century (Princeton, 1945), p. 55; Principles, I, p. 8). Though Ferguson singled out Marcus Aurelius and Epictetus particularly, he admired all the Stoic philosophers. See, for example, History, p. 170; Principles, I, pp. 7-8; See also J. Small, 'Biographical Sketch of Adam Ferguson', in Edinburgh Review, Vol.75, no. 255 (1867), pp. 48-85. For further discussion of Ferguson's Stoicism see, for example, N. Waszek, Man's Social Nature: A Topic of the Scottish Enlightenment in its Historical Setting (Frankfurt, 1986), Ch. 5.
84. Ferguson quotes Marcus Aurelius in the Principles as the finest expositor ever of religious piety, noting that 'such sentiments of a sublime religion may be justly considered as the highest attainments of created intelligence'. The writings of both Marcus and Epictetus are deemed the 'most sublime' (Principles, I, p. 312). For specific references to Epictetus see for example, Institutes, p. 158; Essay, pp. 38,55; Principles, II, pp. 359- 60, Principles, I, p. 7. For Marcus Aurelius: Principles, II, p. 356; Principles, I, pp. 310, 312. The latter attained a species of 'god-like eminence' (Principles, I, pp. 331-2) and was considered the 'most perfectly virtuous' (Principles, I, p. 336). An awareness of Stoicism probably came to Ferguson via Shaftesbury and Hutcheson (G. Bryson, Man and Society, The Scottish Enquiry of the Eighteenth Century (Princeton, 1945), p. 55; Principles, I, p. 8). Though Ferguson singled out Marcus Aurelius and Epictetus particularly, he admired all the Stoic philosophers. See, for example, History, p. 170; Principles, I, pp. 7-8; See also J. Small, 'Biographical Sketch of Adam Ferguson', in Edinburgh Review, Vol.75, no. 255 (1867), pp. 48-85. For further discussion of Ferguson's Stoicism see, for example, N. Waszek, Man's Social Nature: A Topic of the Scottish Enlightenment in its Historical Setting (Frankfurt, 1986), Ch. 5.
85. Principles, I, pp. 338, 180, 312-13. As Marcus says: 'Whatever happens, happens rightly' (The Meditations, trans. and with an introduction by Maxwell Staniforth (London, 1964), iv. 10. p. 66).
86. Principles, I, pp. 338, 180, 312-13. As Marcus says: 'Whatever happens, happens rightly' (The Meditations, trans. and with an introduction by Maxwell Staniforth (London, 1964), iv. 10. p. 66).
87. Principles, I, p. 8.
88. See Waszek, Man's Social Nature, Ch. 4; and N. Waszek, 'Two Concepts of Morality: The Distinction of Adam Smith's Ethics and its Stoic Origin', Journal of the History of Ideas, XLV (4) (October-December, 1984), pp. 591-606. have suggested elsewhere that Smith was far less the Stoic than Ferguson (L. Hill, 'Ferguson and Smith on "Human Nature", "Interest" and the Role of Beneficence in Market Society', Journal of the History of Economic Ideas, IV (1-2) Special Edition on Adam Smith (1996), pp. 353-99).
89. See Waszek, Man's Social Nature, Ch. 4; and N. Waszek, 'Two Concepts of Morality: The Distinction of Adam Smith's Ethics and its Stoic Origin', Journal of the History of Ideas, XLV (4) (October-December, 1984), pp. 591-606. have suggested elsewhere that Smith was far less the Stoic than Ferguson (L. Hill, 'Ferguson and Smith on "Human Nature", "Interest" and the Role of Beneficence in Market Society', Journal of the History of Economic Ideas, IV (1-2) Special Edition on Adam Smith (1996), pp. 353-99).
90. See Waszek, Man's Social Nature, Ch. 4; and N. Waszek, 'Two Concepts of Morality: The Distinction of Adam Smith's Ethics and its Stoic Origin', Journal of the History of Ideas, XLV (4) (October-December, 1984), pp. 591-606. have suggested elsewhere that Smith was far less the Stoic than Ferguson (L. Hill, 'Ferguson and Smith on "Human Nature", "Interest" and the Role of Beneficence in Market Society', Journal of the History of Economic Ideas, IV (1-2) Special Edition on Adam Smith (1996), pp. 353-99).
91. Hutcheson translated the Meditations into English (A. Sher, Church and University in the Scottish Enlightenment (Princeton, 1985), p. 181) while Shaftesbury was well acquainted with the work of both Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius (W.A. Oldfather, 'Introduction to Epictetus', in Epictetus, The Discourses as Reported by Arrian, the Manual and Fragments, English trans. W.A. Oldfather (2 vols., London, 1989), Vol. I, p. xxviii). Ferguson shared in common with Hutcheson a desire to 'mould teenage boys' with the principles of moderate Christianity and Stoicism (R.B. Sher, 'Professors of Virtue: The Social History of the Edinburgh Moral Philosophy Chair in the Eighteenth Century', in Studies in the Philosophy of the Scottish Enlightenment, ed. M.A. Stewart (Oxford, 1990), p. 119).
92. Hutcheson translated the Meditations into English (A. Sher, Church and University in the Scottish Enlightenment (Princeton, 1985), p. 181) while Shaftesbury was well acquainted with the work of both Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius (W.A. Oldfather, 'Introduction to Epictetus', in Epictetus, The Discourses as Reported by Arrian, the Manual and Fragments, English trans. W.A. Oldfather (2 vols., London, 1989), Vol. I, p. xxviii). Ferguson shared in common with Hutcheson a desire to 'mould teenage boys' with the principles of moderate Christianity and Stoicism (R.B. Sher, 'Professors of Virtue: The Social History of the Edinburgh Moral Philosophy Chair in the Eighteenth Century', in Studies in the Philosophy of the Scottish Enlightenment, ed. M.A. Stewart (Oxford, 1990), p. 119).
93. Hutcheson translated the Meditations into English (A. Sher, Church and University in the Scottish Enlightenment (Princeton, 1985), p. 181) while Shaftesbury was well acquainted with the work of both Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius (W.A. Oldfather, 'Introduction to Epictetus', in Epictetus, The Discourses as Reported by Arrian, the Manual and Fragments, English trans. W.A. Oldfather (2 vols., London, 1989), Vol. I, p. xxviii). Ferguson shared in common with Hutcheson a desire to 'mould teenage boys' with the principles of moderate Christianity and Stoicism (R.B. Sher, 'Professors of Virtue: The Social History of the Edinburgh Moral Philosophy Chair in the Eighteenth Century', in Studies in the Philosophy of the Scottish Enlightenment, ed. M.A. Stewart (Oxford, 1990), p. 119).
94. M.A. Stewart, "The Origins of the Scottish Greek Chairs', in Owls to Athens: Essays on Classical Subjects, ed. E.M. Craik (Oxford, 1990), p. 399; and M.A. Stewart, 'The Stoic Legacy in the Early Scottish Enlightenment', in Atoms, Pneuma and Ttranquillity, ed. M.J. Osler (Cambridge, 1991). See also, Sher, Church and University, esp. Ch. 8; and Waszek, Man's Social Nature, passim.
95. M.A. Stewart, "The Origins of the Scottish Greek Chairs', in Owls to Athens: Essays on Classical Subjects, ed. E.M. Craik (Oxford, 1990), p. 399; and M.A. Stewart, 'The Stoic Legacy in the Early Scottish Enlightenment', in Atoms, Pneuma and Ttranquillity, ed. M.J. Osler (Cambridge, 1991). See also, Sher, Church and University, esp. Ch. 8; and Waszek, Man's Social Nature, passim.
96. M.A. Stewart, "The Origins of the Scottish Greek Chairs', in Owls to Athens: Essays on Classical Subjects, ed. E.M. Craik (Oxford, 1990), p. 399; and M.A. Stewart, 'The Stoic Legacy in the Early Scottish Enlightenment', in Atoms, Pneuma and Ttranquillity, ed. M.J. Osler (Cambridge, 1991). See also, Sher, Church and University, esp. Ch. 8; and Waszek, Man's Social Nature, passim.
97. M.A. Stewart, "The Origins of the Scottish Greek Chairs', in Owls to Athens: Essays on Classical Subjects, ed. E.M. Craik (Oxford, 1990), p. 399; and M.A. Stewart, 'The Stoic Legacy in the Early Scottish Enlightenment', in Atoms, Pneuma and Ttranquillity, ed. M.J. Osler (Cambridge, 1991). See also, Sher, Church and University, esp. Ch. 8; and Waszek, Man's Social Nature, passim.
98. Kettler, for example, identifies Ferguson's inconsistency as a function of 'conflicting commitments' (Kettler, Social and Political Thought of Adam
99. Kettler, for example, identifies Ferguson's inconsistency as a function of 'conflicting commitments' (Kettler, Social and Political Thought of Adam Ferguson, p. 293). See also C. Camic, Experience and Enlightenment: Socialization for Cultural Change in Eighteenth Century Scotland (Chicago, 1983), p. 54.
100. L. Whitney, Primitivism and the Idea of Progress (Baltimore, 1934), p. 153.
101. See, for example, Principles, I, pp. 34, 313-14; Principles, II, pp. 487, 501, 295.
102. See, for example, Principles, I, pp. 34, 313-14; Principles, II, pp. 487, 501, 295.
103. Principles, II, p. 512.
104. D. Kubrin, 'Newton and the Cyclical Cosmos: Providence and the Mechanical Philosophy', Journal of the History of Ideas, 28 (1967), pp. 325-46, p. 342.
105. R.A. Leigh, 'Rousseau and the Scottish Enlightenment', Contributions to Political Economy, 5 (1986), pp. 1-21, p. 3.
106. Whitney, Primitivism and the Idea of Progress, p. 22. A number of scholars have concluded that progress, for Ferguson, was not necessarily inevitable. Duncan Forbes, for example, denies that Ferguson's history is progressivist, claiming that 'it certainly does not belong to the history of the idea of progress' (Forbes, intro. to Essay, p. xiv). See also W.C. Lehmann, Adam Ferguson and the Beginnings of Modern Sociology (New York, 1930), pp. 148-9; and H.M. Hopfl, 'From Savage to Scotsman: Conjectural History in the Scottish Enlightenment', Journal of British Studies, 17, no. 2 (1978), pp. 19-40, p. 37.
107. Whitney, Primitivism and the Idea of Progress, p. 22. A number of scholars have concluded that progress, for Ferguson, was not necessarily inevitable. Duncan Forbes, for example, denies that Ferguson's history is progressivist, claiming that 'it certainly does not belong to the history of the idea of progress' (Forbes, intro. to Essay, p. xiv). See also W.C. Lehmann, Adam Ferguson and the Beginnings of Modern Sociology (New York, 1930), pp. 148-9; and H.M. Hopfl, 'From Savage to Scotsman: Conjectural History in the Scottish Enlightenment', Journal of British Studies, 17, no. 2 (1978), pp. 19-40, p. 37.
108. Whitney, Primitivism and the Idea of Progress, p. 22. A number of scholars have concluded that progress, for Ferguson, was not necessarily inevitable. Duncan Forbes, for example, denies that Ferguson's history is progressivist, claiming that 'it certainly does not belong to the history of the idea of progress' (Forbes, intro. to Essay, p. xiv). See also W.C. Lehmann, Adam Ferguson and the Beginnings of Modern Sociology (New York, 1930), pp. 148-9; and H.M. Hopfl, 'From Savage to Scotsman: Conjectural History in the Scottish Enlightenment', Journal of British Studies, 17, no. 2 (1978), pp. 19-40, p. 37.
109. Whitney, Primitivism and the Idea of Progress, p. 22. A number of scholars have concluded that progress, for Ferguson, was not necessarily inevitable. Duncan Forbes, for example, denies that Ferguson's history is progressivist, claiming that 'it certainly does not belong to the history of the idea of progress' (Forbes, intro. to Essay, p. xiv). See also W.C. Lehmann, Adam Ferguson and the Beginnings of Modern Sociology (New York, 1930), pp. 148-9; and H.M. Hopfl, 'From Savage to Scotsman: Conjectural History in the Scottish Enlightenment', Journal of British Studies, 17, no. 2 (1978), pp. 19-40, p. 37.
110. Sher, Church and University, p. 43.
111. See, for example, Essay, pp. 80, 18-19, 106.
112. Principles, I, pp. 313, 47, 184-5, 190-1, 315-16; Essay, p. 5. Ernest Mossner reports that Ferguson's insistence on the inevitability of progress was Hume's major objection to the Essay (E. Mossner, The Life of David Hume (London, 1954), p. 543). Other scholars have given Ferguson's history a perfectibilist/progressivist reading. Willke suggests that Ferguson's conception of nature 'would not permit him to accept a necessary cycle of advance and decline. Nature's plan is one of improvement and prosperity' (Willke, The Historical Thought of Adam Ferguson, p. 172). Bernstein argues that despite the 'intermissions in national exertions' he records, Ferguson believed in the 'long-range inevitability' of human progress (Bernstein, 'Adam Ferguson and the Idea of Progress', p. 115).
113. Principles, I, pp. 313, 47, 184-5, 190-1, 315-16; Essay, p. 5. Ernest Mossner reports that Ferguson's insistence on the inevitability of progress was Hume's major objection to the Essay (E. Mossner, The Life of David Hume (London, 1954), p. 543). Other scholars have given Ferguson's history a perfectibilist/progressivist reading. Willke suggests that Ferguson's conception of nature 'would not permit him to accept a necessary cycle of advance and decline. Nature's plan is one of improvement and prosperity' (Willke, The Historical Thought of Adam Ferguson, p. 172). Bernstein argues that despite the 'intermissions in national exertions' he records, Ferguson believed in the 'long-range inevitability' of human progress (Bernstein, 'Adam Ferguson and the Idea of Progress', p. 115).
114. Principles, I, pp. 313, 47, 184-5, 190-1, 315-16; Essay, p. 5. Ernest Mossner reports that Ferguson's insistence on the inevitability of progress was Hume's major objection to the Essay (E. Mossner, The Life of David Hume (London, 1954), p. 543). Other scholars have given Ferguson's history a perfectibilist/progressivist reading. Willke suggests that Ferguson's conception of nature 'would not permit him to accept a necessary cycle of advance and decline. Nature's plan is one of improvement and prosperity' (Willke, The Historical Thought of Adam Ferguson, p. 172). Bernstein argues that despite the 'intermissions in national exertions' he records, Ferguson believed in the 'long-range inevitability' of human progress (Bernstein, 'Adam Ferguson and the Idea of Progress', p. 115).
115. Principles, I, pp. 313, 47, 184-5, 190-1, 315-16; Essay, p. 5. Ernest Mossner reports that Ferguson's insistence on the inevitability of progress was Hume's major objection to the Essay (E. Mossner, The Life of David Hume (London, 1954), p. 543). Other scholars have given Ferguson's history a perfectibilist/progressivist reading. Willke suggests that Ferguson's conception of nature 'would not permit him to accept a necessary cycle of advance and decline. Nature's plan is one of improvement and prosperity' (Willke, The Historical Thought of Adam Ferguson, p. 172). Bernstein argues that despite the 'intermissions in national exertions' he records, Ferguson believed in the 'long-range inevitability' of human progress (Bernstein, 'Adam Ferguson and the Idea of Progress', p. 115).
116. Principles, I, pp. 313, 47, 184-5, 190-1, 315-16; Essay, p. 5. Ernest Mossner reports that Ferguson's insistence on the inevitability of progress was Hume's major objection to the Essay (E. Mossner, The Life of David Hume (London, 1954), p. 543). Other scholars have given Ferguson's history a perfectibilist/progressivist reading. Willke suggests that Ferguson's conception of nature 'would not permit him to accept a necessary cycle of advance and decline. Nature's plan is one of improvement and prosperity' (Willke, The Historical Thought of Adam Ferguson, p. 172). Bernstein argues that despite the 'intermissions in national exertions' he records, Ferguson believed in the 'long-range inevitability' of human progress (Bernstein, 'Adam Ferguson and the Idea of Progress', p. 115).
117. See Essay, pp. 34, 2; Principles, I, pp. 501, 320.
118. See Essay, pp. 34, 2; Principles, I, pp. 501, 320.
119. Istvan Hont, 'The "Rich Country, Poor Country" Debate in Scottish Classical Political Economy', in Wealth and Virtue: The Shaping of Political Economy in the Scottish Enlightenment, ed. I. Hont and M. Ignatieff (Cambridge, 1983), p. 296. Hont does, however, argue that Ferguson saw commercial growth as unending, though quite how the two claims can be combined comfortably is unclear.
120. Principles, I, p. 194.
121. Essay, p. 279.
122. For example, William Lehmann asserts: 'In fact Ferguson holds quite definitely to a cyclical view of history' (Lehmann, Adam Ferguson and the Beginnings of Modern Sociology, p. 149).
123. Essay, pp. 208-9.
124. Seneca, Letters from a Stoic, selected and translated with an introduction by Robin Campbell (London, 1969), Letter XCI, p. 179.
125. Marcus also wrote: 'All parts of the Whole . . . must in time decay' (Marcus Aurelius, Meditations, 10. 7, p. 153).
126. For example, Marcus Aurelius referred to 'the great cyclic renewals of creation' (Meditations, 11. 1, p. 165). See also, Epictetus, Discourses, II. 1., 17-24, p. 219; III. xiii, 2-7, p. 89.
127. For example, Marcus Aurelius referred to 'the great cyclic renewals of creation' (Meditations, 11. 1, p. 165). See also, Epictetus, Discourses, II. 1., 17-24, p. 219; III. xiii, 2-7, p. 89.
128. For example, Marcus Aurelius referred to 'the great cyclic renewals of creation' (Meditations, 11. 1, p. 165). See also, Epictetus, Discourses, II. 1., 17-24, p. 219; III. xiii, 2-7, p. 89.
129. Cicero, De Natura Deorum, with an English translation by H. Rackham (London, 1956), II, 118; and Cicero, De Republica; De Legibus, with an English translation by C.W. Keyes (London, 1988), VI, 17, 21.
130. Cicero, De Natura Deorum, with an English translation by H. Rackham (London, 1956), II, 118; and Cicero, De Republica; De Legibus, with an English translation by C.W. Keyes (London, 1988), VI, 17, 21.
131. Principles, I, p. 192.
132. Essay, p. 209 (my emphasis). Humanity is 'susceptible of indefinite advancement' (Principles, I, p. 183). To 'advance . . . is the state of nature relative to' humanity (Principles, I, p. 199).
133. Essay, p. 209 (my emphasis). Humanity is 'susceptible of indefinite advancement' (Principles, I, p. 183). To 'advance . . . is the state of nature relative to' humanity (Principles, I, p. 199).
134. Essay, p. 209 (my emphasis). Humanity is 'susceptible of indefinite advancement' (Principles, I, p. 183). To 'advance . . . is the state of nature relative to' humanity (Principles, I, p. 199).
135. Principles, I, pp. 190-2; Essay, pp. 5, 8.
136. Principles, I, pp. 190-2; Essay, pp. 5, 8.
137. Essay, p. 209.
138. W. Mullen, 'Republics for Expansion: The School of Rome', Arion, 3 (1976), pp. 298-364, p. 324.
139. 'Except in the case of soldiering' (Ferguson, 'Of the Separation of the Departments', pp. 75-6).
140. S. Crehan, 'The Roman Analogy', Literature and History, 6, no. 1 (Spring, 1980), pp. 19-42, p. 23. For Machiavelli's views on the superiority of mixed forms of government see N. Machiavelli, The Discourses, ed. and with an intro. by Bernard Crick (Harmondsworth, 1970), 1. 2, p. 109.
141. S. Crehan, 'The Roman Analogy', Literature and History, 6, no. 1 (Spring, 1980), pp. 19-42, p. 23. For Machiavelli's views on the superiority of mixed forms of government see N. Machiavelli, The Discourses, ed. and with an intro. by Bernard Crick (Harmondsworth, 1970), 1. 2, p. 109.
142. See, for example, Essay, p. 62; Remarks on a Pamphlet lately Published by Dr. Price, intitled 'Observations on the Nature of Civil Liberty . . .', in a Letter from a Gentleman in the Country to a Member of Parliament (London, 1776), pp. 15-16; Institutes, p. 273. Ferguson believed that a sound constitutional framework is marked by its complexity, and by its broad distribution and clear separation of powers (Essay, p. 267). One of the 'beauties' of the mixed constitution is that 'it can withstand many evils without being overthrown' (Letter from Professor Ferguson to the Reverend C. Wyvill 2 December, 1782, The Correspondence of Adam Ferguson, ed. V. Merolle (London, 1995), Vol. II, pp. 291-2. See also Essay, pp. 128, 267; Principles, II, p. 498).
143. See, for example, Essay, p. 62; Remarks on a Pamphlet lately Published by Dr. Price, intitled 'Observations on the Nature of Civil Liberty . . .', in a Letter from a Gentleman in the Country to a Member of Parliament (London, 1776), pp. 15-16; Institutes, p. 273. Ferguson believed that a sound constitutional framework is marked by its complexity, and by its broad distribution and clear separation of powers (Essay, p. 267). One of the 'beauties' of the mixed constitution is that 'it can withstand many evils without being overthrown' (Letter from Professor Ferguson to the Reverend C. Wyvill 2 December, 1782, The Correspondence of Adam Ferguson, ed. V. Merolle (London, 1995), Vol. II, pp. 291-2. See also Essay, pp. 128, 267; Principles, II, p. 498).
144. See, for example, Essay, p. 62; Remarks on a Pamphlet lately Published by Dr. Price, intitled 'Observations on the Nature of Civil Liberty . . .', in a Letter from a Gentleman in the Country to a Member of Parliament (London, 1776), pp. 15-16; Institutes, p. 273. Ferguson believed that a sound constitutional framework is marked by its complexity, and by its broad distribution and clear separation of powers (Essay, p. 267). One of the 'beauties' of the mixed constitution is that 'it can withstand many evils without being overthrown' (Letter from Professor Ferguson to the Reverend C. Wyvill 2 December, 1782, The Correspondence of Adam Ferguson, ed. V. Merolle (London, 1995), Vol. II, pp. 291-2. See also Essay, pp. 128, 267; Principles, II, p. 498).
145. See, for example, Essay, p. 62; Remarks on a Pamphlet lately Published by Dr. Price, intitled 'Observations on the Nature of Civil Liberty . . .', in a Letter from a Gentleman in the Country to a Member of Parliament (London, 1776), pp. 15-16; Institutes, p. 273. Ferguson believed that a sound constitutional framework is marked by its complexity, and by its broad distribution and clear separation of powers (Essay, p. 267). One of the 'beauties' of the mixed constitution is that 'it can withstand many evils without being overthrown' (Letter from Professor Ferguson to the Reverend C. Wyvill 2 December, 1782, The Correspondence of Adam Ferguson, ed. V. Merolle (London, 1995), Vol. II, pp. 291-2. See also Essay, pp. 128, 267; Principles, II, p. 498).
146. See, for example, Essay, p. 62; Remarks on a Pamphlet lately Published by Dr. Price, intitled 'Observations on the Nature of Civil Liberty . . .', in a Letter from a Gentleman in the Country to a Member of Parliament (London, 1776), pp. 15-16; Institutes, p. 273. Ferguson believed that a sound constitutional framework is marked by its complexity, and by its broad distribution and clear separation of powers (Essay, p. 267). One of the 'beauties' of the mixed constitution is that 'it can withstand many evils without being overthrown' (Letter from Professor Ferguson to the Reverend C. Wyvill 2 December, 1782, The Correspondence of Adam Ferguson, ed. V. Merolle (London, 1995), Vol. II, pp. 291-2. See also Essay, pp. 128, 267; Principles, II, p. 498).
147. See, for example, Essay, p. 62; Remarks on a Pamphlet lately Published by Dr. Price, intitled 'Observations on the Nature of Civil Liberty . . .', in a Letter from a Gentleman in the Country to a Member of Parliament (London, 1776), pp. 15-16; Institutes, p. 273. Ferguson believed that a sound constitutional framework is marked by its complexity, and by its broad distribution and clear separation of powers (Essay, p. 267). One of the 'beauties' of the mixed constitution is that 'it can withstand many evils without being overthrown' (Letter from Professor Ferguson to the Reverend C. Wyvill 2 December, 1782, The Correspondence of Adam Ferguson, ed. V. Merolle (London, 1995), Vol. II, pp. 291-2. See also Essay, pp. 128, 267; Principles, II, p. 498).
148. See, for example, Essay, p. 62; Remarks on a Pamphlet lately Published by Dr. Price, intitled 'Observations on the Nature of Civil Liberty . . .', in a Letter from a Gentleman in the Country to a Member of Parliament (London, 1776), pp. 15-16; Institutes, p. 273. Ferguson believed that a sound constitutional framework is marked by its complexity, and by its broad distribution and clear separation of powers (Essay, p. 267). One of the 'beauties' of the mixed constitution is that 'it can withstand many evils without being overthrown' (Letter from Professor Ferguson to the Reverend C. Wyvill 2 December, 1782, The Correspondence of Adam Ferguson, ed. V. Merolle (London, 1995), Vol. II, pp. 291-2. See also Essay, pp. 128, 267; Principles, II, p. 498).
149. Principles, I, pp. 321-4.
150. G.L. McDowell, 'Commerce, Virtue and Politics: Adam Ferguson's Constitutionalism', Review of Politics, 45, no. 4 (1983), pp. 536-52, p. 541.
151. Principles, I, pp. 194-5.
152. Institutes, p. 90.
153. Ibid., p. 126. For Willke, Ferguson's references to corruption are 'related to the life of national or political units' whereas his discussion of progress is generalized to 'mankind at large' (Willke, The Historical Thought of Adam Ferguson, p. 112).
154. Ibid., p. 126. For Willke, Ferguson's references to corruption are 'related to the life of national or political units' whereas his discussion of progress is generalized to 'mankind at large' (Willke, The Historical Thought of Adam Ferguson, p. 112).
155. Principles, I, p. 199 (my emphasis).
156. See, for example, Adam Ferguson, 'What May be Affirmed or Apprehended of the Supreme Creative Being', Unpublished Essays, ed. Philip, Vol. 2, no. 2. p. 21; and Ferguson, 'Of Things That Are or May Be', pp. 106, 137.
157. See, for example, Adam Ferguson, 'What May be Affirmed or Apprehended of the Supreme Creative Being', Unpublished Essays, ed. Philip, Vol. 2, no. 2. p. 21; and Ferguson, 'Of Things That Are or May Be', pp. 106, 137.
158. Principles, I, p. 172; Principles, II, p. 27.
159. Principles, I, p. 172; Principles, II, p. 27.
160. J. Passmore, The Perfectibility of Man (London, 1979), p. 56;
161. For Ferguson's most exhaustive treatment of this question see Ferguson, 'Of Things That Are or May Be'.
162. Principles, II, p. 412. This idea was particularly favoured by Epictetus (Discourses, Fragments, Musionius frag. 38, p. 445; II.xvi.42, p. 367). See also G.R. Stanton, 'The Cosmopolitan Ideas of Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius', Phronesis: A Journal for Ancient Philosophy, XIII (1968), pp. 183-95, p. 194).
163. Principles, II, p. 412. This idea was particularly favoured by Epictetus (Discourses, Fragments, Musionius frag. 38, p. 445; II.xvi.42, p. 367). See also G.R. Stanton, 'The Cosmopolitan Ideas of Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius', Phronesis: A Journal for Ancient Philosophy, XIII (1968), pp. 183-95, p. 194).
164. Principles, II, p. 412. This idea was particularly favoured by Epictetus (Discourses, Fragments, Musionius frag. 38, p. 445; II.xvi.42, p. 367). See also G.R. Stanton, 'The Cosmopolitan Ideas of Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius', Phronesis: A Journal for Ancient Philosophy, XIII (1968), pp. 183-95, p. 194).
165. Principles, II, p. 412. This idea was particularly favoured by Epictetus (Discourses, Fragments, Musionius frag. 38, p. 445; II.xvi.42, p. 367). See also G.R. Stanton, 'The Cosmopolitan Ideas of Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius', Phronesis: A Journal for Ancient Philosophy, XIII (1968), pp. 183-95, p. 194).
166. Principles, I, p. 183.
167. Ibid., p. 175.
168. K. Haakonssen, 'Natural Law and Moral Realism: The Scottish Synthesis', in Studies in the Philosophy of the Scottish Enlightenment, ed. Stewart, p. 62.
169. Principles, I, p. 234. See also Ferguson, 'Of Things That Are or May Be', pp. 120-1.
170. Principles, I, p. 234. See also Ferguson, 'Of Things That Are or May Be', pp. 120-1.
171. Marcus Aurelius, Meditations, V, viii, pp. 80-1.
172. Ferguson, 'Of Things that Are or May Be', p. 117.
173. Institutes, p. 125; and ibid, Ch. II, section 13, passim. See also Adam Ferguson, 'Of the Distinctions of Which it is the Lot of Man to Deliberate', Unpublished Essays, ed. Philip, Vol. 3, no. 20, p. 78; and Ferguson, 'Of Things That Are or May Be'.
174. Institutes, p. 125; and ibid, Ch. II, section 13, passim. See also Adam Ferguson, 'Of the Distinctions of Which it is the Lot of Man to Deliberate', Unpublished Essays, ed. Philip, Vol. 3, no. 20, p. 78; and Ferguson, 'Of Things That Are or May Be'.
175. Institutes, p. 125; and ibid, Ch. II, section 13, passim. See also Adam Ferguson, 'Of the Distinctions of Which it is the Lot of Man to Deliberate', Unpublished Essays, ed. Philip, Vol. 3, no. 20, p. 78; and Ferguson, 'Of Things That Are or May Be'.
176. Institutes, p. 125; and ibid, Ch. II, section 13, passim. See also Adam Ferguson, 'Of the Distinctions of Which it is the Lot of Man to Deliberate', Unpublished Essays, ed. Philip, Vol. 3, no. 20, p. 78; and Ferguson, 'Of Things That Are or May Be'.
177. Principles, I, p. 191.
178. Ibid., p. 183.
179. Ibid., p. 202.
180. Ibid., p. 312. See also Essay, pp. 38, 55.
181. Ibid., p. 312. See also Essay, pp. 38, 55.
182. Willke, The Historical Thought of Adam Ferguson, p. 182.
183. Principles, I, p. 202. See also Principles, II, p. 54.
184. Principles, I, p. 202. See also Principles, II, p. 54.
185. Principles, I, p. 202.
186. Principles, II, pp. 27-8.
187. Principles, I, p. 179.
188. Ferguson, 'Of the Separation of the Departments', p. 78.
189. See, for example, Marcus Aurelius, Meditations, IV, 26, p. 69.
190. For references to the doctrine of freewill in Cicero, see De Re Publica; De Legibus, with an English translation by Clinton Walker Keyes (London, 1988), VI, xxvi, pp. 281-3.
191. Principles, I, p. 154.
192. Willke, The Historical Thought of Adam Ferguson, passim.
193. Cicero argues that since we are fragments of divine intelligence, of a first cause capable of moving itself, so we are also capable of self-movement (Cicero, De Re Publica, VI, xxiv-xxvi, pp. 279-83).
194. D. Kettler, 'Ferguson's Principles; Constitution in Permanence', Studies in Burke and His Time, Vol. 19 (1978), pp. 208-22.
195. Principles, I, pp. 130-1, 313; Essay, p. 389; Institutes, p. 11.
196. Principles, I, pp. 130-1, 313; Essay, p. 389; Institutes, p. 11.
197. Principles, I, pp. 130-1, 313; Essay, p. 389; Institutes, p. 11.
198. Principles, I, p. 53.
199. Principles, II, p. 37.
200. Adam Ferguson, 'Distinction of Value and its Source in Existence', Unpublished Essays, ed. Philip, Vol. 1, no. 27, p. 96.
201. Principles, I, p. 54.
202. Ibid., pp. 313-14; Institutes, p. 240.
203. Ibid., pp. 313-14; Institutes, p. 240.
204. Principles, I, p. 54. See also ibid., p. 108; and Ferguson, 'Of Things That Are or May Be', p. 16; Adam Ferguson, 'Of Cause and Effect, Ends and Means, Order, Combination and Design', Unpublished Essays, ed. Philip, Vol. 2, no. 13, p. 67.
205. Principles, I, p. 54. See also ibid., p. 108; and Ferguson, 'Of Things That Are or May Be', p. 16; Adam Ferguson, 'Of Cause and Effect, Ends and Means, Order, Combination and Design', Unpublished Essays, ed. Philip, Vol. 2, no. 13, p. 67.
206. Principles, I, p. 54. See also ibid., p. 108; and Ferguson, 'Of Things That Are or May Be', p. 16; Adam Ferguson, 'Of Cause and Effect, Ends and Means, Order, Combination and Design', Unpublished Essays, ed. Philip, Vol. 2, no. 13, p. 67.
207. Principles, I, p. 54. See also ibid., p. 108; and Ferguson, 'Of Things That Are or May Be', p. 16; Adam Ferguson, 'Of Cause and Effect, Ends and Means, Order, Combination and Design', Unpublished Essays, ed. Philip, Vol. 2, no. 13, p. 67.
208. See, for example, Essay, pp. 122, 140.
209. Ibid., p. 324.
210. Adam Ferguson, 'Of Good and Evil, Perfection and Defect', Unpublished Essays, ed. Philip, Vol. 2, no. 23, passim.
211. Aristotle does believe, though, that there is inherent in matter a 'certain degree' of imperfection, therefore things can go wrong even in nature (Aristotle, Ethics, trans. J.A.K. Thompson (London, 1976), Appendix F, p. 358).
212. Ibid., pp. 55, 204.
213. Principles, I, p. 181.
214. Principles, I, p. 185; See also Principles, I, p. 175; and Ferguson, 'Of Cause and Effects, Ends and Means, Order, Combination and Design', pp. 58-74.
215. Principles, I, p. 185; See also Principles, I, p. 175; and Ferguson, 'Of Cause and Effects, Ends and Means, Order, Combination and Design', pp. 58-74.
216. Principles, I, p. 185; See also Principles, I, p. 175; and Ferguson, 'Of Cause and Effects, Ends and Means, Order, Combination and Design', pp. 58-74.
217. Principles, II, p. 412; Principles, I, pp. 313, 179. Ferguson shared this conception in common with other Moderates (Sher, Church and University, p. 211).
218. Principles, II, p. 412; Principles, I, pp. 313, 179. Ferguson shared this conception in common with other Moderates (Sher, Church and University, p. 211).
219. Principles, II, p. 412; Principles, I, pp. 313, 179. Ferguson shared this conception in common with other Moderates (Sher, Church and University, p. 211).
220. Principles, I, p. 329.
221. Ibid., pp. 3-4.
222. Ibid., p. 181; Ferguson, 'Of Cause and Effect, Ends and Means, Order, Combination and Design', pp. 72-150; Jean Willke adopts a similar line in The Historical Thought of Adam Ferguson, pp. 60-1.
223. Ibid., p. 181; Ferguson, 'Of Cause and Effect, Ends and Means, Order, Combination and Design', pp. 72-150; Jean Willke adopts a similar line in The Historical Thought of Adam Ferguson, pp. 60-1.
224. Ibid., p. 181; Ferguson, 'Of Cause and Effect, Ends and Means, Order, Combination and Design', pp. 72-150; Jean Willke adopts a similar line in The Historical Thought of Adam Ferguson, pp. 60-1.
225. Principles, I, p. 178.
226. Essay, p. 108.
227. Principles, I, p. 184.
228. Ibid., p. 250. See also Ferguson, 'Of Things That Are or May Be', passim.
229. Ibid., p. 250. See also Ferguson, 'Of Things That Are or May Be', passim.
230. Ferguson, 'Of Things That Are or May Be', p. 117; 'Of Cause and Effect, Ends and Means, Order, Combination and Design', pp. 71-2.
231. Ferguson, 'Of Things That Are or May Be', p. 117; 'Of Cause and Effect, Ends and Means, Order, Combination and Design', pp. 71-2.
232. Principles, II, p. 403.
233. Ibid., pp. 32-4.
234. Principles, I, p. 193.
235. Marcus Aurelius, Meditations, 7. 17, p. 108.
236. Principles, II, p. 61; Principles, I, pp. 313, 318.
237. Principles, II, p. 61; Principles, I, pp. 313, 318.
238. Willke, The Historical Thought of Adam Ferguson, p. 138.
239. Haakonssen, 'Natural Law and Moral Realism', p. 77.
240. Principles, I, p. 318.
241. Ibid., p. 4.
242. Institutes, p. 6.
243. Principles, II, p. 41.
244. Principles, I, p. 316.
245. Ibid., pp. 184-5. See also Ferguson, 'Of Things That Are or May Be', p. 141; and Ferguson, 'Of Nature and Art', p. 153.
246. Ibid., pp. 184-5. See also Ferguson, 'Of Things That Are or May Be', p. 141; and Ferguson, 'Of Nature and Art', p. 153.
247. Ibid., pp. 184-5. See also Ferguson, 'Of Things That Are or May Be', p. 141; and Ferguson, 'Of Nature and Art', p. 153.
248. Essay, p. 216.
249. Principles, I, pp. 315-16; See also ibid., pp. 330-1.
250. Principles, I, pp. 315-16; See also ibid., pp. 330-1.
251. Epictetus, Discourses, I.iv.1-27, pp. 27-35.
252. Seneca, Letters From a Stoic, XC, 43, p. 176.
253. Principles, II, p. 327.
254. Principles, I, p. 172.
255. Marcus Aurelius, Meditations, IX, 42, p. 148; Ibid., 4, 44, p. 73.
256. Marcus Aurelius, Meditations, IX, 42, p. 148; Ibid., 4, 44, p. 73.
257. Principles, I, p. 168.
258. Institutes, pp. 122-4.
259. 'The Creator in laying a scheme of Progression for Man towards the Perfection of his Intelligent Being has at the same time projected his Happiness as the end of Creation' (Adam Ferguson, 'Of Perfection and Happiness', Unpublished Essays, ed. Philip, Vol. 2, no. 1, pp. 6-7).
260. Thanks to David Millar and Geoffrey Smith for drawing my attention to the difficulty with Ferguson's approach here.
261. N. Philippson, in Wealth and Virtue, ed. Hont and Ignatieff, p. 181; Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, ed. R.H. Campbell and A.S. Skinner (Oxford, 1979), Book V, pp. 788-96.
262. N. Philippson, in Wealth and Virtue, ed. Hont and Ignatieff, p. 181; Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, ed. R.H. Campbell and A.S. Skinner (Oxford, 1979), Book V, pp. 788-96.
263. Principles, I, p. 155.
264. '[T]he capacity of his progress is indefinite - these steps which we observe him make arc hut part of the scheme of a nature which is destined to endure for ever . . . The progress of Man's nature is various or unequal but nowhere definite' (Ferguson, 'Of Things That Are or May Be', pp. 119, 145). Principles, I, pp. 310-11.
265. '[T]he capacity of his progress is indefinite - these steps which we observe him make arc hut part of the scheme of a nature which is destined to endure for ever . . . The progress of Man's nature is various or unequal but nowhere definite' (Ferguson, 'Of Things That Are or May Be', pp. 119, 145). Principles, I, pp. 310-11.
266. Principles, I, p. 298.
267. Essay, p. 278.
268. Principles, I, p. 503.
269. Ibid., pp. 276-8.
270. Montesquieu, Baron de Secondat, The Spirit of the Laws, ed. and trans. A.M. Cohler, B.C. Miller and H.M. Stone (Cambridge, 1989), Part I, Ch. 21, p. 128.
271. Essay, p. 279.
272. History, p. 5. See also Principles, II, pp. 292, 497.
273. History, p. 5. See also Principles, II, pp. 292, 497.
274. Essay, pp. 278-9 (my emphasis).
275. Willke, The Historical Thought of Adam Ferguson, pp. 190-1.
276. Essay, p. 279.
277. Ibid., p. 212.
278. Ibid., p. 280. See also ibid., pp. 213-14, 136; Letter to John MacPherson (dated 2 June 1796), Correspondence of Adam Ferguson, ed. Vincenzo Merolle (London, 1995), Letter No. 313, p. 393.
279. Ibid., p. 280. See also ibid., pp. 213-14, 136; Letter to John MacPherson (dated 2 June 1796), Correspondence of Adam Ferguson, ed. Vincenzo Merolle (London, 1995), Letter No. 313, p. 393.
280. Ibid., p. 280. See also ibid., pp. 213-14, 136; Letter to John MacPherson (dated 2 June 1796), Correspondence of Adam Ferguson, ed. Vincenzo Merolle (London, 1995), Letter No. 313, p. 393.