Honour and expulsion: Terrorism in nineteenth-century Japan

Terrorism and Political Violence

Volumn 9, Issue 4, 1997, Pages 58-81

  Silke, Andrew ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY COLLEGE CORK   (Ireland)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 0031329739     PISSN: 09546553     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/09546559708427430     Document Type: Article

References (47)

1. David C. Rapoport, 'Introduction', in David C. Rapoport and Yonah Alexander (eds), The Morality of Terrorism (Oxford: Pergamon Press 1982) p.xii.
2. Walter Laqueur, The Age of Terrorism (London: Little, Brown 1987) p.300.
3. As can be seen in the titles of books such as Laqueur's above, as well as more recent works such as Adrian Guelke's, The Age of Terrorism and the International Political System (London: I.E. Tauris 1995).
4. Jerrold Post, 'Terrorist psycho-logic: Terrorist behavior as a product of psychological forces', in W. Reich (ed.), Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind (Cambridge: Woodrow Wilson Center 1990) p.29.
5. Japan experienced peasant revolts on a regular basis but these were generally easily crushed and never posed a serious threat to the feudal order.
6. W.G. Beasley, The Meiji Restoration (California: Stanford University Press 1972) p.24.
7. J.N. Leonard, Early Japan (Nederland, B.V.: Time-Life 1970).
8. H.D. Harootunian, Toward Restoration: The Growth of Political Consciousness in Tokugawa Japan (London: University of California Press 1970) pp.50-1.
9. Seiichi Iwao (ed.), Biographical Dictionary of Japanese History (New York: Kodansha 1978) p.192.
10. This fact was driven home by ominous reports of the destruction of Canton by a British fleet when China reneged on similar treaties. Ii was told that the British fleet was being dispatched to Japan as soon as it was finished levelling the Chinese. The fleet did not arrive but the possibility remained very real.
11. Beasley (note 6) p.117.
12. There is a certain amount of ambiguity about what the correct translation for 'shishi' is. For example, Edwin Reischauer and Albert Craig, Japan: Tradition and Transformation (London: George Allen & Unwin 1973) translated shishi as 'men of determination'. George Wilson, Patriots and Redeemers in Japan: Motives in the Meiji Restoration (London: University of Chicago Press 1992) copped out of the debate entirely, and simply equated shishi with the word 'zealot'. However, for the purposes of this article, Beasley's definition is adopted, although it is important to remember that other authors may have a different interpretation to his 'men of spirit'.
13. There is a certain amount of ambiguity about what the correct translation for 'shishi' is. For example, Edwin Reischauer and Albert Craig, Japan: Tradition and Transformation (London: George Allen & Unwin 1973) translated shishi as 'men of determination'. George Wilson, Patriots and Redeemers in Japan: Motives in the Meiji Restoration (London: University of Chicago Press 1992) copped out of the debate entirely, and simply equated shishi with the word 'zealot'. However, for the purposes of this article, Beasley's definition is adopted, although it is important to remember that other authors may have a different interpretation to his 'men of spirit'.
14. Iwao (note 9) p.177.
15. Though the tale of the 47 ronin has the stature and length of a Norse saga in Japanese folklore, the essential points can be briefly described here. In 1701 a daimyo, Lord Asano, was publicly insulted by Kira Yoshinaka, an official of the shogun's court. In a fit of rage, Asano drew his sword and attacked the official, injuring the man. However, the attack broke Shogunal law and Asano was ordered to commit seppuku, or ritual suicide. This he did. After his death, Asano's fief was confiscated and all of his retainers lost their positions and became ronin. Without a lord, samurai became known as ronin, and were made homeless and destitute, condemned to a life of extreme poverty. However, one of Asano's samurai, Oishi Kuranosuke, was enraged at what had happened and he called the other ronin together and asked them to join him in avenging their lord. Forty six of the former samurai joined him. Kira, however, heard of their plans, and surrounded himself with guards. Unable to reach him, the 47 ronin scattered and disguised themselves. Over a year passed, and Kira finally relaxed his vigilance. The 47 ronin gathered together and on 14 December 1702, 46 of them (one was too old to take an active part in the assault), attacked Kira's mansion, killing him after a hard-fought battle. Kuranosuke took Kira's head to the grave of Asano. Afterwards the ronin surrendered themselves to the authorities. Because Kuranosuke and the others had defied shogunate laws prohibiting vendettas they were ordered to commit seppuku. Their bodies were buried next to their lord in Sengakuji. The graves and their associated cherry trees quickly became venerated as symbols of loyalty and the true samurai spirit. Even today, people still visit the graves burning incense and praying for the souls of the 47 ronin. (For more details see Harry Cook, Samurai: The Story of a Warrior Tradition (London: Blandford 1993) pp.114-15).
16. Wilson (note 12) pp.64-5.
17. Reischauer and Craig (note 12) p.128.
18. Yoshida Shoin, 'Prison letter to Mokurin', in D.J. Lu (ed.), Sources of Japanese History: Volume Two (London: McGraw-Hill 1856/1974).
19. Beasley (note 6) pp.147-8.
20. It is also interesting to note that the Meiji government did everything in its power to remove giri as a motivating force for its military in the years after the 1860s. Clearly they felt it was an unstable characteristic, which in the wrong circumstances could leave superiors powerless to control well-intentioned but volatile subordinates. (For more on this, see Anna Wierzbicka, 'Japanese key words and core cultural values'. Language in Society 20 (1991) pp.333-85.)
21. Pat Barr, The Coming of the Barbarians (London: Macmillan 1967) p.96.
22. Beasley (note 6) p.151.
23. Barr (note 20) p.97.
24. See, for example, H.J. Horchern, 'Terrorism in Germany: 1985', in Paul Wilkinson and Alex Stewart, (eds) Contemporary Research on Terrorism. (Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press 1987); or D.D. Porta, 'Left-wing terrorism in Italy', in Martha Crenshaw (ed.), Terrorism in Context (Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press 1995).
25. See, for example, H.J. Horchern, 'Terrorism in Germany: 1985', in Paul Wilkinson and Alex Stewart, (eds) Contemporary Research on Terrorism. (Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press 1987); or D.D. Porta, 'Left-wing terrorism in Italy', in Martha Crenshaw (ed.), Terrorism in Context (Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press 1995).
26. J.M. Shafritz, E.F. Gibbons and G.E. Scott, Almanac of Modern Terrorism (Oxford: Facts on File 1991) p.97.
27. Federal Bureau of Investigation, 'Unabomb information - information on the Unabomber case', Http://www..fbi.gov/unabomb. 06/01/1997.
28. Barr (note 20) pp.133-41.
29. Another risk was that the ronin's family could also face reprisals because of his actions. There are many instances of fathers being stripped of their samurai status because a son became a ronin.
30. Marius Jansen, Sakamoto Ryoma and the Meiji Restoration (California: Stanford University Press 1961).
31. To put Ii's death in context, imagine the effect on the Nazi Party if Adolf Hitler had been assassinated in 1935. The loss of its leading figure combined with the following three years of internal power struggles left the Bakufu seriously weakened.
32. Jansen (note 28) pp.130-1.
33. Ibid., p.140.
34. Beasley (note 6) p.190.
35. To many - if not most - ordinary Japanese of the period, the shishi were extremely popular folk-heroes, essentially viewed as a contemporary version of the 47 ronin. Songs and tales of their deeds were in heavy demand.
36. There were over 240 domains in Japan at the time of the shishi. That just four domains produced shishi in any real numbers indicates the special circumstances needed to motivate samurai to abandon feudal service to become terrorists.
37. Beasley (note 6) pp.419-20.
38. Jansen (note 28) p.138. This development is also noteworthy as a good early example of state-sponsored terrorism.
39. Beasley (note 6) p.219.
40. Ibid.
41. Peter Duus, The Rise of Modern Japan (London: Houghton Mifflin 1976) pp.67-8.
42. The Bakufu followed this military victory by executing those shishi who had been captured after the Tajima and Yamato risings; see Jansen (note 28) p.142.
43. Laqueur (note 2) p.303.
44. Rapoport (note 1) p.xii.
45. The unusual success of these groups is perhaps the major difference compared with modern terrorists. For example, the Zealots succeeded in inciting a widespread revolt that drove the Roman Legions (briefly) out of Palestine. The Assassins' campaign was so effective that their cult prospered for centuries. The shishi, while a much more short lived phenomenon, had a profound and lasting impact on their society. And all of this was achieved with primitive weapons and poor mass communications.
46. Or could it be that technological advances have benefited those fighting terrorism somewhat more than the terrorists themselves?
47. One possible factor could be the quality of the individual actors. For example, both the Assassins and the shishi were composed of highly trained martial artists, and both groups belonged to a culture where successfully fulfilling your objective was more important than continuing to live. In relative terms, these older terrorists may have been more skilled and better motivated than their average modem counterpart. Another point to consider is that it may not have been possible to even begin a terrorist campaign in the distant past unless your operatives had reached a sufficient level of skill and ability. For example, the shishi were almost entirely made up of trained samurai. The equivalent today would be a terrorist group composed entirely of ex-professional soldiers (who still had access to all their weapons). The PIRA, for example, is known to have had a relatively high proportion of ex-soldiers in its ranks, and undoubtedly this has enhanced the tactical effectiveness of that organisation.