Satisficing leads to cooperation in mutual interests games

International Journal of Game Theory

Volumn 26, Issue 4, 1997, Pages 439-453

  Pazgal, Amit ^a  

^a NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0031329041     PISSN: 00207276     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/BF01813884     Document Type: Article

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