Liberty of office and its defence in seventeenth-century political argument

History of Political Thought

Volumn 18, Issue 3, 1997, Pages 460-482

  Condren, Conal ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0031328758     PISSN: 0143781X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (131)

1. A version of this paper was given at 'The Republican Concept of Freedom' Symposium, Australian National University, August, 1994. It drew on arguments in C. Condren, The Language of Politics in Seventeenth-Century England (London, 1994), Ch. 4; but the evidence has been augmented and the argument re-focused. I would like to thank the other speakers at the symposium, Professors Quentin Skinner and Philip Pettit and the other discussants, to all of whom I am grateful.
2. Wilmore Kendall, 'How to Read Milton's Areopagitica', in The Journal of Politics, 22 (1960), pp. 439-73.
3. Frederick Crews, The Pooh Perplex: A Student Case Book (London, 1964), pp. 101-12.
4. Throughout I use the terms liberty and freedom as synonyms.
5. See for example, Sir Isaiah Berlin, 'Negative and Positive Liberty', in Four Essays on Liberty (Oxford, 1969); Charles Taylor, 'What's Wrong with Negative Liberty', Philosophy and the Human Sciences (Cambridge, 1985), Ch. 8; Philip Pettit, The Common Mind: An Essay on Psychology, Society and Politics (Oxford, 1993), Pt. 3.
6. See for example, Sir Isaiah Berlin, 'Negative and Positive Liberty', in Four Essays on Liberty (Oxford, 1969); Charles Taylor, 'What's Wrong with Negative Liberty', Philosophy and the Human Sciences (Cambridge, 1985), Ch. 8; Philip Pettit, The Common Mind: An Essay on Psychology, Society and Politics (Oxford, 1993), Pt. 3.
7. See for example, Sir Isaiah Berlin, 'Negative and Positive Liberty', in Four Essays on Liberty (Oxford, 1969); Charles Taylor, 'What's Wrong with Negative Liberty', Philosophy and the Human Sciences (Cambridge, 1985), Ch. 8; Philip Pettit, The Common Mind: An Essay on Psychology, Society and Politics (Oxford, 1993), Pt. 3.
8. It is this lack of a deontology of liberty which perhaps most readily distinguishes liberty of office from the propensities of later liberal ideologies. Even J.S. Mill might be crossed from the list of true liberals because he seemed to treat liberty too often as a means to some further end, some fundamental value beyond liberalism. See Maurice Cowling, Mill and Liberalism (Cambridge, 1963).
9. Anon., Certain Sermons (1683), p. 352; also, Thomas Bilson, The Perpetual Government of Christ's Church (1593), 1; Robert Burton, Anatomy of Melancholy, introduced by Holbrook Jackson (London, 1961), Vol. 2, pt. 2, sect. 3, memb. 4, p. 173, for succinct and conventional comments on the ubiquity of subordination.
10. Anon., Certain Sermons (1683), p. 352; also, Thomas Bilson, The Perpetual Government of Christ's Church (1593), 1; Robert Burton, Anatomy of Melancholy, introduced by Holbrook Jackson (London, 1961), Vol. 2, pt. 2, sect. 3, memb. 4, p. 173, for succinct and conventional comments on the ubiquity of subordination.
11. Anon., Certain Sermons (1683), p. 352; also, Thomas Bilson, The Perpetual Government of Christ's Church (1593), 1; Robert Burton, Anatomy of Melancholy, introduced by Holbrook Jackson (London, 1961), Vol. 2, pt. 2, sect. 3, memb. 4, p. 173, for succinct and conventional comments on the ubiquity of subordination.
12. J.C. Davis, 'Religion and the Struggle for Freedom in the English Revolution', The Historical Journal, 35 (1992), pp. 507 ff. Much of Davis's evidence complements that used here. His is a seminal discussion; but see also, Lotte Mulligan, ' "Reason", "Right Reason" and Revelation in Mid-Seventeenth-Century England', in Occult and Scientific Mentalities in the Renaissance, ed. Brian Vickers (Cambridge, 1984), for the frequency of appeals to reason.
13. J.C. Davis, 'Religion and the Struggle for Freedom in the English Revolution', The Historical Journal, 35 (1992), pp. 507 ff. Much of Davis's evidence complements that used here. His is a seminal discussion; but see also, Lotte Mulligan, ' "Reason", "Right Reason" and Revelation in Mid-Seventeenth-Century England', in Occult and Scientific Mentalities in the Renaissance, ed. Brian Vickers (Cambridge, 1984), for the frequency of appeals to reason.
14. N. Machiavelli, The Prince, Chs. 9 and 17. As Russell Price notes, licenzia meant anarchy and disorder. See Machiavelli, The Prince, ed. Quentin Skinner and Russell Price (Cambridge, 1988), Appendix B, p. 110; John Milton, Areopagitica (1644), in The Prose of John Milton, ed. J. Max Patrick (New York, 1967) for the contrasting notions of liberty and licence, and Milton also for true liberty; also John Locke, Two Treatises of Government (1689), ed. Peter Laslett (Cambridge, 1962), 2.2.6. That there has been a change in the status of licence is indicated by J.K. Scott's 'ordinary language'-derived argument that analyses of freedom need to be inclusive of licence, see 'Liberty, License and Not Being Free', in Political Studies, 4 (1956), pp. 176-85.
15. N. Machiavelli, The Prince, Chs. 9 and 17. As Russell Price notes, licenzia meant anarchy and disorder. See Machiavelli, The Prince, ed. Quentin Skinner and Russell Price (Cambridge, 1988), Appendix B, p. 110; John Milton, Areopagitica (1644), in The Prose of John Milton, ed. J. Max Patrick (New York, 1967) for the contrasting notions of liberty and licence, and Milton also for true liberty; also John Locke, Two Treatises of Government (1689), ed. Peter Laslett (Cambridge, 1962), 2.2.6. That there has been a change in the status of licence is indicated by J.K. Scott's 'ordinary language'-derived argument that analyses of freedom need to be inclusive of licence, see 'Liberty, License and Not Being Free', in Political Studies, 4 (1956), pp. 176-85.
16. N. Machiavelli, The Prince, Chs. 9 and 17. As Russell Price notes, licenzia meant anarchy and disorder. See Machiavelli, The Prince, ed. Quentin Skinner and Russell Price (Cambridge, 1988), Appendix B, p. 110; John Milton, Areopagitica (1644), in The Prose of John Milton, ed. J. Max Patrick (New York, 1967) for the contrasting notions of liberty and licence, and Milton also for true liberty; also John Locke, Two Treatises of Government (1689), ed. Peter Laslett (Cambridge, 1962), 2.2.6. That there has been a change in the status of licence is indicated by J.K. Scott's 'ordinary language'-derived argument that analyses of freedom need to be inclusive of licence, see 'Liberty, License and Not Being Free', in Political Studies, 4 (1956), pp. 176-85.
17. N. Machiavelli, The Prince, Chs. 9 and 17. As Russell Price notes, licenzia meant anarchy and disorder. See Machiavelli, The Prince, ed. Quentin Skinner and Russell Price (Cambridge, 1988), Appendix B, p. 110; John Milton, Areopagitica (1644), in The Prose of John Milton, ed. J. Max Patrick (New York, 1967) for the contrasting notions of liberty and licence, and Milton also for true liberty; also John Locke, Two Treatises of Government (1689), ed. Peter Laslett (Cambridge, 1962), 2.2.6. That there has been a change in the status of licence is indicated by J.K. Scott's 'ordinary language'-derived argument that analyses of freedom need to be inclusive of licence, see 'Liberty, License and Not Being Free', in Political Studies, 4 (1956), pp. 176-85.
18. N. Machiavelli, The Prince, Chs. 9 and 17. As Russell Price notes, licenzia meant anarchy and disorder. See Machiavelli, The Prince, ed. Quentin Skinner and Russell Price (Cambridge, 1988), Appendix B, p. 110; John Milton, Areopagitica (1644), in The Prose of John Milton, ed. J. Max Patrick (New York, 1967) for the contrasting notions of liberty and licence, and Milton also for true liberty; also John Locke, Two Treatises of Government (1689), ed. Peter Laslett (Cambridge, 1962), 2.2.6. That there has been a change in the status of licence is indicated by J.K. Scott's 'ordinary language'-derived argument that analyses of freedom need to be inclusive of licence, see 'Liberty, License and Not Being Free', in Political Studies, 4 (1956), pp. 176-85.
19. For random examples see Condren, The Language of Politics, pp. 133, 198.
20. Milton Schoolman, Preface to Richard Flathman, Thomas Hobbes: Skepticism, Individuality and Chastened Politics (Newbury Park, CA, 1993). Flathman is not guilty of a similar abridgment. However, uncharacteristically, Glenn Burgess comes close to it, 'On Hobbesian Resistance Theory', in Political Studies, 42 (1994), pp. 69, 72; but note also p. 73 where to see Hobbes as a theorist of resistance is held to be historically incredible.
21. Milton Schoolman, Preface to Richard Flathman, Thomas Hobbes: Skepticism, Individuality and Chastened Politics (Newbury Park, CA, 1993). Flathman is not guilty of a similar abridgment. However, uncharacteristically, Glenn Burgess comes close to it, 'On Hobbesian Resistance Theory', in Political Studies, 42 (1994), pp. 69, 72; but note also p. 73 where to see Hobbes as a theorist of resistance is held to be historically incredible.
22. Thomas More, Utopia, in The Complete Works, ed. C. Shulz and J.H. Hexter (New Haven, 1972), Vol. 4, p. 94.
23. Response a la supplication . . . (1591), pp. 4-5, in French Political Pamphlets in the Newberry Library (Lindsay and Neu, no. 1762), cited in Kathleen A Parrow, From Defense to Resistance: Justification of Violence during the French Wars of Religion, American Philosophical Society (Philadelphia, 1993), p. 60.
24. Response a la supplication . . . (1591), pp. 4-5, in French Political Pamphlets in the Newberry Library (Lindsay and Neu, no. 1762), cited in Kathleen A Parrow, From Defense to Resistance: Justification of Violence during the French Wars of Religion, American Philosophical Society (Philadelphia, 1993), p. 60.
25. William Ball, Tractatus de jure Regnandi . . . (1645), p. 17.
26. Algernon Sidney, Discourses on Government (2nd edn., 1704), Ch. 3. 36, p. 376. For the best discussion of the trial and Sidney's language see J. Scott, Algernon Sidney and the Restoration Crisis, 1677-83 (Cambridge, 1991), pp. 260 f.
27. Algernon Sidney, Discourses on Government (2nd edn., 1704), Ch. 3. 36, p. 376. For the best discussion of the trial and Sidney's language see J. Scott, Algernon Sidney and the Restoration Crisis, 1677-83 (Cambridge, 1991), pp. 260 f.
28. For a most suggestive discussion on which I am freely drawing here, see Quentin Skinner, 'Thomas Hobbes: Rhetoric and the Construction of Morality', Proceedings of the British Academy, 76 (1991); and more generally 'Moral Ambiguity and the Renaissance Art of Eloquence', in Essays in Criticism, 44 (1994), esp. pp. 280 ff; the arguments are most elaborated in Reason and Rhetoric in the Philosophy of Hobbes (Cambridge, 1996), pp. 142 ff, 156 ff.
29. 16 For a most suggestive discussion on which I am freely drawing here, see Quentin Skinner, 'Thomas Hobbes: Rhetoric and the Construction of Morality', Proceedings of the British Academy, 76 (1991); and more generally 'Moral Ambiguity and the Renaissance Art of Eloquence', in Essays in Criticism, 44 (1994), esp. pp. 280 ff; the arguments are most elaborated in Reason and Rhetoric in the Philosophy of Hobbes (Cambridge, 1996), pp. 142 ff, 156 ff.
30. 16 For a most suggestive discussion on which I am freely drawing here, see Quentin Skinner, 'Thomas Hobbes: Rhetoric and the Construction of Morality', Proceedings of the British Academy, 76 (1991); and more generally 'Moral Ambiguity and the Renaissance Art of Eloquence', in Essays in Criticism, 44 (1994), esp. pp. 280 ff; the arguments are most elaborated in Reason and Rhetoric in the Philosophy of Hobbes (Cambridge, 1996), pp. 142 ff, 156 ff.
31. Skinner, 'Thomas Hobbes', who makes this point about the Hobbesian natural condition although his argument is not presented in terms of two distinct types of redescription analogous to a typology of euphemism and dysphemism; and in 'Moral Ambiguity', pp. 284-6, where the striking claim is made that the institution of the sovereign is itself an answer to the problems Hobbes saw in paradiastole; Reason and Rhetoric, pp. 317 ff.
32. Skinner, 'Thomas Hobbes', who makes this point about the Hobbesian natural condition although his argument is not presented in terms of two distinct types of redescription analogous to a typology of euphemism and dysphemism; and in 'Moral Ambiguity', pp. 284-6, where the striking claim is made that the institution of the sovereign is itself an answer to the problems Hobbes saw in paradiastole; Reason and Rhetoric, pp. 317 ff.
33. D. Bollinger, Language - The Loaded Weapon: The Use and Abuse of Language To-Day (London, 1983), p. 74.
34. See for example, Stephen Greenblatt, Renaissance Self-Fashioning (Chicago, 1980), p. 256, where he disarmingly admits his surprise at finding that individuality was socially constructed.
35. Cited in Conrad Russell, The Causes of the English Civil War (Oxford, 1990), pp. 157-8; see also Glenn Burgess, The Politics of the Ancient Constitution: An Introduction to English Political Thought, 1603-1642 (London, 1992), pp. 160-4.
36. Cited in Conrad Russell, The Causes of the English Civil War (Oxford, 1990), pp. 157-8; see also Glenn Burgess, The Politics of the Ancient Constitution: An Introduction to English Political Thought, 1603-1642 (London, 1992), pp. 160-4.
37. Lawson, Politica sacra et civilis (1660), ed. Conal Condren (Cambridge, 1992), Ch. 15.8.
38. See for example, Charles A Beard, Preface to The Leveller Manifestoes of the Puritan Revolution, ed. Don M. Wolfe (1944) (London, 1967), pp. vii-x, where the manifestoes are called a permanent 'exhibit' in the history of Liberty in Britain and the United States.
39. Overton, An Appeale . . . (1647), in ibid., p. 174.
40. Ibid., 'while they move in the Sphere of our safety, their motions are Parliamentary . . .'. Offices as spheres of legitimate movement, hence circumscribed liberties, are also found in Lawson, Politica, see for example, Chs. 8 and 15. For Overton's argument about abuse of office rephrased as a destruction of liberty see Overton, An Appeale, p. 169.
41. Ibid., 'while they move in the Sphere of our safety, their motions are Parliamentary . . .'. Offices as spheres of legitimate movement, hence circumscribed liberties, are also found in Lawson, Politica, see for example, Chs. 8 and 15. For Overton's argument about abuse of office rephrased as a destruction of liberty see Overton, An Appeale, p. 169.
42. Ibid., 'while they move in the Sphere of our safety, their motions are Parliamentary . . .'. Offices as spheres of legitimate movement, hence circumscribed liberties, are also found in Lawson, Politica, see for example, Chs. 8 and 15. For Overton's argument about abuse of office rephrased as a destruction of liberty see Overton, An Appeale, p. 169.
43. This is clearly the thrust of Overton's Appeale: parliament has liberties for the safety of the people, to protect their freedoms; and what he calls God's 'ground-worke' (p. 178) is our duty to preserve mankind. See also Davis, 'Religion and the Struggle for Freedom', esp. pp. 513, 521.
44. Overton, An Appeale, p. 177. See also, especially for its repetitive use of the terms freedom and liberty, Gerrard Winstanley, The Law of Freedom (1652), ed. Robert W. Kenny (New York, 1973).
45. Overton, An Appeale, p. 177. See also, especially for its repetitive use of the terms freedom and liberty, Gerrard Winstanley, The Law of Freedom (1652), ed. Robert W. Kenny (New York, 1973).
46. John Milton, The Tenure of Kings and Magistrates (1649), in Prose, ed. Max Patrick, pp. 353, 355.
47. Thus Eikon Basilike (1649), in the voice of Charles I states 'by my freedom' misunderstanding might have been prevented, p. 1; and then he refers to the Honour and Freedom of Parliament (p. 17), and of 'Our Freedom' in Parliament (p. 21). All these uses of freedom and others throughout the book specify the proper conduct of an office, distinguishable from duty only in tone. Writers like Montaigne had certainly developed a sense of self, but as a seat of judgment it was a form of moral office. Expressing a stoic withdrawl, its liberties remained duties to nature or God analogous to those of public office. I am grateful to Geoff Baldwin's unpublished paper 'Self and State in Jacobean Britain' for making me think this through.
48. MacCallum, 'Negative and Positive Freedom', The Philosophical Review, 76 (1967), pp. 314-19. Davis, 'Religion and the Struggle for Freedom', concludes on a similar point. This is not to claim that MacCallum's argument destroys any distinction between positive and negative and so creates a universally applicable unitary concept. I am latterly persuaded by Mon-Han Tsai that as the positive/negative dichotomy has been established by different criteria, a refutation of a verbal formulation in a part of Berlin's case does not collapse all distinctions. By the same token, defences of a distinction between positive and negative do not necessarily address MacCallum's critique. Thus Pettit's distinction between positive (republican) liberty and liberal (negative) liberty (Pettit, The Common Mind, Pt. 3; see also note 5, above) suggests a complementary rather than oppositional relationship. There is nothing logically incompatible in appealing both to the effective fragility of liberties which need securing, called republican/positive liberties, and to immunity (liberal negative liberty). On such a basis Charles I (like pretty well everyone) could be construed as having been both a liberal and a republican. This, logically, is what we might expect, for Pettit's re-specification of the distinction between negative and positive liberty seems to be a matter of turning the latter into a predicate variable for the former.
49. See Andrew Marvell, An Account of the Rise of Popery and Arbitrary Government (1677), in The Complete Works of Andrew Marvell, ed. A.B. Grosart (1875) (New York, 1966), Vol. 4, pp. 361-72.
50. See Taylor, 'What's Wrong with Negative Liberty'. It is not, however, quite the same collapse as MacCallum affects, for Taylor's distinction depends upon conceptions of the self (see note 29, above).
51. Of The State of Matrimony (1562?), in Certain Sermons (1683), pp. 319 f. is representative; see also Anthony Ascham, 'Of Marriage in General, of its State and Condition' (1647), Cambridge University Library, MS Gg. 1.4., where marriage is framed conceptually by duty to God, a duty which restricts liberties even in the event of infidelity (Ch. 3); or more elaborately, George Lawson, Theo-politica (1659) which in part uses the Ten Commandments as topoi for a discussion of the offices of private life.
52. Of The State of Matrimony (1562?), in Certain Sermons (1683), pp. 319 f. is representative; see also Anthony Ascham, 'Of Marriage in General, of its State and Condition' (1647), Cambridge University Library, MS Gg. 1.4., where marriage is framed conceptually by duty to God, a duty which restricts liberties even in the event of infidelity (Ch. 3); or more elaborately, George Lawson, Theo-politica (1659) which in part uses the Ten Commandments as topoi for a discussion of the offices of private life.
53. Of The State of Matrimony (1562?), in Certain Sermons (1683), pp. 319 f. is representative; see also Anthony Ascham, 'Of Marriage in General, of its State and Condition' (1647), Cambridge University Library, MS Gg. 1.4., where marriage is framed conceptually by duty to God, a duty which restricts liberties even in the event of infidelity (Ch. 3); or more elaborately, George Lawson, Theo-politica (1659) which in part uses the Ten Commandments as topoi for a discussion of the offices of private life.
54. Daniel Defoe, in The Review, Vol. 8, p. 115 (1710), quoted in Lester M. Beattie, John Arbuthnot: Mathematician and Satirist (Cambridge, MA, 1935; reissued, New York, 1967), p. 143. The Queen is 'married' to the nation; the Coronation was a 'wedding'; tyranny is 'state adultery', and so on. For Milton see, The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce (1643), in The Prose of John Milton, ed. Patrick, pp. 143 ff. The notions of marital and social contract were symbolically so useful precisely because a contract was a specification of liberties and obligations delineating role and proper behaviour. For Arbuthnot's sustained satiric allegory, see John Bull in His Senses, Ch. 1 (1712), in The History of John Bull, ed. Alan Bower and Robert A. Erickson (Oxford, 1976), pp. 25-7; also Law is a Bottomless Pit, Ch. 8, pp. 12-13. As the notes point out, Arbuthnot is parodying specific speeches made at the Sacheverell trial (1710). His view is that such liberties are really licence, and 'cuckoldom' is rebellion.
55. Daniel Defoe, in The Review, Vol. 8, p. 115 (1710), quoted in Lester M. Beattie, John Arbuthnot: Mathematician and Satirist (Cambridge, MA, 1935; reissued, New York, 1967), p. 143. The Queen is 'married' to the nation; the Coronation was a 'wedding'; tyranny is 'state adultery', and so on. For Milton see, The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce (1643), in The Prose of John Milton, ed. Patrick, pp. 143 ff. The notions of marital and social contract were symbolically so useful precisely because a contract was a specification of liberties and obligations delineating role and proper behaviour. For Arbuthnot's sustained satiric allegory, see John Bull in His Senses, Ch. 1 (1712), in The History of John Bull, ed. Alan Bower and Robert A. Erickson (Oxford, 1976), pp. 25-7; also Law is a Bottomless Pit, Ch. 8, pp. 12-13. As the notes point out, Arbuthnot is parodying specific speeches made at the Sacheverell trial (1710). His view is that such liberties are really licence, and 'cuckoldom' is rebellion.
56. Daniel Defoe, in The Review, Vol. 8, p. 115 (1710), quoted in Lester M. Beattie, John Arbuthnot: Mathematician and Satirist (Cambridge, MA, 1935; reissued, New York, 1967), p. 143. The Queen is 'married' to the nation; the Coronation was a 'wedding'; tyranny is 'state adultery', and so on. For Milton see, The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce (1643), in The Prose of John Milton, ed. Patrick, pp. 143 ff. The notions of marital and social contract were symbolically so useful precisely because a contract was a specification of liberties and obligations delineating role and proper behaviour. For Arbuthnot's sustained satiric allegory, see John Bull in His Senses, Ch. 1 (1712), in The History of John Bull, ed. Alan Bower and Robert A. Erickson (Oxford, 1976), pp. 25-7; also Law is a Bottomless Pit, Ch. 8, pp. 12-13. As the notes point out, Arbuthnot is parodying specific speeches made at the Sacheverell trial (1710). His view is that such liberties are really licence, and 'cuckoldom' is rebellion.
57. Daniel Defoe, in The Review, Vol. 8, p. 115 (1710), quoted in Lester M. Beattie, John Arbuthnot: Mathematician and Satirist (Cambridge, MA, 1935; reissued, New York, 1967), p. 143. The Queen is 'married' to the nation; the Coronation was a 'wedding'; tyranny is 'state adultery', and so on. For Milton see, The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce (1643), in The Prose of John Milton, ed. Patrick, pp. 143 ff. The notions of marital and social contract were symbolically so useful precisely because a contract was a specification of liberties and obligations delineating role and proper behaviour. For Arbuthnot's sustained satiric allegory, see John Bull in His Senses, Ch. 1 (1712), in The History of John Bull, ed. Alan Bower and Robert A. Erickson (Oxford, 1976), pp. 25-7; also Law is a Bottomless Pit, Ch. 8, pp. 12-13. As the notes point out, Arbuthnot is parodying specific speeches made at the Sacheverell trial (1710). His view is that such liberties are really licence, and 'cuckoldom' is rebellion.
58. Daniel Defoe, in The Review, Vol. 8, p. 115 (1710), quoted in Lester M. Beattie, John Arbuthnot: Mathematician and Satirist (Cambridge, MA, 1935; reissued, New York, 1967), p. 143. The Queen is 'married' to the nation; the Coronation was a 'wedding'; tyranny is 'state adultery', and so on. For Milton see, The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce (1643), in The Prose of John Milton, ed. Patrick, pp. 143 ff. The notions of marital and social contract were symbolically so useful precisely because a contract was a specification of liberties and obligations delineating role and proper behaviour. For Arbuthnot's sustained satiric allegory, see John Bull in His Senses, Ch. 1 (1712), in The History of John Bull, ed. Alan Bower and Robert A. Erickson (Oxford, 1976), pp. 25-7; also Law is a Bottomless Pit, Ch. 8, pp. 12-13. As the notes point out, Arbuthnot is parodying specific speeches made at the Sacheverell trial (1710). His view is that such liberties are really licence, and 'cuckoldom' is rebellion.
59. Winstanley, The Law of Freedom, Ch. 4, where in the private family the father is an officer; see generally, William Scott, An Essay on Drapery (1635, reprinted Cambridge, MA, 1953); and Anon., The Citizen's Companion or Tradesman's Mirror (1673).
60. Winstanley, The Law of Freedom, Ch. 4, where in the private family the father is an officer; see generally, William Scott, An Essay on Drapery (1635, reprinted Cambridge, MA, 1953); and Anon., The Citizen's Companion or Tradesman's Mirror (1673).
61. Winstanley, The Law of Freedom, Ch. 4, where in the private family the father is an officer; see generally, William Scott, An Essay on Drapery (1635, reprinted Cambridge, MA, 1953); and Anon., The Citizen's Companion or Tradesman's Mirror (1673).
62. The State of Matrimony, in Certain Sermons, p. 319; Overton, An Appeale, p. 178; the under-pinning relevance of this basic obligation to Locke's oeuvre is well discussed by James Tully, A Discourse on Property: John Locke and his Adversaries (Cambridge, 1982), esp. pp. 35-9 and 43-4, on duties being freedoms. Winstanley, The Law of Freedom, is based throughout on the complaint that commoners (so-called subjects) are denied their freedoms.
63. The State of Matrimony, in Certain Sermons, p. 319; Overton, An Appeale, p. 178; the under-pinning relevance of this basic obligation to Locke's oeuvre is well discussed by James Tully, A Discourse on Property: John Locke and his Adversaries (Cambridge, 1982), esp. pp. 35-9 and 43-4, on duties being freedoms. Winstanley, The Law of Freedom, is based throughout on the complaint that commoners (so-called subjects) are denied their freedoms.
64. The State of Matrimony, in Certain Sermons, p. 319; Overton, An Appeale, p. 178; the under-pinning relevance of this basic obligation to Locke's oeuvre is well discussed by James Tully, A Discourse on Property: John Locke and his Adversaries (Cambridge, 1982), esp. pp. 35-9 and 43-4, on duties being freedoms. Winstanley, The Law of Freedom, is based throughout on the complaint that commoners (so-called subjects) are denied their freedoms.
65. The State of Matrimony, in Certain Sermons, p. 319; Overton, An Appeale, p. 178; the under-pinning relevance of this basic obligation to Locke's oeuvre is well discussed by James Tully, A Discourse on Property: John Locke and his Adversaries (Cambridge, 1982), esp. pp. 35-9 and 43-4, on duties being freedoms. Winstanley, The Law of Freedom, is based throughout on the complaint that commoners (so-called subjects) are denied their freedoms.
66. William Shakespeare, The Tempest, cf 1.2, 1 247; 6.1, 11 6 and 96;
67. see also some of Sir Thomas Wyatt's elliptical uses of liberty, Egerton MS 2711, poems 11 and 67, in Collected Poems, ed. Kenneth Muir (London, 1976).
68. This is exactly Skinner's point, though it is not the only explanation he gives for Hobbes's usage, 'Hobbes and the Proper Signification of Liberty', Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 40 (1990), pp. 121 f.; see also Maurice Goldsmith, 'Hobbes on Liberty', in Hobbes Studies, 2 (1989), pp. 27, 37.
69. This is exactly Skinner's point, though it is not the only explanation he gives for Hobbes's usage, 'Hobbes and the Proper Signification of Liberty', Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 40 (1990), pp. 121 f.; see also Maurice Goldsmith, 'Hobbes on Liberty', in Hobbes Studies, 2 (1989), pp. 27, 37.
70. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (1651), ed. R. Tuck (Cambridge, 1991), Ch. 14.
71. Goldsmith, 'Hobbes on Liberty', pp. 31-2.
72. See, Flathman, Thomas Hobbes, for a thoughtful example.
73. Hobbes, Leviathan, Ch. 25, esp. p. 176; for a recent analysis of Hobbes's understanding of counsel see A.P. Martinich, The Two Gods of Leviathan: Thomas Hobbes on Religion and Politics (Cambridge, 1992), pp. 128-32.
74. Hobbes, Leviathan, Ch. 25, esp. p. 176; for a recent analysis of Hobbes's understanding of counsel see A.P. Martinich, The Two Gods of Leviathan: Thomas Hobbes on Religion and Politics (Cambridge, 1992), pp. 128-32.
75. Henry de Bracton, De legibus et consuetudinibus Angliae, ed. G.E. Woodbine and S.E. Thorne (Cambridge, MA, 1968-77), Vol. 2, pp. 109-10. For a discussion see C. Nederman, 'The Royal Will and the Baronial Bridle: The Place of the addicio de cartis in Bractonian Political Thought', History of Political Thought, IX (1988), pp. 415-29. My argument here follows Condren, The Language of Politics, Ch. 4.
76. Henry de Bracton, De legibus et consuetudinibus Angliae, ed. G.E. Woodbine and S.E. Thorne (Cambridge, MA, 1968-77), Vol. 2, pp. 109-10. For a discussion see C. Nederman, 'The Royal Will and the Baronial Bridle: The Place of the addicio de cartis in Bractonian Political Thought', History of Political Thought, IX (1988), pp. 415-29. My argument here follows Condren, The Language of Politics, Ch. 4.
77. Henry de Bracton, De legibus et consuetudinibus Angliae, ed. G.E. Woodbine and S.E. Thorne (Cambridge, MA, 1968-77), Vol. 2, pp. 109-10. For a discussion see C. Nederman, 'The Royal Will and the Baronial Bridle: The Place of the addicio de cartis in Bractonian Political Thought', History of Political Thought, IX (1988), pp. 415-29. My argument here follows Condren, The Language of Politics, Ch. 4.
78. Hobbes, Leviathan, Ch. 25, p. 178.
79. J.W.H. Salmon, The French Wars of Religion and English Political Thought (Oxford, 1959).
80. L.J. Reeve, Charles I and the Road to Personal Rule (Cambridge, 1989). For the remainder of this paragraph I am abridging the fine discussion in Ch. 3.
81. Shakespeare, Richard II, 2. I. 11. 241-2.
82. For details, Condren, The Language of Politics, p. 121.
83. Shakespeare, Julius Caesar, 2. i. 11. 169-70.
84. C. Russell, Causes of the English Civil War, pp. 23, 132 f.
85. Marvell, An Account of the Growth of Popery, see especially the peroration.
86. Mark Goldie, 'The Revolution of 1689 and the Structure of Political Argument', The Bulletin of Research in the Humanities (1980), pp. 496, 489.
87. Milton, The Tenure of Kings and Magistrates, the sub-title of which refers to the 'ordinary magistrate' and the neglect of the duty to depose a 'tyrant, or wicked king'.
88. Anon., A Word to the Approaching Parliament, Somers Tracts (1689), pp. 4-5.
89. James Tully, A Discourse on Property, Chs. 2, 5.
90. For a fine and succinct discussion of the casuistry of self-defence see at length, Margaret Sampson, 'Laxity and Liberty in Seventeenth-Century English Political Thought', in Conscience and Casuistry in Early Modern Europe, ed. E. Leites (Cambridge, 1988), pp. 72-118. I am much indebted to this essay.
91. See for example, Anon., The Mournful Cries of Many thousand poor tradesmen who are ready to famish through decay of trade. Or the warning Tears of the Oppressed (1648), in The Leveller Manifestoes, p. 278: 'O heark, heark at our doors, how our children cry Bread . . . pity an oppressed, enslaved People: . . . tell them [Parliament] the Tears of the oppressed will wash away the foundations of their houses.' Is this a threat of uprising?
92. Parrow, From Defense to Resistance, Ch. 1.
93. Ibid., pp. 16-21.
94. For a valuable discussion see Burgess, 'On Hobbesian Resistance Theory', pp. 62-72.
95. Christopher Fox, Locke and the Scriblerians: Identity and Consciousness in Early Eighteenth-Century Britain (Los Angeles, 1988), pp. 2-18.
96. See at length, Keith Thomas, 'The Social Origins of Hobbes's Political Thought', in Hobbes Studies, ed. K.C. Brown (Oxford, 1965), pp. 185-236; Bernard de Mandeville, The Fable of the Bees, ed. F.B. Kaye (Indianapolis, 1988), Vol. 1, pp. 220-1.
97. See at length, Keith Thomas, 'The Social Origins of Hobbes's Political Thought', in Hobbes Studies, ed. K.C. Brown (Oxford, 1965), pp. 185-236; Bernard de Mandeville, The Fable of the Bees, ed. F.B. Kaye (Indianapolis, 1988), Vol. 1, pp. 220-1.
98. John Nalson, The Complaint of Liberty and Property Against Arbitrary Government in Political and Religious Tracts (1681), pp. 1 ff.
99. Parrow, From Defence to Resistance, pp. 38 f., 54, 57.
100. Alberico Gentili, De juri belli libri tres (1608; reprinted Oxford, 1933), 1.15 for the state as a citizen. The right of self-defence among states is more famously elaborated by Hugo Grotius, De jure belli ac pacis (Paris, 1625).
101. Alberico Gentili, De juri belli libri tres (1608; reprinted Oxford, 1933), 1.15 for the state as a citizen. The right of self-defence among states is more famously elaborated by Hugo Grotius, De jure belli ac pacis (Paris, 1625).
102. John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, 2. 220.
103. Cited in Sampson, 'Liberty and Laxity', p. 95.
104. The unlawfulness of subjects taking up armes against their sovereigne in what case soever (1643); see also Henry Hammond, Of Resisting the Lawfull Magistrate under Colour of Religion (1644), both discussed in Sampson, 'Liberty and Laxity', pp. 111 and 107, respectively.
105. The unlawfulness of subjects taking up armes against their sovereigne in what case soever (1643); see also Henry Hammond, Of Resisting the Lawfull Magistrate under Colour of Religion (1644), both discussed in Sampson, 'Liberty and Laxity', pp. 111 and 107, respectively.
106. The unlawfulness of subjects taking up armes against their sovereigne in what case soever (1643); see also Henry Hammond, Of Resisting the Lawfull Magistrate under Colour of Religion (1644), both discussed in Sampson, 'Liberty and Laxity', pp. 111 and 107, respectively.
107. The repeated theme of Overton, An Appeale, all the stronger because using the precedent of Parliament's own arguments against Charles.
108. See for example the enthusiastic Professor Janelle Greenberg, who celebrates a whole legion of resistance theorists in the seventeenth century who justified rebellion (J. Greenberg, 'The Confessor's Laws and the Radical Face of the Ancient Constitution', in The English Historical Review, 104 (1989)); also Lois Schwoerer, who has trouble listing all the resistance theorists from the period around the revolution of 1688 (L. Schwoerer, 'The Right to Resist: Whig Resistance Theory 1688-1694', in Political Discourse in Early Modern Britain, ed. N. Phillipson and Q. Skinner (Cambridge, 1993)).
109. See for example the enthusiastic Professor Janelle Greenberg, who celebrates a whole legion of resistance theorists in the seventeenth century who justified rebellion (J. Greenberg, 'The Confessor's Laws and the Radical Face of the Ancient Constitution', in The English Historical Review, 104 (1989)); also Lois Schwoerer, who has trouble listing all the resistance theorists from the period around the revolution of 1688 (L. Schwoerer, 'The Right to Resist: Whig Resistance Theory 1688-1694', in Political Discourse in Early Modern Britain, ed. N. Phillipson and Q. Skinner (Cambridge, 1993)).
110. Conal Condren, George Lawson's Politica and the English Revolution (Cambridge, 1989), p. 151; L. Anderton, Remarks on the Present Confederacy (1693), in Somers Tracts, Vol. 3, first collection (1748), p. 545; Francis Gibbon, marginal gloss to the Folger Library copy of James Tyrrell, Patriarcha non monarcha, p. 197
111. Conal Condren, George Lawson's Politica and the English Revolution (Cambridge, 1989), p. 151; L. Anderton, Remarks on the Present Confederacy (1693), in Somers Tracts, Vol. 3, first collection (1748), p. 545; Francis Gibbon, marginal gloss to the Folger Library copy of James Tyrrell, Patriarcha non monarcha, p. 197
112. Conal Condren, George Lawson's Politica and the English Revolution (Cambridge, 1989), p. 151; L. Anderton, Remarks on the Present Confederacy (1693), in Somers Tracts, Vol. 3, first collection (1748), p. 545; Francis Gibbon, marginal gloss to the Folger Library copy of James Tyrrell, Patriarcha non monarcha, p. 197
113. See for example, The Rebel's Catechism (1643); The Revolution no Rebellion (1709).
114. See for example, The Rebel's Catechism (1643); The Revolution no Rebellion (1709).
115. Samuel Johnson, The Opinion is This, That Resistance may be Us'd (1689 edn.), pp. 2-4, 8; Anon., An Argument for Self-Defence, Written about the Year 1687, in Somers Tracts, Vol. 3, first collection (1748).
116. Samuel Johnson, The Opinion is This, That Resistance may be Us'd (1689 edn.), pp. 2-4, 8; Anon., An Argument for Self-Defence, Written about the Year 1687, in Somers Tracts, Vol. 3, first collection (1748).
117. Locke, Two Treatises, 2. 19. have discussed the notion of an argument from dissolution in Condren, The Language of Politics, Ch. 4, sects. 5-6.
118. Locke, Two Treatises, 2. 19. have discussed the notion of an argument from dissolution in Condren, The Language of Politics, Ch. 4, sects. 5-6.
119. Withers, A History of Resistance Practis'd bv the Church of England (1710), in The Somers Tracts, Vol. 3, first collection (1748), pp. 585, 593.
120. This line of argument is found in Anthony Ascham, On the Confusions and Revolutions of Government (1649) and a number of other 'de facto' tracts. But note also Overton's remarks in An Appeale, on the 'ground-worke that God in nature hath laid for all common-wealths' (p. 178), to wit, the preservation of mankind.
121. This line of argument is found in Anthony Ascham, On the Confusions and Revolutions of Government (1649) and a number of other 'de facto' tracts. But note also Overton's remarks in An Appeale, on the 'ground-worke that God in nature hath laid for all common-wealths' (p. 178), to wit, the preservation of mankind.
122. David Hume, 'Of Passive Obedience', in Essays, Moral, Political and Literary, ed. Eugene F. Miller (Indianapolis, 1987), p. 492. Hume is quite sanguine about the equations of resistance and rebellion, and recognizes that we are dealing with a form of casuistry (p. 491). Nevertheless, where rebellion remained a likely accusation, it is probably the case that writers still preferred to rebut it. American sermons clearly show the survival of seventeenth-century taboos and strategies of avoidance. See for example, John Allen, An Oration on the Beauties of Liberty (1773); Jacob Cushing, Divine Judgements Upon Tyrants (1778); Stephen Case (?) Defensive Arms Vindicated (1783), in Political Sermons, ed. Sandoz, pp. 305-25; 611-26; 715-70.
123. David Hume, 'Of Passive Obedience', in Essays, Moral, Political and Literary, ed. Eugene F. Miller (Indianapolis, 1987), p. 492. Hume is quite sanguine about the equations of resistance and rebellion, and recognizes that we are dealing with a form of casuistry (p. 491). Nevertheless, where rebellion remained a likely accusation, it is probably the case that writers still preferred to rebut it. American sermons clearly show the survival of seventeenth-century taboos and strategies of avoidance. See for example, John Allen, An Oration on the Beauties of Liberty (1773); Jacob Cushing, Divine Judgements Upon Tyrants (1778); Stephen Case (?) Defensive Arms Vindicated (1783), in Political Sermons, ed. Sandoz, pp. 305-25; 611-26; 715-70.
124. David Hume, 'Of Passive Obedience', in Essays, Moral, Political and Literary, ed. Eugene F. Miller (Indianapolis, 1987), p. 492. Hume is quite sanguine about the equations of resistance and rebellion, and recognizes that we are dealing with a form of casuistry (p. 491). Nevertheless, where rebellion remained a likely accusation, it is probably the case that writers still preferred to rebut it. American sermons clearly show the survival of seventeenth-century taboos and strategies of avoidance. See for example, John Allen, An Oration on the Beauties of Liberty (1773); Jacob Cushing, Divine Judgements Upon Tyrants (1778); Stephen Case (?) Defensive Arms Vindicated (1783), in Political Sermons, ed. Sandoz, pp. 305-25; 611-26; 715-70.
125. David Hume, 'Of Passive Obedience', in Essays, Moral, Political and Literary, ed. Eugene F. Miller (Indianapolis, 1987), p. 492. Hume is quite sanguine about the equations of resistance and rebellion, and recognizes that we are dealing with a form of casuistry (p. 491). Nevertheless, where rebellion remained a likely accusation, it is probably the case that writers still preferred to rebut it. American sermons clearly show the survival of seventeenth-century taboos and strategies of avoidance. See for example, John Allen, An Oration on the Beauties of Liberty (1773); Jacob Cushing, Divine Judgements Upon Tyrants (1778); Stephen Case (?) Defensive Arms Vindicated (1783), in Political Sermons, ed. Sandoz, pp. 305-25; 611-26; 715-70.
126. 'there is nothing in itself valuable or despicable . . . these attributes arise from human sentiments and affection, even with respect to the deformed or odious, the qualities are not in the objects but in the mind that blames or praises'. 'The Sceptic', in Hume, Essays, pp. 162-3. Thus eventually via Keats to Nietzsche.
127. Robert Lowe, The People's Advocate (16 June 1849). I am grateful to Mark McKenna for this reference, Lowe is discussed in M. McKenna, The Captive Republic (Cambridge, 1996).
128. Robert Lowe, The People's Advocate (16 June 1849). I am grateful to Mark McKenna for this reference, Lowe is discussed in M. McKenna, The Captive Republic (Cambridge, 1996).
129. Again, I am indebted to McKenna's analysis.
130. Gregory S. Kavka, Hobbesian Moral and Political Theory (Princeton, 1986); and 'Some Neglected Liberal Aspects of Hobbes's Philosophy', in Hobbes Studies, 1 (1988), pp. 89 ff.
131. Gregory S. Kavka, Hobbesian Moral and Political Theory (Princeton, 1986); and 'Some Neglected Liberal Aspects of Hobbes's Philosophy', in Hobbes Studies, 1 (1988), pp. 89 ff.