State-society interaction and European integration: A political economy approach to the dynamics and policy-making of the European Union

Review of International Studies

Volumn 23, Issue 4, 1997, Pages 469-500

  Ugur, Mehmet ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0031328523     PISSN: 02602105     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0260210597004695     Document Type: Article

References (136)

1. For the original analogy, see D. Puchala, 'Of Blind Men, Elephants and International Integration', Journal of Common Market Studies, 3 (1972), pp. 267-84.
2. In a recent paper, Haaland-Matlary suggests that the current state of research on European integration can still be described with reference to Puchala's metaphor. See J. Haaland-Matlary, 'Integration Theory and International Relations Theory: What Does the Elephant Look Like Today and How Should It Be Studied?', paper submitted to the 2nd ECSA World Conference on 'Federalism, Subsidiarity and Democracy in the European Union', Brussels, 5-6 May 1994.
3. For a discussion on the origins and relevance of the policy networks approach, see R. A. W. Rhodes and D. Marsh, 'Policy Networks in British Politics: A Critique of Existing Approaches', in D. Marsh and R. A. W. Rhodes (eds.), Policy Networks in British Government (Oxford, 1992), pp. 1-26. For the application of the model to EU policy-making, see J. Peterson, 'The European Technology Community: Policy Networks in a Supranational Setting', in Marsh and Rhodes (eds.), Policy Networks, pp. 226-48; and V. Schneider et al., 'Corporate Actor Networks in European Policy Making: Harmonising Telecommunications Policy', Journal of Common Market Studies, 4 (1994), pp. 473-98.
4. For a discussion on the origins and relevance of the policy networks approach, see R. A. W. Rhodes and D. Marsh, 'Policy Networks in British Politics: A Critique of Existing Approaches', in D. Marsh and R. A. W. Rhodes (eds.), Policy Networks in British Government (Oxford, 1992), pp. 1-26. For the application of the model to EU policy-making, see J. Peterson, 'The European Technology Community: Policy Networks in a Supranational Setting', in Marsh and Rhodes (eds.), Policy Networks, pp. 226-48; and V. Schneider et al., 'Corporate Actor Networks in European Policy Making: Harmonising Telecommunications Policy', Journal of Common Market Studies, 4 (1994), pp. 473-98.
5. For a discussion on the origins and relevance of the policy networks approach, see R. A. W. Rhodes and D. Marsh, 'Policy Networks in British Politics: A Critique of Existing Approaches', in D. Marsh and R. A. W. Rhodes (eds.), Policy Networks in British Government (Oxford, 1992), pp. 1-26. For the application of the model to EU policy-making, see J. Peterson, 'The European Technology Community: Policy Networks in a Supranational Setting', in Marsh and Rhodes (eds.), Policy Networks, pp. 226-48; and V. Schneider et al., 'Corporate Actor Networks in European Policy Making: Harmonising Telecommunications Policy', Journal of Common Market Studies, 4 (1994), pp. 473-98.
6. The neglect of the state by functionalists is a result of their subscription to a Realist state image that leads them to see the state as an obstacle to cross-border cooperation of non-state actors. See David Mitrany, The Functional Theory of Politics (London, 1975), and A Working Peace System (Chicago, 1966). Neofunctionalism, on the other hand, perceives the state as an aberration which conceals the pluralist nature of politics. See Ernst B. Haas, The Uniting of Europe, 2nd edn (Stanford, CA, 1968); and E. B. Haas, Beyond the Nation State (Stanford, CA, 1964). On Haas's acknowledgement that his analysis is not based on an explicit definition of the state, see Ernst B. Haas, 'Letter to the Editor', Journal of Common Market Studies, 1 (1969), p. 70.
7. The neglect of the state by functionalists is a result of their subscription to a Realist state image that leads them to see the state as an obstacle to cross-border cooperation of non-state actors. See David Mitrany, The Functional Theory of Politics (London, 1975), and A Working Peace System (Chicago, 1966). Neofunctionalism, on the other hand, perceives the state as an aberration which conceals the pluralist nature of politics. See Ernst B. Haas, The Uniting of Europe, 2nd edn (Stanford, CA, 1968); and E. B. Haas, Beyond the Nation State (Stanford, CA, 1964). On Haas's acknowledgement that his analysis is not based on an explicit definition of the state, see Ernst B. Haas, 'Letter to the Editor', Journal of Common Market Studies, 1 (1969), p. 70.
8. The neglect of the state by functionalists is a result of their subscription to a Realist state image that leads them to see the state as an obstacle to cross-border cooperation of non-state actors. See David Mitrany, The Functional Theory of Politics (London, 1975), and A Working Peace System (Chicago, 1966). Neofunctionalism, on the other hand, perceives the state as an aberration which conceals the pluralist nature of politics. See Ernst B. Haas, The Uniting of Europe, 2nd edn (Stanford, CA, 1968); and E. B. Haas, Beyond the Nation State (Stanford, CA, 1964). On Haas's acknowledgement that his analysis is not based on an explicit definition of the state, see Ernst B. Haas, 'Letter to the Editor', Journal of Common Market Studies, 1 (1969), p. 70.
9. The neglect of the state by functionalists is a result of their subscription to a Realist state image that leads them to see the state as an obstacle to cross-border cooperation of non-state actors. See David Mitrany, The Functional Theory of Politics (London, 1975), and A Working Peace System (Chicago, 1966). Neofunctionalism, on the other hand, perceives the state as an aberration which conceals the pluralist nature of politics. See Ernst B. Haas, The Uniting of Europe, 2nd edn (Stanford, CA, 1968); and E. B. Haas, Beyond the Nation State (Stanford, CA, 1964). On Haas's acknowledgement that his analysis is not based on an explicit definition of the state, see Ernst B. Haas, 'Letter to the Editor', Journal of Common Market Studies, 1 (1969), p. 70.
10. The neglect of the state by functionalists is a result of their subscription to a Realist state image that leads them to see the state as an obstacle to cross-border cooperation of non-state actors. See David Mitrany, The Functional Theory of Politics (London, 1975), and A Working Peace System (Chicago, 1966). Neofunctionalism, on the other hand, perceives the state as an aberration which conceals the pluralist nature of politics. See Ernst B. Haas, The Uniting of Europe, 2nd edn (Stanford, CA, 1968); and E. B. Haas, Beyond the Nation State (Stanford, CA, 1964). On Haas's acknowledgement that his analysis is not based on an explicit definition of the state, see Ernst B. Haas, 'Letter to the Editor', Journal of Common Market Studies, 1 (1969), p. 70.
11. Alan S. Milward, The European Rescue of the Nation-state (London, 1992).
12. Haas, Beyond the Nation State, p. 48.
13. C. Webb, 'Theoretical Perspectives and Problems', in H. Wallace, W. Wallace and C. Webb (eds.), Policy-making in the European Community (Chichester, 1987), p. 18.
14. Irrespective of the shortcomings of this pluralist approach, it must be acknowledged that Haas's observation that 'interest group politics' is a necessary condition for regional integration remains significant. On this, see Haas, Beyond the Nation State, pp. 447-57. That is because in polities where interest groups are able to penetrate the state, or where the latter is able to control the former, legitimation of state rule will be based on either clientelism or a nationalist/populist ideology. Consequently, the capacity of the state to engage in integrative frameworks requiring binding rules will be reduced. For further elaboration on this issue, see section 3 below.
15. L. N. Lindberg and A. Scheingold, Europe's Would-be Polity: Patterns of Change in the European Community (Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1970), pp. 64-100.
16. Ironically, the tendency to free-ride will become more pronounced as the size of the group with a common interest increases. As group size increases, the rationally behaving individual will expect his/her free-riding to have minimal or no effect either on the establishment of the interest group organization or on its success in providing the collective good. See M. Olson, The Logic of Collective Action (Cambridge, MA, 1965), pp. 31-42. As examples of work on group theory, see also J. M. Hansen, 'The Political Economy of Group Membership', American Political Science Review, 1 (1985), pp. 79-96; M. Laver, The Politics of Private Desires (Harmondsworth, 1981); and M. Wallerstein, 'Union Organisation in Advanced Industrial Democracies', American Political Science Review, 2 (1989), pp. 481-501.
17. Ironically, the tendency to free-ride will become more pronounced as the size of the group with a common interest increases. As group size increases, the rationally behaving individual will expect his/her free-riding to have minimal or no effect either on the establishment of the interest group organization or on its success in providing the collective good. See M. Olson, The Logic of Collective Action (Cambridge, MA, 1965), pp. 31-42. As examples of work on group theory, see also J. M. Hansen, 'The Political Economy of Group Membership', American Political Science Review, 1 (1985), pp. 79-96; M. Laver, The Politics of Private Desires (Harmondsworth, 1981); and M. Wallerstein, 'Union Organisation in Advanced Industrial Democracies', American Political Science Review, 2 (1989), pp. 481-501.
18. Ironically, the tendency to free-ride will become more pronounced as the size of the group with a common interest increases. As group size increases, the rationally behaving individual will expect his/her free-riding to have minimal or no effect either on the establishment of the interest group organization or on its success in providing the collective good. See M. Olson, The Logic of Collective Action (Cambridge, MA, 1965), pp. 31-42. As examples of work on group theory, see also J. M. Hansen, 'The Political Economy of Group Membership', American Political Science Review, 1 (1985), pp. 79-96; M. Laver, The Politics of Private Desires (Harmondsworth, 1981); and M. Wallerstein, 'Union Organisation in Advanced Industrial Democracies', American Political Science Review, 2 (1989), pp. 481-501.
19. Ironically, the tendency to free-ride will become more pronounced as the size of the group with a common interest increases. As group size increases, the rationally behaving individual will expect his/her free-riding to have minimal or no effect either on the establishment of the interest group organization or on its success in providing the collective good. See M. Olson, The Logic of Collective Action (Cambridge, MA, 1965), pp. 31-42. As examples of work on group theory, see also J. M. Hansen, 'The Political Economy of Group Membership', American Political Science Review, 1 (1985), pp. 79-96; M. Laver, The Politics of Private Desires (Harmondsworth, 1981); and M. Wallerstein, 'Union Organisation in Advanced Industrial Democracies', American Political Science Review, 2 (1989), pp. 481-501.
20. Such a possibility emerges as the state recognizes the fact that the leadership of the interest group organization would be inclined to advance not only the collective welfare of the group, but also their own interests. On this, see Patrick Dunleavy and Brendan O'Leary, Theories of the State: The Politics of Liberal Democracy (London, 1987), pp. 163-4.
21. C. Webb, 'Theoretical Perspectives and Problems', in Wallace et al. (eds.), Policy-making, p. 14.
22. For example, Haas observes that economic planning and reliance on technocracy have become the most significant features of national governance in the postwar period. The elevation of these norms to the European level would then require merely an adaptation of the national forms. See E. B. Haas, 'Technocracy, Pluralism and the New Europe', in S. B. Graubard (ed.), A New Europe? (London, 1964), pp. 65-71.
23. Hirschman states that both the neofunctionalist 'spill-over' thesis and his concepts of 'backward' and 'forward' linkages have failed to survive as the process they attempt to explain becomes more complex. See A. O. Hirschman, 'Three Uses of Political Economy in Analysing European Integration', in A. O. Hirschman, Essays in Trespassing: Economics to Politics and Beyond (Cambridge, 1981), pp. 276-7.
24. See R. O. Keohane and S. Hoffmann, 'Institutional Change in Europe in the 1980s', in R. O. Keohane and S. Hoffmann (eds.), The New European Community: Decisionmaking and Institutional Change (Boulder, CO, 1991), pp. 1-39; and Andrew Moravcsik, 'Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach', Journal of Common Market Studies, 4 (1993), pp. 473-9. It must be pointed out that Haas himself has also acknowledged the obsolescence of neofunctionalism. See Ernst B. Haas, The Obsolescence of Regional Integration Theory (Berkeley, CA, 1975). For earlier attempts at coping with the problems posed for the theory, see L. Lindberg, 'Integration as a Source of Stress on the European Community System', International Organization, 2 (1966), pp. 233-65; P. C. Schmitter, 'Central American Integration: Spill-over, Spill-around and Encapsulation', Journal of Common Market Studies, 1 (1970), pp. 1-48.
25. See R. O. Keohane and S. Hoffmann, 'Institutional Change in Europe in the 1980s', in R. O. Keohane and S. Hoffmann (eds.), The New European Community: Decisionmaking and Institutional Change (Boulder, CO, 1991), pp. 1-39; and Andrew Moravcsik, 'Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach', Journal of Common Market Studies, 4 (1993), pp. 473-9. It must be pointed out that Haas himself has also acknowledged the obsolescence of neofunctionalism. See Ernst B. Haas, The Obsolescence of Regional Integration Theory (Berkeley, CA, 1975). For earlier attempts at coping with the problems posed for the theory, see L. Lindberg, 'Integration as a Source of Stress on the European Community System', International Organization, 2 (1966), pp. 233-65; P. C. Schmitter, 'Central American Integration: Spill-over, Spill-around and Encapsulation', Journal of Common Market Studies, 1 (1970), pp. 1-48.
26. See R. O. Keohane and S. Hoffmann, 'Institutional Change in Europe in the 1980s', in R. O. Keohane and S. Hoffmann (eds.), The New European Community: Decisionmaking and Institutional Change (Boulder, CO, 1991), pp. 1-39; and Andrew Moravcsik, 'Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach', Journal of Common Market Studies, 4 (1993), pp. 473-9. It must be pointed out that Haas himself has also acknowledged the obsolescence of neofunctionalism. See Ernst B. Haas, The Obsolescence of Regional Integration Theory (Berkeley, CA, 1975). For earlier attempts at coping with the problems posed for the theory, see L. Lindberg, 'Integration as a Source of Stress on the European Community System', International Organization, 2 (1966), pp. 233-65; P. C. Schmitter, 'Central American Integration: Spill-over, Spill-around and Encapsulation', Journal of Common Market Studies, 1 (1970), pp. 1-48.
27. See R. O. Keohane and S. Hoffmann, 'Institutional Change in Europe in the 1980s', in R. O. Keohane and S. Hoffmann (eds.), The New European Community: Decisionmaking and Institutional Change (Boulder, CO, 1991), pp. 1-39; and Andrew Moravcsik, 'Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach', Journal of Common Market Studies, 4 (1993), pp. 473-9. It must be pointed out that Haas himself has also acknowledged the obsolescence of neofunctionalism. See Ernst B. Haas, The Obsolescence of Regional Integration Theory (Berkeley, CA, 1975). For earlier attempts at coping with the problems posed for the theory, see L. Lindberg, 'Integration as a Source of Stress on the European Community System', International Organization, 2 (1966), pp. 233-65; P. C. Schmitter, 'Central American Integration: Spill-over, Spill-around and Encapsulation', Journal of Common Market Studies, 1 (1970), pp. 1-48.
28. See R. O. Keohane and S. Hoffmann, 'Institutional Change in Europe in the 1980s', in R. O. Keohane and S. Hoffmann (eds.), The New European Community: Decisionmaking and Institutional Change (Boulder, CO, 1991), pp. 1-39; and Andrew Moravcsik, 'Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach', Journal of Common Market Studies, 4 (1993), pp. 473-9. It must be pointed out that Haas himself has also acknowledged the obsolescence of neofunctionalism. See Ernst B. Haas, The Obsolescence of Regional Integration Theory (Berkeley, CA, 1975). For earlier attempts at coping with the problems posed for the theory, see L. Lindberg, 'Integration as a Source of Stress on the European Community System', International Organization, 2 (1966), pp. 233-65; P. C. Schmitter, 'Central American Integration: Spill-over, Spill-around and Encapsulation', Journal of Common Market Studies, 1 (1970), pp. 1-48.
29. For an assessment of the intergovernmentalist drive in the 1970s, see Paul Taylor, 'Intergovernmentalism in the EC in the 1970s; Patterns and Perspectives', International Organization, 4 (1982), pp. 741-66. For an explanation provided from an international regime perspective, see R. O. Keohane and S. Hoffmann, 'Conclusions: Community Politics and Institutional Change', in William Wallace (ed.), The Dynamics of European Integration (London, 1990), pp. 277-300. For other state-centric explanations, see Miles Kahler, 'The Survival of the State in European International Relations', in Charles S. Maier (ed.), Changing Boundaries of the Political: Essays on the Evolving Balance between the State and Society, Public and Private in Europe (Cambridge, 1987), pp. 287-319; and Paolo Guerrieri and Pier Carlo Padoan, 'Integration, Co-operation and Adjustment Policies', in P. Guerrieri and P. C. Padoan (eds.), The Political Economy of European Integration: States, Markets and Institutions (New York, 1990), pp. 1-30.
30. For an assessment of the intergovernmentalist drive in the 1970s, see Paul Taylor, 'Intergovernmentalism in the EC in the 1970s; Patterns and Perspectives', International Organization, 4 (1982), pp. 741-66. For an explanation provided from an international regime perspective, see R. O. Keohane and S. Hoffmann, 'Conclusions: Community Politics and Institutional Change', in William Wallace (ed.), The Dynamics of European Integration (London, 1990), pp. 277-300. For other state-centric explanations, see Miles Kahler, 'The Survival of the State in European International Relations', in Charles S. Maier (ed.), Changing Boundaries of the Political: Essays on the Evolving Balance between the State and Society, Public and Private in Europe (Cambridge, 1987), pp. 287-319; and Paolo Guerrieri and Pier Carlo Padoan, 'Integration, Co-operation and Adjustment Policies', in P. Guerrieri and P. C. Padoan (eds.), The Political Economy of European Integration: States, Markets and Institutions (New York, 1990), pp. 1-30.
31. For an assessment of the intergovernmentalist drive in the 1970s, see Paul Taylor, 'Intergovernmentalism in the EC in the 1970s; Patterns and Perspectives', International Organization, 4 (1982), pp. 741-66. For an explanation provided from an international regime perspective, see R. O. Keohane and S. Hoffmann, 'Conclusions: Community Politics and Institutional Change', in William Wallace (ed.), The Dynamics of European Integration (London, 1990), pp. 277-300. For other state-centric explanations, see Miles Kahler, 'The Survival of the State in European International Relations', in Charles S. Maier (ed.), Changing Boundaries of the Political: Essays on the Evolving Balance between the State and Society, Public and Private in Europe (Cambridge, 1987), pp. 287-319; and Paolo Guerrieri and Pier Carlo Padoan, 'Integration, Co-operation and Adjustment Policies', in P. Guerrieri and P. C. Padoan (eds.), The Political Economy of European Integration: States, Markets and Institutions (New York, 1990), pp. 1-30.
32. For an assessment of the intergovernmentalist drive in the 1970s, see Paul Taylor, 'Intergovernmentalism in the EC in the 1970s; Patterns and Perspectives', International Organization, 4 (1982), pp. 741-66. For an explanation provided from an international regime perspective, see R. O. Keohane and S. Hoffmann, 'Conclusions: Community Politics and Institutional Change', in William Wallace (ed.), The Dynamics of European Integration (London, 1990), pp. 277-300. For other state-centric explanations, see Miles Kahler, 'The Survival of the State in European International Relations', in Charles S. Maier (ed.), Changing Boundaries of the Political: Essays on the Evolving Balance between the State and Society, Public and Private in Europe (Cambridge, 1987), pp. 287-319; and Paolo Guerrieri and Pier Carlo Padoan, 'Integration, Co-operation and Adjustment Policies', in P. Guerrieri and P. C. Padoan (eds.), The Political Economy of European Integration: States, Markets and Institutions (New York, 1990), pp. 1-30.
33. Milward, European Rescue, pp. 2, 3. For similar conclusions, see Alan S. Milward and Vibeke Sorensen, 'Integration or Interdependence? A National Choice', in A. S. Milward et al., The Frontier of National Sovereignty: History and Theory 1945-1992 (London, 1993), pp. 1-32.
34. Milward, European Rescue, pp. 2, 3. For similar conclusions, see Alan S. Milward and Vibeke Sorensen, 'Integration or Interdependence? A National Choice', in A. S. Milward et al., The Frontier of National Sovereignty: History and Theory 1945-1992 (London, 1993), pp. 1-32.
35. See S. Hoffmann, 'Obstinate or Obsolete: The Fate of the Nation-state and the Case of Western Europe', Daedalus, 95 (1966), pp. 862-915. It is necessary to point out that the pioneering work of Stanley Hoffmann was not written within a strictly Realist framework, but, because of his state-centric approach and his differentiation between 'high' and 'low' politics, his contribution has been regarded as a Realist challenge to neofunctionalism. For a more recent argument in favour of Realism, see Alfred E. Pijpers, 'European Political Co-operation and the Realist Paradigm', in Martin Holland (ed.), The Future of European Political Co-operation: Essays on Theory and Practice (London, 1991), pp. 8-35.
36. See S. Hoffmann, 'Obstinate or Obsolete: The Fate of the Nation-state and the Case of Western Europe', Daedalus, 95 (1966), pp. 862-915. It is necessary to point out that the pioneering work of Stanley Hoffmann was not written within a strictly Realist framework, but, because of his state-centric approach and his differentiation between 'high' and 'low' politics, his contribution has been regarded as a Realist challenge to neofunctionalism. For a more recent argument in favour of Realism, see Alfred E. Pijpers, 'European Political Co-operation and the Realist Paradigm', in Martin Holland (ed.), The Future of European Political Co-operation: Essays on Theory and Practice (London, 1991), pp. 8-35.
37. See K. N. Waltz, The Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA, 1979), p. 71.
38. For example, Morgenthau mentions three state functions performed in the domestic realm, but none of these functions appears to be incorporated into his account of international politics. Ironically, Morgenthau addresses the question of the state only towards the end of his book, when he attempts to prove that a world state is not feasible. See Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 3rd edn (New York, 1960), pp. 507-12. Waltz is even more unequivocal. He abstracts from 'any particular qualities of states and from all their concrete connections' in order to attain a 'positional picture . . . in terms of the placement of the units rather than in terms of their qualities'. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, p. 99.
39. For example, Morgenthau mentions three state functions performed in the domestic realm, but none of these functions appears to be incorporated into his account of international politics. Ironically, Morgenthau addresses the question of the state only towards the end of his book, when he attempts to prove that a world state is not feasible. See Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 3rd edn (New York, 1960), pp. 507-12. Waltz is even more unequivocal. He abstracts from 'any particular qualities of states and from all their concrete connections' in order to attain a 'positional picture . . . in terms of the placement of the units rather than in terms of their qualities'. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, p. 99.
40. Helen Wallace, 'Negotiations, Conflict and Compromise: The Elusive Pursuit of Common Policies', in Wallace et al. (eds.), Policy-making, p. 77.
41. Here we share the view suggested by Milward and Sorensen that the 'high/low' politics dichotomy shares common ground with the neofunctionalist premise that posits an antagonism between integration and the nation-state, a premise that 'on the basis of the present state of historical research, appears to be false'. Milward and Sorensen, 'Integration or Interdependence', p. 20.
42. In his attempt at a modified research agenda, Keohane indicates that the state-centric assumption of the Realist/neorealist approach could and should be maintained, albeit with some acknowledgement of the roles also played by non-governmental or transgovernmental organizations. On this, see R. O. Keohane, 'Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond', in Robert O. Keohane, Neorealism and its Critics (New York, 1986), pp. 158-203.
43. On this, see Robert O, Keohane and J. Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition (Boston, MA, 1977); and Robert O, Keohane, After Hegemony: Collaboration and Discord in the World Economy (Princeton, 1984). Despite his early interest in domestic determinants of international politics, Stanley Hoffmann has also moved towards an international regimes framework. See S. Hoffmann, 'Reflections on the Nation-state in Western Europe Today', Journal of Common Market Studies, 1/2 (1982), pp. 21-37. For specific reference to the oligopolistic environment in which European states exist, see P. Guerrieri and P. C. Padoan, 'Introduction', in Guerrieri and Padoan (eds.), Political Economy, pp. vii-xx.
44. On this, see Robert O, Keohane and J. Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition (Boston, MA, 1977); and Robert O, Keohane, After Hegemony: Collaboration and Discord in the World Economy (Princeton, 1984). Despite his early interest in domestic determinants of international politics, Stanley Hoffmann has also moved towards an international regimes framework. See S. Hoffmann, 'Reflections on the Nation-state in Western Europe Today', Journal of Common Market Studies, 1/2 (1982), pp. 21-37. For specific reference to the oligopolistic environment in which European states exist, see P. Guerrieri and P. C. Padoan, 'Introduction', in Guerrieri and Padoan (eds.), Political Economy, pp. vii-xx.
45. On this, see Robert O, Keohane and J. Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition (Boston, MA, 1977); and Robert O, Keohane, After Hegemony: Collaboration and Discord in the World Economy (Princeton, 1984). Despite his early interest in domestic determinants of international politics, Stanley Hoffmann has also moved towards an international regimes framework. See S. Hoffmann, 'Reflections on the Nation-state in Western Europe Today', Journal of Common Market Studies, 1/2 (1982), pp. 21-37. For specific reference to the oligopolistic environment in which European states exist, see P. Guerrieri and P. C. Padoan, 'Introduction', in Guerrieri and Padoan (eds.), Political Economy, pp. vii-xx.
46. On this, see Robert O, Keohane and J. Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition (Boston, MA, 1977); and Robert O, Keohane, After Hegemony: Collaboration and Discord in the World Economy (Princeton, 1984). Despite his early interest in domestic determinants of international politics, Stanley Hoffmann has also moved towards an international regimes framework. See S. Hoffmann, 'Reflections on the Nation-state in Western Europe Today', Journal of Common Market Studies, 1/2 (1982), pp. 21-37. For specific reference to the oligopolistic environment in which European states exist, see P. Guerrieri and P. C. Padoan, 'Introduction', in Guerrieri and Padoan (eds.), Political Economy, pp. vii-xx.
47. On Keohane's analysis of the demand for international regimes, see R. O. Keohane, International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International Relations Theory (London, 1989), pp. 104-16.
48. It is necessary to point out that Keohane himself is aware of this problem. He states that international regimes 'could change as a result not only of shifts in the allegedly objective interests of states . . . but of changes in how people think about their interests'. Nevertheless, he refrains from elaborating on this issue and acknowledges that his analysis remains focused on arguments about power and institutions. See Keohane, After Hegemony, p. 132.
49. On this, see Andrew Moravcsik, 'Negotiating the Single European Act: National Interests and Conventional Statecraft in the European Community', International Organization, 1 (1991), p. 21, n.5.
50. A. Moravcsik, 'Preferences and Power, p. 481.
51. Compare A. Moravcsik, 'Preferences and Power', pp. 482-95 with pp. 496-507.
52. Hussein Kassim, 'Policy Networks and European Union Policy Making: A Sceptical View', West European Politics, 4 (1994), p. 17. For a discussion in the national context, see also Rhodes and Marsh, 'Policy Networks'.
53. Hussein Kassim, 'Policy Networks and European Union Policy Making: A Sceptical View', West European Politics, 4 (1994), p. 17. For a discussion in the national context, see also Rhodes and Marsh, 'Policy Networks'.
54. That is why the policy networks approach has been mainly used in the study of sectoral EU policy. See, e.g., W. Grant et al., Government and the Chemical Industry (Oxford, 1988); J. Peterson, 'The European Technology Community: Policy Networks in a Supranational Setting', in Marsh and Rhodes (eds.), Policy Networks, pp. 226-48; V. Schneider et al., 'Corporate Actor Networks in European Policy Making: Harmonising Telecommunications Policy', Journal of Common Market Studies, 4 (1994), pp. 473-98; and J. Anderson, 'Skeptical Reflections on a Europe of Regions: Britain, Germany, and the ERDF', Journal of Public Policy, 1 (1991), pp. 417-47.
55. That is why the policy networks approach has been mainly used in the study of sectoral EU policy. See, e.g., W. Grant et al., Government and the Chemical Industry (Oxford, 1988); J. Peterson, 'The European Technology Community: Policy Networks in a Supranational Setting', in Marsh and Rhodes (eds.), Policy Networks, pp. 226-48; V. Schneider et al., 'Corporate Actor Networks in European Policy Making: Harmonising Telecommunications Policy', Journal of Common Market Studies, 4 (1994), pp. 473-98; and J. Anderson, 'Skeptical Reflections on a Europe of Regions: Britain, Germany, and the ERDF', Journal of Public Policy, 1 (1991), pp. 417-47.
56. That is why the policy networks approach has been mainly used in the study of sectoral EU policy. See, e.g., W. Grant et al., Government and the Chemical Industry (Oxford, 1988); J. Peterson, 'The European Technology Community: Policy Networks in a Supranational Setting', in Marsh and Rhodes (eds.), Policy Networks, pp. 226-48; V. Schneider et al., 'Corporate Actor Networks in European Policy Making: Harmonising Telecommunications Policy', Journal of Common Market Studies, 4 (1994), pp. 473-98; and J. Anderson, 'Skeptical Reflections on a Europe of Regions: Britain, Germany, and the ERDF', Journal of Public Policy, 1 (1991), pp. 417-47.
57. That is why the policy networks approach has been mainly used in the study of sectoral EU policy. See, e.g., W. Grant et al., Government and the Chemical Industry (Oxford, 1988); J. Peterson, 'The European Technology Community: Policy Networks in a Supranational Setting', in Marsh and Rhodes (eds.), Policy Networks, pp. 226-48; V. Schneider et al., 'Corporate Actor Networks in European Policy Making: Harmonising Telecommunications Policy', Journal of Common Market Studies, 4 (1994), pp. 473-98; and J. Anderson, 'Skeptical Reflections on a Europe of Regions: Britain, Germany, and the ERDF', Journal of Public Policy, 1 (1991), pp. 417-47.
58. For example, G. Marks et al. argue that the relevance of multi-level governance is due to the fact that political arenas in Europe are connected rather than nested within each member state. See G. Marks et al., 'European Integration from the 1980s: State-centric vs. Multi-level Governance', Journal of Common Market Studies, 3 (1996), pp. 341-77.
59. For an exposition of the varied and sometimes conflicting approaches to the state in international relations, see Y. H. Ferguson and R. W. Mansbach, The Elusive Quest: Theory and International Politics (Columbia, SC, 1988), pp. 136 ff.
60. J. P. Nettl, The State as a Conceptual Variable', World Politics, 4 (1968), p. 588.
61. That is because societal dissent and claims, as long as their object is the state itself, may also reflect the relevance of the state as a concept. See Nettl, 'State as a Conceptual Variable', pp. 571, 578, 587.
62. M. Mann, 'The Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origins, Mechanisms and Results', in J. A. Hall (ed.), States in History (Oxford, 1986), p. 125.
63. See Eric A. Nordlinger, On the Autonomy of the Democratic State (Cambridge, MA, 1981). Also, for a comparative macro-sociological study on how the state can introduce its own projects and pursue its own objectives, see Peter Evans, Dietrich Reuschmeyer and Theda Skocpol (eds.), Bringing the State Back In (Cambridge, 1985).
64. See Eric A. Nordlinger, On the Autonomy of the Democratic State (Cambridge, MA, 1981). Also, for a comparative macro-sociological study on how the state can introduce its own projects and pursue its own objectives, see Peter Evans, Dietrich Reuschmeyer and Theda Skocpol (eds.), Bringing the State Back In (Cambridge, 1985).
65. See Göran Therborn, 'Neo-Marxist, Pluralist, Corporatist, Statist Theories of the Welfare State', in A. Kazancigil (ed.), The State in Global Perspective (Aldershot, 1986), p. 208.
66. On foreign economic policy, see Peter Katzenstein, Between Power and Plenty: Foreign Economic Policies of Advanced Capitalist States (Madison, WI, 1978). For a good illustration of how the American state policy on raw materials diverges from powerful corporate demands, see Stephen D. Krasner, Defending the National Interest: Raw Materials Investment and US Foreign Policy (Princeton, 1978).
67. On foreign economic policy, see Peter Katzenstein, Between Power and Plenty: Foreign Economic Policies of Advanced Capitalist States (Madison, WI, 1978). For a good illustration of how the American state policy on raw materials diverges from powerful corporate demands, see Stephen D. Krasner, Defending the National Interest: Raw Materials Investment and US Foreign Policy (Princeton, 1978).
68. The concept of 'political control techniques' refers to methods of interest aggregation as well as means of force and surveillance. In his attempt to conceptualize the political sphere as an independent area of study, Mouzelis uses the concept of 'political control technologies'. See Nicos Mouzelis, 'Marxism or Post-Marxism?', New Left Review, 167 (1988), p. 121. Because of the limited connotation that 'technology' implies, however, the term 'techniques' is preferred here.
69. F. S. Northedge, The International Political System (London, 1976), p. 15. This is a definition that Realist/neorealist approaches would subscribe to. On this, see Fred Halliday, 'State and Society in International Relations: A Second Agenda', in H. C. Dyer and L. Mangasarian (eds.), The Study of International Relations: The State of the Art (London, 1989), p. 43.
70. F. S. Northedge, The International Political System (London, 1976), p. 15. This is a definition that Realist/neorealist approaches would subscribe to. On this, see Fred Halliday, 'State and Society in International Relations: A Second Agenda', in H. C. Dyer and L. Mangasarian (eds.), The Study of International Relations: The State of the Art (London, 1989), p. 43.
71. On the definitional content of the elite theory, see George Moyser and Margaret Wagstaffe (eds.), Research Methods for Elite Studies (London, 1987), pp. 1-24. See also Dunleavy and O'Leary, Theories of the State, pp. 136-203. On the distinction between governing, societal and specialized elites, see S. F. Nadel, 'The Concept of Social Elites', International Social Science Bulletin, 3 (1956).
72. On the definitional content of the elite theory, see George Moyser and Margaret Wagstaffe (eds.), Research Methods for Elite Studies (London, 1987), pp. 1-24. See also Dunleavy and O'Leary, Theories of the State, pp. 136-203. On the distinction between governing, societal and specialized elites, see S. F. Nadel, 'The Concept of Social Elites', International Social Science Bulletin, 3 (1956).
73. On the definitional content of the elite theory, see George Moyser and Margaret Wagstaffe (eds.), Research Methods for Elite Studies (London, 1987), pp. 1-24. See also Dunleavy and O'Leary, Theories of the State, pp. 136-203. On the distinction between governing, societal and specialized elites, see S. F. Nadel, 'The Concept of Social Elites', International Social Science Bulletin, 3 (1956).
74. Basing the definition of the state on assumptions concerning state-society relations is paving the way for reductionism, in either its instrumentalist or structuralist form. On this, see N. Mouzelis, Post-Marxist Alternatives: The Construction of Social Orders (London, 1990). As examples of instrumentalist and structuralist reductionism, see, respectively, Ralph Miliband, The State in Capitalist Society: The Analysis of the Western System of Power (London, 1984), and Nicos Poulantzas, Political Power and Social Classes, tr. Timothy O'Hagan (London, 1975). For the debate between the two, see R. Miliband, 'The Capitalist State: Two Exchanges with Nicos Poulantzas', in R. Miliband, Class Power and State Power: Political Essays (London, 1983), pp. 26-49.
75. Basing the definition of the state on assumptions concerning state-society relations is paving the way for reductionism, in either its instrumentalist or structuralist form. On this, see N. Mouzelis, Post-Marxist Alternatives: The Construction of Social Orders (London, 1990). As examples of instrumentalist and structuralist reductionism, see, respectively, Ralph Miliband, The State in Capitalist Society: The Analysis of the Western System of Power (London, 1984), and Nicos Poulantzas, Political Power and Social Classes, tr. Timothy O'Hagan (London, 1975). For the debate between the two, see R. Miliband, 'The Capitalist State: Two Exchanges with Nicos Poulantzas', in R. Miliband, Class Power and State Power: Political Essays (London, 1983), pp. 26-49.
76. Basing the definition of the state on assumptions concerning state-society relations is paving the way for reductionism, in either its instrumentalist or structuralist form. On this, see N. Mouzelis, Post-Marxist Alternatives: The Construction of Social Orders (London, 1990). As examples of instrumentalist and structuralist reductionism, see, respectively, Ralph Miliband, The State in Capitalist Society: The Analysis of the Western System of Power (London, 1984), and Nicos Poulantzas, Political Power and Social Classes, tr. Timothy O'Hagan (London, 1975). For the debate between the two, see R. Miliband, 'The Capitalist State: Two Exchanges with Nicos Poulantzas', in R. Miliband, Class Power and State Power: Political Essays (London, 1983), pp. 26-49.
77. Basing the definition of the state on assumptions concerning state-society relations is paving the way for reductionism, in either its instrumentalist or structuralist form. On this, see N. Mouzelis, Post-Marxist Alternatives: The Construction of Social Orders (London, 1990). As examples of instrumentalist and structuralist reductionism, see, respectively, Ralph Miliband, The State in Capitalist Society: The Analysis of the Western System of Power (London, 1984), and Nicos Poulantzas, Political Power and Social Classes, tr. Timothy O'Hagan (London, 1975). For the debate between the two, see R. Miliband, 'The Capitalist State: Two Exchanges with Nicos Poulantzas', in R. Miliband, Class Power and State Power: Political Essays (London, 1983), pp. 26-49.
78. Max Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology, ed. Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich (New York, 1968), p. 904.
79. We do not intend here to elaborate on how state-society interaction may be depicted as a strategic game. Our purpose is limited to pointing out the possible outcomes of state-society interaction and therefore suggesting that the state, although autonomous, is neither a Leviathan which can dictate its preferences to the society nor simply an agent serving the interests of societal actors as principals. For an informative account of how game theory emerged and was diffused into the social sciences, see E. Roy Weintraub, Towards a History of Game Theory. Annual Supplement to Volume 24, History of Political Economy (Durham and London, 1992).
80. Fred Halliday, 'International Society as Homogeneity: Burke, Marx, Fukuyama', Millennium, 21:3 (1992), pp. 453-61.
81. The following summary is based on Harold Hotelling, 'Stability in Competition', in Adrian C. Darnell (ed.), The Collected Economics Articles of Harold Hotelling (New York, 1990), pp. 50-63. Hotelling's article first appeared in Economic Journal, 39 (1929), pp. 41-57.
82. The following summary is based on Harold Hotelling, 'Stability in Competition', in Adrian C. Darnell (ed.), The Collected Economics Articles of Harold Hotelling (New York, 1990), pp. 50-63. Hotelling's article first appeared in Economic Journal, 39 (1929), pp. 41-57.
83. The gradual rather than abrupt shift of demand was a major difference between Hotelling and other scholars who had studied oligopolistic competition. The issue of oligopolistic competition had been first examined by Cournot. See A. Cournot, Researches into the Mathematical Principles of the Theory of Wealth, tr. N. T. Bacon (New York, 1897). See also Francis Y. Edgeworth, Papers Relating to Political Economy (London, 1925), vol. 1, pp. 116-26.
84. The gradual rather than abrupt shift of demand was a major difference between Hotelling and other scholars who had studied oligopolistic competition. The issue of oligopolistic competition had been first examined by Cournot. See A. Cournot, Researches into the Mathematical Principles of the Theory of Wealth, tr. N. T. Bacon (New York, 1897). See also Francis Y. Edgeworth, Papers Relating to Political Economy (London, 1925), vol. 1, pp. 116-26.
85. Hotelling ends his article on a pessimistic note: 'Methodist and Prebysterian churches are too much alike; cider is too homogenous'. Hotelling, 'Stability in Competition', p. 62.
86. On this, see A. O. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organisations and States (Cambridge, MA, 1970). On the application of this analysis to European integration, see Hirschman, 'Three Uses of Political Economy', pp. 277-84.
87. On this, see A. O. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organisations and States (Cambridge, MA, 1970). On the application of this analysis to European integration, see Hirschman, 'Three Uses of Political Economy', pp. 277-84.
88. Derek W. Urwin, The Community of Europe: A History of European Integration since 1945 (London, 1991), p. 12.
89. Alessandro Pizzorno, 'The Individualistic Mobilisation of Europe', in Graubard (ed.), A New Europe?.
90. On the European context of these tendencies, see Peter Maier, 'Political Parties, Popular Legitimacy and Public Privilege', West European Politics, 3 (1995), pp. 40-57; J. Richardson, 'The Market for Political Activism: Interest Groups as a Challenge to Political Parties', West European Politics, 1 (1995), pp. 116-39. For the general context of advanced industrialist countries, see R. Inglehart, Culture Shift in Advanced Industrialist Society (Princeton, 1990); A. Melucci, Nomads of the Present: Social Movements and Individual Needs in Contemporary Society (Philadelphia, 1990); and C. Offe, 'New Social Movements: Challenging the Boundaries of Institutional Politics', Social Research, 52 (1985), pp. 817-68.
91. On the European context of these tendencies, see Peter Maier, 'Political Parties, Popular Legitimacy and Public Privilege', West European Politics, 3 (1995), pp. 40-57; J. Richardson, 'The Market for Political Activism: Interest Groups as a Challenge to Political Parties', West European Politics, 1 (1995), pp. 116-39. For the general context of advanced industrialist countries, see R. Inglehart, Culture Shift in Advanced Industrialist Society (Princeton, 1990); A. Melucci, Nomads of the Present: Social Movements and Individual Needs in Contemporary Society (Philadelphia, 1990); and C. Offe, 'New Social Movements: Challenging the Boundaries of Institutional Politics', Social Research, 52 (1985), pp. 817-68.
92. On the European context of these tendencies, see Peter Maier, 'Political Parties, Popular Legitimacy and Public Privilege', West European Politics, 3 (1995), pp. 40-57; J. Richardson, 'The Market for Political Activism: Interest Groups as a Challenge to Political Parties', West European Politics, 1 (1995), pp. 116-39. For the general context of advanced industrialist countries, see R. Inglehart, Culture Shift in Advanced Industrialist Society (Princeton, 1990); A. Melucci, Nomads of the Present: Social Movements and Individual Needs in Contemporary Society (Philadelphia, 1990); and C. Offe, 'New Social Movements: Challenging the Boundaries of Institutional Politics', Social Research, 52 (1985), pp. 817-68.
93. On the European context of these tendencies, see Peter Maier, 'Political Parties, Popular Legitimacy and Public Privilege', West European Politics, 3 (1995), pp. 40-57; J. Richardson, 'The Market for Political Activism: Interest Groups as a Challenge to Political Parties', West European Politics, 1 (1995), pp. 116-39. For the general context of advanced industrialist countries, see R. Inglehart, Culture Shift in Advanced Industrialist Society (Princeton, 1990); A. Melucci, Nomads of the Present: Social Movements and Individual Needs in Contemporary Society (Philadelphia, 1990); and C. Offe, 'New Social Movements: Challenging the Boundaries of Institutional Politics', Social Research, 52 (1985), pp. 817-68.
94. On the European context of these tendencies, see Peter Maier, 'Political Parties, Popular Legitimacy and Public Privilege', West European Politics, 3 (1995), pp. 40-57; J. Richardson, 'The Market for Political Activism: Interest Groups as a Challenge to Political Parties', West European Politics, 1 (1995), pp. 116-39. For the general context of advanced industrialist countries, see R. Inglehart, Culture Shift in Advanced Industrialist Society (Princeton, 1990); A. Melucci, Nomads of the Present: Social Movements and Individual Needs in Contemporary Society (Philadelphia, 1990); and C. Offe, 'New Social Movements: Challenging the Boundaries of Institutional Politics', Social Research, 52 (1985), pp. 817-68.
95. For a careful and competent analysis of the recent developments which generate centrifugal societal tendencies in both developed and developing countries, see John Dunn, 'Introduction: Crisis of the Nation State?', Political Studies, special issue, 1994, pp. 3-15. On the specific case of Western Europe, see W. C. Müller and V. Wright, 'Reshaping the State in Western Europe: The Limits to Retreat', West European Politics, 3 (1994), pp. 1-11.
96. For a careful and competent analysis of the recent developments which generate centrifugal societal tendencies in both developed and developing countries, see John Dunn, 'Introduction: Crisis of the Nation State?', Political Studies, special issue, 1994, pp. 3-15. On the specific case of Western Europe, see W. C. Müller and V. Wright, 'Reshaping the State in Western Europe: The Limits to Retreat', West European Politics, 3 (1994), pp. 1-11.
97. See Amitai Etzioni, The Active Society: A Theory of Societal and Political Processes (New York, 1968), pp. 282-305. See also A. Etzioni, 'Mixed-scanning: A "Third" Approach to Decision Making', Public Administration Review, 5 (1967), pp. 385-92.
98. See Amitai Etzioni, The Active Society: A Theory of Societal and Political Processes (New York, 1968), pp. 282-305. See also A. Etzioni, 'Mixed-scanning: A "Third" Approach to Decision Making', Public Administration Review, 5 (1967), pp. 385-92.
99. It is necessary to point out here that this analysis has a Kantian flavour. It agrees with Kant's argument that the mode of government is an important factor that determines the type of interstate interaction. It disagrees, however, with the Kantian idea that the republican constitution is the only polity compatible with perpetual peace since the constituents would supposedly be reluctant to give their consent to war. Even in a republican constitution the constituents can grant consent to war against either a despotic state or another state with a republican constitution. That would depend on the way in which they identify with the 'republican state' elements of the legitimation strategy that the governing elite happens to be utilizing. For an accessible extract reflecting Kant's analysis of war and peace, see I. Kant, 'Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch', in H. Reiss, (ed.), Kant's Political Writings, tr. H. B. Nisbet (Cambridge, 1970), pp. 93-130. See also H. Williams et al. (eds.), A Reader in International Relations and Political Theory (Buckingham, 1993), pp. 112-21.
100. It is necessary to point out here that this analysis has a Kantian flavour. It agrees with Kant's argument that the mode of government is an important factor that determines the type of interstate interaction. It disagrees, however, with the Kantian idea that the republican constitution is the only polity compatible with perpetual peace since the constituents would supposedly be reluctant to give their consent to war. Even in a republican constitution the constituents can grant consent to war against either a despotic state or another state with a republican constitution. That would depend on the way in which they identify with the 'republican state' elements of the legitimation strategy that the governing elite happens to be utilizing. For an accessible extract reflecting Kant's analysis of war and peace, see I. Kant, 'Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch', in H. Reiss, (ed.), Kant's Political Writings, tr. H. B. Nisbet (Cambridge, 1970), pp. 93-130. See also H. Williams et al. (eds.), A Reader in International Relations and Political Theory (Buckingham, 1993), pp. 112-21.
101. William Wallace, 'Introduction: The Dynamics of European Integration', in Wallace (ed.), Dynamics of European Integration, p. 5.
102. Milward, European Rescue, pp. 315-40.
103. Wolfgang Wessels, 'The EC Council: The Community's Decision-making Centre', in Keohane and Hoffmann (eds.), New European Community, p. 135. Wessels has developed this argument further by formulating the 'fusion thesis' on European integration. The 'fusion thesis' tries to capture the virtuous and vicious circles that European states are faced with as a result of European integration. Whilst European integration has empowered the state to consolidate its authority through its contribution to the success of the welfare state and participatory democracy, it has also generated a growing gap between demands and capacities. See W. Wessels, 'Theories and Strategies for European Integration: The Fusion Thesis', paper submitted to UACES Annual Conference, Cambridge, January 1995.
104. Wolfgang Wessels, 'The EC Council: The Community's Decision-making Centre', in Keohane and Hoffmann (eds.), New European Community, p. 135. Wessels has developed this argument further by formulating the 'fusion thesis' on European integration. The 'fusion thesis' tries to capture the virtuous and vicious circles that European states are faced with as a result of European integration. Whilst European integration has empowered the state to consolidate its authority through its contribution to the success of the welfare state and participatory democracy, it has also generated a growing gap between demands and capacities. See W. Wessels, 'Theories and Strategies for European Integration: The Fusion Thesis', paper submitted to UACES Annual Conference, Cambridge, January 1995.
105. The Action Committee was the transnational platform that brought together European political party and trades union leaders under Jean Monnet's leadership. In its first joint declaration, the Action Committee stated that the hopes of the European people for 'improvements in living conditions, justice, freedom and peace' would be fulfilled only if European countries pooled their resources. See The Action Committee for the United States of Europe, Statements and Declarations: 1955-67 (London, 1969), p. 12. Similar expectations were indicated in subsequent declarations.
106. See Peter Ludlow, 'Europe's Institutions: Europe's Politics', in Geoffrey F. Treverdon (ed.), The Shape of the New Europe (New York, 1992), p. 60.
107. On the existence of a primordial process of convergence in macroeconomic policies as a precondition for the initiation and success of monetary integration, see J. Mortensen, Federalism vs Co-ordination: Macroeconomic Policy in the European Community (Brussels, 1990); Massimo Russo and Giuseppe Tuillo, 'Monetary Policy Coordination within the European Monetary System: Is There a Rule?', in F. Giavazzi and M. Miller (eds.), The European Monetary System (Cambridge, 1988), pp. 292-356; John T. Wooley, 'Policy Credibility and European Monetary Institutions', in Alberta M. Sbragia (ed.), Europolitics: Institutions and Policymaking in the 'New' European Community (Washington, DC, 1992), p. 166;
108. On the existence of a primordial process of convergence in macroeconomic policies as a precondition for the initiation and success of monetary integration, see J. Mortensen, Federalism vs Co-ordination: Macroeconomic Policy in the European Community (Brussels, 1990); Massimo Russo and Giuseppe Tuillo, 'Monetary Policy Coordination within the European Monetary System: Is There a Rule?', in F. Giavazzi and M. Miller (eds.), The European Monetary System (Cambridge, 1988), pp. 292-356; John T. Wooley, 'Policy Credibility and European Monetary Institutions', in Alberta M. Sbragia (ed.), Europolitics: Institutions and Policymaking in the 'New' European Community (Washington, DC, 1992), p. 166; and Jacques Melitz, 'The Welfare Case for the European Monetary System', Journal of International Money and Finance, 4 (1985), pp. 488-506. On the convergence of policies towards the 'supply side' prescriptions before the move towards the Single Market, see Wayne Sandholtz and John Zysman, '1992: Recasting the European Bargain', World Politics, 1 (1989), p. 112; Andrew Moravcsik, 'Negotiating the Single European Act', International Organization, 1 (1991), p. 21; and David R. Cameron, 'The 1992 Initiative: Causes and Consequences', in A. M. Sbragia (ed.), Europolitics, pp. 23-74. On the convergence in national regional policies prior to the development of Community regional policy, see Michael Keating, State and Regional Nationalism: Territorial Politics and the European State (New York, 1988), pp. 121-46, 167-234.
109. On the existence of a primordial process of convergence in macroeconomic policies as a precondition for the initiation and success of monetary integration, see J. Mortensen, Federalism vs Co-ordination: Macroeconomic Policy in the European Community (Brussels, 1990); Massimo Russo and Giuseppe Tuillo, 'Monetary Policy Coordination within the European Monetary System: Is There a Rule?', in F. Giavazzi and M. Miller (eds.), The European Monetary System (Cambridge, 1988), pp. 292-356; John T. Wooley, 'Policy Credibility and European Monetary Institutions', in Alberta M. Sbragia (ed.), Europolitics: Institutions and Policymaking in the 'New' European Community (Washington, DC, 1992), p. 166; and Jacques Melitz, 'The Welfare Case for the European Monetary System', Journal of International Money and Finance, 4 (1985), pp. 488-506. On the convergence of policies towards the 'supply side' prescriptions before the move towards the Single Market, see Wayne Sandholtz and John Zysman, '1992: Recasting the European Bargain', World Politics, 1 (1989), p. 112; Andrew Moravcsik, 'Negotiating the Single European Act', International Organization, 1 (1991), p. 21; and David R. Cameron, 'The 1992 Initiative: Causes and Consequences', in A. M. Sbragia (ed.), Europolitics, pp. 23-74. On the convergence in national regional policies prior to the development of Community regional policy, see Michael Keating, State and Regional Nationalism: Territorial Politics and the European State (New York, 1988), pp. 121-46, 167-234.
110. On the existence of a primordial process of convergence in macroeconomic policies as a precondition for the initiation and success of monetary integration, see J. Mortensen, Federalism vs Co-ordination: Macroeconomic Policy in the European Community (Brussels, 1990); Massimo Russo and Giuseppe Tuillo, 'Monetary Policy Coordination within the European Monetary System: Is There a Rule?', in F. Giavazzi and M. Miller (eds.), The European Monetary System (Cambridge, 1988), pp. 292-356; John T. Wooley, 'Policy Credibility and European Monetary Institutions', in Alberta M. Sbragia (ed.), Europolitics: Institutions and Policymaking in the 'New' European Community (Washington, DC, 1992), p. 166; and Jacques Melitz, 'The Welfare Case for the European Monetary System', Journal of International Money and Finance, 4 (1985), pp. 488-506. On the convergence of policies towards the 'supply side' prescriptions before the move towards the Single Market, see Wayne Sandholtz and John Zysman, '1992: Recasting the European Bargain', World Politics, 1 (1989), p. 112; Andrew Moravcsik, 'Negotiating the Single European Act', International Organization, 1 (1991), p. 21; and David R. Cameron, 'The 1992 Initiative: Causes and Consequences', in A. M. Sbragia (ed.), Europolitics, pp. 23-74. On the convergence in national regional policies prior to the development of Community regional policy, see Michael Keating, State and Regional Nationalism: Territorial Politics and the European State (New York, 1988), pp. 121-46, 167-234.
111. On the existence of a primordial process of convergence in macroeconomic policies as a precondition for the initiation and success of monetary integration, see J. Mortensen, Federalism vs Co-ordination: Macroeconomic Policy in the European Community (Brussels, 1990); Massimo Russo and Giuseppe Tuillo, 'Monetary Policy Coordination within the European Monetary System: Is There a Rule?', in F. Giavazzi and M. Miller (eds.), The European Monetary System (Cambridge, 1988), pp. 292-356; John T. Wooley, 'Policy Credibility and European Monetary Institutions', in Alberta M. Sbragia (ed.), Europolitics: Institutions and Policymaking in the 'New' European Community (Washington, DC, 1992), p. 166; and Jacques Melitz, 'The Welfare Case for the European Monetary System', Journal of International Money and Finance, 4 (1985), pp. 488-506. On the convergence of policies towards the 'supply side' prescriptions before the move towards the Single Market, see Wayne Sandholtz and John Zysman, '1992: Recasting the European Bargain', World Politics, 1 (1989), p. 112; Andrew Moravcsik, 'Negotiating the Single European Act', International Organization, 1 (1991), p. 21; and David R. Cameron, 'The 1992 Initiative: Causes and Consequences', in A. M. Sbragia (ed.), Europolitics, pp. 23-74. On the convergence in national regional policies prior to the development of Community regional policy, see Michael Keating, State and Regional Nationalism: Territorial Politics and the European State (New York, 1988), pp. 121-46, 167-234.
112. On the existence of a primordial process of convergence in macroeconomic policies as a precondition for the initiation and success of monetary integration, see J. Mortensen, Federalism vs Co-ordination: Macroeconomic Policy in the European Community (Brussels, 1990); Massimo Russo and Giuseppe Tuillo, 'Monetary Policy Coordination within the European Monetary System: Is There a Rule?', in F. Giavazzi and M. Miller (eds.), The European Monetary System (Cambridge, 1988), pp. 292-356; John T. Wooley, 'Policy Credibility and European Monetary Institutions', in Alberta M. Sbragia (ed.), Europolitics: Institutions and Policymaking in the 'New' European Community (Washington, DC, 1992), p. 166; and Jacques Melitz, 'The Welfare Case for the European Monetary System', Journal of International Money and Finance, 4 (1985), pp. 488-506. On the convergence of policies towards the 'supply side' prescriptions before the move towards the Single Market, see Wayne Sandholtz and John Zysman, '1992: Recasting the European Bargain', World Politics, 1 (1989), p. 112; Andrew Moravcsik, 'Negotiating the Single European Act', International Organization, 1 (1991), p. 21; and David R. Cameron, 'The 1992 Initiative: Causes and Consequences', in A. M. Sbragia (ed.), Europolitics, pp. 23-74. On the convergence in national regional policies prior to the development of Community regional policy, see Michael Keating, State and Regional Nationalism: Territorial Politics and the European State (New York, 1988), pp. 121-46, 167-234.
113. On the existence of a primordial process of convergence in macroeconomic policies as a precondition for the initiation and success of monetary integration, see J. Mortensen, Federalism vs Co-ordination: Macroeconomic Policy in the European Community (Brussels, 1990); Massimo Russo and Giuseppe Tuillo, 'Monetary Policy Coordination within the European Monetary System: Is There a Rule?', in F. Giavazzi and M. Miller (eds.), The European Monetary System (Cambridge, 1988), pp. 292-356; John T. Wooley, 'Policy Credibility and European Monetary Institutions', in Alberta M. Sbragia (ed.), Europolitics: Institutions and Policymaking in the 'New' European Community (Washington, DC, 1992), p. 166; and Jacques Melitz, 'The Welfare Case for the European Monetary System', Journal of International Money and Finance, 4 (1985), pp. 488-506. On the convergence of policies towards the 'supply side' prescriptions before the move towards the Single Market, see Wayne Sandholtz and John Zysman, '1992: Recasting the European Bargain', World Politics, 1 (1989), p. 112; Andrew Moravcsik, 'Negotiating the Single European Act', International Organization, 1 (1991), p. 21; and David R. Cameron, 'The 1992 Initiative: Causes and Consequences', in A. M. Sbragia (ed.), Europolitics, pp. 23-74. On the convergence in national regional policies prior to the development of Community regional policy, see Michael Keating, State and Regional Nationalism: Territorial Politics and the European State (New York, 1988), pp. 121-46, 167-234.
114. On the existence of a primordial process of convergence in macroeconomic policies as a precondition for the initiation and success of monetary integration, see J. Mortensen, Federalism vs Co-ordination: Macroeconomic Policy in the European Community (Brussels, 1990); Massimo Russo and Giuseppe Tuillo, 'Monetary Policy Coordination within the European Monetary System: Is There a Rule?', in F. Giavazzi and M. Miller (eds.), The European Monetary System (Cambridge, 1988), pp. 292-356; John T. Wooley, 'Policy Credibility and European Monetary Institutions', in Alberta M. Sbragia (ed.), Europolitics: Institutions and Policymaking in the 'New' European Community (Washington, DC, 1992), p. 166; and Jacques Melitz, 'The Welfare Case for the European Monetary System', Journal of International Money and Finance, 4 (1985), pp. 488-506. On the convergence of policies towards the 'supply side' prescriptions before the move towards the Single Market, see Wayne Sandholtz and John Zysman, '1992: Recasting the European Bargain', World Politics, 1 (1989), p. 112; Andrew Moravcsik, 'Negotiating the Single European Act', International Organization, 1 (1991), p. 21; and David R. Cameron, 'The 1992 Initiative: Causes and Consequences', in A. M. Sbragia (ed.), Europolitics, pp. 23-74. On the convergence in national regional policies prior to the development of Community regional policy, see Michael Keating, State and Regional Nationalism: Territorial Politics and the European State (New York, 1988), pp. 121-46, 167-234.
115. A similar analytical framework has been used in the investigation of the European Community's immigration policy. See M. Ugur, 'Freedom of Movement vs. Exclusion: A Reinterpretation of the "Insider"-"Outsider" Divide in the European Union', International Migration Review, 4 (1995), pp. 968-74.
116. See James Rosenau, 'Towards the Study of National-International Linkages', in J. Rosenau, Linkage Politics: Essays on the Convergence of National and International Systems (New York, 1969), pp. 44-63. The drawback emanating from the multiplicity of variables was elegantly avoided by international-regimes theory, which focused on interdependence as an alternative to the power politics of the Realist school.
117. Reductionism in Andrews' analysis stems from the lack of theorization about how the domestic paradigm 'articulate[s] the particular social system that gives foreign policy its horizons and meaning'. See Bruce Andrews, 'The Domestic Content of International Behaviour', International Organization, 2 (1984), pp. 321-7.
118. See Robert D. Putnam, 'Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-level Games', International Organization, 3 (1988), pp. 427-60. Putnam's two-level game metaphor was later used by Guerrieri and Padoan in the context of international reputation and domestic popularity objectives of the governments. See Guerrieri and Padoan, 'Integration, Co-operation and Adjustment Policies', pp. 1-30.
119. See Robert D. Putnam, 'Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-level Games', International Organization, 3 (1988), pp. 427-60. Putnam's two-level game metaphor was later used by Guerrieri and Padoan in the context of international reputation and domestic popularity objectives of the governments. See Guerrieri and Padoan, 'Integration, Co-operation and Adjustment Policies', pp. 1-30.
120. Moravcsik, 'Preferences and Power' pp. 483-507.
121. For a diagrammatic exposition of this interaction, see Schneider et al., 'Corporate Actor Networks', p. 478.
122. On the role of lobbying in EU policy-making, see S. Mazey and J. Richardson, Lobbying in the European Community (Oxford, 1993); M. P. van Schenedelen, National Public and Private EC Lobbying (Aldershot, 1993); and S. S. Andersen and K. A. Eliassen, Making Policy in Europe (London, 1993).
123. On the role of lobbying in EU policy-making, see S. Mazey and J. Richardson, Lobbying in the European Community (Oxford, 1993); M. P. van Schenedelen, National Public and Private EC Lobbying (Aldershot, 1993); and S. S. Andersen and K. A. Eliassen, Making Policy in Europe (London, 1993).
124. On the role of lobbying in EU policy-making, see S. Mazey and J. Richardson, Lobbying in the European Community (Oxford, 1993); M. P. van Schenedelen, National Public and Private EC Lobbying (Aldershot, 1993); and S. S. Andersen and K. A. Eliassen, Making Policy in Europe (London, 1993).
125. For example, in the area of telecommunications the EU's initial attempts at harmonization were based on legal measures which were 'not contingent on the mobilisation of a large policy network'. Also, before the start of preparations for the 1987 Green Paper and negotiations with corporate actors, the Commission had established the Special Task Force in 1983 to prepare the agenda and establish a dialogue with national governments, who were caught in the debate on how to tackle the problems of their national industries. See Schneider et al. 'Corporate Actor Networks', pp. 482-5. A similar development was observed in the formulation and conclusion of the EU-Japan consensus of 1991 on automotive trade. Here again it was the Commission that anticipated the implications of the Single Market for existing restrictive agreements between various member states and Japan. The participation of the car producers in policy formulation took place only after the Commission had completed its draft, again on the basis of negotiations with governments, in the au umn of 1990. See Mark Mason, 'Elements of Consensus: Europe's Response to the Japanese Automotive Challenge', Journal of Common Market Studies, 4 (1994), pp. 439-42.
126. For example, in the area of telecommunications the EU's initial attempts at harmonization were based on legal measures which were 'not contingent on the mobilisation of a large policy network'. Also, before the start of preparations for the 1987 Green Paper and negotiations with corporate actors, the Commission had established the Special Task Force in 1983 to prepare the agenda and establish a dialogue with national governments, who were caught in the debate on how to tackle the problems of their national industries. See Schneider et al. 'Corporate Actor Networks', pp. 482-5. A similar development was observed in the formulation and conclusion of the EU-Japan consensus of 1991 on automotive trade. Here again it was the Commission that anticipated the implications of the Single Market for existing restrictive agreements between various member states and Japan. The participation of the car producers in policy formulation took place only after the Commission had completed its draft, again on the basis of negotiations with governments, in the au umn of 1990. See Mark Mason, 'Elements of Consensus: Europe's Response to the Japanese Automotive Challenge', Journal of Common Market Studies, 4 (1994), pp. 439-42.
127. On this, see N. Nugent, The Government and Politics of the European Union (London, 1994), pp. 101-3, 260-1. On the need to exhaust the consultative process to ensure effective implementation of policy decisions, see H. Siedentopf and J. Ziller (eds.), Making European Policies Work: The Implementation of Community Legislation in the Member States (London, 1988).
128. On this, see N. Nugent, The Government and Politics of the European Union (London, 1994), pp. 101-3, 260-1. On the need to exhaust the consultative process to ensure effective implementation of policy decisions, see H. Siedentopf and J. Ziller (eds.), Making European Policies Work: The Implementation of Community Legislation in the Member States (London, 1988).
129. See Lindberg and Scheingold, Europe's Would-be Polity, p. 95. However, the concept of symbiotic relationship has been developed since then and linked to the concept of consociation by Taylor. See Paul Taylor, 'Consociationalism and Federation as Approaches to International Integration', in A. J. R. Groom and P. Taylor (eds.), Frameworks for International Co-operation, pp. 172-84. For similar comments, see also Ludlow, 'Europe's Institutions', esp. pp. 59-68.
130. See Lindberg and Scheingold, Europe's Would-be Polity, p. 95. However, the concept of symbiotic relationship has been developed since then and linked to the concept of consociation by Taylor. See Paul Taylor, 'Consociationalism and Federation as Approaches to International Integration', in A. J. R. Groom and P. Taylor (eds.), Frameworks for International Co-operation, pp. 172-84. For similar comments, see also Ludlow, 'Europe's Institutions', esp. pp. 59-68.
131. See Lindberg and Scheingold, Europe's Would-be Polity, p. 95. However, the concept of symbiotic relationship has been developed since then and linked to the concept of consociation by Taylor. See Paul Taylor, 'Consociationalism and Federation as Approaches to International Integration', in A. J. R. Groom and P. Taylor (eds.), Frameworks for International Co-operation, pp. 172-84. For similar comments, see also Ludlow, 'Europe's Institutions', esp. pp. 59-68.
132. Siedentopf and Hauschild also found out that the more effective the joint policy-making is, the higher is the rate of implementation of directives. See H. Siedentopf and C. Hauschild, 'The Implementation of Community Legislation by the Member States: A Comparative Analysis', in H. Siedentopf and J. Ziller (eds.), Making European Policies Work: The Implementation of the Community Legislation in the Member States, vol. 1: Comparative Synthesis (London, 1988), pp. 1-83. This view is shared by Nugent. See Nugent, Government and Politics, pp. 297-304, 329-34.
133. Siedentopf and Hauschild also found out that the more effective the joint policy-making is, the higher is the rate of implementation of directives. See H. Siedentopf and C. Hauschild, 'The Implementation of Community Legislation by the Member States: A Comparative Analysis', in H. Siedentopf and J. Ziller (eds.), Making European Policies Work: The Implementation of the Community Legislation in the Member States, vol. 1: Comparative Synthesis (London, 1988), pp. 1-83. This view is shared by Nugent. See Nugent, Government and Politics, pp. 297-304, 329-34.
134. Siedentopf and Hauschild observe that the role of national parliaments has been in decline. About two-thirds of the directives that required national legislation for incorporation into the domestic law were incorporated without parliamentary acts. Siedentopf and Hauschild, 'Implementation of Community Legislation', p. 54. On the proliferation of committees and the issue of democratic deficit, see Shirley Williams, 'Sovereignty and Accountability in the European Community', in Keohane and Hoffmann (eds.), New European Community, pp. 155-76.
135. Siedentopf and Hauschild observe that the role of national parliaments has been in decline. About two-thirds of the directives that required national legislation for incorporation into the domestic law were incorporated without parliamentary acts. Siedentopf and Hauschild, 'Implementation of Community Legislation', p. 54. On the proliferation of committees and the issue of democratic deficit, see Shirley Williams, 'Sovereignty and Accountability in the European Community', in Keohane and Hoffmann (eds.), New European Community, pp. 155-76.
136. For an examination of the EU's human rights policy, see M. Ugur, 'The European Community's External Policy-making Process: The Case of the EC-Turkey Association', Ph.D. dissertation, University of London (1995), pp. 147-99.