Stories of war origins: A narrativist theory of the causes of war

Review of International Studies

Volumn 23, Issue 4, 1997, Pages 401-418

  Suganami, Hidemi ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0031327572     PISSN: 02602105     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0260210597004014     Document Type: Article

References (124)

1. R. G. Collingwood, The Idea of History, rev. edn, ed. Jan Van Der Dussen (Oxford, 1994), p. 398.
2. C. Lévi-Strauss, The Savage Mind (La Pensée sauvage) (London, 1972), p. 257. This is reminiscent of Robert Cox's much-quoted statement that '[t]heory is always for someone and for some purpose'. See his 'Social Forces, States and World Order: Beyond International Relations Theory', Millennium, 10 (1981), pp. 126-55, at p. 128.
3. C. Lévi-Strauss, The Savage Mind (La Pensée sauvage) (London, 1972), p. 257. This is reminiscent of Robert Cox's much-quoted statement that '[t]heory is always for someone and for some purpose'. See his 'Social Forces, States and World Order: Beyond International Relations Theory', Millennium, 10 (1981), pp. 126-55, at p. 128.
4. A. Seabury and A. Codevilla, War: Ends and Means (New York, 1989), p. 50; emphasis in original.
5. J. A. Vasquez, The War Puzzle (Cambridge, 1993), p. 48. For a dissenting voice, see B. Bueno de Mesquita, The War Trap (New Haven, CT, 1981). Vasquez, however, goes on to suggest three necessary conditions of 'world wars'. For a brief, critical discussion of Bueno de Mesquita and Vasquez, see my On the Causes of War, pp. 74-9.
6. J. A. Vasquez, The War Puzzle (Cambridge, 1993), p. 48. For a dissenting voice, see B. Bueno de Mesquita, The War Trap (New Haven, CT, 1981). Vasquez, however, goes on to suggest three necessary conditions of 'world wars'. For a brief, critical discussion of Bueno de Mesquita and Vasquez, see my On the Causes of War, pp. 74-9.
7. J. A. Vasquez, The War Puzzle (Cambridge, 1993), p. 48. For a dissenting voice, see B. Bueno de Mesquita, The War Trap (New Haven, CT, 1981). Vasquez, however, goes on to suggest three necessary conditions of 'world wars'. For a brief, critical discussion of Bueno de Mesquita and Vasquez, see my On the Causes of War, pp. 74-9.
8. The best survey of the literature on the contributory causes of war is J. S. Levy, 'The Causes of War: A Review of Theories and Evidence', in P. E. Tetlock et al. (eds.), Behavior, Society, and Nuclear War, 3 vols. (New York, 1989), vol. 1, pp. 209-333.
9. John Mackie offers a convenient term 'inus condition', an acronym for an insufficient but non-redundant element of an unnecessary but sufficient set of conditions. What we take to be contributory causes of war are most likely to be of this type. See J. L. Mackie, The Cement of the Universe: A Study of Causation (Oxford, 1980). Note, however, that Mackie defines an 'inus condition' solely in terms of a complex pattern of regularity: it is no part of the concept of 'inus condition' that it takes part in the production or explanation of an effect.
10. For the idea of family resemblances, see L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, tr. G. E. M. Anscombe (Oxford, 1968), sections 66 & 67.
11. In reviewing my book, On the Causes of War, on which this article is based, Hew Strachan made a significant error, which I have frequently observed among historians, of mistaking my formal analysis for an empirical generalization. See Strachan, 'Who Deters, Wins Sometimes', Times Literary Supplement, 12 April 1996, p. 28. Historians are generally so committed to defending their idiographic approach against the nomothetic that they seem to assume almost automatically that those, like myself, who are not idiographic in their approach must necessarily be nomothetic.
12. In reviewing my book, On the Causes of War, on which this article is based, Hew Strachan made a significant error, which I have frequently observed among historians, of mistaking my formal analysis for an empirical generalization. See Strachan, 'Who Deters, Wins Sometimes', Times Literary Supplement, 12 April 1996, p. 28. Historians are generally so committed to defending their idiographic approach against the nomothetic that they seem to assume almost automatically that those, like myself, who are not idiographic in their approach must necessarily be nomothetic.
13. 4th edn (Basingstoke, 1985).
14. Underlying the argument here is the view of 'causation' as an explanatory relation. See Thomas Hobbes, Elements of Philosophy, ed. Sir William Molesworth (London, 1839), pp. 121-2; W. Kneale, Probability and Induction (Oxford, 1949), p. 60; M. Scriven, 'Causation as Explanation', Noûs, 9 (1975), pp. 3-16; and my On the Causes of War, ch. 4. See, however, J. Kim, 'Explanatory Realism, Causal Realism, and Explanatory Exclusion', in D.-H. Ruben (ed.), Explanation (Oxford, 1993), pp. 228-45. One implication of the position advanced here is that where family resemblances are found among the narratives of war origins, we can also say that they are family resemblances among war origins as such. This is so insofar as we focus on war origins as conceptualized and narrated within a particular culture; in a culture whose ways of explaining things are radically different, war origins, too, may be conceptualized and narrated in a different way.
15. Underlying the argument here is the view of 'causation' as an explanatory relation. See Thomas Hobbes, Elements of Philosophy, ed. Sir William Molesworth (London, 1839), pp. 121-2; W. Kneale, Probability and Induction (Oxford, 1949), p. 60; M. Scriven, 'Causation as Explanation', Noûs, 9 (1975), pp. 3-16; and my On the Causes of War, ch. 4. See, however, J. Kim, 'Explanatory Realism, Causal Realism, and Explanatory Exclusion', in D.-H. Ruben (ed.), Explanation (Oxford, 1993), pp. 228-45. One implication of the position advanced here is that where family resemblances are found among the narratives of war origins, we can also say that they are family resemblances among war origins as such. This is so insofar as we focus on war origins as conceptualized and narrated within a particular culture; in a culture whose ways of explaining things are radically different, war origins, too, may be conceptualized and narrated in a different way.
16. Underlying the argument here is the view of 'causation' as an explanatory relation. See Thomas Hobbes, Elements of Philosophy, ed. Sir William Molesworth (London, 1839), pp. 121-2; W. Kneale, Probability and Induction (Oxford, 1949), p. 60; M. Scriven, 'Causation as Explanation', Noûs, 9 (1975), pp. 3-16; and my On the Causes of War, ch. 4. See, however, J. Kim, 'Explanatory Realism, Causal Realism, and Explanatory Exclusion', in D.-H. Ruben (ed.), Explanation (Oxford, 1993), pp. 228-45. One implication of the position advanced here is that where family resemblances are found among the narratives of war origins, we can also say that they are family resemblances among war origins as such. This is so insofar as we focus on war origins as conceptualized and narrated within a particular culture; in a culture whose ways of explaining things are radically different, war origins, too, may be conceptualized and narrated in a different way.
17. Underlying the argument here is the view of 'causation' as an explanatory relation. See Thomas Hobbes, Elements of Philosophy, ed. Sir William Molesworth (London, 1839), pp. 121-2; W. Kneale, Probability and Induction (Oxford, 1949), p. 60; M. Scriven, 'Causation as Explanation', Noûs, 9 (1975), pp. 3-16; and my On the Causes of War, ch. 4. See, however, J. Kim, 'Explanatory Realism, Causal Realism, and Explanatory Exclusion', in D.-H. Ruben (ed.), Explanation (Oxford, 1993), pp. 228-45. One implication of the position advanced here is that where family resemblances are found among the narratives of war origins, we can also say that they are family resemblances among war origins as such. This is so insofar as we focus on war origins as conceptualized and narrated within a particular culture; in a culture whose ways of explaining things are radically different, war origins, too, may be conceptualized and narrated in a different way.
18. Underlying the argument here is the view of 'causation' as an explanatory relation. See Thomas Hobbes, Elements of Philosophy, ed. Sir William Molesworth (London, 1839), pp. 121-2; W. Kneale, Probability and Induction (Oxford, 1949), p. 60; M. Scriven, 'Causation as Explanation', Noûs, 9 (1975), pp. 3-16; and my On the Causes of War, ch. 4. See, however, J. Kim, 'Explanatory Realism, Causal Realism, and Explanatory Exclusion', in D.-H. Ruben (ed.), Explanation (Oxford, 1993), pp. 228-45. One implication of the position advanced here is that where family resemblances are found among the narratives of war origins, we can also say that they are family resemblances among war origins as such. This is so insofar as we focus on war origins as conceptualized and narrated within a particular culture; in a culture whose ways of explaining things are radically different, war origins, too, may be conceptualized and narrated in a different way.
19. See, e.g., F. R. Ankersmit, 'The Dilemmas of Contemporary Anglo-Saxon Philosophy of History', History and Theory, 25 (1986), pp. 1-27, from where the term 'narrativist' was borrowed; Robert F. Berkhofer, Jr, Beyond the Great Story: History as Text and Discourse (Cambridge, MA, 1995); Frank Ankersmit and Hans Kellner (eds.), A New Philosophy of History (London, 1995); and Keith Jenkins, On 'What is History?' (London, 1995).
20. See, e.g., F. R. Ankersmit, 'The Dilemmas of Contemporary Anglo-Saxon Philosophy of History', History and Theory, 25 (1986), pp. 1-27, from where the term 'narrativist' was borrowed; Robert F. Berkhofer, Jr, Beyond the Great Story: History as Text and Discourse (Cambridge, MA, 1995); Frank Ankersmit and Hans Kellner (eds.), A New Philosophy of History (London, 1995); and Keith Jenkins, On 'What is History?' (London, 1995).
21. See, e.g., F. R. Ankersmit, 'The Dilemmas of Contemporary Anglo-Saxon Philosophy of History', History and Theory, 25 (1986), pp. 1-27, from where the term 'narrativist' was borrowed; Robert F. Berkhofer, Jr, Beyond the Great Story: History as Text and Discourse (Cambridge, MA, 1995); Frank Ankersmit and Hans Kellner (eds.), A New Philosophy of History (London, 1995); and Keith Jenkins, On 'What is History?' (London, 1995).
22. See, e.g., F. R. Ankersmit, 'The Dilemmas of Contemporary Anglo-Saxon Philosophy of History', History and Theory, 25 (1986), pp. 1-27, from where the term 'narrativist' was borrowed; Robert F. Berkhofer, Jr, Beyond the Great Story: History as Text and Discourse (Cambridge, MA, 1995); Frank Ankersmit and Hans Kellner (eds.), A New Philosophy of History (London, 1995); and Keith Jenkins, On 'What is History?' (London, 1995).
23. See Hayden White, Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-century Europe (Baltimore, MD, 1973); Tropics of Discourse (Baltimore, MD, 1978); The Content of the Form: Narrative Discourse and Historical Representation (Baltimore, MD, 1987). Exceptionally, and working independently, Hayward Alker has used White's works, as well as Propp's mentioned presently. See, e.g., Hayward R. Alker, Jr, 'Fairy Tales, Tragedies and World Histories: Towards Interpretive Story Grammar as Possibilist World Models', Behaviormetrika, 21 (1987), pp. 1-28, and, more recently, Rediscoveries and Reformulations: Humanistic Methodologies for International Studies (Cambridge, 1996). See also David Campbell, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity (Manchester, 1992), and Politics without Principles: Sovereignty, Ethics, and the Narratives of the Gulf War (Boulder, CO, 1993), where White's work is cited briefly. Campbell has now written for this journal a review article on contemporary writings on Bosnia, incorporating White's ideas extensively. On 'new' philosophers of history, see Ankersmit and Kellner (eds.), New Philosophy of History.
24. See Hayden White, Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-century Europe (Baltimore, MD, 1973); Tropics of Discourse (Baltimore, MD, 1978); The Content of the Form: Narrative Discourse and Historical Representation (Baltimore, MD, 1987). Exceptionally, and working independently, Hayward Alker has used White's works, as well as Propp's mentioned presently. See, e.g., Hayward R. Alker, Jr, 'Fairy Tales, Tragedies and World Histories: Towards Interpretive Story Grammar as Possibilist World Models', Behaviormetrika, 21 (1987), pp. 1-28, and, more recently, Rediscoveries and Reformulations: Humanistic Methodologies for International Studies (Cambridge, 1996). See also David Campbell, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity (Manchester, 1992), and Politics without Principles: Sovereignty, Ethics, and the Narratives of the Gulf War (Boulder, CO, 1993), where White's work is cited briefly. Campbell has now written for this journal a review article on contemporary writings on Bosnia, incorporating White's ideas extensively. On 'new' philosophers of history, see Ankersmit and Kellner (eds.), New Philosophy of History.
25. See Hayden White, Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-century Europe (Baltimore, MD, 1973); Tropics of Discourse (Baltimore, MD, 1978); The Content of the Form: Narrative Discourse and Historical Representation (Baltimore, MD, 1987). Exceptionally, and working independently, Hayward Alker has used White's works, as well as Propp's mentioned presently. See, e.g., Hayward R. Alker, Jr, 'Fairy Tales, Tragedies and World Histories: Towards Interpretive Story Grammar as Possibilist World Models', Behaviormetrika, 21 (1987), pp. 1-28, and, more recently, Rediscoveries and Reformulations: Humanistic Methodologies for International Studies (Cambridge, 1996). See also David Campbell, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity (Manchester, 1992), and Politics without Principles: Sovereignty, Ethics, and the Narratives of the Gulf War (Boulder, CO, 1993), where White's work is cited briefly. Campbell has now written for this journal a review article on contemporary writings on Bosnia, incorporating White's ideas extensively. On 'new' philosophers of history, see Ankersmit and Kellner (eds.), New Philosophy of History.
26. See Hayden White, Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-century Europe (Baltimore, MD, 1973); Tropics of Discourse (Baltimore, MD, 1978); The Content of the Form: Narrative Discourse and Historical Representation (Baltimore, MD, 1987). Exceptionally, and working independently, Hayward Alker has used White's works, as well as Propp's mentioned presently. See, e.g., Hayward R. Alker, Jr, 'Fairy Tales, Tragedies and World Histories: Towards Interpretive Story Grammar as Possibilist World Models', Behaviormetrika, 21 (1987), pp. 1-28, and, more recently, Rediscoveries and Reformulations: Humanistic Methodologies for International Studies (Cambridge, 1996). See also David Campbell, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity (Manchester, 1992), and Politics without Principles: Sovereignty, Ethics, and the Narratives of the Gulf War (Boulder, CO, 1993), where White's work is cited briefly. Campbell has now written for this journal a review article on contemporary writings on Bosnia, incorporating White's ideas extensively. On 'new' philosophers of history, see Ankersmit and Kellner (eds.), New Philosophy of History.
27. See Hayden White, Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-century Europe (Baltimore, MD, 1973); Tropics of Discourse (Baltimore, MD, 1978); The Content of the Form: Narrative Discourse and Historical Representation (Baltimore, MD, 1987). Exceptionally, and working independently, Hayward Alker has used White's works, as well as Propp's mentioned presently. See, e.g., Hayward R. Alker, Jr, 'Fairy Tales, Tragedies and World Histories: Towards Interpretive Story Grammar as Possibilist World Models', Behaviormetrika, 21 (1987), pp. 1-28, and, more recently, Rediscoveries and Reformulations: Humanistic Methodologies for International Studies (Cambridge, 1996). See also David Campbell, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity (Manchester, 1992), and Politics without Principles: Sovereignty, Ethics, and the Narratives of the Gulf War (Boulder, CO, 1993), where White's work is cited briefly. Campbell has now written for this journal a review article on contemporary writings on Bosnia, incorporating White's ideas extensively. On 'new' philosophers of history, see Ankersmit and Kellner (eds.), New Philosophy of History.
28. See Hayden White, Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-century Europe (Baltimore, MD, 1973); Tropics of Discourse (Baltimore, MD, 1978); The Content of the Form: Narrative Discourse and Historical Representation (Baltimore, MD, 1987). Exceptionally, and working independently, Hayward Alker has used White's works, as well as Propp's mentioned presently. See, e.g., Hayward R. Alker, Jr, 'Fairy Tales, Tragedies and World Histories: Towards Interpretive Story Grammar as Possibilist World Models', Behaviormetrika, 21 (1987), pp. 1-28, and, more recently, Rediscoveries and Reformulations: Humanistic Methodologies for International Studies (Cambridge, 1996). See also David Campbell, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity (Manchester, 1992), and Politics without Principles: Sovereignty, Ethics, and the Narratives of the Gulf War (Boulder, CO, 1993), where White's work is cited briefly. Campbell has now written for this journal a review article on contemporary writings on Bosnia, incorporating White's ideas extensively. On 'new' philosophers of history, see Ankersmit and Kellner (eds.), New Philosophy of History.
29. See Hayden White, Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-century Europe (Baltimore, MD, 1973); Tropics of Discourse (Baltimore, MD, 1978); The Content of the Form: Narrative Discourse and Historical Representation (Baltimore, MD, 1987). Exceptionally, and working independently, Hayward Alker has used White's works, as well as Propp's mentioned presently. See, e.g., Hayward R. Alker, Jr, 'Fairy Tales, Tragedies and World Histories: Towards Interpretive Story Grammar as Possibilist World Models', Behaviormetrika, 21 (1987), pp. 1-28, and, more recently, Rediscoveries and Reformulations: Humanistic Methodologies for International Studies (Cambridge, 1996). See also David Campbell, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity (Manchester, 1992), and Politics without Principles: Sovereignty, Ethics, and the Narratives of the Gulf War (Boulder, CO, 1993), where White's work is cited briefly. Campbell has now written for this journal a review article on contemporary writings on Bosnia, incorporating White's ideas extensively. On 'new' philosophers of history, see Ankersmit and Kellner (eds.), New Philosophy of History.
30. See Hayden White, Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-century Europe (Baltimore, MD, 1973); Tropics of Discourse (Baltimore, MD, 1978); The Content of the Form: Narrative Discourse and Historical Representation (Baltimore, MD, 1987). Exceptionally, and working independently, Hayward Alker has used White's works, as well as Propp's mentioned presently. See, e.g., Hayward R. Alker, Jr, 'Fairy Tales, Tragedies and World Histories: Towards Interpretive Story Grammar as Possibilist World Models', Behaviormetrika, 21 (1987), pp. 1-28, and, more recently, Rediscoveries and Reformulations: Humanistic Methodologies for International Studies (Cambridge, 1996). See also David Campbell, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity (Manchester, 1992), and Politics without Principles: Sovereignty, Ethics, and the Narratives of the Gulf War (Boulder, CO, 1993), where White's work is cited briefly. Campbell has now written for this journal a review article on contemporary writings on Bosnia, incorporating White's ideas extensively. On 'new' philosophers of history, see Ankersmit and Kellner (eds.), New Philosophy of History.
31. See V. Propp, Morphology of the Folktale, 2nd edn, tr. Laurence Scott, rev. and ed. Louis A. Wagner (Austin, TX, 1968).
32. See K. N. Waltz, Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis (New York, 1959); Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA, 1979); 'The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory', in R. I. Rotberg and T. K. Rabb (eds.), The Origins and Prevention of Major Wars (Cambridge, 1989), pp. 39-52. See, for a similar view, M. Wight, Power Politics, ed. H. Bull and C. Holbraad (Leicester, 1978), p. 101; M. Howard, 'The Causes of Wars', in his The Causes of Wars and Other Essays (London, 1983), pp. 7-22.
33. See K. N. Waltz, Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis (New York, 1959); Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA, 1979); 'The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory', in R. I. Rotberg and T. K. Rabb (eds.), The Origins and Prevention of Major Wars (Cambridge, 1989), pp. 39-52. See, for a similar view, M. Wight, Power Politics, ed. H. Bull and C. Holbraad (Leicester, 1978), p. 101; M. Howard, 'The Causes of Wars', in his The Causes of Wars and Other Essays (London, 1983), pp. 7-22.
34. See K. N. Waltz, Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis (New York, 1959); Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA, 1979); 'The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory', in R. I. Rotberg and T. K. Rabb (eds.), The Origins and Prevention of Major Wars (Cambridge, 1989), pp. 39-52. See, for a similar view, M. Wight, Power Politics, ed. H. Bull and C. Holbraad (Leicester, 1978), p. 101; M. Howard, 'The Causes of Wars', in his The Causes of Wars and Other Essays (London, 1983), pp. 7-22.
35. See K. N. Waltz, Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis (New York, 1959); Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA, 1979); 'The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory', in R. I. Rotberg and T. K. Rabb (eds.), The Origins and Prevention of Major Wars (Cambridge, 1989), pp. 39-52. See, for a similar view, M. Wight, Power Politics, ed. H. Bull and C. Holbraad (Leicester, 1978), p. 101; M. Howard, 'The Causes of Wars', in his The Causes of Wars and Other Essays (London, 1983), pp. 7-22.
36. See K. N. Waltz, Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis (New York, 1959); Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA, 1979); 'The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory', in R. I. Rotberg and T. K. Rabb (eds.), The Origins and Prevention of Major Wars (Cambridge, 1989), pp. 39-52. See, for a similar view, M. Wight, Power Politics, ed. H. Bull and C. Holbraad (Leicester, 1978), p. 101; M. Howard, 'The Causes of Wars', in his The Causes of Wars and Other Essays (London, 1983), pp. 7-22.
37. M. Hollis and S. Smith, Explaining and Understanding International Relations (Oxford, 1990); 'Beware of Gurus: Structure and Action in International Relations', Review of International Studies, 17 (1991), pp. 393-410; 'Two Stories about Structure and Agency', Review of International Studies, 20 (1994), pp. 241-51; 'A Response: Why Epistemology Matters in International Theory', Review of International Studies, 22 (1996), pp. 111-16; M. Hollis, The Philosophy of Social Science: An Introduction (Cambridge, 1994).
38. M. Hollis and S. Smith, Explaining and Understanding International Relations (Oxford, 1990); 'Beware of Gurus: Structure and Action in International Relations', Review of International Studies, 17 (1991), pp. 393-410; 'Two Stories about Structure and Agency', Review of International Studies, 20 (1994), pp. 241-51; 'A Response: Why Epistemology Matters in International Theory', Review of International Studies, 22 (1996), pp. 111-16; M. Hollis, The Philosophy of Social Science: An Introduction (Cambridge, 1994).
39. M. Hollis and S. Smith, Explaining and Understanding International Relations (Oxford, 1990); 'Beware of Gurus: Structure and Action in International Relations', Review of International Studies, 17 (1991), pp. 393-410; 'Two Stories about Structure and Agency', Review of International Studies, 20 (1994), pp. 241-51; 'A Response: Why Epistemology Matters in International Theory', Review of International Studies, 22 (1996), pp. 111-16; M. Hollis, The Philosophy of Social Science: An Introduction (Cambridge, 1994).
40. M. Hollis and S. Smith, Explaining and Understanding International Relations (Oxford, 1990); 'Beware of Gurus: Structure and Action in International Relations', Review of International Studies, 17 (1991), pp. 393-410; 'Two Stories about Structure and Agency', Review of International Studies, 20 (1994), pp. 241-51; 'A Response: Why Epistemology Matters in International Theory', Review of International Studies, 22 (1996), pp. 111-16; M. Hollis, The Philosophy of Social Science: An Introduction (Cambridge, 1994).
41. M. Hollis and S. Smith, Explaining and Understanding International Relations (Oxford, 1990); 'Beware of Gurus: Structure and Action in International Relations', Review of International Studies, 17 (1991), pp. 393-410; 'Two Stories about Structure and Agency', Review of International Studies, 20 (1994), pp. 241-51; 'A Response: Why Epistemology Matters in International Theory', Review of International Studies, 22 (1996), pp. 111-16; M. Hollis, The Philosophy of Social Science: An Introduction (Cambridge, 1994).
42. See Waltz, Theory of International Politics, p. 88; 'Origins of War', p. 42.
43. See Waltz, Theory of International Politics, p. 88; 'Origins of War', p. 42.
44. D. A. Welch, Justice and the Genesis of War (Cambridge, 1993), p. 13.
45. See A. E. Wendt, 'Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics', International Organization, 46 (1992), pp. 391-425. A detailed critical exposition of Waltz's 'third-image' theory is found in my On the Causes of War, chs. 1 and 2.
46. See A. E. Wendt, 'Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics', International Organization, 46 (1992), pp. 391-425. A detailed critical exposition of Waltz's 'third-image' theory is found in my On the Causes of War, chs. 1 and 2.
47. See e.g., William Outhwaite, Understanding Social Life: The Method Called Verstehen (London, 1975), which traces the history of the development of the concept of 'understanding' as distinct from 'explanation'.
48. M. Scriven, 'Truisms as the Grounds for Historical Explanations', in P. Gardiner (ed.), Theories of History (London, 1959), pp. 443-75, at p. 449. See also A. Giddens, Studies in Social and Political Theory (London, 1977), p. 12. To 'understand from the inside' is really to approach the subject from the outside (the inter-subjective), and 'to explain from the outside' is really to remain inside (the community sharing basic understandings). On the interdependence of the inter-subjective and the subjective, see Max Scheller, The Nature of Sympathy, tr. P. Heath (London, 1954), esp. pp. 252-3.
49. M. Scriven, 'Truisms as the Grounds for Historical Explanations', in P. Gardiner (ed.), Theories of History (London, 1959), pp. 443-75, at p. 449. See also A. Giddens, Studies in Social and Political Theory (London, 1977), p. 12. To 'understand from the inside' is really to approach the subject from the outside (the inter-subjective), and 'to explain from the outside' is really to remain inside (the community sharing basic understandings). On the interdependence of the inter-subjective and the subjective, see Max Scheller, The Nature of Sympathy, tr. P. Heath (London, 1954), esp. pp. 252-3.
50. M. Scriven, 'Truisms as the Grounds for Historical Explanations', in P. Gardiner (ed.), Theories of History (London, 1959), pp. 443-75, at p. 449. See also A. Giddens, Studies in Social and Political Theory (London, 1977), p. 12. To 'understand from the inside' is really to approach the subject from the outside (the inter-subjective), and 'to explain from the outside' is really to remain inside (the community sharing basic understandings). On the interdependence of the inter-subjective and the subjective, see Max Scheller, The Nature of Sympathy, tr. P. Heath (London, 1954), esp. pp. 252-3.
51. See Louis O. Mink, 'Narrative Form as a Cognitive Instrument', in R. H. Canary and H. Kozicki (eds.), The Writing of History (Madison, WI, 1978), pp. 129-49; W. H. Dray, 'On the Nature and Role of Narrative in Historiography', History and Theory, 10 (1971), pp. 153-71; F. R. Ankersmit, 'The Dilemmas of Contemporary Anglo-Saxon Philosophy of History'. Ankersmit's contrast of the Anglo-Saxon and Continental traditions of hermeneutics - the former concerned with reconstructing the actors' actual reasons for their particular actions, the latter with interpreting (the world as) texts - is enlightening, given the usual (Anglo-Saxon) tendency to confine 'understanding' to that of particular actions, as does Hollis and Smith's Explaining and Understanding International Relations.
52. See Louis O. Mink, 'Narrative Form as a Cognitive Instrument', in R. H. Canary and H. Kozicki (eds.), The Writing of History (Madison, WI, 1978), pp. 129-49; W. H. Dray, 'On the Nature and Role of Narrative in Historiography', History and Theory, 10 (1971), pp. 153-71; F. R. Ankersmit, 'The Dilemmas of Contemporary Anglo-Saxon Philosophy of History'. Ankersmit's contrast of the Anglo-Saxon and Continental traditions of hermeneutics - the former concerned with reconstructing the actors' actual reasons for their particular actions, the latter with interpreting (the world as) texts - is enlightening, given the usual (Anglo-Saxon) tendency to confine 'understanding' to that of particular actions, as does Hollis and Smith's Explaining and Understanding International Relations.
53. See Louis O. Mink, 'Narrative Form as a Cognitive Instrument', in R. H. Canary and H. Kozicki (eds.), The Writing of History (Madison, WI, 1978), pp. 129-49; W. H. Dray, 'On the Nature and Role of Narrative in Historiography', History and Theory, 10 (1971), pp. 153-71; F. R. Ankersmit, 'The Dilemmas of Contemporary Anglo-Saxon Philosophy of History'. Ankersmit's contrast of the Anglo-Saxon and Continental traditions of hermeneutics - the former concerned with reconstructing the actors' actual reasons for their particular actions, the latter with interpreting (the world as) texts - is enlightening, given the usual (Anglo-Saxon) tendency to confine 'understanding' to that of particular actions, as does Hollis and Smith's Explaining and Understanding International Relations.
54. See Louis O. Mink, 'Narrative Form as a Cognitive Instrument', in R. H. Canary and H. Kozicki (eds.), The Writing of History (Madison, WI, 1978), pp. 129-49; W. H. Dray, 'On the Nature and Role of Narrative in Historiography', History and Theory, 10 (1971), pp. 153-71; F. R. Ankersmit, 'The Dilemmas of Contemporary Anglo-Saxon Philosophy of History'. Ankersmit's contrast of the Anglo-Saxon and Continental traditions of hermeneutics - the former concerned with reconstructing the actors' actual reasons for their particular actions, the latter with interpreting (the world as) texts - is enlightening, given the usual (Anglo-Saxon) tendency to confine 'understanding' to that of particular actions, as does Hollis and Smith's Explaining and Understanding International Relations.
55. This paragraph's assertion is based on an analysis of the relationship between causation, explanation, and narration, conducted in my On the Causes of War, ch. 4, where, among other things, the 'covering law model of explanation' is shown to be unsatisfactory. To explain an outbreak of war, according to this model, it is necessary and sufficient to point to general laws and initial conditions such that together they logically guarantee the truth of the proposition that the war in question occurred. The model is rejected mainly because the truth of this proposition is never in doubt when it is asked why the war occurred. What we are seeking is not a logical guarantee that the proposition is true, but more information, in addition to what we already have, about the circumstances in which the war came to be fought, so that our picture of the subject matter, and the world, is rendered somewhat more comprehensive and coherent. The covering-law model of explanation, however, is still widely accepted as an ideal. See, e.g., Michael Nicholson, Causes and Consequences in International Relations: A Conceptual Study (London, 1996). As rightly noticed by Heikki Patomäki, Hollis and Smith's conception of 'explanation' appears to be of this sort. See Patomäki, 'How to Tell Better Stories about World Politics', European Journal of International Relations, 1 (1996), pp. 105-33, at p. 110. See, however, Smith's more recent position found in Steve Smith, 'Positivism and Beyond', in Steve Smith, Ken Booth and Marysia Zalewski (eds.), International Theory: Positivism and Beyond (London, 1996), pp. 11-44, esp. pp. 19-20.
56. This paragraph's assertion is based on an analysis of the relationship between causation, explanation, and narration, conducted in my On the Causes of War, ch. 4, where, among other things, the 'covering law model of explanation' is shown to be unsatisfactory. To explain an outbreak of war, according to this model, it is necessary and sufficient to point to general laws and initial conditions such that together they logically guarantee the truth of the proposition that the war in question occurred. The model is rejected mainly because the truth of this proposition is never in doubt when it is asked why the war occurred. What we are seeking is not a logical guarantee that the proposition is true, but more information, in addition to what we already have, about the circumstances in which the war came to be fought, so that our picture of the subject matter, and the world, is rendered somewhat more comprehensive and coherent. The covering-law model of explanation, however, is still widely accepted as an ideal. See, e.g., Michael Nicholson, Causes and Consequences in International Relations: A Conceptual Study (London, 1996). As rightly noticed by Heikki Patomäki, Hollis and Smith's conception of 'explanation' appears to be of this sort. See Patomäki, 'How to Tell Better Stories about World Politics', European Journal of International Relations, 1 (1996), pp. 105-33, at p. 110. See, however, Smith's more recent position found in Steve Smith, 'Positivism and Beyond', in Steve Smith, Ken Booth and Marysia Zalewski (eds.), International Theory: Positivism and Beyond (London, 1996), pp. 11-44, esp. pp. 19-20.
57. This paragraph's assertion is based on an analysis of the relationship between causation, explanation, and narration, conducted in my On the Causes of War, ch. 4, where, among other things, the 'covering law model of explanation' is shown to be unsatisfactory. To explain an outbreak of war, according to this model, it is necessary and sufficient to point to general laws and initial conditions such that together they logically guarantee the truth of the proposition that the war in question occurred. The model is rejected mainly because the truth of this proposition is never in doubt when it is asked why the war occurred. What we are seeking is not a logical guarantee that the proposition is true, but more information, in addition to what we already have, about the circumstances in which the war came to be fought, so that our picture of the subject matter, and the world, is rendered somewhat more comprehensive and coherent. The covering-law model of explanation, however, is still widely accepted as an ideal. See, e.g., Michael Nicholson, Causes and Consequences in International Relations: A Conceptual Study (London, 1996). As rightly noticed by Heikki Patomäki, Hollis and Smith's conception of 'explanation' appears to be of this sort. See Patomäki, 'How to Tell Better Stories about World Politics', European Journal of International Relations, 1 (1996), pp. 105-33, at p. 110. See, however, Smith's more recent position found in Steve Smith, 'Positivism and Beyond', in Steve Smith, Ken Booth and Marysia Zalewski (eds.), International Theory: Positivism and Beyond (London, 1996), pp. 11-44, esp. pp. 19-20.
58. This paragraph's assertion is based on an analysis of the relationship between causation, explanation, and narration, conducted in my On the Causes of War, ch. 4, where, among other things, the 'covering law model of explanation' is shown to be unsatisfactory. To explain an outbreak of war, according to this model, it is necessary and sufficient to point to general laws and initial conditions such that together they logically guarantee the truth of the proposition that the war in question occurred. The model is rejected mainly because the truth of this proposition is never in doubt when it is asked why the war occurred. What we are seeking is not a logical guarantee that the proposition is true, but more information, in addition to what we already have, about the circumstances in which the war came to be fought, so that our picture of the subject matter, and the world, is rendered somewhat more comprehensive and coherent. The covering-law model of explanation, however, is still widely accepted as an ideal. See, e.g., Michael Nicholson, Causes and Consequences in International Relations: A Conceptual Study (London, 1996). As rightly noticed by Heikki Patomäki, Hollis and Smith's conception of 'explanation' appears to be of this sort. See Patomäki, 'How to Tell Better Stories about World Politics', European Journal of International Relations, 1 (1996), pp. 105-33, at p. 110. See, however, Smith's more recent position found in Steve Smith, 'Positivism and Beyond', in Steve Smith, Ken Booth and Marysia Zalewski (eds.), International Theory: Positivism and Beyond (London, 1996), pp. 11-44, esp. pp. 19-20.
59. See Vasquez, War Puzzle.
60. See Kneale, Probability and Induction, pp. 114-17; E. H. Carr, What is History? (Harmondsworth, 1961), pp. 98-100.
61. See Kneale, Probability and Induction, pp. 114-17; E. H. Carr, What is History? (Harmondsworth, 1961), pp. 98-100.
62. A. J. P. Taylor, 'In Defence of Small Nations', The Listener, 98 (4 August 1977), pp. 138-40, at p. 138.
63. S. B. Fay, The Origins of the World War, 2 vols., 2nd edn (New York, 1930), vol. 2, p. 53; L. Albertini, The Origins of the War of 1914, tr. and ed. I. M. Massey, 3 vols. (London, 1952-7), vol. 2, p. 38; A. J. P. Taylor, 'Accident Prone, or What Happened Next', Journal of Modern History, 49 (1977), pp. 1-18, at p. 10.
64. S. B. Fay, The Origins of the World War, 2 vols., 2nd edn (New York, 1930), vol. 2, p. 53; L. Albertini, The Origins of the War of 1914, tr. and ed. I. M. Massey, 3 vols. (London, 1952-7), vol. 2, p. 38; A. J. P. Taylor, 'Accident Prone, or What Happened Next', Journal of Modern History, 49 (1977), pp. 1-18, at p. 10.
65. S. B. Fay, The Origins of the World War, 2 vols., 2nd edn (New York, 1930), vol. 2, p. 53; L. Albertini, The Origins of the War of 1914, tr. and ed. I. M. Massey, 3 vols. (London, 1952-7), vol. 2, p. 38; A. J. P. Taylor, 'Accident Prone, or What Happened Next', Journal of Modern History, 49 (1977), pp. 1-18, at p. 10.
66. G. Blainey, The Causes of War, 3rd edn (London, 1988), p. 142.
67. International Studies Quarterly, 30 (1986), pp. 193-222.
68. Ibid., p. 193.
69. The view that 'mechanisms', as opposed to 'mechanical devices', are narratives, intelligibilifying the output, is advanced, and its implications for contemporary debates in international theory noted, in my On the Causes of War, ch. 5.
70. Levy, 'Organizational Routines', p. 208.
71. Ibid, p. 212.
72. Ibid, p. 213; see also O. R. Holsti, 'Crisis Management', in B. Glad (ed.), Psychological Dimensions of War (London, 1990), pp. 116-42.
73. Ibid, p. 213; see also O. R. Holsti, 'Crisis Management', in B. Glad (ed.), Psychological Dimensions of War (London, 1990), pp. 116-42.
74. Levy, 'Organizational Routines', p. 214; see also I. L. Janis, Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes, 2nd edn (Boston, MA, 1982).
75. Levy, 'Organizational Routines', p. 214; see also I. L. Janis, Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes, 2nd edn (Boston, MA, 1982).
76. P. Veyne, Writing History: Essay on Epistemology, tr. Mina Moore-Rinvolucri (Manchester, 1984), ch. 6.
77. Ibid, p. 105, p. 307 n.18; see also A. Heller, A Theory of History (London, 1982), p. 173.
78. Ibid, p. 105, p. 307 n.18; see also A. Heller, A Theory of History (London, 1982), p. 173.
79. J. Huizinga, 'The Idea of History', in F. Stern (ed.), The Varieties of History: From Voltaire to the Present (New York, 1973), pp. 289-303, at p. 293. See in this connection Tzvetan Todorov, The Conquest of America: The Question of the Other, tr. R. Howard (New York, 1992), p. 14, where we find that Columbus's world comprised three spheres, natural, divine and human, which shaped the way he analyzed and explained things.
80. J. Huizinga, 'The Idea of History', in F. Stern (ed.), The Varieties of History: From Voltaire to the Present (New York, 1973), pp. 289-303, at p. 293. See in this connection Tzvetan Todorov, The Conquest of America: The Question of the Other, tr. R. Howard (New York, 1992), p. 14, where we find that Columbus's world comprised three spheres, natural, divine and human, which shaped the way he analyzed and explained things.
81. J. D. Singer, 'The Historical Experiment as a Research Strategy in the Study of World Politics', in J. D. Singer (ed.), The Correlates of War, 2 vols. (New York, 1979), vol. 1, pp. 175-96, at p. 184. Also interestingly, Clausewitz talks of the trinity of war - blind natural force, chance, and reason - and remarks that the theory of war must pay attention to all three. See Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and tr. M. Howard and P. Paret (Princeton, 1976), p. 89.
82. J. D. Singer, 'The Historical Experiment as a Research Strategy in the Study of World Politics', in J. D. Singer (ed.), The Correlates of War, 2 vols. (New York, 1979), vol. 1, pp. 175-96, at p. 184. Also interestingly, Clausewitz talks of the trinity of war - blind natural force, chance, and reason - and remarks that the theory of war must pay attention to all three. See Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and tr. M. Howard and P. Paret (Princeton, 1976), p. 89.
83. Howard, 'Causes of Wars', p. 89.
84. See, e.g., A. W. Kinglake, The Invasion of the Crimea: Its Origin, and an Account of its Progress Down to the Death of Lord Raglan, 6th edn (Edinburgh, 1877).
85. For the rise of what M. Ceadel has called 'pacificism', see his Thinking about Peace and War (Oxford, 1987); and my The Domestic Analogy and World Order Proposals (Cambridge, 1989), ch. 5.
86. For the rise of what M. Ceadel has called 'pacificism', see his Thinking about Peace and War (Oxford, 1987); and my The Domestic Analogy and World Order Proposals (Cambridge, 1989), ch. 5.
87. See Blainey, Causes of War, p. 292; Stoessinger, Why Nations Go to War, which closely follows the Blainey line.
88. See Blainey, Causes of War, p. 292; Stoessinger, Why Nations Go to War, which closely follows the Blainey line.
89. L. Freedman and V. Gamba-Stonehouse, Signals of War: The Falklands Conflict of 1982 (London, 1990), pp. 142, 323.
90. Ibid, p. 124.
91. Ibid, p. 143.
92. See L. Freedman and E. Karsh, The Gulf Conflict 1990-1991: Diplomacy and War in the New World Order (Princeton, 1993).
93. See I. Nish, The Origins of the Russo-Japanese War (London, 1985).
94. See A. Iriye, The Origins of the Second World War in Asia and the Pacific (London, 1987).
95. See P. M. H. Bell, The Origins of the Second World War in Europe (London, 1986).
96. See S. R. Williamson, Austria-Hungary and the Origins of the First World War (London, 1991), pp. 190ff.
97. See J. S. Levy, 'Preferences, Constraints, and Choices in July 1914', in S. E. Miller, S. M. Lynn-Jones, and S. van Evera (eds.), Military Strategy and the Origins of the First World War (Princeton, 1991), pp. 226-61.
98. See L. C. F. Turner, 'The Russian Mobilization in 1914', Journal of Contemporary History, 3 (1968), pp. 65-88; M. Trachtenberg, 'The Coming of the First World War: A Reassessment', in M. Trachtenberg, History and Strategy (Princeton, 1991), pp. 72ff.; J. S. Levy, T. J. Christensen, and M. Trachtenberg, 'Correspondence: Mobilization and Inadvertence in the July Crisis', International Security, 16 (1991), pp. 189-203, at pp. 194-7, 201-3.
99. See L. C. F. Turner, 'The Russian Mobilization in 1914', Journal of Contemporary History, 3 (1968), pp. 65-88; M. Trachtenberg, 'The Coming of the First World War: A Reassessment', in M. Trachtenberg, History and Strategy (Princeton, 1991), pp. 72ff.; J. S. Levy, T. J. Christensen, and M. Trachtenberg, 'Correspondence: Mobilization and Inadvertence in the July Crisis', International Security, 16 (1991), pp. 189-203, at pp. 194-7, 201-3.
100. See L. C. F. Turner, 'The Russian Mobilization in 1914', Journal of Contemporary History, 3 (1968), pp. 65-88; M. Trachtenberg, 'The Coming of the First World War: A Reassessment', in M. Trachtenberg, History and Strategy (Princeton, 1991), pp. 72ff.; J. S. Levy, T. J. Christensen, and M. Trachtenberg, 'Correspondence: Mobilization and Inadvertence in the July Crisis', International Security, 16 (1991), pp. 189-203, at pp. 194-7, 201-3.
101. See in this connection David Campbell, Politics without Principle: Sovereignty, Ethics, and the Narratives of the Gulf War (Boulder, CO, 1993). Though revisionist, Campbell's narrative, in my view, illustrates my point here. A noteworthy innovation is found in Jennifer Milliken and David Sylvan, 'Soft Bodies, Hard Targets, and Chic Theories: US Bombing Policy in Indochina', Millennium, 25 (Summer 1996), pp. 321-59. Milliken and Sylvan's satirical representation, however, concerns US military (and, in particular, bombing) policy in Indochina, and is not written as a full-scale historical account of the origins of the Vietnam War.
102. See in this connection David Campbell, Politics without Principle: Sovereignty, Ethics, and the Narratives of the Gulf War (Boulder, CO, 1993). Though revisionist, Campbell's narrative, in my view, illustrates my point here. A noteworthy innovation is found in Jennifer Milliken and David Sylvan, 'Soft Bodies, Hard Targets, and Chic Theories: US Bombing Policy in Indochina', Millennium, 25 (Summer 1996), pp. 321-59. Milliken and Sylvan's satirical representation, however, concerns US military (and, in particular, bombing) policy in Indochina, and is not written as a full-scale historical account of the origins of the Vietnam War.
103. See Waltz, Theory of International Politics, p. 171.
104. See J. Snyder, 'Averting Anarchy in the New Europe', International Security, 14 (1990), pp. 5-41, at pp., 18-19.
105. Bell, Origins of the Second World War in Europe, Part 2.
106. See Waltz, Man, the State and War.
107. Some cultures, however, do try to make sense of what to others appear as chance coincidences not requiring any further explanation. See, e.g., E. E. Evans-Pritchard, Witchcraft, Oracles, and Magic among the Azande (Oxford, 1976), esp. ch. 2.
108. See F. Fischer, War of Illusions: German Policies from 1911 to 1914, tr. Marian Jackson (London, 1975); Levy, 'Preferences, Constraints, and Choices'.
109. See F. Fischer, War of Illusions: German Policies from 1911 to 1914, tr. Marian Jackson (London, 1975); Levy, 'Preferences, Constraints, and Choices'.
110. See A. J. P. Taylor, The Origins of the Second World War (Harmondsworth, 1964); E. M. Robertson (ed.), The Origins of the Second World War Historical Interpretations (London, 1971); W. H. Dray, 'A Controversy over Causes: A. J. P. Taylor and the Origins of the Second World War', in W. H. Dray, Perspectives on History (London, 1980), pp. 69-96.
111. See A. J. P. Taylor, The Origins of the Second World War (Harmondsworth, 1964); E. M. Robertson (ed.), The Origins of the Second World War Historical Interpretations (London, 1971); W. H. Dray, 'A Controversy over Causes: A. J. P. Taylor and the Origins of the Second World War', in W. H. Dray, Perspectives on History (London, 1980), pp. 69-96.
112. See A. J. P. Taylor, The Origins of the Second World War (Harmondsworth, 1964); E. M. Robertson (ed.), The Origins of the Second World War Historical Interpretations (London, 1971); W. H. Dray, 'A Controversy over Causes: A. J. P. Taylor and the Origins of the Second World War', in W. H. Dray, Perspectives on History (London, 1980), pp. 69-96.
113. These categories have in fact been worked out gradually over a number of years by going back and forth between legal writings and historical works on war origins. The categories found in legal sources supplied the prototypes, but were repeatedly modified in the course of reading and re-reading historical works on war origins. The legal sources consulted include: Aquarius (pseudonym), 'Causation and Legal Responsibility', South African Law Journal, 62 (1945), pp. 126-45; H. L. A. Hart and T. Honoré, Causation in the Law, 2nd edn (Oxford, 1985); J. C. Smith and B. Hogan, Criminal Law, 7th edn (London, 1992).
114. These categories have in fact been worked out gradually over a number of years by going back and forth between legal writings and historical works on war origins. The categories found in legal sources supplied the prototypes, but were repeatedly modified in the course of reading and re-reading historical works on war origins. The legal sources consulted include: Aquarius (pseudonym), 'Causation and Legal Responsibility', South African Law Journal, 62 (1945), pp. 126-45; H. L. A. Hart and T. Honoré, Causation in the Law, 2nd edn (Oxford, 1985); J. C. Smith and B. Hogan, Criminal Law, 7th edn (London, 1992).
115. These categories have in fact been worked out gradually over a number of years by going back and forth between legal writings and historical works on war origins. The categories found in legal sources supplied the prototypes, but were repeatedly modified in the course of reading and re-reading historical works on war origins. The legal sources consulted include: Aquarius (pseudonym), 'Causation and Legal Responsibility', South African Law Journal, 62 (1945), pp. 126-45; H. L. A. Hart and T. Honoré, Causation in the Law, 2nd edn (Oxford, 1985); J. C. Smith and B. Hogan, Criminal Law, 7th edn (London, 1992).
116. Taylor, 'Accident Prone', p. 17.
117. See J. Joll, 'Politicians and the Freedom to Choose: The Case of July 1914', in A. Ryan (ed.), The Idea of Freedom: Essays in Honour of Isaiah Berlin (Oxford, 1979), pp. 99-114.
118. H. Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law, tr. from the 2nd German edn by Max Knight (Berkeley, CA, 1967), p. 84; see also R. G. Collingwood, An Essay on Metaphysics (Oxford, 1940), esp. p. 291.
119. H. Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law, tr. from the 2nd German edn by Max Knight (Berkeley, CA, 1967), p. 84; see also R. G. Collingwood, An Essay on Metaphysics (Oxford, 1940), esp. p. 291.
120. One possible side effect of too much concentration on origins of wars may, however, be that the important issue of ius in bello becomes neglected.
121. See, e.g., L. L. Farrar, Jr, 'The Limits of Choice: July 1914 Reconsidered', Journal of Conflict Resolution, 16 (1972), pp. 1-23. Recall the discussion above regarding 'not-contributorily negligent', etc.
122. See K. W. Deutsch et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area (Princeton, 1957).
123. J. L. Ray, 'The Abolition of Slavery and the End of International War', International Organization, 43 (1989), pp. 405-39.
124. Collingwood, Idea of History, p. 400; emphasis added.