Everybody out of the pool: Products liability, punitive damages, and competition

Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization

Volumn 13, Issue 2, 1997, Pages 410-432

  Daughety, Andrew F ^a   Reinganum, Jennifer F ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0031326166     PISSN: 87566222     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/oxfordjournals.jleo.a023390     Document Type: Article

References (26)

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