Interpretations of political violence in ethnically divided societies

Terrorism and Political Violence

Volumn 9, Issue 3, 1997, Pages 33-54

  Cavanaugh, Kathleen A ^a  

^a QUEEN'S UNIVERSITY BELFAST   (United Kingdom)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 0031321056     PISSN: 09546553     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/09546559708427414     Document Type: Article

References (100)

1. David Held, Political Theory and the Modern Slate (Stanford: Stanford UP 1989) p.146.
2. Anne Norton, Reflections on Political Identity (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press 1988) p.146.
3. Violence may also put on the mask of the law.
4. Interviews were conducted in Belfast, Northern Ireland with paramilitants, as well as community members during four separate time intervals (1985, 1990, 1994 and 1995). Some paramilitant respondents were, at the time, militarily engaged while others had moved from the military to political party activism (as active and, at times, visible members of Sinn Fein, IRSP, UDA [in 1985], UDP [in 1994, 1995], and PUP). With few exceptions I will provide only a summary of these findings.
5. On 30 Jan. 1996, Gino Gallagher was killed on the Falls Road in West Belfast. Initially the IRSP, INLA's political wing, denied reports that this was due to an internal feud. The organization later stated that Gallagher was killed by breakaway members of its group. Gallagher's death led to a series of reprisal beatings, murders and attempted murders of INLA members that continued throughout 1996.
6. Often referred to by community members as 'the boys', 'the Provies' or 'the Rah' ('RA).
7. The split, ostensibly, was the demise of the Officials eventually reforming into Official Sinn Fein (Sinn Fein: the Workers Party in Northern Ireland) and, in 1982, the Workers Party. In 1992, the Workers Party split with most of its southern membership forming a new party, Democratic Left. Flackes and Elliot, Northern Ireland: A Political Directory 1968-1993 (Belfast: Blackstaff Press 1994) pp.356-7. While political offshoots of the Officials continue to reject paramilitarism, recent post-cease-fire activities suggest that at least some remnants of the Officials are active and have maintained armaments.
8. See the critique by Ronnie Munck, 'Rethinking Irish Nationalism', Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism (1987) pp.31-48. Also see Anthony McIntyre's, 'Modern Irish republicanism: the product of British state strategies', Irish Political Studies 10 (1995) pp.97-122. McIntyre argues that republican strategies, including the use of violence, have actually been far more reactive than analysts have noted. He argues that republican tactics and ideology since the early 1970s have been adapted 'to survive in the face of British state strategies', p.102.
9. See the critique by Ronnie Munck, 'Rethinking Irish Nationalism', Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism (1987) pp.31-48. Also see Anthony McIntyre's, 'Modern Irish republicanism: the product of British state strategies', Irish Political Studies 10 (1995) pp.97-122. McIntyre argues that republican strategies, including the use of violence, have actually been far more reactive than analysts have noted. He argues that republican tactics and ideology since the early 1970s have been adapted 'to survive in the face of British state strategies', p.102.
10. This has been referred to as the 'armolite and ballot box' phase, a phrase adapted from Danny Morrison's 1981 Ard Feis speech.
11. See Iris Bheag uimh. a. 8. (March 1987) pp.19-20.
12. See Iris Bheag uimh. a 9. (April 1989), pp.20-25.
13. This departure from traditional republican strategy and analysis is outlined in Sinn Fein's, Towards a Lasting Peace (Belfast: Sinn Fein 1992).
14. See Mitchel McLaughlin, 'Protestantism, Unionism and Loyalism', The Starry Plough 1/ 2 (Nov. 1991) pp.13-16.
15. UDA leadership claimed that this was not the result of decreasing support but a deliberate policy to downsize in order to better maintain the group.
16. The UDA is said to presently be split between those involved and those against UDA involvement in the drug trade.
17. Spence now serves in the leadership of the PUP.
18. The UVF drew its name from Carson's Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) established in 1912 to fight against Home Rule. According to David Boulton, recruitment and training of the UVF: was done essentially by the Orange Order as the lodge room was no place for conscientious objectors or political opponents. Likewise, drilling was carried on in Orange Halls, but when the weather and landowners permitted, drilling was done openly. The UVF were given suite offices in the Belfast Town Hall where the provincial government sat. Belfast businessmen underwrote the UVF to the tune of one million. The organization grew to some 10,000 men. It successfully infiltrated both industrial and rural sectors of Northern Ireland. By the early 1920s, the UVF became the Ulster Special Constabulary with the authorization of Lloyd George. See David Boulton, The U.V.F. 1966-1973: an anatomy of loyalist rebellion (Dublin: Tore Books 1973) pp.16-17, 21.
19. In a special Forum election held in Northern Ireland on 30 May 1996, the PUP polled 26,082 votes or 3.47 per cent of the electorate, and the UDP polled 16,715 votes or 2.22 per cent of the electorate.
20. Ted R. Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1970).
21. Denis O'Hearn, 'Catholic Grievances, Catholic Nationalism: A Comment', British Journal of Sociology 34/3 (1983) pp.438-45.
22. J. Stacy Adams, Equity Theory: Toward a General Theory of Social Interactions (New York: Academic Press 1976).
23. Elaine Walster, G. William Walster and Ellen Berscheid, Equity: theory and research (Boston: Allyn and Bacon 1978) pp.50-56.
24. See Coopers & Lybrand, Northern Ireland Economy: Review and Prospects (Belfast: Coopers & Lybrand 1994) pp.22, 33.
25. In the republican study area (and its three adjacent wards) the male unemployment rate for 1993 was 47 per cent. Long term unemployment (12 months or more) as a percentage of all unemployed was set at 58 per cent for this area (Belfast Action Team 1994, 77). In the loyalist study area, a 1991 Census revealed an overall unemployment rate for the greater ward of approximately 21 per cent. The unemployment rate among males aged 16+ was 50 per cent, and long term unemployment for all unemployed was 50.5 per cent.
26. See Robert White, 'Political Violence by the Nonaggrieved: Explaining the Political Participation of those with no Apparent Grievances', International Social Movement Research 4 (1992) p.84. White found that IRA supporters in the Republic were drawn from both working, farming and middle class social backgrounds. A comparable study conducted by White in Northern Ireland yielded similar results - activists were drawn from a mixed social background. White used ethnographic study to interpret results from time series regression analysis and concluded that 'political violence was not a function of economic deprivation'. See White, 'From Peaceful Protest to Guerrilla War: Micromobilization of the Provisional Irish Republican Army', American Journal of Sociology 94 (1989) p.1297. An early study by Boyle, Hadden and Chesney examined the socio-economic grouping and social class of Diplock Defendants. The findings confirmed that most, but not all, defendants were drawn from working class homes. See K. Boyle, R. Chesney and T. Hadden, 'Who are the Terrorists?', Fortnight 126 (1976) pp.6-8. Christopher Hewitt's 'Catholic Grievances, Catholic Nationalism in Northern Ireland 1968-1971: A Reinterpretation', British Journal of Sociology 32 (Sept. 1981) pp.362-80 was a seminal piece for the nationalist argument.
27. See Robert White, 'Political Violence by the Nonaggrieved: Explaining the Political Participation of those with no Apparent Grievances', International Social Movement Research 4 (1992) p.84. White found that IRA supporters in the Republic were drawn from both working, farming and middle class social backgrounds. A comparable study conducted by White in Northern Ireland yielded similar results - activists were drawn from a mixed social background. White used ethnographic study to interpret results from time series regression analysis and concluded that 'political violence was not a function of economic deprivation'. See White, 'From Peaceful Protest to Guerrilla War: Micromobilization of the Provisional Irish Republican Army', American Journal of Sociology 94 (1989) p.1297. An early study by Boyle, Hadden and Chesney examined the socio-economic grouping and social class of Diplock Defendants. The findings confirmed that most, but not all, defendants were drawn from working class homes. See K. Boyle, R. Chesney and T. Hadden, 'Who are the Terrorists?', Fortnight 126 (1976) pp.6-8. Christopher Hewitt's 'Catholic Grievances, Catholic Nationalism in Northern Ireland 1968-1971: A Reinterpretation', British Journal of Sociology 32 (Sept. 1981) pp.362-80 was a seminal piece for the nationalist argument.
28. See Robert White, 'Political Violence by the Nonaggrieved: Explaining the Political Participation of those with no Apparent Grievances', International Social Movement Research 4 (1992) p.84. White found that IRA supporters in the Republic were drawn from both working, farming and middle class social backgrounds. A comparable study conducted by White in Northern Ireland yielded similar results - activists were drawn from a mixed social background. White used ethnographic study to interpret results from time series regression analysis and concluded that 'political violence was not a function of economic deprivation'. See White, 'From Peaceful Protest to Guerrilla War: Micromobilization of the Provisional Irish Republican Army', American Journal of Sociology 94 (1989) p.1297. An early study by Boyle, Hadden and Chesney examined the socio-economic grouping and social class of Diplock Defendants. The findings confirmed that most, but not all, defendants were drawn from working class homes. See K. Boyle, R. Chesney and T. Hadden, 'Who are the Terrorists?', Fortnight 126 (1976) pp.6-8. Christopher Hewitt's 'Catholic Grievances, Catholic Nationalism in Northern Ireland 1968-1971: A Reinterpretation', British Journal of Sociology 32 (Sept. 1981) pp.362-80 was a seminal piece for the nationalist argument.
29. See Robert White, 'Political Violence by the Nonaggrieved: Explaining the Political Participation of those with no Apparent Grievances', International Social Movement Research 4 (1992) p.84. White found that IRA supporters in the Republic were drawn from both working, farming and middle class social backgrounds. A comparable study conducted by White in Northern Ireland yielded similar results - activists were drawn from a mixed social background. White used ethnographic study to interpret results from time series regression analysis and concluded that 'political violence was not a function of economic deprivation'. See White, 'From Peaceful Protest to Guerrilla War: Micromobilization of the Provisional Irish Republican Army', American Journal of Sociology 94 (1989) p.1297. An early study by Boyle, Hadden and Chesney examined the socio-economic grouping and social class of Diplock Defendants. The findings confirmed that most, but not all, defendants were drawn from working class homes. See K. Boyle, R. Chesney and T. Hadden, 'Who are the Terrorists?', Fortnight 126 (1976) pp.6-8. Christopher Hewitt's 'Catholic Grievances, Catholic Nationalism in Northern Ireland 1968-1971: A Reinterpretation', British Journal of Sociology 32 (Sept. 1981) pp.362-80 was a seminal piece for the nationalist argument.
30. In choosing unemployment as an indicator of deprivation levels within the Catholic community Robert White argues that 'Discrimination in employment is probably the key form of economic deprivation in the North of Ireland and in Deny in particular' (note 25b) p. 1284. His findings are consistent with Peroff and Hewitt, 'who show that the unemployment rate but not the level of 'new Homes completed' was related to the frequency and severity of rioting in the North between 1968 and 1973'. Kathleen Peroff and Christopher Hewitt, 'Rioting in Northern Ireland: The Effects of Different Policies', Journal of Conflict Resolution 24 (1980) pp.593-612.
31. Brendan O'Leary and John McGarry, Explaining Northern Ireland: Broken Images (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers 1995) p.289-90. O'Leary and McGarry concede that a more sophisticated analysis of the data is necessary but are quite right to note that their results are in concert with other more detailed studies (p.486).
32. Respondents often cited more than one contributing factor when explaining the causes of political violence in Northern Ireland or their own personal involvement in a paramilitary organization. However, in most cases there were reasons that were core to the individuals decision to engage, and those that were secondary or contributing factors.
33. A partner of a paramilitant described their marriage as his second; 'his first', she recalled, 'was to politics of this place' (Interview, 1994).
34. As I shall explore in subsequent sections, communal support of paramilitants was not unconditional.
35. Term used to describe petty criminals.
36. One respondent did relate vague memories of his family having been 'burnt out from Lenadoon' (now an all-Catholic housing estate in West Belfast).
37. Interview with Loyalist, male, UDA, 1985.
38. Interview with Loyalist, male, UVF, 1994.
39. Robert White, On Measuring Political Violence: Northern Ireland, 1969 to 1980', American Sociological Review 58 (1993) p.582. Similar conclusions can be found in O'Leary and McGarry (note 27) p.291.
40. For example. Labour Force Survey data for February 1997 indicate that the unemployment rate for Belfast was 7.7 per cent. The rate of unemployment in Glasgow during the same time period was 7.9 per cent, and in Dublin the rate was 17.17 per cent! Boyle and Hadden compared Northern Ireland with other less economically prosperous regions of the UK and Republic of Ireland. Their data set reveals similar patterns of economic deprivation. Disparities are noted, however, when the figures are broken down between Protestants and Catholics within Northern Ireland. See Kevin Boyle and Tom Hadden, Northern Ireland: The Choice (London: Penguin Books 1994) pp.52-3.
41. It should be noted that survey data also suggest that a greater consensus on this issue exists for Protestants than for Catholics.
42. For a summary of survey data see Boyle and Hadden (note 36) pp.90-91.
43. Interview with Loyalist, male, Taughmonagh estate, 1994.
44. Edward Azar, The Management of Protracted Social Conflicts (Dartmouth: Dartmouth Publishing 1990) p.13.
45. Azar (note 40) p. 16.
46. A.M. Gallagher, 'Freedom to Change', Community Relations (July 1992) p.3.
47. Azar (note 40) p. 17.
48. Peter Stringer and Gillian Robinson (eds), Social Attitudes in Northern Ireland: The Third Report (Belfast: Blackstaff Press 1994) p.37.
49. Paul Compton, Demographic Review: Northern Ireland 1995 (Belfast: Northern Ireland Economic Development Office 1995) p. 144.
50. Stringer and Robinson (note 44).
51. See John Darby, Seamus Dunn and Kenneth Mullan (eds), Education and community in Northern Ireland: schools apart? schools together? (Coleraine: Centre for the Study of Conflict, University of Ulster 1989). Also, Robert Coles, The political life of children (Boston: Houghton Mifflin 1986); Dominic Murray, Worlds Apart: Segregated Schools in Northern Ireland (Belfast: Appletree 1985) and Ken Heskin, Northern Ireland: A Psychological Analysis (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan 1980).
52. See John Darby, Seamus Dunn and Kenneth Mullan (eds), Education and community in Northern Ireland: schools apart? schools together? (Coleraine: Centre for the Study of Conflict, University of Ulster 1989). Also, Robert Coles, The political life of children (Boston: Houghton Mifflin 1986); Dominic Murray, Worlds Apart: Segregated Schools in Northern Ireland (Belfast: Appletree 1985) and Ken Heskin, Northern Ireland: A Psychological Analysis (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan 1980).
53. See John Darby, Seamus Dunn and Kenneth Mullan (eds), Education and community in Northern Ireland: schools apart? schools together? (Coleraine: Centre for the Study of Conflict, University of Ulster 1989). Also, Robert Coles, The political life of children (Boston: Houghton Mifflin 1986); Dominic Murray, Worlds Apart: Segregated Schools in Northern Ireland (Belfast: Appletree 1985) and Ken Heskin, Northern Ireland: A Psychological Analysis (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan 1980).
54. See John Darby, Seamus Dunn and Kenneth Mullan (eds), Education and community in Northern Ireland: schools apart? schools together? (Coleraine: Centre for the Study of Conflict, University of Ulster 1989). Also, Robert Coles, The political life of children (Boston: Houghton Mifflin 1986); Dominic Murray, Worlds Apart: Segregated Schools in Northern Ireland (Belfast: Appletree 1985) and Ken Heskin, Northern Ireland: A Psychological Analysis (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan 1980).
55. William Hazleton, 'Constitutional Uncertainty and Political Deadlock: Overcoming Unionist Intransigence in Northern Ireland', Conflict Quarterly (Summer 1993) p.27.
56. See Donald Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press 1985).
57. W.D. Flackes and Sydney Elliott (note 7) pp.359-412.
58. Paul Mitchell, 'Party competition in an ethnic dual party system'. Ethnic and Racial Studies (Oct. 1995) p.776.
59. Mitchell (note 51).
60. John Darby, Intimidation and Conflict in Northern Ireland (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan 1986) p.169.
61. Rosemary Harris, Prejudice and Tolerance in Ulster: A study of neighbors and 'strangers' in a border community (Manchester: Manchester University Press 1972) p.xi.
62. John Whyte, Interpreting Northern Ireland (Oxford: OUP 1991) p.50.
63. The Catholic Church's 'just war' theory is detailed in Fionnuala O'Connor's, In Search of State (Belfast: Appletree 1993) pp.295-6. Definition and examination of Protestant Covenant Theology can be found in Marianne Elliot's, Watchman in Sion: the Protestant idea of liberty (Belfast: Field Day Pamphlet No 8 1985).
64. The Catholic Church's 'just war' theory is detailed in Fionnuala O'Connor's, In Search of State (Belfast: Appletree 1993) pp.295-6. Definition and examination of Protestant Covenant Theology can be found in Marianne Elliot's, Watchman in Sion: the Protestant idea of liberty (Belfast: Field Day Pamphlet No 8 1985).
65. See Stringer and Robinson (note 44) and Richard Breen, Paula Devine and Gillian Robinson (eds), Social Attitudes in Northern Ireland, Fourth Report: 1994-95 (Belfast: Appletree 1995).
66. See Table 5.1 in O'Leary and McGarry (note 27) p.174.
67. An in-depth discussion of this approach can be found in O'Leary and McGarry (note 27) Ch.6.
68. See Jeffrey Sluka, Hearts and Minds, Water and Fish: Support for the IRA and INLA in a Northern Irish Ghetto (Greenwich: JAI Press 1989); Frank Burton, The Politics of Legitimacy: Struggles in a Belfast Community (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul 1978); and White (notes 26 and 35).
69. See Jeffrey Sluka, Hearts and Minds, Water and Fish: Support for the IRA and INLA in a Northern Irish Ghetto (Greenwich: JAI Press 1989); Frank Burton, The Politics of Legitimacy: Struggles in a Belfast Community (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul 1978); and White (notes 26 and 35).
70. Bert Klandermans, 'Social-Psychological Expansions of Resource Mobilization Theory', American Sociological Review 49 (1984) pp.583-600; Edward N. Muller and Karl-Dieter Opp, 'Rational Action and Rebellious Collective Action', America Political Science Review 89 (1986) pp.471-87.
71. Bert Klandermans, 'Social-Psychological Expansions of Resource Mobilization Theory', American Sociological Review 49 (1984) pp.583-600; Edward N. Muller and Karl-Dieter Opp, 'Rational Action and Rebellious Collective Action', America Political Science Review 89 (1986) pp.471-87.
72. The unit of analysis here is the organization, not the individual.
73. Charles Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley 1978) pp.151-66.
74. For a critique of this approach see O'Leary and McGarry (note 27) pp.292-6.
75. Flackes and Elliot (note 7) p.277.
76. Darby (note 53) p.5.
77. Victims were killed because they were (or were assumed to be) Catholic. Sectarian killings of Protestants by nationalist militant agents comprise eight per cent of the total during the same time period. Percentages represent deaths related to conflict between July 1969 and March 1996. Tabulated from Malcolm Sutton, An Index of Deaths from the Conflict in Ireland: 1969-1993 (Belfast: Beyond the Pale Publications 1994) pp.196-203; Fortnight Magazine's 'Chronology of Troubles', Jan. 1994-March 1996; and statistics obtained through RUC information services (for 1995 only). For an informative debate on this matter, see Robert White and Steve Brace's article on sectarianism victim and selection, TPV 9/1 (Spring 1997) pp.20-71 and TPV9/2 (Summer 1997) pp.120-31.
78. Victims were killed because they were (or were assumed to be) Catholic. Sectarian killings of Protestants by nationalist militant agents comprise eight per cent of the total during the same time period. Percentages represent deaths related to conflict between July 1969 and March 1996. Tabulated from Malcolm Sutton, An Index of Deaths from the Conflict in Ireland: 1969-1993 (Belfast: Beyond the Pale Publications 1994) pp.196-203; Fortnight Magazine's 'Chronology of Troubles', Jan. 1994-March 1996; and statistics obtained through RUC information services (for 1995 only). For an informative debate on this matter, see Robert White and Steve Brace's article on sectarianism victim and selection, TPV 9/1 (Spring 1997) pp.20-71 and TPV9/2 (Summer 1997) pp.120-31.
79. Victims were killed because they were (or were assumed to be) Catholic. Sectarian killings of Protestants by nationalist militant agents comprise eight per cent of the total during the same time period. Percentages represent deaths related to conflict between July 1969 and March 1996. Tabulated from Malcolm Sutton, An Index of Deaths from the Conflict in Ireland: 1969-1993 (Belfast: Beyond the Pale Publications 1994) pp.196-203; Fortnight Magazine's 'Chronology of Troubles', Jan. 1994-March 1996; and statistics obtained through RUC information services (for 1995 only). For an informative debate on this matter, see Robert White and Steve Brace's article on sectarianism victim and selection, TPV 9/1 (Spring 1997) pp.20-71 and TPV9/2 (Summer 1997) pp.120-31.
80. Victims were killed because they were (or were assumed to be) Catholic. Sectarian killings of Protestants by nationalist militant agents comprise eight per cent of the total during the same time period. Percentages represent deaths related to conflict between July 1969 and March 1996. Tabulated from Malcolm Sutton, An Index of Deaths from the Conflict in Ireland: 1969-1993 (Belfast: Beyond the Pale Publications 1994) pp.196-203; Fortnight Magazine's 'Chronology of Troubles', Jan. 1994-March 1996; and statistics obtained through RUC information services (for 1995 only). For an informative debate on this matter, see Robert White and Steve Brace's article on sectarianism victim and selection, TPV 9/1 (Spring 1997) pp.20-71 and TPV9/2 (Summer 1997) pp.120-31.
81. O'Leary and McGarry (note 27) p.263.
82. A significant rise in loyalist paramilitary killings occurred between 1991 and 1993.
83. See Burton, Sluka, White (note 60) and Darby (note 53).
84. Burton (note 60) p.2.
85. Burton (note 60) p.1.
86. Burton (note 60) p. 128.
87. Within republican and loyalist communities I found that paramilitants had a small but core group of support that remained consistent and was impervious to external factors or concerns.
88. Interview with Loyalist, male respondent, 1995.
89. Interview with Republican, female respondent, 1994.
90. Interview, 1995.
91. Interview with Catholic respondent, male, 1994.
92. Amnesty International, United Kingdom, Northern Ireland: fair trial concerns in the Casement Park trials (London: Al Index: EUR 45/07/93).
93. Interview with Catholic respondent, female, 1990.
94. Darby (note 53) p. 162.
95. Human Rights Watch (Helsinki), Children in Northern Ireland: Abused by Security Forces and Paramilitaries (New York: Human Rights Watch 1992) p.36.
96. The Helsinki Watch report referred to security harassment in Protestant areas. Helsinki Watch (note 82) pp.31-2.
97. In an interview with Human Rights Watch (Helsinki), Sinn Fein councillor Joe Austin states: The policing role is not played by Sinn Fein, but by the Republican movement - the IRA. The community should police itself - the IRA shouldn't do it. But the dilemma is that if the movement does nothing, people will resort to self-help and take matters in their own hand. Helsinki Watch (note 82) p.39. Austin maintains that shootings were a last option and only used when an individual 'habitually create[s] problems, and commit[s] violent crimes like armed robbery, rape and muggings', p.41.
98. Burton (note 60) p. 109.
99. Burton (note 60) p.106.
100. Burton (note 60) p.85.