Information terrorism: Political violence in the information age

Terrorism and Political Violence

Volumn 9, Issue 1, 1997, Pages 72-83

  Devost, Matthew G ^a   Houghton, Brian K ^a   Pollard, Neal Allen ^a  

^a SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0031315433     PISSN: 09546553     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/09546559708427387     Document Type: Article

References (16)

1. In this case, the Trojan horse would be a malicious program, as the name implies, inserted without initial suspicion and activated at a later advantageous time.
2. See http://www.cs.princeton.edu/∼ddean/java/dns-scenario.html for the DNS attack scenario that Princeton researchers used to exploit a flaw in Java.
3. By a most unfortunate coincidence, this scenario was fully developed four days before the tragic crash of Commerce Secretary Brown's airplane in Croatia. While not wishing to exploit such a tragic loss, we feel the scenario is still clearly relevant. Our most sincere condolences go to the families, friends and colleagues of all who perished.
4. 'CIA Gears Up to Thwart "Information Attacks'", Washington Post, 26 June 1996, p A19.
5. See Alex P. Schmid and J.F.A. DeGraaf, Violence as Communication: Insurgent Terrorism and the Western News Media (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage 1982).
6. Robert Kupperman, Facing Tomorrow's Terrorist Incident Today (Washington, DC: US Department of Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration 1977). Cited in Grant Wardlaw, Political Terrorism, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: CUP 1989) p.26.
7. Robert Kupperman, Facing Tomorrow's Terrorist Incident Today (Washington, DC: US Department of Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration 1977). Cited in Grant Wardlaw, Political Terrorism, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: CUP 1989) p.26.
8. This assumption is based on the notion that in political crimes, as opposed to crimes for ego or greed, the perpetrator and the beneficiary are usually not the same person, with more tenuous connections, and the intended long-term gains from the crime are usually abstract. From a law enforcement perspective, this places primacy on the motivations of the act; however, from a military perspective, it is the act itself which merits focus, since it is the act itself which wreaks the damage and poses the threat to national security. This is one of many facets in the argument surrounding the degree to which counterterrorism should be approached from a military vis-à-vis law enforcement perspective.
9. Review of Richard Hundley and Robert Anderson, 'Security in Cyberspace: An Emerging Challenge for Society', from That Wild, Wild Cyberspace Frontier. Internet source: http://www.rand.org/publications/RRR/RRR.fall95.cyber/wild.html, 5 April 1996.
10. Philip Fites, Peter Johnson and Martin Kratz, The Computer Virus Crisis, 2nd ed. (NY: Van Nostrand Reinhold 1992) p.63.
11. London Times, via CNN Web News Digest, 26 March 1996 (http://www.cnn.com).
12. The IRA were specifically targeting the Square Mile of London on a weekend to minimize casualties but maximize damage to a financial center of western Europe.
13. Washington Post (note 4).
14. The best mixture of protection, detection and reaction strategies for the information infrastructure is itself an issue of debate, and is far beyond the scope of this article.
15. Washington Post (note 4).
16. Telephone conversation with Senator Sam Nunn's office, 2 July 1996.