Strategies and doctrines of imperial defence: Britain and India, 1919-45

Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History

Volumn 25, Issue 2, 1997, Pages 240-266

  Barua, Pradeep ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NEBRASKA AT KEARNEY   (United States)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 0031287831     PISSN: 03086534     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/03086539708583000     Document Type: Article

References (126)

1. Michael Howard, The Continental Commitment: The Dilemma for British Defence Policy in the Two World Wars (London, 1972), 100, 120; Brian Bond, British Military Policy Between the Two World Wars (Oxford, 1980), 12, 111, 267-70, 338; Corelli Barnett, The Collapse of British Power (London, 1972), see Ch. IV.
2. Michael Howard, The Continental Commitment: The Dilemma for British Defence Policy in the Two World Wars (London, 1972), 100, 120; Brian Bond, British Military Policy Between the Two World Wars (Oxford, 1980), 12, 111, 267-70, 338; Corelli Barnett, The Collapse of British Power (London, 1972), see Ch. IV.
3. Michael Howard, The Continental Commitment: The Dilemma for British Defence Policy in the Two World Wars (London, 1972), 100, 120; Brian Bond, British Military Policy Between the Two World Wars (Oxford, 1980), 12, 111, 267-70, 338; Corelli Barnett, The Collapse of British Power (London, 1972), see Ch. IV.
4. G.C. Peden 'The Burden of Imperial Defence and the Continental Commitment Reconsidered', Historical Journal, 27, 2 (1984), 405-23.
5. John Gallagher and Anil Seal, 'Britain and India between the Wars', Modern Asian Studies, 15, 3 (1981) 401; Keith Jeffrey, 'Sir Henry Wilson and the Defence of the British Empire, 1918-22', Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 5, 3 (1977), 272-3; A Martin Wainright, Inhiretance of Empire: Britain, India and the Balance of Power in Asia (New York, 1994), 16.
6. John Gallagher and Anil Seal, 'Britain and India between the Wars', Modern Asian Studies, 15, 3 (1981) 401; Keith Jeffrey, 'Sir Henry Wilson and the Defence of the British Empire, 1918-22', Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 5, 3 (1977), 272-3; A Martin Wainright, Inhiretance of Empire: Britain, India and the Balance of Power in Asia (New York, 1994), 16.
7. John Gallagher and Anil Seal, 'Britain and India between the Wars', Modern Asian Studies, 15, 3 (1981) 401; Keith Jeffrey, 'Sir Henry Wilson and the Defence of the British Empire, 1918-22', Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 5, 3 (1977), 272-3; A Martin Wainright, Inhiretance of Empire: Britain, India and the Balance of Power in Asia (New York, 1994), 16.
8. See Howard, Continental Commitment, and Bond, British Military Policy.
9. Stephen P. Cohen, The Indian Army: Its Contribution to the Development of a Nation (Delhi, 1990), 138-9.
10. Report of the Commissioners appointed to inquire into the organization of the Indian Army [Peel Commission], Parl. Papers (1859), 2515. V.
11. Military despatch to India No. 213, 3 Aug. 1876, quoted in K.M.L. Saxena, The Military System of India 1850-1900 (New Delhi 1974), 1823.
12. Brian Bond, 'The Effect of the Cardwell Reforms', RUSI Journal, (Nov. 1960), 229-36; also idem, 'Cardwell's Army Reforms', Army, (April 1962), 108-17.
13. Brian Bond, 'The Effect of the Cardwell Reforms', RUSI Journal, (Nov. 1960), 229-36; also idem, 'Cardwell's Army Reforms', Army, (April 1962), 108-17.
14. Major B.C. Denning, The Future of the British Army (London, 1928), 60-1.
15. See Bond, British Military Policy, Robin Higham, The Military Intellectuals in Britain, 1918-1939 (New Brunswick, NJ, 1966); Robert H. Larson, The British Army and the Theory of Armoured Warfare (Newark, NJ, 1984); Brian Holden Reid, Fuller: Military Thinker (New York, 1987); Major General J.F.C. Fuller, The Army in My Time (London, 1935); Basil Liddell Hart, The Defence of Britain (London, 1939).
16. See Bond, British Military Policy, Robin Higham, The Military Intellectuals in Britain, 1918-1939 (New Brunswick, NJ, 1966); Robert H. Larson, The British Army and the Theory of Armoured Warfare (Newark, NJ, 1984); Brian Holden Reid, Fuller: Military Thinker (New York, 1987); Major General J.F.C. Fuller, The Army in My Time (London, 1935); Basil Liddell Hart, The Defence of Britain (London, 1939).
17. See Bond, British Military Policy, Robin Higham, The Military Intellectuals in Britain, 1918-1939 (New Brunswick, NJ, 1966); Robert H. Larson, The British Army and the Theory of Armoured Warfare (Newark, NJ, 1984); Brian Holden Reid, Fuller: Military Thinker (New York, 1987); Major General J.F.C. Fuller, The Army in My Time (London, 1935); Basil Liddell Hart, The Defence of Britain (London, 1939).
18. See Bond, British Military Policy, Robin Higham, The Military Intellectuals in Britain, 1918-1939 (New Brunswick, NJ, 1966); Robert H. Larson, The British Army and the Theory of Armoured Warfare (Newark, NJ, 1984); Brian Holden Reid, Fuller: Military Thinker (New York, 1987); Major General J.F.C. Fuller, The Army in My Time (London, 1935); Basil Liddell Hart, The Defence of Britain (London, 1939).
19. See Bond, British Military Policy, Robin Higham, The Military Intellectuals in Britain, 1918-1939 (New Brunswick, NJ, 1966); Robert H. Larson, The British Army and the Theory of Armoured Warfare (Newark, NJ, 1984); Brian Holden Reid, Fuller: Military Thinker (New York, 1987); Major General J.F.C. Fuller, The Army in My Time (London, 1935); Basil Liddell Hart, The Defence of Britain (London, 1939).
20. See Bond, British Military Policy, Robin Higham, The Military Intellectuals in Britain, 1918-1939 (New Brunswick, NJ, 1966); Robert H. Larson, The British Army and the Theory of Armoured Warfare (Newark, NJ, 1984); Brian Holden Reid, Fuller: Military Thinker (New York, 1987); Major General J.F.C. Fuller, The Army in My Time (London, 1935); Basil Liddell Hart, The Defence of Britain (London, 1939).
21. 'During most of the British rule strategic decisions were jointly made by India and Whitehall. The Indian Army had considerable autonomy in minor matters, but important decisions were made with the concurrence of the Viceroy and often referred to London for further consideration by the British government and the senior military [British] leadership.' Cohen, Indian Army, 1701.
22. For the purposes of this paper, I will be viewing the British forces in India and the Indian army as one operational entity operating under the command of the Indian general staff.
23. Report of the Army in India Committee, 1919-20, [Esher Committee], British Library/India Office Records (henceforth BL/IOR) L/MIL/5/1762, pt IV, 7.
24. Legislative Assembly Debates, I, 15, 1683-762, in BL/IOR, L/MIL/7/108222.
25. Chelmsford to Montagu, 12 Feb. 1919, Montagu Collection, BL/IOR, MSS.D.523, Vol.8, 26.
26. Rawlinson to Derby, 30 March 1921, Derby Collection, BL/IOR, MSS.D.605/5.
27. Take, for example, a private letter to Sir Alexander Cobbe, from C-in-C Sir Philip Chetwode, in which he noted 'a lot of nonsense was talked using the official majority at all'. Extract from personal and private letter from Chetwode to Cobbe, Simla, 21 Aug. 1931, BL/IOR, L/MIL/5/885, 97.
28. Report of the Indian Retrenchment Committee, 1922-23, (London: HMSO, 1923), in BL/IOR, L/MIL/17/5/1780.
29. Report of the Indian Military Requirements Sub-Committee, 22 June 1922, Public Record Office (PRO), CAB 16/38, Vol.1, paper 130-D.
30. Tribunal on certain questions in regard to defence expenditure in dispute the government of India and the War Office and the Air Ministry, [Garran Tribunal], India Office, Nov. 1932, BL/IOR, L/MIL/17/5/1911. 21. Quoted in Bond, British Military Policy, 112.
31. Pownall was the director general of ordnance and intelligence.
32. The Defence Problems of India and the Composition and Organization of the Army and the RAF in India, [Pownall Committee], 12 May 1938, BL/IOR, L/MIL/5/886, 331.
33. Ibid., 393-5. At the same time the Pownall Committee was making its report, an unofficial Indian army committee led by the DCGS (India) Major General Auchinleck was reaching much the same conclusion and urging the government of India to set up local munition and weapon manufacturing facilities to modernize the army. See Report of the Modernization Committee, Simla, Army HQ, Oct. 1938, [Auchinleck Committee], BL/IOR, L/MIL/17/5/1801.
34. Ibid., 393-5. At the same time the Pownall Committee was making its report, an unofficial Indian army committee led by the DCGS (India) Major General Auchinleck was reaching much the same conclusion and urging the government of India to set up local munition and weapon manufacturing facilities to modernize the army. See Report of the Modernization Committee, Simla, Army HQ, Oct. 1938, [Auchinleck Committee], BL/IOR, L/MIL/17/5/1801.
35. Report of the Expert Committee on the Defence of India, 1938-39, [Chatfield Committee], BL/IOR, L/MIL/5/886, 451, 459, 463, 477-8.
36. Defence Requirements 1938-39, Chatfield Committee, Notes on the Report by Generals Muspratt and Auchinleck, BL/IOR, WS 1934 - L/WS/1/155, 15.
37. One British cavalry regiment and six British infantry battalions to return to England, three Indian cavalry regiments, four companies of Indian Sappers and Miners, and fourteen Indian infantry battalions to be disbanded.
38. Notes on Report by Generals Muspratt and Auchinleck, BL/IOR, WS 1934 -L/WS/1/155, 7.
39. Plan for Modernization of the Army, 1939 (operations), General Staff India, BL/IOR, WS 2099 - L/WS/1/170.
40. Liddell Hart, Defence of Britain, 305-6; See also idem Memoirs (London, 1959), 917.
41. Liddell Hart, Defence of Britain, 305-6; See also idem Memoirs (London, 1959), 917.
42. This was after his 1927 tour of India. See J.F.C. Fuller, On Future War (London, 1928), 262.
43. Harold R. Winton, To Change on Army: General Sir John Burnett-Stuart and British Armored Doctrine, 1927-1938 (Lawrence, Kansas, 1988), 124; see also Captain J. Keith Edwards, 'Second (Military) Prize Winning Essay for 1927', Journal RUSI, 73 (Aug. 1928), 458-73.
44. Harold R. Winton, To Change on Army: General Sir John Burnett-Stuart and British Armored Doctrine, 1927-1938 (Lawrence, Kansas, 1988), 124; see also Captain J. Keith Edwards, 'Second (Military) Prize Winning Essay for 1927', Journal RUSI, 73 (Aug. 1928), 458-73.
45. Future Military Expenditure, Aug. 1921, CAB 27, 27/164 GRC (DD) 8.
46. Rawlinson to Derby, 25 Nov. 1920, BL/IOR, MSS.D.605/1.
47. Secretary of State to Viceroy, 18 Jan. 1921, Chelmsford Collection, BL/IOR, MSS.E.264, Vol.14, 50.
48. Viceroy to Secretary of State, 22 Jan. 1921, ibid., 33.
49. Monthly Returns, distribution of the army, PRO, WO 73/115.
50. Secretary of State for War to Prime Minister, 1 Nov. 1937, quoted in R.J. Minney, The Private Papers of Hore-Belisha (London, 1960), 66.
51. Ibid.
52. On 1 Dec. 1937 he writes to Deverell asking him to step down. The latter concurs with the comment, 'Time will show that your criticisms as far as I am concerned are unjust as they are cruel.' Ibid., 69, 72.
53. Hore-Belisha called for 'the new army to be made more flexible'. Among other things he proposed the reduction of the personnel by creating a greater number of 'smaller' divisions which would be easier to move and support. Ibid., 92-4.
54. Ad-hoc Sub-committees of the Committee for Imperial Defence, CAB 16/38, Vol.II, IMR/14.
55. Viceroy (Army Dept) to Secretary of State, 21 July 1921, BL/IOR, L/MIL/3/2513, 1631.
56. Since November 1921 a CID sub-committee had been examining the Rawlinson proposals at a leisurely pace. 'The Proceedings of the Indian Military Requirements Sub-Committee', CAB 16/38, Vol.I. In explaining the British cabinet's rejection of the proposal, the secretary of state for India, Montagu, stated that the cabinet felt that further reduction of the British troops in India was not possible in view of the political condition in India and on the frontier. Secretary of State to Viceroy, 14 Feb. 1922, BL/IOR, L/MIL/3/2534 M.1348/1922, No. 1.
57. Sir Frederick Maurice, The Life of General Lord Rawlinson of Trent (London, 1928), 313.
58. Ibid., 109.
59. Keith Jeffery, The British Army and the Crisis of Empire 1918-1922 (Manchester, 1984), 88.
60. Cabinet meeting, 25 Aug. 1921, CAB 23/26/72(21).
61. The actual withdrawal began in December 1922. CAB 23/32/68(22), appdx II.
62. Bond, British Military Policy, 106.
63. Examination for the Admission to the Staff Colleges at Camberley and Quetta, 1936, 1937 (Feb.-March), War Office, London, HMSO, BL/IOR, L/MIL/17/5/2281, 2-4.
64. Bond, British Military Policy, 106.
65. Winton, To Change an Army, 65.
66. Although mopping-up operations continued until the second half of 1922, the back of the rebellion had been broken by November 1921, thanks to Burnett-Stuart's mobile columns. A.C.B. Mackinnon, 'The Moplah Rebellion 1921-1922', Army Quarterly, VIII (1924), 260-77. In 1926 Burnett-Stuart became commander of the 3rd Armoured Force from 1927 onwards. Bond, British Military Policy, 62, 65.
67. Although mopping-up operations continued until the second half of 1922, the back of the rebellion had been broken by November 1921, thanks to Burnett-Stuart's mobile columns. A.C.B. Mackinnon, 'The Moplah Rebellion 1921-1922', Army Quarterly, VIII (1924), 260-77. In 1926 Burnett-Stuart became commander of the 3rd Armoured Force from 1927 onwards. Bond, British Military Policy, 62, 65.
68. While at Quetta Montgomery met Auchinleck and Alexander who both were then brigade commanders. He is reported to have remarked that 'the best man, was a chap called Auchinleck'. Auchinleck had also served as chief instructor at Quotta from 1930-32 and was three years older than Montgomery. Nigery Hamilton, Monty: the Making of a General (1887-1942) (New York, 1981), 248-9, 258.
69. One of the exceptions was General Percy Hobart ('Hobo') the first commander of the permanent tank brigade (1933) who also serve as instructor at Quetta where he developed many of his radical and uncompromising views of armoured warfare. Kenneth Macksey, Armored Crusader: Major General Percy Hobart (London, 1967), 82-3.
70. Winton, To Change an Army, 85.
71. Ibid., 33-4.
72. Bond, British Military Policy, 67-8.
73. Ibid., 67.
74. A.P. Wavell, 'The Army and the Prophets', RUSI Journal, 75 (Nov. 1930), 671.
75. Wavell also served as commander of the 2nd Aldershot Division in 1935-37.
76. Recent research seems to indicate that senior commanders of the British home army,] including Haig, who were often bitterly criticized by the reformers ([see the case of Deverell above), were enthusiastic supporters of machanization. However, like their counterparts in India, they too had a more realistic appreciation of the rate and quality of mechanization possible under the current financial and technological restrictions. See J.P. Harris, Men, Ideas and Tanks: British Military Theory and Armoured Forces, 1903-1939 (Manchester, 1996).
77. C.G.S Army HQ to all commands, 13 Dec. 1938, BL/IOR, WS 2047 - L/WS/1/164, 94.
78. Ibid., 95.
79. Ibid., Letter from Army HQ to Southern Command, 15 July 1939, 56.
80. Ibid., C.G.S. Army HQ to all commands, 96-7.
81. Bond, British Military Policy, 123-4.
82. Gazette of India, 3 Sept. 1939.
83. The famous 'Red Eagles'.
84. Major P.C. Bharucha, 'The North African Campaign 1949-1943', in Bisheswar Prasad (ed.), Official History of the Indian Armed Forces in the Second World War 1939-1945 (New Delhi, 1956) 91-3; also Lt. Col. G.R. Stevens, Fourth Indian Division (Toronto, n.d.), 16.
85. Major P.C. Bharucha, 'The North African Campaign 1949-1943', in Bisheswar Prasad (ed.), Official History of the Indian Armed Forces in the Second World War 1939-1945 (New Delhi, 1956) 91-3; also Lt. Col. G.R. Stevens, Fourth Indian Division (Toronto, n.d.), 16.
86. The HQ of the Deccan district which had proceeded to Egypt to form HQ 4th Indian Division, was reconstituted, and these newbrigades, plus Poona Horse, were formed into the 5th Indian Divisision. India's part in the War 1940, General Staff India, Government of India Press, Simla, 1940, BL/IOR, L/MIL/5/4261, 5.
87. Individual battalion attacks like those by 4/16th Rajputana Rifles during the first battle of Keren received the support of the entire divisional artillery - 44 25pdrs, 8 6in howitzers, and 4 3.7 howitzers, Bisheshwar Prasad (ed.), Official History of the Indian Armed Forces in the Second World War: East African Campaign 1940-1941 (New Delhi, 1963), 68, 121.
88. Stevens, Fourth Indian Division, 46.
89. An Indian Army circular issued in 1942 acknowledged that minefields and German 88mm high-velocity anti-tank guns posed a serious obstacle to tank/infantry cooperation. War Information Circular No. 26A, General Staff, New Delhi, Government of India Press, 1942, BL/IOR, L/MIL/17/5/4265.
90. Brigadier R.G.S. Bidwell, 'The development of British Field Artillery Tactics 1940-1942', Journal of Royal Artillery, XCIV, 2, (Sept. 1967), 92.
91. I.S.O. Playfair, The Mediterranean and the Middle East, 1, 103; J.A.I. Agar-Hamilton, The Sidi Rezegh Battles (Cape Town, South Africa, 1957), Apdx 1, 474-5.
92. I.S.O. Playfair, The Mediterranean and the Middle East, 1, 103; J.A.I. Agar-Hamilton, The Sidi Rezegh Battles (Cape Town, South Africa, 1957), Apdx 1, 474-5.
93. These proposals were accepted by the War Office and a circular was sent to all commands specifying the following composition for armoured and infantry divisions: Infantry Division - 2 infantry brigades, 1 tank brigade, plus supporting arms (tank brigade later replaced by infantry brigade); Armoured Division - 1 armoured brigade, 1 lorried infantry brigade, plus supporting arms. WO letter to various commands and theatres, 20 May 1942, BL/IOR, WS 12048 - L/WS/616, 264.
94. Proposals from C-in-C Middle East - extensive reorganization of armoured division in that theatre, BL/IOR, WS 6385 - L/WS/1/448, 281. Auchinleck also proposed to give brigades more supporting arms to make them a self-sufficient tactical unit - the so-called 'Brigade Group' - capable of fighting independent of a division. This proposal was in part influenced by similar independent formations frequently utilized by the Afrika Korps. I.S.O. Playfair, The Mediterranean and the Middle East, III, 213-5, 254, 286-7. This proposal however was not so well received. The secretary to the India Office, Military Department, felt that independent brigade groups would not be an economic use of force, and that if supporting arms were permanently decentralized to brigade groups, they would be difficult to withdraw. Major General R.M.M. Lockhart to General S.W. Kirby, GHQ New Delhi, 9 April 1942, BL/IOR, WS 6385 - L/WS/448, 218-9.
95. Connell, Auchinleck, 684.
96. The Rommel Papers, B.H. Lidell Hart (ed.), translated by Paul Findlay, (New York, 1953), 248.
97. Agenda and Minutes of Commanders Conference, Meeting at GHQ BTE, 15 July 1942, WO 201/2050.
98. Indeed, with the possible exception of the United States Army, none of the combatants in the Second World War had the necessary resources to conduct large-scale mechanized operations.
99. There is a considerable debate among 'pro-Auchinleck' and 'pro-Montgomery' historians about which of these commanders played a pivotal role in determining the emergence of a 'winning' British tactical doctrine for the rest of the war. Recent work reveals that both sides are beginning to take compromise positions, which would seem to suggest that British military doctrine in North Africa was an evolutionary process, with both Auchinleck and Montgomery making important contributions. However, even Michael Carver, a 'pro-Monty' writer (and former 8th Army officer), has acknowledged that, unlike Montgomery, Auchinleck was never given the luxury of time to prepare adequately for battle. Michael Carver, Dilemmas of the Desert War: A New Look at the Libyan Campaign, 1940-1942 (Bloomington, 1986), 132, 145.
100. Carver notes that when Montgomery arrived in Egypt, he had an unduly optimistic plan so far as the role of the armour was concerned. He subsequently changed his plans to a less ambitious one and his pursuit of the Germans was therefore 'over-insured'. Ibid., 138-9.
101. Stevens, Fourth Indian Division, 191.
102. Bidwell, 'The Development of British Field Artillery Tactics 1940-42', 90.
103. Stevens, Fourth Indian Division, 191.
104. Tuker, Approach to Battle, 153.
105. J.B.A. Bailey, Field Artillery and Firepower (Oxford, 1989), 185-6, fn.44. The 8th Army's artillery tactics themselves represent a return in part to the fire-support system evolved towards the end of the First World War. The main difference during the Second World War was that the rapid evolution of air-power meant that air-reconnaissance enabled accurate and less wasteful shoots to be carried out. Air-power also took on the role of deep-strike interdiction and strategic bombing allowing the artillery to concentrate on the close battle. See ibid., 184.
106. J.B.A. Bailey, Field Artillery and Firepower (Oxford, 1989), 185-6, fn.44. The 8th Army's artillery tactics themselves represent a return in part to the fire-support system evolved towards the end of the First World War. The main difference during the Second World War was that the rapid evolution of air-power meant that air-reconnaissance enabled accurate and less wasteful shoots to be carried out. Air-power also took on the role of deep-strike interdiction and strategic bombing allowing the artillery to concentrate on the close battle. See ibid., 184.
107. Tuker, Approach to Battle, 224.
108. Ibid., 361-4.
109. John A. English, A Perspective on Infantry (New York, 1981), 175.
110. Alphonse Juin, Mémoires (Paris, 1959), 232.
111. The Indian Army had considerable difficulty in trying to prise its divisions away from the Italian theatre. In a letter to the Allied HQ in Algiers, the C-in-C's office in New Delhi pointed out that the Indian government had never contracted 'to keep three or any other number of Indian divisions in the Mediterranean theatre - the fact that five Indian divisions are there is purely fortuitous'. Telegram C-in-C India to WO and Armed Forces HQ Algiers, 13 June 1944, BL/IOR, Was 5725 - L/WS/1/431, 3-4. The 4th Indian Division never arrived in Burma, since it was transferred to Greece in September 1944 to try to check the budding civil war.
112. See annexure 9, Report to the Combined Chiefs of Staff: by the Supreme Commander South East Asia 1943-1945, Vice-Admiral The Earl Mountbatten of Burma (London, 1951) 265-72.
113. Viscount Slim, Defeat into Victory (New York, 1961), 116-17.
114. Prasad, Reconquest of Burma, II, 48.
115. A.L. Pemberton, The Development of Artillery Tactics and Equipment (London, 1950), 308-9.
116. FO's were then called VCP or Visual Command Posts. Ibid., 341, fn.67.
117. Brigadier Michael Calvert, 'Victory in Burma', in E. Bauer (ed.), The History of World War II (London, 1979), 631.
118. Including the Dominions.
119. A very conservative 'official' estimate.
120. All data from India and the War 1939-45: The Facts, Information Department, India Office, 1 Jan. 1946, L/MIL/17/5/4263.
121. Ibid.
122. T.W.X. Wallbank, A Short History of India and Pakistan (New York, 1958), 208, 215-15, 219.
123. Anita Inder Singh, 'Imperial Defence and the Transfer of Power in India, 1946-1947', International History Review, 4, 4 (1982), 568-88; idem, 'Keeping India in the Commonwealth: British Political and Military Aims, 1947-1949', Journal of Contemporary History, 20, 3 (1985), 469-81; idem, 'Post Imperial British Attitudes to India: The Military Aspect, 1947-1951', Round Table, 296 (1985), 360-75; Ayesha Jalal, 'India's Partition and the Defence of Pakistan: A Historical Perspective', Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 15, 3 (1987), 290-310.
124. Anita Inder Singh, 'Imperial Defence and the Transfer of Power in India, 1946-1947', International History Review, 4, 4 (1982), 568-88; idem, 'Keeping India in the Commonwealth: British Political and Military Aims, 1947-1949', Journal of Contemporary History, 20, 3 (1985), 469-81; idem, 'Post Imperial British Attitudes to India: The Military Aspect, 1947-1951', Round Table, 296 (1985), 360-75; Ayesha Jalal, 'India's Partition and the Defence of Pakistan: A Historical Perspective', Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 15, 3 (1987), 290-310.
125. Anita Inder Singh, 'Imperial Defence and the Transfer of Power in India, 1946-1947', International History Review, 4, 4 (1982), 568-88; idem, 'Keeping India in the Commonwealth: British Political and Military Aims, 1947-1949', Journal of Contemporary History, 20, 3 (1985), 469-81; idem, 'Post Imperial British Attitudes to India: The Military Aspect, 1947-1951', Round Table, 296 (1985), 360-75; Ayesha Jalal, 'India's Partition and the Defence of Pakistan: A Historical Perspective', Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 15, 3 (1987), 290-310.
126. Anita Inder Singh, 'Imperial Defence and the Transfer of Power in India, 1946-1947', International History Review, 4, 4 (1982), 568-88; idem, 'Keeping India in the Commonwealth: British Political and Military Aims, 1947-1949', Journal of Contemporary History, 20, 3 (1985), 469-81; idem, 'Post Imperial British Attitudes to India: The Military Aspect, 1947-1951', Round Table, 296 (1985), 360-75; Ayesha Jalal, 'India's Partition and the Defence of Pakistan: A Historical Perspective', Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 15, 3 (1987), 290-310.