At odds with themselves: David Hume's skeptical citizens

Polity

Volumn 29, Issue 3, 1997, Pages 323-342

  Chabot, Dana ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0031286631     PISSN: 00323497     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/3235310     Document Type: Article

References (57)

1. 1. Salman Rushdie, East, West (London: Jonathan Cape, 1994), p. 209.
2. 2. Leanita McClain, A Foot in Each World, ed. Clarence Page (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1986), p. 14.
3. 3. Jennifer Hochschild, "Disjunction and Ambivalence in Citizens' Political Outlooks," in Reconsidering the Democratic Public, ed. George Marcus and Russell Hanson (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1993), p. 206.
4. 4. John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), pp. 224, 225. Rawls qualifies this later when he says that in some cases "reasons given explicitly in terms of comprehensive doctrines" may be permitted in discussions involving "funda" mental political matters," and he acknowledges that "the limits imposed by public reason" do not apply in cases where nonfundamental questions are in dispute (pp. 214, 247). I take the term "bracketing" from Michael Sandel's review of Political Liberalism in the Harvard Law Review (1994): 1765-94.
5. 4. John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), pp. 224, 225. Rawls qualifies this later when he says that in some cases "reasons given explicitly in terms of comprehensive doctrines" may be permitted in discussions involving "funda" mental political matters," and he acknowledges that "the limits imposed by public reason" do not apply in cases where nonfundamental questions are in dispute (pp. 214, 247). I take the term "bracketing" from Michael Sandel's review of Political Liberalism in the Harvard Law Review (1994): 1765-94.
6. 5. Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 31.
7. 6. Michael Walzer, Liberalism and the Art of Separation," Political Theory, 12 (1984): 325.
8. 7. Amy Gutmann, "Undemocratic Education," Liberalism and the Moral Life, ed. Nancy Rosenblum (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989), p. 77.
9. 8. Stephen Macedo, Liberal Virtues (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), pp. 53, 54.
10. 9. These do not exhaust the possibilities. Bonnie Honig argues that civic strain should be turned against the social structure that produces it ["Difference, Dilemmas, and the Politics of Home," Social Research, 61 (1994): 563-97]. Brian Walker argues that the experience of civic strain calls for a revised, postmodern conception of toleration ["John Rawls, Mikhail Bakhtin, and the Praxis of Toleration," Political Theory, 23 (1995): 101-27].
11. 9. These do not exhaust the possibilities. Bonnie Honig argues that civic strain should be turned against the social structure that produces it ["Difference, Dilemmas, and the Politics of Home," Social Research, 61 (1994): 563-97]. Brian Walker argues that the experience of civic strain calls for a revised, postmodern conception of toleration ["John Rawls, Mikhail Bakhtin, and the Praxis of Toleration," Political Theory, 23 (1995): 101-27].
12. 10. Donald Livingston, Hume's Philosophy of Common Life (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), p. 310, links Hume's skepticism with political conservatism. For a similar view see David Miller, Philosophy and Ideology in Hume's Political Thought (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), p. 191, and Sheldon Wolin, "Hume and Conservatism," in Hume: A Re-Evaluation, ed. Donald Livingston and James King (New York: Fordham University Press, 1976), pp. 239-56. Duncan Forbes, Hume's Philosophical Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975) and David Wootton, "David Hume, 'The Historian,'" in The Cambridge Companion to Hume, ed. David Norton (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 281-312, argue that Hume was both a defender of the post-1688 Whig establishment and an internal (or skeptical) critic of its intellectual foundations.
13. 10. Donald Livingston, Hume's Philosophy of Common Life (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), p. 310, links Hume's skepticism with political conservatism. For a similar view see David Miller, Philosophy and Ideology in Hume's Political Thought (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), p. 191, and Sheldon Wolin, "Hume and Conservatism," in Hume: A Re-Evaluation, ed. Donald Livingston and James King (New York: Fordham University Press, 1976), pp. 239-56. Duncan Forbes, Hume's Philosophical Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975) and David Wootton, "David Hume, 'The Historian,'" in The Cambridge Companion to Hume, ed. David Norton (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 281-312, argue that Hume was both a defender of the post-1688 Whig establishment and an internal (or skeptical) critic of its intellectual foundations.
14. 10. Donald Livingston, Hume's Philosophy of Common Life (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), p. 310, links Hume's skepticism with political conservatism. For a similar view see David Miller, Philosophy and Ideology in Hume's Political Thought (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), p. 191, and Sheldon Wolin, "Hume and Conservatism," in Hume: A Re-Evaluation, ed. Donald Livingston and James King (New York: Fordham University Press, 1976), pp. 239-56. Duncan Forbes, Hume's Philosophical Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975) and David Wootton, "David Hume, 'The Historian,'" in The Cambridge Companion to Hume, ed. David Norton (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 281-312, argue that Hume was both a defender of the post-1688 Whig establishment and an internal (or skeptical) critic of its intellectual foundations.
15. 10. Donald Livingston, Hume's Philosophy of Common Life (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), p. 310, links Hume's skepticism with political conservatism. For a similar view see David Miller, Philosophy and Ideology in Hume's Political Thought (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), p. 191, and Sheldon Wolin, "Hume and Conservatism," in Hume: A Re-Evaluation, ed. Donald Livingston and James King (New York: Fordham University Press, 1976), pp. 239-56. Duncan Forbes, Hume's Philosophical Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975) and David Wootton, "David Hume, 'The Historian,'" in The Cambridge Companion to Hume, ed. David Norton (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 281-312, argue that Hume was both a defender of the post-1688 Whig establishment and an internal (or skeptical) critic of its intellectual foundations.
16. 10. Donald Livingston, Hume's Philosophy of Common Life (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), p. 310, links Hume's skepticism with political conservatism. For a similar view see David Miller, Philosophy and Ideology in Hume's Political Thought (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), p. 191, and Sheldon Wolin, "Hume and Conservatism," in Hume: A Re-Evaluation, ed. Donald Livingston and James King (New York: Fordham University Press, 1976), pp. 239-56. Duncan Forbes, Hume's Philosophical Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975) and David Wootton, "David Hume, 'The Historian,'" in The Cambridge Companion to Hume, ed. David Norton (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 281-312, argue that Hume was both a defender of the post-1688 Whig establishment and an internal (or skeptical) critic of its intellectual foundations.
17. 11. David Norton, David Hume: Common-Sense Moralist, Sceptical Metaphysician (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982), p. 43. Norton has accepted Norman Kemp Smith's identification of Hume as a nonskeptical moralist (The Philosophy of David Hume [London: MacMillan, 1960], p. 155) but quarrels with Smith's characterization of him as a naturalist. Alasdair MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988), p. 293; Annette Baier, A Progress of Sentiments: Reflections on Hume's Treatise (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991), p. 285; and John Stewart, Opinion and Reform in Hume's Political Philosophy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), p. 194, also deny that skepticism was a major factor in Hume's moral theory.
18. 11. David Norton, David Hume: Common-Sense Moralist, Sceptical Metaphysician (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982), p. 43. Norton has accepted Norman Kemp Smith's identification of Hume as a nonskeptical moralist (The Philosophy of David Hume [London: MacMillan, 1960], p. 155) but quarrels with Smith's characterization of him as a naturalist. Alasdair MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988), p. 293; Annette Baier, A Progress of Sentiments: Reflections on Hume's Treatise (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991), p. 285; and John Stewart, Opinion and Reform in Hume's Political Philosophy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), p. 194, also deny that skepticism was a major factor in Hume's moral theory.
19. 11. David Norton, David Hume: Common-Sense Moralist, Sceptical Metaphysician (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982), p. 43. Norton has accepted Norman Kemp Smith's identification of Hume as a nonskeptical moralist (The Philosophy of David Hume [London: MacMillan, 1960], p. 155) but quarrels with Smith's characterization of him as a naturalist. Alasdair MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988), p. 293; Annette Baier, A Progress of Sentiments: Reflections on Hume's Treatise (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991), p. 285; and John Stewart, Opinion and Reform in Hume's Political Philosophy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), p. 194, also deny that skepticism was a major factor in Hume's moral theory.
20. 11. David Norton, David Hume: Common-Sense Moralist, Sceptical Metaphysician (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982), p. 43. Norton has accepted Norman Kemp Smith's identification of Hume as a nonskeptical moralist (The Philosophy of David Hume [London: MacMillan, 1960], p. 155) but quarrels with Smith's characterization of him as a naturalist. Alasdair MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988), p. 293; Annette Baier, A Progress of Sentiments: Reflections on Hume's Treatise (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991), p. 285; and John Stewart, Opinion and Reform in Hume's Political Philosophy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), p. 194, also deny that skepticism was a major factor in Hume's moral theory.
21. 11. David Norton, David Hume: Common-Sense Moralist, Sceptical Metaphysician (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982), p. 43. Norton has accepted Norman Kemp Smith's identification of Hume as a nonskeptical moralist (The Philosophy of David Hume [London: MacMillan, 1960], p. 155) but quarrels with Smith's characterization of him as a naturalist. Alasdair MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988), p. 293; Annette Baier, A Progress of Sentiments: Reflections on Hume's Treatise (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991), p. 285; and John Stewart, Opinion and Reform in Hume's Political Philosophy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), p. 194, also deny that skepticism was a major factor in Hume's moral theory.
22. 12. Hume, Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, ed. P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), p. 24, hereafter cited as EM. Hume's other major works will be cited as follows: (E) Essays Moral, Political, and Literary, ed. Eugene Miller (Indianapolis: Liberty Press, 1985); (EU) Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, ed. P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975); (H) History of England, 6 volumes (Indianapolis: Liberty Press, 1983); (T) Treatise of Human Nature, ed. P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978).
23. 12. Hume, Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, ed. P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), p. 24, hereafter cited as EM. Hume's other major works will be cited as follows: (E) Essays Moral, Political, and Literary, ed. Eugene Miller (Indianapolis: Liberty Press, 1985); (EU) Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, ed. P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975); (H) History of England, 6 volumes (Indianapolis: Liberty Press, 1983); (T) Treatise of Human Nature, ed. P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978).
24. 12. Hume, Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, ed. P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), p. 24, hereafter cited as EM. Hume's other major works will be cited as follows: (E) Essays Moral, Political, and Literary, ed. Eugene Miller (Indianapolis: Liberty Press, 1985); (EU) Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, ed. P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975); (H) History of England, 6 volumes (Indianapolis: Liberty Press, 1983); (T) Treatise of Human Nature, ed. P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978).
25. 12. Hume, Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, ed. P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), p. 24, hereafter cited as EM. Hume's other major works will be cited as follows: (E) Essays Moral, Political, and Literary, ed. Eugene Miller (Indianapolis: Liberty Press, 1985); (EU) Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, ed. P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975); (H) History of England, 6 volumes (Indianapolis: Liberty Press, 1983); (T) Treatise of Human Nature, ed. P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978).
26. 12. Hume, Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, ed. P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), p. 24, hereafter cited as EM. Hume's other major works will be cited as follows: (E) Essays Moral, Political, and Literary, ed. Eugene Miller (Indianapolis: Liberty Press, 1985); (EU) Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, ed. P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975); (H) History of England, 6 volumes (Indianapolis: Liberty Press, 1983); (T) Treatise of Human Nature, ed. P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978).
27. 13. Mandeville, The Fable of the Bees; or Private Vices, Publick Benefits, ed. F. B. Kaye (Indianapolis: Liberty Press, 1988), volume 1:72, 73.
28. 14. Letter to John Stewart (February, 1754), The Letters of David Hume, ed. J. Y. T. Grieg (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1932), volume 1: 186-87.
29. 15. Forbes, Hume's Philosophical Politics, p. 89.
30. 16. Walzer, Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality (New York: Basic Books, 1983), p. 6.
31. 17. See also John Danford, David Hume and the Problem of Reason: Recovering the Human Sciences (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990), p. 161. A somewhat different statement of Hume's pluralism is offered by Albert Hirschman, The Passions and the Interests: Political Arguments for Capitalism Before Its Triumph (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), p. 26.
32. 17. See also John Danford, David Hume and the Problem of Reason: Recovering the Human Sciences (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990), p. 161. A somewhat different statement of Hume's pluralism is offered by Albert Hirschman, The Passions and the Interests: Political Arguments for Capitalism Before Its Triumph (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), p. 26.
33. 18. Baier, A Progress of Sentiments, p. 288.
34. 19. Baier, A Progress of Sentiments, p. 213.
35. 20. Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 8.
36. 21. Walzer, Spheres of Justice, p. 313.
37. 22. Baier, A Progress of Sentiments, p. 277. Nicholas Capaldi, Hume's Place in Moral Philosophy (New York: Peter Lang, 1989), pp. 21-22, makes a similar claim, arguing that Hume rejected the rationalist, or "I Think," model of reason in favor of a more action-oriented, "We Do" model of reason.
38. 22. Baier, A Progress of Sentiments, p. 277. Nicholas Capaldi, Hume's Place in Moral Philosophy (New York: Peter Lang, 1989), pp. 21-22, makes a similar claim, arguing that Hume rejected the rationalist, or "I Think," model of reason in favor of a more action-oriented, "We Do" model of reason.
39. 23. MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, p. 295.
40. 24. Baier, A Progress of Sentiments, p. 221.
41. 25. As James Farr has observed, Hume used sympathy in the Treatise not as a synonym for 'pity,' 'empathy,' or 'fellow-feeling,' but to denote an active principle of communication. "To put it bluntly, our sympathizing with others is something we do or engage in, not something which simply happens to us" ("Hume, Hermeneutics, and History: A 'Sympathetic' Account," History and Theory, 17 [1978]: 296). Note the resemblance between Fair's account of sympathy and Capaldi's discovery of an active "We Do" conception of reason in Hume's moral philosophy, Hume's Place in Moral Philosophy, pp. 195-235.
42. 25. As James Farr has observed, Hume used sympathy in the Treatise not as a synonym for 'pity,' 'empathy,' or 'fellow-feeling,' but to denote an active principle of communication. "To put it bluntly, our sympathizing with others is something we do or engage in, not something which simply happens to us" ("Hume, Hermeneutics, and History: A 'Sympathetic' Account," History and Theory, 17 [1978]: 296). Note the resemblance between Fair's account of sympathy and Capaldi's discovery of an active "We Do" conception of reason in Hume's moral philosophy, Hume's Place in Moral Philosophy, pp. 195-235.
43. 26. "When men act in a faction, they are apt, without shame or remorse, to neglect all the ties of honour and morality, in order to serve their party"; especially, Hume added, when driven by a "determined sense of justice and equity" (E33). See also the discussion of "party-zealots" in That Politics May be Reduced to a Science (E 28) and "party-zeal" in Of the Original Contract (E 466).
44. 26. "When men act in a faction, they are apt, without shame or remorse, to neglect all the ties of honour and morality, in order to serve their party"; especially, Hume added, when driven by a "determined sense of justice and equity" (E33). See also the discussion of "party-zealots" in That Politics May be Reduced to a Science (E 28) and "party-zeal" in Of the Original Contract (E 466).
45. 27. Unlike "artificial" virtues, which are "mere human contrivances for the good of society," natural virtues "have no dependance on the artifice and contrivance of men" (T 574, 577). Justice, promise-keeping, and modesty are examples of the former; benevolence, good humor, and "a due degree of pride" are examples of the latter (T 596).
46. 28. According to Forbes, Hume was trying "to give the established regime, the Revolution Settlement, the Hanoverian succession, the respectable intellectual foundation which, in the 'fashionable [Whig] system' it had not got" (Hume's Philosophical Politics, p. 91).
47. 29. Livingston concedes that Hume's conservatism was not "a mindless disposition to preserve the established regime," but "a doctrine of limits, in particular a doctrine of the limits beyond which philosophical criticism of social and political order cannot go" (Hume's Philosophy of Common Life, p. 308).
48. 30. Forbes, Hume's Philosophical Politics, pp. 224-27. Similarly, J. G. A. Pocock, "Hume and the American Revolution: The Dying Thoughts of a North Briton," Virtue, Commerce, and History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), maintains that Hume disconnected virtue from politics, seeing commerce and refinement in the arts as more critical factors in a modern state's political wellbeing.
49. 30. Forbes, Hume's Philosophical Politics, pp. 224-27. Similarly, J. G. A. Pocock, "Hume and the American Revolution: The Dying Thoughts of a North Briton," Virtue, Commerce, and History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), maintains that Hume disconnected virtue from politics, seeing commerce and refinement in the arts as more critical factors in a modern state's political wellbeing.
50. 31. H 5:572. Contrast Hume's critical character sketches of Becket (H 1:306-334), Laud (H 5:222-229), Cromwell (H 6:95-96, 105-110), and Vane (H 6:180-182) with his laudatory remarks about Lucius Cary (H 5:416-417), Lawrence Hyde (H 6:163-165), William Temple (H 6:219-220), and Thomas Fairfax (H 5:449-450), all of whom managed to come to terms with the tension built into their country's constitution.
51. 32. Livingston, Hume's Philosophy of Common Life, pp. 278, 283.
52. 33. The Washington Post, March 24, 1995, p. A1.
53. 34. Paul Sniderman and Thomas Piazza, The Scar of Race (Cambridge: The Belknap Press, 1993), p. 130.
54. 35. Hochschild, Facing Up to the American Dream: Race, Class, and the Soul of the Nation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), pp. 72-73.
55. 36. Pamela Johnston Conover, Stephen Leonard, and Donald Searing, "Duty Is a Four-Letter Word: Democratic Citizenship in the Liberal Polity," in Reconsidering the Democratic Public, p. 166.
56. 37. J. Donald Moon, "Theory, Citizenship, and Democracy," Reconsidering the Democratic Public, p. 218.
57. 38. Gutmann, "Undemocratic Education," p. 79.