Leadership and credibility in N-Person: Coordination games

Journal of Conflict Resolution

Volumn 41, Issue 6, 1997, Pages 767-791

  Wilson, Rick K ^a   Rhodes, Carl M ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0031286357     PISSN: 00220027     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0022002797041006003     Document Type: Article

References (14)

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