Specialized courts of appeals' review of bureaucratic actions and the politics of protectionism

Political Research Quarterly

Volumn 50, Issue 4, 1997, Pages 851-878

  Unah, Isaac ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0031283720     PISSN: 10659129     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/106591299705000407     Document Type: Article

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