The GATS and new rules for regulators

Telecommunications Policy

Volumn 21, Issue 9-10, 1997, Pages 783-798

  Tuthill, Lee ^a  

^a WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION   (Switzerland)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION; INTERNATIONAL TRADE; MARKETING; PERFORMANCE; SCHEDULING; SECURITY OF DATA; COMPETITION; CONTRACTS; LAWS AND LEGISLATION; TELECOMMUNICATION SERVICES;

REGULATORS; GENERAL AGREEMENT IN TRADES AND SERVICES (GATS);

TELECOMMUNICATION; TELECOMMUNICATION CONTROL;

EID: 0031260771     PISSN: 03085961     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0308-5961(97)00048-7     Document Type: Article

References (64)

1. Local, domestic long distance, or international service.
2. For more details on the results of the WTO negotiations on basic telecommunications and copies of the schedules of commitments made, see the WTO website at http://www.wto.org.
3. The formal entry into force of the basic telecom schedules will be on 1 January 1998. But where commitments on certain services are to be phased in, actual implementation will be on the date specified in the schedule.
4. Berg and Foreman caution against "regulatory micro-management" but emphasize that the regulatory tasks of serving as an umpire of competition rules and protecting consumers are unavoidable. Berg, S V and Foreman, R D 'Incentive regulation and telco performance: a primer' Telecommunications Policy, 1996, 20(9), 651.
5. As an example of how competition can be harnessed to extend service to rural areas, see Wellenius, B, Extending telecommunications service to rural areas - The Chilean experience: Awarding subsidies through competitive bidding. FPD Note series, The World Bank, Washington, DC (1997).
6. See also "Types of regulatory decision" in Cave, M and Crowther, P 'Determining the level of regulation in EU telecommunications: A preliminary assessment' Telecommunications Policy, 1996, 20(10), 728-729.
7. See, for example, Wellenius, B Success factors of telecommunications reform FPD Note series, The World Bank, Washington, DC (1997) in press.
8. However, the Annex permits departures from its core obligations by a developing country, but, for transparency, only if the departure is noted in its schedule.
9. GATS Article XVI.
10. Or, for (a)-(d), any economic needs tests having the same effect as explicit limitations of these types.
11. GATS Article XVII.
12. GATS Article XVIII.
13. GATS Article II.
14. By Colombia, Honduras, Pakistan and Turkey.
15. By Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bangladesh, Brazil, India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Turkey, and the United States.
16. The term "measures of general application" excludes measures that concern, eg a ruling or decision involving an individual supplier.
17. GATS Article III.
18. Annex, Section 4.
19. GATS Article III bis.
20. GATS Article VI, para 2.
21. Such tribunals or procedures are not required where this would be inconsistent with a Member's constitutional structure or the nature of its legal system.
22. GATS Article VI, paras 4 and 5.
23. Reference Paper, para 3.
24. GATS Article VI, para 3.
25. GATS Article VI, para 4.
26. Reference Paper, para 4.
27. GATS Article VII.
28. GATS Article VII, para 5.
29. Reference Paper, para 6.
30. WTO Doc. No. S/GBT/W/3, 3 February 1997.
31. GATS Article VIII.
32. GATS Article XIX.
33. For more details on obligations of the Annex on Telecommunications, see Tuthill, L 'Users Rights: The multilateral rules on access to telecommunications' Telecommunications Policy, 1996, 20(2), 89-99.
34. "Non-discriminatory" refers to MFN and national treatment as defined in the GATS, as well as to sector-specific usage involving "terms and conditions no less favourable than those accorded to any other user of like public telecommunications transport networks or services under like circumstances" (footnote to Annex para 5a).
35. In Annex definitions: "Public telecommunications transport service" means any telecommunications transport service required, explicitly or in effect, to be offered to the public generally and typically involving the real-time transmission of customer-supplied information without any end-to-end change in its form or content. "Public telecommunications transport network" means the public telecommunications infrastructure permitting telecommunications between and among network termination points.
36. Annex, para 5a.
37. At the time, governments who maintained monopolies were wary of obligations that they alone would incur, given concern that dominant operators in a competitive regime might also engage in unfair practices restricting access and use.
38. Annex, para 5(f).
39. Holmes et al warn that without agreement on competition safeguards in the WTO negotiations, the industry would have faced the uncertain prospect of unilateral safeguards and further trade conflicts in Holmes, P, Kempton, J and McGowan, F 'International competition policy and telecommunications: Lessons from the EU and prospects for the WTO' Telecommunications Policy, 1996, 20(10), 766-767.
40. In Reference Paper definitions: A "major supplier" is one which has the ability to materially affect the terms of participation (having regard to price and supply) in the relevant market for basic telecommunications services as a result of: (a) control over essential facilities; or (b) use of its position in the market. "Essential facilities" mean facilities of a public telecommunications transport network or service that: (a) are exclusively or predominantly provided by a single or limited number of suppliers; and (b) cannot feasibly be economically or technically substituted to provide a service.
41. Reference Paper, para 1.1.
42. Reference Paper, para 1.2.
43. Reference Paper, para 2.2.
44. Reference Paper, paras 2.3 and 2.4.
45. Reference Paper, para 2.5.
46. The importance of the possibility for regulator intervention to settle interconnection disputes is stressed in Lasserre, B 'La régulation, la concurrence et la dominance' Communications & Strategies, 1966, 24, 131-132.
47. GATS Article XIV.
48. GATS Article XIV bis.
49. GATS Article V.
50. Such arrangements must have substantial sectoral coverage and provide for the elimination of substantially all national treatment discrimination among the parties at entry into force or on a reasonable time-frame. Also, they must not raise the overall level of barriers to trade with other WTO Members.
51. GATS Article XII.
52. The restrictions must be nondiscriminatory, consistent with IMF rules, avoid unnecessary damage to the commercial, economic and financial interests of other Members, not exceed what is necessary to deal with the circumstances, be temporary and notified and subject to a WTO consultative process.
53. GATS Article X.
54. GATS Article XIX.
55. See Tuthill, L 'Developing countries hook up' South April 1997, 23-24.
56. GATS Article XXI.
57. The sanctions for non-compliance are that if agreed compensatory adjustments to the schedule are not implemented, an affected Member may retaliate by withholding some of its own commitments from the government concerned.
58. Cave and Crowther review considerations and options on allocation of regulatory functions with the introduction of EU telecoms competition in Cave, M and Crowther, P 'Determining the level of regulation in EU telecommunications: A preliminary assessment' Telecommunications Policy, 1996, 20(10), 731-735.
59. See The Role of Information in Telecommunications Regulations OECD General Distribution Document and OECD/ GD(96)106, Paris (1996).
60. See, for example, Dnes, A Post-Privatization Performance - Regulating Telecommunications in the UK: Testing for regulatory capture FDP Note series, The World Bank, Washington, DC (1995).
61. An asset emphasized in op cit Ref 46, 130.
62. OECD Communications Outlook 1997 Vol. 1c OECD, Paris (1997), p. 31.
63. See, for example, What must governments do? In Talero, E and Gaudette P (eds) Harnessing Information for Development: A Proposal for a World Bank Group Strategy. The World Bank (1996) and Fenoulhet, T R "The Regulatory Dynamics of the Information Society" in Dumort, A and Dryden J (eds) The Economics of the Information Society European Communities in arrangement with OECD, Luxembourg, 1997, esp. pp 23-26.
64. See, for example, What must governments do? In Talero, E and Gaudette P (eds) Harnessing Information for Development: A Proposal for a World Bank Group Strategy. The World Bank (1996) and Fenoulhet, T R "The Regulatory Dynamics of the Information Society" in Dumort, A and Dryden J (eds) The Economics of the Information Society European Communities in arrangement with OECD, Luxembourg, 1997, esp. pp 23-26.