Continuity or change? civil-military relations in democratic Argentina, Chile, and Peru

Political Science Quarterly

Volumn 112, Issue 3, 1997, Pages 453-475

  Hunter, Wendy ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0031232335     PISSN: 00323195     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2657566     Document Type: Article

References (85)

1. For an informative overview of how state and military power expanded under Latin America's bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes, see Jorge Dominguez, "Political Change: Central America, South America, and the Caribbean" in Myron Weiner and Samuel P. Huntington, eds., Understanding Political Development (New York: Harper Collins, 1987).
2. Alfred Stepan, Rethinking Military Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988).
3. Examples of the continuity thesis include Stepan, Rethinking; Terry Karl, "Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America," Comparative Politics 23 (October 1990): 1-21; and Francis Hagopian, "Democracy by Undemocratic Means?" Comparative Political Studies 23 (July 1990): 147-70.
4. Examples of the continuity thesis include Stepan, Rethinking; Terry Karl, "Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America," Comparative Politics 23 (October 1990): 1-21; and Francis Hagopian, "Democracy by Undemocratic Means?" Comparative Political Studies 23 (July 1990): 147-70.
5. Examples of the continuity thesis include Stepan, Rethinking; Terry Karl, "Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America," Comparative Politics 23 (October 1990): 1-21; and Francis Hagopian, "Democracy by Undemocratic Means?" Comparative Political Studies 23 (July 1990): 147-70.
6. Wendy Hunter, "Politicians Against Soldiers: Contesting the Military in Post-Authoritarian Brazil," Comparative Politics 27 (July 1995): 425-43; Hunter, Eroding Military Influence in Brazil (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997). On the recent decline of military power in Latin America and other regions, see Samuel P. Huntington, "Reforming Civil-Military Relations," Journal of Democracy 6 (October 1995): 9-17; Paul Sigmund, "Approaches to the Study of the Military in Latin America," Comparative Politics 26 (October 1993): 111-122.
7. Wendy Hunter, "Politicians Against Soldiers: Contesting the Military in Post-Authoritarian Brazil," Comparative Politics 27 (July 1995): 425-43; Hunter, Eroding Military Influence in Brazil (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997). On the recent decline of military power in Latin America and other regions, see Samuel P. Huntington, "Reforming Civil-Military Relations," Journal of Democracy 6 (October 1995): 9-17; Paul Sigmund, "Approaches to the Study of the Military in Latin America," Comparative Politics 26 (October 1993): 111-122.
8. Wendy Hunter, "Politicians Against Soldiers: Contesting the Military in Post-Authoritarian Brazil," Comparative Politics 27 (July 1995): 425-43; Hunter, Eroding Military Influence in Brazil (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997). On the recent decline of military power in Latin America and other regions, see Samuel P. Huntington, "Reforming Civil-Military Relations," Journal of Democracy 6 (October 1995): 9-17; Paul Sigmund, "Approaches to the Study of the Military in Latin America," Comparative Politics 26 (October 1993): 111-122.
9. Wendy Hunter, "Politicians Against Soldiers: Contesting the Military in Post-Authoritarian Brazil," Comparative Politics 27 (July 1995): 425-43; Hunter, Eroding Military Influence in Brazil (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997). On the recent decline of military power in Latin America and other regions, see Samuel P. Huntington, "Reforming Civil-Military Relations," Journal of Democracy 6 (October 1995): 9-17; Paul Sigmund, "Approaches to the Study of the Military in Latin America," Comparative Politics 26 (October 1993): 111-122.
10. Analyses that employ a rational choice framework similar to that used here include Barry Ames, Political Survival (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987); and Barbara Geddes, Politician's Dilemma (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994).
11. Analyses that employ a rational choice framework similar to that used here include Barry Ames, Political Survival (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987); and Barbara Geddes, Politician's Dilemma (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994).
12. See Stepan, Rethinking; Hagopian, "Democracy"; Jörge Zaverucha, Rumor de Sabres (Sāo Paulo: Editora Ática, 1994) ; and Hunter, "Politicians" and Eroding Military Influence.
13. See Stepan, Rethinking; Hagopian, "Democracy"; Jörge Zaverucha, Rumor de Sabres (Sāo Paulo: Editora Ática, 1994) ; and Hunter, "Politicians" and Eroding Military Influence.
14. See Stepan, Rethinking; Hagopian, "Democracy"; Jörge Zaverucha, Rumor de Sabres (Sāo Paulo: Editora Ática, 1994) ; and Hunter, "Politicians" and Eroding Military Influence.
15. See Stepan, Rethinking; Hagopian, "Democracy"; Jörge Zaverucha, Rumor de Sabres (Sāo Paulo: Editora Ática, 1994) ; and Hunter, "Politicians" and Eroding Military Influence.
16. Harry Eckstein, "Case Study and Theory in Political Science" in Fred Greenstein and Nelson Polsby, eds., Handbook of Political Science, vol. 7: Strategies of Inquiry (Reading, MA: AddisonWesley, 1975).
17. My assessment focuses on relative change over time (taking the end of military rule as a baseline), not on the attainment of an ideal model of civil-military relations in a democratic polity or the precedent established in the West.
18. On the Constitution and attempts to reform it, see Mark Ensalaco, "In with the New. Out with the Old?" Journal of Latin American Studies 26 (May 1994): 409-429; and Francisco Geisse and José Antonio Ramíirez Arrayas, La reforma constitutional (Santiago: Centro de Estudios Sociales. 1989).
19. On the Constitution and attempts to reform it, see Mark Ensalaco, "In with the New. Out with the Old?" Journal of Latin American Studies 26 (May 1994): 409-429; and Francisco Geisse and José Antonio Ramíirez Arrayas, La reforma constitutional (Santiago: Centro de Estudios Sociales. 1989).
20. Rodrigo Atria, El Consejo de Seguridad National (Santiago: Programa de Estudios Prospectives. Papeles de Trabajo no. 34, January 1994).
21. Among elected senators, the Concertación enjoyed a 22 to 16 majority. But the designated senators (eight, following the death of one) gave the right-wing opposition a two-seat edge.
22. "Juegos de Guerra," El Mercurio, (Santiago), 4 November 1990; and "Aylwin Impone su Autoridad," Que Posa, 5 November 1990, 12-16.
23. "Juegos de Guerra," El Mercurio, (Santiago), 4 November 1990; and "Aylwin Impone su Autoridad," Que Posa, 5 November 1990, 12-16.
24. "No Part for Army in Anti-Terrorist Unit," Latin American Regional Reports-Southern Cone, 30 May 1991, 6.
25. "Reformas Constitucionales: Pesadilla IV," Revista Hoy (Santiago), 4-10 March 1996, 4-7.
26. "Author interview with Marco Riveros Keller, adviser to the RN party leadership, Santiago, 9 February 1995. See also "Los 'Chascones' de RN," Revista Hoy, 25-31 March 1996, 10-11.
27. "Sospechas Mutuas," Revista Hoy, 1-7 April, 11; "Los Designados del 97," Revista Hoy, 6-12 May 1996, 6-8.
28. "Sospechas Mutuas," Revista Hoy, 1-7 April, 11; "Los Designados del 97," Revista Hoy, 6-12 May 1996, 6-8.
29. See Ensalaco, "In with the New," for details on the rules for selecting the designated senators. "Los Designados del 97," Revista Hoy, 6-12 May 1996, 6-8, suggests that the Concertación might be able to designate as many as six pro-government figures to fill the available posts.
30. See Ensalaco, "In with the New," for details on the rules for selecting the designated senators. "Los Designados del 97," Revista Hoy, 6-12 May 1996, 6-8, suggests that the Concertación might be able to designate as many as six pro-government figures to fill the available posts.
31. See Francisco Rojas, "Chile y el gasto militar," in Rojas, ed., Gasto Militar en América Latina (Santiago: Facultad Latinamericano de Cienciaes Sociales, 1994), 239-277.
32. Ministerio de Planificación y Cooperación of Chile, Avanzando en Equidad (Santiago: Ministerio de Planificación y Cooperación, 1992); Kurt Weyland, ́'Growth with Equity' in Chile's New Democracy?́ Latin American Research Review 32 (Spring 1997): 37-67.
33. Ministerio de Planificación y Cooperación of Chile, Avanzando en Equidad (Santiago: Ministerio de Planificación y Cooperación, 1992); Kurt Weyland, ́'Growth with Equity' in Chile's New Democracy?́ Latin American Research Review 32 (Spring 1997): 37-67.
34. Alejandro Foxley, La Economía Político de la Transición (Santiago: Dolmen, 1993) 7, 17.
35. Chile, Ministerio de Hacienda, Directión de Presuppuestos, Estadísticas de las Finazas Públicas, 1987-1995 (Santiago: Ministerio de Hacienda, 1996), 37.
36. Ibid., 38.
37. Comisión Nacional de Verad y Reconciliación, "Informe de la Comisión Nacional de Verdad y Recociliación," Estudios Públicos 41 (Summer 1991).
38. "Viera-Gallo pide al Gobierno que considere la posición del PS-PPD," Ultimas Noticias, 23 August 1993; "Manifestó la Senadora Laura Soto," El Mercurio, 26 August 1993.
39. "Viera-Gallo pide al Gobierno que considere la posición del PS-PPD," Ultimas Noticias, 23 August 1993; "Manifestó la Senadora Laura Soto," El Mercurio, 26 August 1993.
40. "Advierten Senadores de RN," El Mercurio, 21 August 1993.
41. "No Se Ha Logrado Plena Reconciliatión National,́ El Mercurio, Edición International, 20-26 July 1995.
42. On the military pay hike, see "Gobierno Decide Subir Sueldos de las FF.AA," El Mercuno, Edition International, 21-27 September 1995. On concessions to humans rights, see "Presidente Frei Anunció Medidas de Reconciliación," El Mercurio, Edición International, 17-23 August 1995.
43. On the military pay hike, see "Gobierno Decide Subir Sueldos de las FF.AA," El Mercuno, Edition International, 21-27 September 1995. On concessions to humans rights, see "Presidente Frei Anunció Medidas de Reconciliación," El Mercurio, Edición International, 17-23 August 1995.
44. Public opinion data that reflect society's animosity toward the military include Edgardo Catterberg, Argentina Confronts Politics (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1991) 56, 93; and Rosendo Fraga, La Cuestión Militar en los Noventa (Buenos Aires: Centro de Estudios Unión para la Nueva Mayoria, 1991), 239-259.
45. Public opinion data that reflect society's animosity toward the military include Edgardo Catterberg, Argentina Confronts Politics (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1991) 56, 93; and Rosendo Fraga, La Cuestión Militar en los Noventa (Buenos Aires: Centro de Estudios Unión para la Nueva Mayoria, 1991), 239-259.
46. See Ernesto López. Ni la Ceniza Ni la Gloria (Buenos Aires: Universidad Nacional de Quilmes, 1994), 43-49.
47. This section draws on López, Ni la Ceniza; Deborah Norden, Between Coups and Consolidation (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1995), chap. 4; and David Pion-Berlin, "Between Confrontation and Accommodation," Journal of Latin American Studies 23 (October 1991): 543-571.
48. This section draws on López, Ni la Ceniza; Deborah Norden, Between Coups and Consolidation (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1995), chap. 4; and David Pion-Berlin, "Between Confrontation and Accommodation," Journal of Latin American Studies 23 (October 1991): 543-571.
49. This section draws on López, Ni la Ceniza; Deborah Norden, Between Coups and Consolidation (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1995), chap. 4; and David Pion-Berlin, "Between Confrontation and Accommodation," Journal of Latin American Studies 23 (October 1991): 543-571.
50. On public opinion toward compulsory military service, see "Sondeo favorable a la eliminación del servicio militar obligatorio," Nueva Provincia, 2 October 1994.
51. Argentina, Presidencia de la Nación, Mensaje Presidential, 1° de Mono de 1995 (Buenos Aires: Presidencia, 1995), 15, 20.
52. Thomas Scheetz, "Military Expenditures in South America" (paper for United Nations Disarmament Conference, Asunción, Paraguay, 1993), tables 4 and 5.
53. U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1993-1994 (Washington, DC: ACDA, 1994), 52.
54. Ibid.
55. Approximately 400 new names were added to the list of those to be tried. See Norden, Military Rebellion, 103.
56. On these rebellions, see ibid., chaps. 5-6; and Marcelo Sain, Los Levantamientos Carapintada, 1987-1991, 2 vols. (Buenos Aires: Centro Editor de America Latina, 1994).
57. On these rebellions, see ibid., chaps. 5-6; and Marcelo Sain, Los Levantamientos Carapintada, 1987-1991, 2 vols. (Buenos Aires: Centro Editor de America Latina, 1994).
58. On changing attitudes within the military, see especially J. Samuel Fitch, "Military Role Beliefs in Latin American Democracies" (paper for XIX International Congress, Latin American Studies Association, Washington, DC, 28-30 September 1995).
59. On the military's role in Peru's regime transition, see Julio Cotler, "Military Interventions and 'Transfer of Power to Civilians' in Peru" in Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehaed, eds., Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Latin America (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 148-172.
60. Enrique Obando, "El Poder de los Militares" in Augusto Alvarez Rodrich, ed., El Poder en el Perú (Lima: Apoyo, 1993),79-80.
61. Scheetz, "Military Expenditures," tables 4 nad 5.
62. On the rise of García see John Crabtree, Peru under García (pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1992), chap. 3.
63. Ibid., 111.
64. Obando, "El Poder," articulates this perspective.
65. Cynthia McClintock, "The Prospects for Democratic Consolidation in a 'Least Likely' Case: Peru," Comparative Politics 21 (January 1989): 134.
66. Scheetz, "Military Expenditures," tables 4 and 5.
67. McClintock, "Prospects," 134.
68. On Garcia's changing popularity over time, see Crabtree, Peru, 159.
69. Ibid., 204.
70. On Fujimori's rise, see Carlos Iván Degregori and Romeo Grompone, Eleccciones 1990: Demonios y Redentores en el Nuevo Perú (Lima: IEP, 1991).
71. After the April 1992 cuop, Fujimori acchieved an approval rating of 60 percent or higher. IMASEN, IMASEN Confidencial 17 (January 1994): 13,
72. See Catherine Conaghan, "Polls, Political Discourse, and the Public Sphere" in Peter H. Smith, ed., Latin America in Comparative Perspective (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1995), 227-255.
73. See Philip Mauceri, "State Reform, Coalitions, and the Neoliberal Augolpe in Peru," Latin American Research Review 30 (1995): 7-37.
74. Cynthia McClintock, "The Breakdown of Constitutional Democracy in Peru" Congress, Latin Amirican Studies Association, Atlanta, 10-12 March 1994), 1. In fact, many institutionalist officers have objected fiercely to the politicization of the intitution that has accompanied Fujimori's use of the military as a power base. See "Las Heridas del Ejécito Peruano," Quehacer 81 (January-February 1993): 8-15; and Enrique Obando, "Fujimori and the Ejér Peruano," Quehacer Americas 30 (July-August 1996) 31-36.
75. Cynthia McClintock, "The Breakdown of Constitutional Democracy in Peru" Congress, Latin Amirican Studies Association, Atlanta, 10-12 March 1994), 1. In fact, many institutionalist officers have objected fiercely to the politicization of the intitution that has accompanied Fujimori's use of the military as a power base. See "Las Heridas del Ejécito Peruano," Quehacer 81 (January-February 1993): 8-15; and Enrique Obando, "Fujimori and the Ejér Peruano," Quehacer Americas 30 (July-August 1996) 31-36.
76. Cynthia McClintock, "The Breakdown of Constitutional Democracy in Peru" Congress, Latin Amirican Studies Association, Atlanta, 10-12 March 1994), 1. In fact, many institutionalist officers have objected fiercely to the politicization of the intitution that has accompanied Fujimori's use of the military as a power base. See "Las Heridas del Ejécito Peruano," Quehacer 81 (January-February 1993): 8-15; and Enrique Obando, "Fujimori and the Ejér Peruano," Quehacer Americas 30 (July-August 1996) 31-36.
77. Obando, "Poder," 82.
78. On the rise of military power under the Fujimori government, see Calos Iván Degregori and Carlos Rivera, "Perú 1980-1993: Fuerzas Armadas, Subversiós y Democracia," Documento de Tra-bajo 53 (Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 1994), 14-22.
79. In the month between the beginning and end of the trials, Fujimori's approval rating fell from 63.8 percent to 54.3 percent. No other event occurred in this period. See "Soldiers Sentenced in Cantuta Case," Latin American Weekly Report (LAWR), 3 March 1994, 86-87.
80. Quoted in "Pérez de Cuellar Joins the Race," Latin American Regional Reports-Andean Group, 13 October 1994, 6-7.
81. "Amnesty Law Causes Uproar," LAWR, 29 June 1995, 287; ́Protests Grow against Amnesty,́ LAWR, 6 July 1995, 298.
82. "Amnesty Law Causes Uproar," LAWR, 29 June 1995, 287; ́Protests Grow against Amnesty,́ LAWR, 6 July 1995, 298.
83. See Fernando Rospigliosi, "Las Fuerzas Armadas y el 5 de Abril" Documento de Trabajo 73 (Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 1996), 43-51.
84. Obando, "Fujimori and the Military," 36.
85. Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, Phillips Bradley, ed. (New York: Vintage, 1945), vol. 1, chaps, iv and xv, and vol. 2, second book, chap. 1, and fourth book, chap. 1.