Whewell on the ultimate problem of philosophy

Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A

Volumn 28, Issue 3, 1997, Pages 417-437

  Morrison, Margaret ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO   (Canada)

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EID: 0031232166     PISSN: 00393681     EISSN: 18792510     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0039-3681(96)00028-3     Document Type: Article

References (49)

1. 1 All references to the Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences (PIS) are to the Second Edition Facimile (London, 1847) reprinted by Johnson Reprint Company (New York, 1967).
2. 2 M. Fisch (1991) William Whewell, Philosopher of Science (Oxford: Oxford University Press); L. Snyder (1994) 'It's All Necessarily So: William Whewell on Scientific Truth', Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 25, 785-807; R. E. Butts (1965) 'Necessary Truth in Whewell's Theory of Science', American Philosophical Quarterly 2,161-181; K. Ducasse (1951) 'Whewell's Philosophy of Scientific Discovery, Parts I and II', Philosophical Review 60, 46-59, 213-234.
3. 2 M. Fisch (1991) William Whewell, Philosopher of Science (Oxford: Oxford University Press); L. Snyder (1994) 'It's All Necessarily So: William Whewell on Scientific Truth', Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 25, 785-807; R. E. Butts (1965) 'Necessary Truth in Whewell's Theory of Science', American Philosophical Quarterly 2,161-181; K. Ducasse (1951) 'Whewell's Philosophy of Scientific Discovery, Parts I and II', Philosophical Review 60, 46-59, 213-234.
4. 2 M. Fisch (1991) William Whewell, Philosopher of Science (Oxford: Oxford University Press); L. Snyder (1994) 'It's All Necessarily So: William Whewell on Scientific Truth', Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 25, 785-807; R. E. Butts (1965) 'Necessary Truth in Whewell's Theory of Science', American Philosophical Quarterly 2,161-181; K. Ducasse (1951) 'Whewell's Philosophy of Scientific Discovery, Parts I and II', Philosophical Review 60, 46-59, 213-234.
5. 2 M. Fisch (1991) William Whewell, Philosopher of Science (Oxford: Oxford University Press); L. Snyder (1994) 'It's All Necessarily So: William Whewell on Scientific Truth', Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 25, 785-807; R. E. Butts (1965) 'Necessary Truth in Whewell's Theory of Science', American Philosophical Quarterly 2,161-181; K. Ducasse (1951) 'Whewell's Philosophy of Scientific Discovery, Parts I and II', Philosophical Review 60, 46-59, 213-234.
6. 3 See W. Whewell (1852) 'A Letter to the Author of Prolegomena Logica', 20 September. Reprinted as Chap. 28 in Philosophy of Discovery (PD) (1860) (London; reprint New York) (1971).
7. 4 W. Whewell (1858) Novum Organon Renovation (London).
8. 5 In addition to the argument of the fundamental antithesis Whewell states explicitly that ideas as he conceives of them are not innate since they possess none of the attributes usually associated with innate ideas. They are not capable of direct or immediate reference regardless of the historical context and they are not considered to be perfect in their original condition. See PIS, p. 633.
9. 6 See a letter to Herschel entitled 'Remarks on a Review of the Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences' published in PIS, pp. 669-679, especially p. 675.
10. 7 Op. cit., p. 676.
11. 8 Op. cit.
12. 9 (1837) The Mechanical Euclid (Cambridge); quote taken from the 5th Edn (1849), p. 32.
13. 10 Fisch, op. cit., note 2.
14. 11 Butts, op. cit., note 2.
15. 12 Snyder, op. cit., note 2.
16. 13 See PIS, 1, p. 95.
17. 14 Op. cit., note 2, p. 158.
18. 15 Ducasse, op. cit., note 2.
19. 16 See Fisch, op. cit. note 2, p. 161.
20. 17 Op. cit., p. 162.
21. 18 There is even some question as to whether Kant himself was able to show this using only the deduction. For an excellent account of what the transcendental deduction does and does not establish see H. Allison (1983) Kant's Transcendental Idealism (New Haven: Yale University Press).
22. 19 POD, p. 359, also quoted in Snyder, p. 796.
23. 20 Snyder, op. cit., note 2, p. 798.
24. 21 Op. cit., p. 785.
25. 22 W. Whewell (1852) 'A Letter to the Author of Prolegomena Logica [H.L. Mansel] from the Author of History and Philosophy of Science' (Cambridge), p. 13.
26. 23 Mansel, op. cit., p. 16.
27. 24 Ironically, it was the attribution of psychologism to Kant that resulted in many of the criticisms of his transcendental philosophy. For Kant psychology involved securing the foundation of human knowledge on empirical laws of thought; transcendental philosophy consisted of an investigation of a priori conditions that make knowledge, including empirical psychology itself, possible.
28. 25 See letter to Mansel, op. cit., note 22, pp. 16-17.
29. 26 Reprinted in R. Butts (ed.) (1968) Whewell's Theory of Scientific Method (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press), pp. 54-75, especially pp. 60-61. Reprinted Hackett, Indianapolis (1991).
30. 27 Op. cit.
31. 28 See PIS, 2.
32. 4 (Cambridge: Trinity College Library). To give an adequate treatment of this topic would require a separate paper; my intention here is just to stress its relevance to the fundamental antithesis and Whewell's psychologism in general.
33. 30 R. Smith (1973) 'The Background of Physiological Psychology in Natural Philosophy'. History of Science xi, 75-123. Smith also refers to H. H. Price (1944) on this topic, 'Touch and Organic Sensation', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society xliv, i-xxx.
34. 30 R. Smith (1973) 'The Background of Physiological Psychology in Natural Philosophy'. History of Science xi, 75-123. Smith also refers to H. H. Price (1944) on this topic, 'Touch and Organic Sensation', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society xliv, i-xxx.
35. 31 E. Darwin (1794-1796) Zoonomia or the Laws of Organic Life, Vols 1 and 2 (London), reprint Hildesheim (1974); D. Hartley (1749) Various Conjectures on the Perception, Motion and Generation of Ideas, R. E. A. Palmer (trans.) (Los Angeles) London, 2 vols.; B. Rand (1923) 'Early Development of Hartley's Doctrine of Association', Psychological Review xxx, 306-320, reprint Hildesheim (1974).
36. 31 E. Darwin (1794-1796) Zoonomia or the Laws of Organic Life, Vols 1 and 2 (London), reprint Hildesheim (1974); D. Hartley (1749) Various Conjectures on the Perception, Motion and Generation of Ideas, R. E. A. Palmer (trans.) (Los Angeles) London, 2 vols.; B. Rand (1923) 'Early Development of Hartley's Doctrine of Association', Psychological Review xxx, 306-320, reprint Hildesheim (1974).
37. 31 E. Darwin (1794-1796) Zoonomia or the Laws of Organic Life, Vols 1 and 2 (London), reprint Hildesheim (1974); D. Hartley (1749) Various Conjectures on the Perception, Motion and Generation of Ideas, R. E. A. Palmer (trans.) (Los Angeles) London, 2 vols.; B. Rand (1923) 'Early Development of Hartley's Doctrine of Association', Psychological Review xxx, 306-320, reprint Hildesheim (1974).
38. 32 T. Brown (1824) Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind, 2nd Edition, Vols 1-4 (Edinburgh), especially Vol. 1, Lectures xxii-xxvi.
39. 33 C. Bell (1830) 'On the Nervous Cycle which Connects the Voluntary Muscles with the Brain', Philosophical Transactions, 163-173, reprinted in (1830) The Nervous System of the Human Body. Embracing the Papers Delivered to the Royal Society on the Subject of Nerves (London), pp. 225-238; C. S. Sherrington (1898-1900) 'The Muscular Sense', in E. A. Schafer (ed.) Text-book of Physiology (Edinburgh), ii, pp. 1002-1025.
40. 33 C. Bell (1830) 'On the Nervous Cycle which Connects the Voluntary Muscles with the Brain', Philosophical Transactions, 163-173, reprinted in (1830) The Nervous System of the Human Body. Embracing the Papers Delivered to the Royal Society on the Subject of Nerves (London), pp. 225-238; C. S. Sherrington (1898-1900) 'The Muscular Sense', in E. A. Schafer (ed.) Text-book of Physiology (Edinburgh), ii, pp. 1002-1025.
41. 33 C. Bell (1830) 'On the Nervous Cycle which Connects the Voluntary Muscles with the Brain', Philosophical Transactions, 163-173, reprinted in (1830) The Nervous System of the Human Body. Embracing the Papers Delivered to the Royal Society on the Subject of Nerves (London), pp. 225-238; C. S. Sherrington (1898-1900) 'The Muscular Sense', in E. A. Schafer (ed.) Text-book of Physiology (Edinburgh), ii, pp. 1002-1025.
42. 34 J. Mill (1869) Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind, Vols 1 and 2 (London; reprint East Orange, NJ, 1967).
43. 35 For a discussion of William Hamilton on this topic and his relation to Scottish philosophy see the various reprints of Reid's works especially, Philosophical Works. With Notes and Supplementary Dissertations by Sir William Hamilton, 8th Edition, Vols 1 and 2 (Hildesheim) (1967).
44. 36 This is because there is no way of achieving the kind of independence required for the ideas to have a transcendental status similar to Kant's categories.
45. 37 As Whewell remarks in PIS, 1, p. 110, 'Neither axioms not syllogisms are necessary for conviction; but they are necessary to display the conditions under which conviction becomes inevitable.'
46. 38 In his 'Remarks on Mathematical Reasoning' Whewell claims that although the connections between axioms is the basis of our reasoning, the connection resides in our thoughts and cannot be made to follow as a logical result from any assumed form of words presented as a definition. These remarks were originally published as a supplement to the Fourth Edition of The Mechanical Euclid and reprinted in PIS, 2, pp. 595-623, especially p. 603.
47. 39 For a good account of Whewell's psychologism see J. Metcalf (1991) 'Whewell's Developmental Psychologism: A Victorian Account of Scientific Progress', Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 22, 117-139.
48. 40 The psychologism differs dramatically from its 17th century counterpart in that its roots are not ultimately traceable to experience. When we look to the history of science it is simply a fact that we find truths that were not derived from experience and cannot be proven by appeal to experience. The conservation of matter and the causal principle are two examples. Experience can only teach by a limited number of examples and hence can never securely establish a universal proposition. Likewise, experience can only inform us that something is the case; it can never prove that it must be the case. What experience shows us is that there are necessary truths different from those that depend on contingent facts about the world, but it does not provide the foundation for their necessity.
49. 41 Quoted in I. Todhunter (1876) William Whewell, D.D. Master of Trinity College Cambridge: An Account of his Writings with Selections from his Literary and Scientific Correspondence, Vols 1 (p. 298) and 2 (London).