Government survival in western multi-party democracies. The effect of credible exit threats via dominance

European Journal of Political Research

Volumn 32, Issue 1, 1997, Pages 71-92

  Van Roozendaal, Peter ^a  

^a Netherlands Court of Audit ^*  (Netherlands)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0031195350     PISSN: 03044130     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1475-6765.00332     Document Type: Article

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