Absolute priority rule violations, credit rationing, and efficiency

Journal of Financial Intermediation

Volumn 6, Issue 3, 1997, Pages 249-267

  Longhofer, Stanley D ^a  

^a FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CLEVELAND   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0031185282     PISSN: 10429573     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jfin.1997.0220     Document Type: Article

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