The economics of nuclear accident law

International Review of Law and Economics

Volumn 17, Issue 2, 1997, Pages 215-243

  Trebilcock, Michael ^a   Winter, Ralph A ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO   (Canada)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0031164936     PISSN: 01448188     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0144-8188(97)00004-5     Document Type: Article

References (29)

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