Self-selection and violence in the market for crime

International Review of Law and Economics

Volumn 17, Issue 2, 1997, Pages 193-201

  Marceau, Nicolas ^a  

^a UNIVERSITÉ DU QUÉBEC À MONTRÉAL   (Canada)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0031161717     PISSN: 01448188     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0144-8188(97)00008-2     Document Type: Article

References (17)

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