Incomplete information, task assignment, and managerial control systems

Management Science

Volumn 43, Issue 6, 1997, Pages 764-778

  Sridhar, Sri S ^a   Balachandran, Bala V ^a  

^a NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Assignment of Tasks; Boundaries of Firm; Control System; Incomplete Information; Internal Employee Versus Outside Supplier; Outsourcing

Indexed keywords

DECISION THEORY; INFORMATION THEORY; MANAGEMENT; OPTIMAL CONTROL SYSTEMS; PERSONNEL; SYSTEMS ANALYSIS;

BOUNDARIES OF FIRM; INCOMPLETE INFORMATION; INTERNAL EMPLOYEE VERSUS OUTSIDE SUPPLIER; MANAGERIAL CONTROL SYSTEMS; OUTSOURCING; TASK ASSIGNMENT;

MANAGEMENT SCIENCE;

EID: 0031152914     PISSN: 00251909     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.43.6.764     Document Type: Article

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