Distribution of potential gains from international environmental agreements: The case of the greenhouse effect

Journal of Environmental Economics and Management

Volumn 33, Issue 1, 1997, Pages 1-16

  Escapa, Marta ^a   Gutiérrez, María José ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF THE BASQUE COUNTRY UPV EHU   (Spain)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0031149682     PISSN: 00950696     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jeem.1996.0974     Document Type: Article

References (33)

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