Dynamic incentives and term limits in bureaucracy regulation

European Journal of Political Economy

Volumn 13, Issue 2, 1997, Pages 261-279

  Konrad, Kai A ^a   Torsvik, Gaute ^b  

^a FREIE UNIVERSITÄT BERLIN   (Germany)

^b UNIVERSITY OF BERGEN   (Norway)

Author keywords

Ratchet effect; Reelection; Regulation; Term limits

Indexed keywords

EID: 0031139008     PISSN: 01762680     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0176-2680(97)00005-0     Document Type: Article

References (8)

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3. Keech, W.R., 1994. Economic Politics: The Cost of Democracy. Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge.
4. Laffont, J.-J., Tirole, J., 1993. A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Government Regulation. MIT-Press, Cambridge.
5. Mueller, D., 1989. Public Choice II. Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge.
6. Olsen, T.E., Torsvik, G., 1993. The ratchet effect in common agency. Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 9, 136-158.
7. Persson, T., Tabellini, G., 1991. Credibility and Macroeconomic Policy. Harwood Publishers, Chur.
8. Rowley, C.K., Elgin, R., 1988. Government and its bureaucracy: A bilateral bargaining versus a principal-agent approach. In: Rowley, C.K., Tollison, R.D., Tullock, G. (Eds.). The Political Economy of Rent-Seeking. Kluwer, Boston.