Restricted houseswapping games

Journal of Mathematical Economics

Volumn 27, Issue 4, 1997, Pages 451-470

  Quint, Thomas ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NEVADA   (United States)

Author keywords

Cooperative game theory; Core; Equilibrium; Indivisible goods; Matching

Indexed keywords

EID: 0031138972     PISSN: 03044068     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0304-4068(96)00780-X     Document Type: Article

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