-
1
-
-
84920564867
-
The Arduous Virtue of Fidelity: Originalism, Scalia, Tribe, and Nerve
-
Ronald Dworkin, The Arduous Virtue of Fidelity: Originalism, Scalia, Tribe, and Nerve, 65 Fordham L. Rev. 1249, 1249-50 (1997) [hereinafter Dworkin, Arduous Virtue].
-
(1997)
Fordham L. Rev.
, vol.65
, pp. 1249
-
-
Dworkin, R.1
-
2
-
-
2442624164
-
-
hereinafter
-
Ronald Dworkin, The Arduous Virtue of Fidelity: Originalism, Scalia, Tribe, and Nerve, 65 Fordham L. Rev. 1249, 1249-50 (1997) [hereinafter Dworkin, Arduous Virtue].
-
Arduous Virtue
-
-
Dworkin1
-
3
-
-
0345864037
-
Davis v. Davis: An Inconsistent Exception to an Otherwise Sound Rule Advancing Procreational Freedom and Reproductive Technology
-
Jennifer L. Carow, Davis v. Davis: An Inconsistent Exception to an Otherwise Sound Rule Advancing Procreational Freedom and Reproductive Technology, 43 DePaul L. Rev. 523, 526 (1994) (citations omitted).
-
(1994)
DePaul L. Rev.
, vol.43
, pp. 523
-
-
Carow, J.L.1
-
4
-
-
84923755160
-
-
Id.
-
Id.
-
-
-
-
5
-
-
84923755159
-
-
Id.
-
Id.
-
-
-
-
6
-
-
0018280560
-
The First Test-Tube Baby
-
July 31
-
The First Test-Tube Baby, Time, July 31, 1978, at 58.
-
(1978)
Time
, pp. 58
-
-
-
7
-
-
0022741116
-
Embryos, Families, and Procreative Liberty: The Legal Structure of the New Reproduction
-
John A. Robertson, Embryos, Families, and Procreative Liberty: The Legal Structure of the New Reproduction, 59 S. Cal. L. Rev. 939, 948 (1986) [hereinafter Robertson, Embryos]; see infra part I (explaining the IVF procedure); see also Lesley Brown & John Brown, Our Miracle Called Louise: A Parents' Story (1979) (recounting the story of Louise Brown's parents in their own words); Robert Edwards & Patrick Steptoe, A Matter of Life: The Story of a Medical Breakthrough (1980) (providing the account of Louise Brown's birth from the doctors' perspective).
-
(1986)
S. Cal. L. Rev.
, vol.59
, pp. 939
-
-
Robertson, J.A.1
-
8
-
-
0022741116
-
-
hereinafter
-
John A. Robertson, Embryos, Families, and Procreative Liberty: The Legal Structure of the New Reproduction, 59 S. Cal. L. Rev. 939, 948 (1986) [hereinafter Robertson, Embryos]; see infra part I (explaining the IVF procedure); see also Lesley Brown & John Brown, Our Miracle Called Louise: A Parents' Story (1979) (recounting the story of Louise Brown's parents in their own words); Robert Edwards & Patrick Steptoe, A Matter of Life: The Story of a Medical Breakthrough (1980) (providing the account of Louise Brown's birth from the doctors' perspective).
-
Embryos
-
-
Robertson1
-
9
-
-
0022741116
-
-
John A. Robertson, Embryos, Families, and Procreative Liberty: The Legal Structure of the New Reproduction, 59 S. Cal. L. Rev. 939, 948 (1986) [hereinafter Robertson, Embryos]; see infra part I (explaining the IVF procedure); see also Lesley Brown & John Brown, Our Miracle Called Louise: A Parents' Story (1979) (recounting the story of Louise Brown's parents in their own words); Robert Edwards & Patrick Steptoe, A Matter of Life: The Story of a Medical Breakthrough (1980) (providing the account of Louise Brown's birth from the doctors' perspective).
-
(1979)
Our Miracle Called Louise: A Parents' Story
-
-
Brown, L.1
Brown, J.2
-
10
-
-
0022741116
-
-
John A. Robertson, Embryos, Families, and Procreative Liberty: The Legal Structure of the New Reproduction, 59 S. Cal. L. Rev. 939, 948 (1986) [hereinafter Robertson, Embryos]; see infra part I (explaining the IVF procedure); see also Lesley Brown & John Brown, Our Miracle Called Louise: A Parents' Story (1979) (recounting the story of Louise Brown's parents in their own words); Robert Edwards & Patrick Steptoe, A Matter of Life: The Story of a Medical Breakthrough (1980) (providing the account of Louise Brown's birth from the doctors' perspective).
-
(1980)
A Matter of Life: The Story of a Medical Breakthrough
-
-
Edwards, R.1
Steptoe, P.2
-
11
-
-
84923704272
-
-
supra note 6
-
Treatments range "from fertility drugs to tubal reconstruction by microsurgery and artificial insemination." Robertson, Embryos, supra note 6, at 947.
-
Embryos
, pp. 947
-
-
Robertson1
-
12
-
-
84923755158
-
-
Id.
-
Id.
-
-
-
-
13
-
-
84923755157
-
-
See Kass v. Kass, 1995 WL 110368 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 18, 1995) (no docket number); Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 911 (1993); see AZ v. BZ, slip op. (Mass. P. Ct. Mar. 25, 1996) (no docket number) (order granting permanent injunction) (on file with the Fordham Law Review). Foreign courts also have addressed IVF conflicts. In a case of first impression, the Israeli Supreme Court resolved a frozen embryo disposition dispute. Joel Greenberg, Israeli Court Gives Wife the Right to Her Embryos, N.Y. Times, Sept. 13, 1996, at A10. In Nahmani v. Nahmani, the Israeli Supreme Court voted 7-4 that although both parents have reproductive rights over the embryo, the mother's right to be a parent prevailed over the father's right not to be a parent. Id. The court reasoned that implanting the embryos in the mother, who had previously undergone a hysterectomy, would afford her the only opportunity to become a parent. Id.
-
See Kass v. Kass, 1995 WL 110368 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 18, 1995) (no docket number); Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 911 (1993); see AZ v. BZ, slip op. (Mass. P. Ct. Mar. 25, 1996) (no docket number) (order granting permanent injunction) (on file with the Fordham Law Review). Foreign courts also have addressed IVF conflicts. In a case of first impression, the Israeli Supreme Court resolved a frozen embryo disposition dispute. Joel Greenberg, Israeli Court Gives Wife the Right to Her Embryos, N.Y. Times, Sept. 13, 1996, at A10. In Nahmani v. Nahmani, the Israeli Supreme Court voted 7-4 that although both parents have reproductive rights over the embryo, the mother's right to be a parent prevailed over the father's right not to be a parent. Id. The court reasoned that implanting the embryos in the mother, who had previously undergone a hysterectomy, would afford her the only opportunity to become a parent. Id.
-
-
-
-
14
-
-
84923755156
-
-
See infra part I.A (detailing a description of the cryopreservation process)
-
See infra part I.A (detailing a description of the cryopreservation process).
-
-
-
-
15
-
-
0025620982
-
Prior Agreements for Disposition of Frozen Embryos
-
John A. Robertson, Prior Agreements for Disposition of Frozen Embryos, 51 Ohio St. L.J. 407, 409-10 (1990) [hereinafter Robertson, Prior Agreements].
-
(1990)
Ohio St. L.J.
, vol.51
, pp. 407
-
-
Robertson, J.A.1
-
16
-
-
0025620982
-
-
hereinafter
-
John A. Robertson, Prior Agreements for Disposition of Frozen Embryos, 51 Ohio St. L.J. 407, 409-10 (1990) [hereinafter Robertson, Prior Agreements].
-
Prior Agreements
-
-
Robertson1
-
17
-
-
84936628259
-
Market-Inalienability
-
One can argue that such agreements are unenforceable on the ground that reproductive rights are inalienable. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (holding that the Constitution can make contracts unenforceable even when they are not void ab initio); Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 1849 (1987) (discussing rights that are nonwaivable or nonrelinquishable); Robertson, Prior Agreements, supra note 11, at 418-19 (analogizing preconception agreements to abortion or child rearing agreements that are not binding); William Joseph Wagner, The Contractual Reallocation of Procreative Resources and Parental Rights: The Natural Endowment Critique, 41 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1, 12 (1990) (arguing that contractual reallocation of procreative resources and parental rights risks the structural breakdown of the American political tradition of respect for human dignity). In addition, contracts relinquishing parental rights through IVF agreements can be analogized to surrogacy contracts, which have been held to be illegal. See In re Baby M., 537 A.2d 1227, 1255 (N.J. 1988) (holding that unpaid surrogacy contracts are unenforceable); Martha A. Field, Surrogate Motherhood (1988) (discussing arguments for and against enforcing surrogacy contracts and arguing that if abortion and adoption contracts are unenforceable, the same rule should apply to surrogacy contracts); M. Celeste Schejbal-Vossmeyer, Comment, What Money Cannot Buy: Commercial Surrogacy and the Doctrine of Illegal Contracts, 32 St. Louis U. L.J. 1171, 1206 (1988) (arguing that "[g]iving a second party the right to control another person's reproductive capacity is contradictory" because it allows a party to waive his or her right so that another party can exercise it). But see Richard A. Posner, Sex and Reason 420-27 (1992) (applying an economic theory for surrogate contracts and advocating enforcement of cash transactions in the formation of family relationships).
-
(1987)
Harv. L. Rev.
, vol.100
, pp. 1849
-
-
Radin, M.J.1
-
18
-
-
0347125324
-
-
supra note 11
-
One can argue that such agreements are unenforceable on the ground that reproductive rights are inalienable. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (holding that the Constitution can make contracts unenforceable even when they are not void ab initio); Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 1849 (1987) (discussing rights that are nonwaivable or nonrelinquishable); Robertson, Prior Agreements, supra note 11, at 418-19 (analogizing preconception agreements to abortion or child rearing agreements that are not binding); William Joseph Wagner, The Contractual Reallocation of Procreative Resources and Parental Rights: The Natural Endowment Critique, 41 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1, 12 (1990) (arguing that contractual reallocation of procreative resources and parental rights risks the structural breakdown of the American political tradition of respect for human dignity). In addition, contracts relinquishing parental rights through IVF agreements can be analogized to surrogacy contracts, which have been held to be illegal. See In re Baby M., 537 A.2d 1227, 1255 (N.J. 1988) (holding that unpaid surrogacy contracts are unenforceable); Martha A. Field, Surrogate Motherhood (1988) (discussing arguments for and against enforcing surrogacy contracts and arguing that if abortion and adoption contracts are unenforceable, the same rule should apply to surrogacy contracts); M. Celeste Schejbal-Vossmeyer, Comment, What Money Cannot Buy: Commercial Surrogacy and the Doctrine of Illegal Contracts, 32 St. Louis U. L.J. 1171, 1206 (1988) (arguing that "[g]iving a second party the right to control another person's reproductive capacity is contradictory" because it allows a party to waive his or her right so that another party can exercise it). But see Richard A. Posner, Sex and Reason 420-27 (1992) (applying an economic theory for surrogate contracts and advocating enforcement of cash transactions in the formation of family relationships).
-
Prior Agreements
, pp. 418-419
-
-
Robertson1
-
19
-
-
84964217666
-
The Contractual Reallocation of Procreative Resources and Parental Rights: The Natural Endowment Critique
-
One can argue that such agreements are unenforceable on the ground that reproductive rights are inalienable. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (holding that the Constitution can make contracts unenforceable even when they are not void ab initio); Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 1849 (1987) (discussing rights that are nonwaivable or nonrelinquishable); Robertson, Prior Agreements, supra note 11, at 418-19 (analogizing preconception agreements to abortion or child rearing agreements that are not binding); William Joseph Wagner, The Contractual Reallocation of Procreative Resources and Parental Rights: The Natural Endowment Critique, 41 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1, 12 (1990) (arguing that contractual reallocation of procreative resources and parental rights risks the structural breakdown of the American political tradition of respect for human dignity). In addition, contracts relinquishing parental rights through IVF agreements can be analogized to surrogacy contracts, which have been held to be illegal. See In re Baby M., 537 A.2d 1227, 1255 (N.J. 1988) (holding that unpaid surrogacy contracts are unenforceable); Martha A. Field, Surrogate Motherhood (1988) (discussing arguments for and against enforcing surrogacy contracts and arguing that if abortion and adoption contracts are unenforceable, the same rule should apply to surrogacy contracts); M. Celeste Schejbal-Vossmeyer, Comment, What Money Cannot Buy: Commercial Surrogacy and the Doctrine of Illegal Contracts, 32 St. Louis U. L.J. 1171, 1206 (1988) (arguing that "[g]iving a second party the right to control another person's reproductive capacity is contradictory" because it allows a party to waive his or her right so that another party can exercise it). But see Richard A. Posner, Sex and Reason 420-27 (1992) (applying an economic theory for surrogate contracts and advocating enforcement of cash transactions in the formation of family relationships).
-
(1990)
Case W. Res. L. Rev.
, vol.41
, pp. 1
-
-
Wagner, W.J.1
-
20
-
-
0040377924
-
-
One can argue that such agreements are unenforceable on the ground that reproductive rights are inalienable. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (holding that the Constitution can make contracts unenforceable even when they are not void ab initio); Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 1849 (1987) (discussing rights that are nonwaivable or nonrelinquishable); Robertson, Prior Agreements, supra note 11, at 418-19 (analogizing preconception agreements to abortion or child rearing agreements that are not binding); William Joseph Wagner, The Contractual Reallocation of Procreative Resources and Parental Rights: The Natural Endowment Critique, 41 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1, 12 (1990) (arguing that contractual reallocation of procreative resources and parental rights risks the structural breakdown of the American political tradition of respect for human dignity). In addition, contracts relinquishing parental rights through IVF agreements can be analogized to surrogacy contracts, which have been held to be illegal. See In re Baby M., 537 A.2d 1227, 1255 (N.J. 1988) (holding that unpaid surrogacy contracts are unenforceable); Martha A. Field, Surrogate Motherhood (1988) (discussing arguments for and against enforcing surrogacy contracts and arguing that if abortion and adoption contracts are unenforceable, the same rule should apply to surrogacy contracts); M. Celeste Schejbal-Vossmeyer, Comment, What Money Cannot Buy: Commercial Surrogacy and the Doctrine of Illegal Contracts, 32 St. Louis U. L.J. 1171, 1206 (1988) (arguing that "[g]iving a second party the right to control another person's reproductive capacity is contradictory" because it allows a party to waive his or her right so that another party can exercise it). But see Richard A. Posner, Sex and Reason 420-27 (1992) (applying an economic theory for surrogate contracts and advocating enforcement of cash transactions in the formation of family relationships).
-
(1988)
Surrogate Motherhood
-
-
Field, M.A.1
-
21
-
-
2442491664
-
What Money Cannot Buy: Commercial Surrogacy and the Doctrine of Illegal Contracts
-
Comment
-
One can argue that such agreements are unenforceable on the ground that reproductive rights are inalienable. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (holding that the Constitution can make contracts unenforceable even when they are not void ab initio); Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 1849 (1987) (discussing rights that are nonwaivable or nonrelinquishable); Robertson, Prior Agreements, supra note 11, at 418-19 (analogizing preconception agreements to abortion or child rearing agreements that are not binding); William Joseph Wagner, The Contractual Reallocation of Procreative Resources and Parental Rights: The Natural Endowment Critique, 41 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1, 12 (1990) (arguing that contractual reallocation of procreative resources and parental rights risks the structural breakdown of the American political tradition of respect for human dignity). In addition, contracts relinquishing parental rights through IVF agreements can be analogized to surrogacy contracts, which have been held to be illegal. See In re Baby M., 537 A.2d 1227, 1255 (N.J. 1988) (holding that unpaid surrogacy contracts are unenforceable); Martha A. Field, Surrogate Motherhood (1988) (discussing arguments for and against enforcing surrogacy contracts and arguing that if abortion and adoption contracts are unenforceable, the same rule should apply to surrogacy contracts); M. Celeste Schejbal-Vossmeyer, Comment, What Money Cannot Buy: Commercial Surrogacy and the Doctrine of Illegal Contracts, 32 St. Louis U. L.J. 1171, 1206 (1988) (arguing that "[g]iving a second party the right to control another person's reproductive capacity is contradictory" because it allows a party to waive his or her right so that another party can exercise it). But see Richard A. Posner, Sex and Reason 420-27 (1992) (applying an economic theory for surrogate contracts and advocating enforcement of cash transactions in the formation of family relationships).
-
(1988)
St. Louis U. L.J.
, vol.32
, pp. 1171
-
-
Celeste Schejbal-Vossmeyer, M.1
-
22
-
-
0004039332
-
-
One can argue that such agreements are unenforceable on the ground that reproductive rights are inalienable. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (holding that the Constitution can make contracts unenforceable even when they are not void ab initio); Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 1849 (1987) (discussing rights that are nonwaivable or nonrelinquishable); Robertson, Prior Agreements, supra note 11, at 418-19 (analogizing preconception agreements to abortion or child rearing agreements that are not binding); William Joseph Wagner, The Contractual Reallocation of Procreative Resources and Parental Rights: The Natural Endowment Critique, 41 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1, 12 (1990) (arguing that contractual reallocation of procreative resources and parental rights risks the structural breakdown of the American political tradition of respect for human dignity). In addition, contracts relinquishing parental rights through IVF agreements can be analogized to surrogacy contracts, which have been held to be illegal. See In re Baby M., 537 A.2d 1227, 1255 (N.J. 1988) (holding that unpaid surrogacy contracts are unenforceable); Martha A. Field, Surrogate Motherhood (1988) (discussing arguments for and against enforcing surrogacy contracts and arguing that if abortion and adoption contracts are unenforceable, the same rule should apply to surrogacy contracts); M. Celeste Schejbal-Vossmeyer, Comment, What Money Cannot Buy: Commercial Surrogacy and the Doctrine of Illegal Contracts, 32 St. Louis U. L.J. 1171, 1206 (1988) (arguing that "[g]iving a second party the right to control another person's reproductive capacity is contradictory" because it allows a party to waive his or her right so that another party can exercise it). But see Richard A. Posner, Sex and Reason 420-27 (1992) (applying an economic theory for surrogate contracts and advocating enforcement of cash transactions in the formation of family relationships).
-
(1992)
Sex and Reason
, pp. 420-427
-
-
Posner, R.A.1
-
23
-
-
84923755154
-
-
note
-
In Davis, the court assumed the existence of reproductive autonomy rights, noting that "[f]or the purposes of this litigation it is sufficient to note that, whatever its ultimate constitutional boundaries, the right of procreational autonomy is composed of two rights of equal significance - the right to procreate and the right to avoid procreation. Undoubtedly, both are subject to protections and limitations." Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 601 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944)).
-
-
-
-
24
-
-
84923755152
-
-
note
-
In most frozen embryo conflicts, the mother seeks to implant the embryo and the father wishes to terminate the embryo. See, e.g., Kass v. Kass, 1995 WL 110368 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 18, 1995) (no docket number); see AZ v. BZ, slip op. (Mass. P. Ct. Mar. 25, 1996) (no docket number) (order granting permanent injunction) (on file with the Fordham Law Review). Although the right to affirmative procreation should apply equally to both the mother and the father, for purposes of simplicity and clarity this Note will refer to the mother as the party seeking to implant the frozen embryo, and the father as the party seeking to terminate it. It is important to note that if the roles were reversed and the man wished to implant the frozen embryo, a court could not force transfer of the frozen embryo to the woman's body over her objections because that would violate her bodily integrity. See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 71 (1976). The only option available to the man would be to have the frozen embryo implanted in a surrogate mother.
-
-
-
-
25
-
-
84923755143
-
-
842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 911 (1993)
-
842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 911 (1993).
-
-
-
-
26
-
-
84923755142
-
-
See infra part I.B.1 (providing a full discussion of Davis)
-
See infra part I.B.1 (providing a full discussion of Davis).
-
-
-
-
27
-
-
84923755141
-
-
note
-
Kass, 1995 WL 110368. In contrast to Kass, a Massachusetts Probate and Family Court in 1996 held that because the mother and father are equal gamete providers, they should be given equal authority in decisions regarding frozen embryos. AZ v. BZ, slip op. at 22 (discussing Kass and Davis).
-
-
-
-
28
-
-
84923755140
-
-
See infra part I.B.2 (discussing Kass in detail). Only one state, Louisiana, has enacted pertinent legislation regarding custody of frozen embryos by declaring that a dispute between parties over a cryopreserved IVF embryo should be resolved in the "best interest" of the embryo. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9:131 (West 1986)
-
See infra part I.B.2 (discussing Kass in detail). Only one state, Louisiana, has enacted pertinent legislation regarding custody of frozen embryos by declaring that a dispute between parties over a cryopreserved IVF embryo should be resolved in the "best interest" of the embryo. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9:131 (West 1986).
-
-
-
-
29
-
-
84923755139
-
-
note
-
The Supreme Court, invalidating a state statute prohibiting the distribution of birth control to unmarried adults, held that [i]f . . . the distribution of contraceptives to married persons cannot be prohibited, a ban on distribution to unmarried persons would be equally impermissible. . . . If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (emphasis omitted).
-
-
-
-
30
-
-
84923755138
-
-
See infra notes 230-44 and accompanying text (outlining the Supreme Court's right to privacy cases establishing rights of reproductive autonomy)
-
See infra notes 230-44 and accompanying text (outlining the Supreme Court's right to privacy cases establishing rights of reproductive autonomy).
-
-
-
-
31
-
-
84923755137
-
-
See infra notes 230-44 and accompanying text
-
See infra notes 230-44 and accompanying text.
-
-
-
-
32
-
-
84923755136
-
-
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992) (plurality opinion) (finding that the Constitution places limits on a state's right to interfere with a woman's decision to terminate her pregnancy); Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 509-10 (1989) (holding that although a woman has a right to choose an abortion, a state may refuse to allow public facilities to be used or public employees to participate in abortions); Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 686-91 (1977) (striking down a New York statute which limited the distribution of contraceptives); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (limiting a state's right to regulate abortions); Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453 (holding that individuals, whether single or married, have a right to use contraception); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (finding that married people have a right to use contraceptives)
-
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992) (plurality opinion) (finding that the Constitution places limits on a state's right to interfere with a woman's decision to terminate her pregnancy); Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 509-10 (1989) (holding that although a woman has a right to choose an abortion, a state may refuse to allow public facilities to be used or public employees to participate in abortions); Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 686-91 (1977) (striking down a New York statute which limited the distribution of contraceptives); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (limiting a state's right to regulate abortions); Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453 (holding that individuals, whether single or married, have a right to use contraception); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (finding that married people have a right to use contraceptives).
-
-
-
-
33
-
-
84923755134
-
-
Kass v. Kass, 1995 WL 110368, at *2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 18, 1995) (no docket number); Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 601 (Tenn. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 911 (1993)
-
Kass v. Kass, 1995 WL 110368, at *2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 18, 1995) (no docket number); Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 601 (Tenn. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 911 (1993).
-
-
-
-
34
-
-
84923755132
-
-
Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 589-90; Kass, 1995 WL 110368, at *1
-
Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 589-90; Kass, 1995 WL 110368, at *1.
-
-
-
-
35
-
-
84923755123
-
-
See infra notes 230-44 and accompanying text
-
See infra notes 230-44 and accompanying text.
-
-
-
-
36
-
-
84923755122
-
-
See infra part I.B
-
See infra part I.B.
-
-
-
-
37
-
-
84923755121
-
-
U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1
-
U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
-
-
-
-
38
-
-
0003867869
-
-
For a detailed explanation of this approach to constitutional interpretation, see Ronald Dworkin, Life's Dominion: An Argument About Abortion, Euthanasia, and Individual Freedom 122-23, 158-59 (1994) [hereinafter Dworkin, Life's Dominion],
-
(1994)
Life's Dominion: An Argument about Abortion, Euthanasia, and Individual Freedom
, pp. 122-123
-
-
Dworkin, R.1
-
39
-
-
0004150971
-
-
hereinafter
-
For a detailed explanation of this approach to constitutional interpretation, see Ronald Dworkin, Life's Dominion: An Argument About Abortion, Euthanasia, and Individual Freedom 122-23, 158-59 (1994) [hereinafter Dworkin, Life's Dominion],
-
Life's Dominion
-
-
Dworkin1
-
40
-
-
0020732129
-
Procreative Liberty and the Control of Conception, Pregnancy, and Childbirth
-
John A. Robertson, Procreative Liberty and the Control of Conception, Pregnancy, and Childbirth, 69 Va. L. Rev. 405, 423 (1983) [hereinafter Robertson, Procreative Liberty].
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(1983)
Va. L. Rev.
, vol.69
, pp. 405
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Robertson, J.A.1
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41
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0020732129
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hereinafter
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John A. Robertson, Procreative Liberty and the Control of Conception, Pregnancy, and Childbirth, 69 Va. L. Rev. 405, 423 (1983) [hereinafter Robertson, Procreative Liberty].
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Procreative Liberty
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Robertson1
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43
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84923704272
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supra note 6
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Robertson, Embryos, supra note 6, at 948.
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Embryos
, pp. 948
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Robertson1
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44
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84923755120
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note
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Shortly before the surge of luteinizing hormone indicating ovulation - that the egg has been shed from the follicle - the woman takes another drug to guarantee that the egg matures. Several eggs are then aspirated - removed by suction - from the follicles by laparoscopy. After the eggs are examined for maturity, the mature eggs are mixed in a dish with sperm from the husband that has been examined and prepared for insemination. Id.
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45
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84923755119
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Id. at 968
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Id. at 968.
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46
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84923755118
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note
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The term "preembryo" is used to describe the fertilized egg at this stage. See, e.g., AZ v. BZ, slip op. at 7 (Mass. P. Ct. Mar. 25, 1996) (no docket number) (order granting permanent injunction) (on file with the Fordham Law Review); Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 593 (Tenn. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 911 (1993).
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47
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84923704272
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supra note 6
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Robertson, Embryos, supra note 6, at 968.
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Embryos
, pp. 968
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Robertson1
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48
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84923755117
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Id. at 948. The transfer of multiple fertilized eggs increases the chance of multiple gestation. It is optimal, however, to transfer no more than three or four eggs. Most programs, however, will transfer as many eggs as have been fertilized; as a result, they may aspirate or fertilize fewer eggs than are available to avoid transferring all the eggs. Id. at 948-49
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Id. at 948. The transfer of multiple fertilized eggs increases the chance of multiple gestation. It is optimal, however, to transfer no more than three or four eggs. Most programs, however, will transfer as many eggs as have been fertilized; as a result, they may aspirate or fertilize fewer eggs than are available to avoid transferring all the eggs. Id. at 948-49.
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49
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84923755116
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Carow, supra note 2, at 529 & n.40
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Carow, supra note 2, at 529 & n.40.
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50
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2442567381
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23d ed. hereinafter Stedman
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Laparoscopy, or peritoneoscopy, is the method by which the clinician examines the contents of the lining of the abdominal cavity. The clinician does this by passing an electrically lighted tubular instrument through the abdominal wall. Stedman's Medical Dictionary 1059 (23d ed. 1976) [hereinafter Stedman].
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(1976)
Medical Dictionary
, vol.1059
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Stedman1
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51
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84923755114
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Carow, supra note 2, at 529
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Carow, supra note 2, at 529.
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52
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84923755112
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Id.
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Id.
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53
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84923755103
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Id.
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Id.
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55
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84923755102
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Carow, supra note 2, at 529-30
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Carow, supra note 2, at 529-30.
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56
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84923755101
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842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 911 (1993)
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842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 911 (1993).
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57
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84923755100
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Id. at 601, 603-04
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Id. at 601, 603-04.
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58
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84923755099
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1995 WL 110368 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 18, 1995) (no docket number)
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1995 WL 110368 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 18, 1995) (no docket number).
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59
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84923755098
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Id. at *4
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Id. at *4.
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60
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84923755097
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Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 591
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Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 591.
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61
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84923755096
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Id. A tubal pregnancy occurs when the fertilized ovum implants in an area other than the endometrium, often in the fallopian tube. Carow, supra note 2, at 544 n.155 (citing 1 The Oxford Companion to Medicine 331 (John Walton et al. eds. 1986)).
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(1986)
The Oxford Companion to Medicine
, vol.331
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Walton, J.1
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62
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84923755094
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Davls, 842 S.W.2d at 591
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Davls, 842 S.W.2d at 591.
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63
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84923755092
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Id. at 592
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Id. at 592.
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64
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84923755083
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Id.
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Id.
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65
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84923755082
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Davis v. Davis, No. E-14496, 1989 WL 140495, at *3 (Tenn. Cir. Ct. Sept. 21, 1989), rev'd, No. 180, 1990 WL 130807 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 13, 1990), aff'd, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 911 (1993). The court also analyzed whether the embryos were "beings" or "property that may become human beings." Id.
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Davis v. Davis, No. E-14496, 1989 WL 140495, at *3 (Tenn. Cir. Ct. Sept. 21, 1989), rev'd, No. 180, 1990 WL 130807 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 13, 1990), aff'd, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 911 (1993). The court also analyzed whether the embryos were "beings" or "property that may become human beings." Id.
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66
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84923755081
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Davis, 1989 WL 140495, at *25
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Davis, 1989 WL 140495, at *25.
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67
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84923755080
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Id. at *20
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Id. at *20.
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68
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84923755079
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Id. at *11 (applying the doctrine of parens patriae, which attempts to protect the best interests of the child)
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Id. at *11 (applying the doctrine of parens patriae, which attempts to protect the best interests of the child).
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69
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84923755078
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Id.
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Id.
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70
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84923755077
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Davis v. Davis, No. 180, 1990 WL 130807, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 13, 1990), aff'd, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn, 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 911 (1993)
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Davis v. Davis, No. 180, 1990 WL 130807, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 13, 1990), aff'd, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn, 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 911 (1993).
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71
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84923755076
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Id. at *2 (footnote omitted)
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Id. at *2 (footnote omitted).
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72
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84923755074
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Id. at *1 (footnote omitted)
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Id. at *1 (footnote omitted).
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73
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84923755072
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See id.
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See id.
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74
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84923755063
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Id. at *2 (citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-5-106 (1980))
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Id. at *2 (citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-5-106 (1980)).
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75
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84923755062
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Id. (citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-15-201 (1989))
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Id. (citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-15-201 (1989)).
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76
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84923755061
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Id.
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Id.
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77
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84923755060
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717 F. Supp. 421 (E.D. Va. 1989). The York court held that a Virginia clinic was obligated to return a frozen embryo to parents who wished to transfer the frozen embryo to a clinic in California. Id. at 425. The court's rationale was that a bailor-bailee relationship existed between the Virginia clinic and the parents, and that once the bailment ceased, the clinic was under an obligation to return the "property" to the parents. Id.
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717 F. Supp. 421 (E.D. Va. 1989). The York court held that a Virginia clinic was obligated to return a frozen embryo to parents who wished to transfer the frozen embryo to a clinic in California. Id. at 425. The court's rationale was that a bailor-bailee relationship existed between the Virginia clinic and the parents, and that once the bailment ceased, the clinic was under an obligation to return the "property" to the parents. Id.
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78
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84923755059
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See Davis, 1990 WL 130807, at *2 (citing Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942))
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See Davis, 1990 WL 130807, at *2 (citing Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942)).
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79
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84923755058
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See id.
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See id.
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80
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84923755057
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Id. at *3
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Id. at *3.
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81
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84923755056
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See Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 911 (1993)
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See Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 911 (1993).
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82
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84923755054
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Id. at 594-95 (citing Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973))
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Id. at 594-95 (citing Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)).
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83
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84923755052
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Id. (applying Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-15-201 (1989); Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-107 (1989); Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-210 (1989))
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Id. (applying Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-15-201 (1989); Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-107 (1989); Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-210 (1989)).
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84
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0024966523
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717 F. Supp. 421 (E.D. Va. 1989)
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717 F. Supp. 421 (E.D. Va. 1989).
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85
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84923755002
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Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 596 (citing York v. York, 717 F. Supp. 421, 424-25 (E.D. Va. 1989))
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Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 596 (citing York v. York, 717 F. Supp. 421, 424-25 (E.D. Va. 1989)).
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86
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84923755001
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Id. at 596-97 (citation omitted)
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Id. at 596-97 (citation omitted).
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87
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84923755000
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Id. at 597
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Id. at 597.
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88
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0037582615
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Ethical Considerations of the New Reproductive Technologies
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Id.
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Id. (citing American Fertility Society, Ethical Considerations of the New Reproductive Technologies, 53 Fertility & Sterility 34S-35S (Supp. 1990)).
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Fertility & Sterility
, vol.53
, Issue.1990 SUPPL.
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89
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84923754999
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262 U.S. 390 (1923)
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262 U.S. 390 (1923).
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90
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84923754998
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316 U.S. 535 (1942)
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316 U.S. 535 (1942).
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91
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84923754997
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410 U.S. 113 (1973)
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410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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92
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84923754996
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Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 601
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Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 601.
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93
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84923754995
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321 U.S. 158 (1944)
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321 U.S. 158 (1944).
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94
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84923754994
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410 U.S. 113 (1973)
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410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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95
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84923754993
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Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 601 (using Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989), as a reference point for understanding procreative rights)
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Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 601 (using Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989), as a reference point for understanding procreative rights).
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96
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84923754992
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Id. at 603-04 (citing Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988), in which the Court weighed the two parties' conflicting interests in reaching a conclusion)
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Id. at 603-04 (citing Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988), in which the Court weighed the two parties' conflicting interests in reaching a conclusion).
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97
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84923754991
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Id. at 604
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Id. at 604.
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98
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84923754990
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Id.
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Id.
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99
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84923754989
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Id.
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Id.
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100
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84923754988
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Id.
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Id.
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101
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84923754987
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Id.
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Id.
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102
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84923754986
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Id. at 603-04
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Id. at 603-04.
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103
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84923754985
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Id. at 604
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Id. at 604.
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104
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25544435666
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Embryo Fight Yields Few Answers: Disposal Disclosed: Embryos are Discarded in a Tennessee Case, but Legal and Ethical Questions Remain
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June 14
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Mark Curriden, Embryo Fight Yields Few Answers: Disposal Disclosed: Embryos Are Discarded in a Tennessee Case, but Legal and Ethical Questions Remain, Atlanta J. & Const., June 14, 1993, at A1.
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(1993)
Atlanta J. & Const.
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Curriden, M.1
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105
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84923754984
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See AZ v. BZ, sup op. at 21 (Mass. P. Ct. Mar. 25, 1996) (no docket number) (order granting permanent injunction) (on file with the Fordham Law Review); Kristine E. Luongo, Comment, The Big Chill: Davis v. Davis and the Protection of "Potential Life"?, 29 New Eng. L. Rev. 1011 (1995)
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See AZ v. BZ, sup op. at 21 (Mass. P. Ct. Mar. 25, 1996) (no docket number) (order granting permanent injunction) (on file with the Fordham Law Review); Kristine E. Luongo, Comment, The Big Chill: Davis v. Davis and the Protection of "Potential Life"?, 29 New Eng. L. Rev. 1011 (1995).
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106
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84923754983
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Kass v. Kass, 1995 WL 110368 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 18, 1995) (no docket number). Obviously, the New York court was not bound by Davis, which was decided in Tennessee
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Kass v. Kass, 1995 WL 110368 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 18, 1995) (no docket number). Obviously, the New York court was not bound by Davis, which was decided in Tennessee.
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107
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84923754982
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Id. at *1
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Id. at *1.
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108
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84923754981
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Id.
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Id.
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109
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84923754980
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Id.
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Id.
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110
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84923754979
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Id. at *3
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Id. at *3.
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111
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84923754978
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Id. at *1
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Id. at *1
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112
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84923754977
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Id. at *1
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Id. at *1.
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113
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84923754976
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Id.
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Id.
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114
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84923754975
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Id. at *1, *4. Like Davis, however, Kass determined that the constitutional guarantee of the right to privacy encompasses the right to procreate by referring to Supreme Court cases which have nothing to do with any affirmative procreative rights. Id. at *2 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923))
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Id. at *1, *4. Like Davis, however, Kass determined that the constitutional guarantee of the right to privacy encompasses the right to procreate by referring to Supreme Court cases which have nothing to do with any affirmative procreative rights. Id. at *2 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923)).
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115
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84923754974
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Id. at *3. Beginning with an analysis of the preembryos' status, the judge concluded that while they were not persons, the preembryos were certainly not property within the ordinary sense of the term. Id. at *2. Because preembryos possess a unique status as "potential" life, the court refused to equate them with chattel such as "washing machines and jewelry." Id.
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Id. at *3. Beginning with an analysis of the preembryos' status, the judge concluded that while they were not persons, the preembryos were certainly not property within the ordinary sense of the term. Id. at *2. Because preembryos possess a unique status as "potential" life, the court refused to equate them with chattel such as "washing machines and jewelry." Id.
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116
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84923754973
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See infra part III.B.1 (suggesting why it is a crucial and determining factor to the outcome of a frozen embryo conflict whether the court compares the termination of frozen embryos to abortion or contraception)
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See infra part III.B.1 (suggesting why it is a crucial and determining factor to the outcome of a frozen embryo conflict whether the court compares the termination of frozen embryos to abortion or contraception).
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117
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84923754972
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See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 896 (1992) (plurality opinion); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 71 (1976)
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See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 896 (1992) (plurality opinion); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 71 (1976).
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118
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84923754971
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Kass, 1995 WL 110368, at *2. The court reasoned that where a husband realizes that there might be a delay in implanting the embryos, his initial consent to the implantation should not be abolished nunc pro tunc merely because of a change in circumstances which could and should have been anticipated. Id. at *3; see also Casey, 505 U.S. at 896-97 (striking down spousal notification as a condition to an abortion)
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Kass, 1995 WL 110368, at *2. The court reasoned that where a husband realizes that there might be a delay in implanting the embryos, his initial consent to the implantation should not be abolished nunc pro tunc merely because of a change in circumstances which could and should have been anticipated. Id. at *3; see also Casey, 505 U.S. at 896-97 (striking down spousal notification as a condition to an abortion).
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119
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84923754970
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Kass, 1995 WL 110368, at *3
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Kass, 1995 WL 110368, at *3.
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121
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84923754969
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Kass, 1995 WL 110368, at *2. In contrast to Kass, a Massachusetts Probate and Family Court judge addressing a frozen embryo dispute held that because men and women are equal gamete providers, they should be given equal authority in decisions regarding frozen embryo disposition. AZ v. BZ, slip op. at 22 (Mass. P. Ct. Mar. 25, 1996) (no docket number) (order granting permanent injunction) (on file with the Fordham Law Review). Like the Kass and Davis courts, however, the Massachusetts court did not clearly explain its method of analyzing the reproductive autonomy rights of the two parties in a frozen embryo dispute. In AZ v. BZ, a couple who began treatment at an IVF clinic signed seven different consent forms stipulating that, should the couple separate, the embryos would be returned to the mother for implantation. Id. at 7-11. As a result of an embryo transfer, the mother became pregnant and eventually gave birth to twin daughters
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Kass, 1995 WL 110368, at *2. In contrast to Kass, a Massachusetts Probate and Family Court judge addressing a frozen embryo dispute held that because men and women are equal gamete providers, they should be given equal authority in decisions regarding frozen embryo disposition. AZ v. BZ, slip op. at 22 (Mass. P. Ct. Mar. 25, 1996) (no docket number) (order granting permanent injunction) (on file with the Fordham Law Review). Like the Kass and Davis courts, however, the Massachusetts court did not clearly explain its method of analyzing the reproductive autonomy rights of the two parties in a frozen embryo dispute. In AZ v. BZ, a couple who began treatment at an IVF clinic signed seven different consent forms stipulating that, should the couple separate, the embryos would be returned to the mother for implantation. Id. at 7-11. As a result of an embryo transfer, the mother became pregnant and eventually gave birth to twin daughters. Id. at 14. Two vials of embryos remained frozen at the clinic. Id. Later, without informing her husband, the wife went to the clinic to have one of the two vials thawed and implanted in her body in an attempt to become pregnant again. Id. at 14-15. She did not, however, become pregnant from this procedure. Id. The couple separated and the husband filed for divorce, seeking an order enjoining his wife from using the remaining vial of frozen embryos. Id. at 15, 28. The Massachusetts court first analyzed the legal status of preembryos and held that it would not consider the embryos persons or property, but would instead accord them a special status. Id. at 17-19. As the court explained, this "interim category provides the gamete-providers the primary decision-making authority regarding the preembryo [and] recognizes the dual characteristics of the preembryos and will therefore be applied to the preembryos at issue." Id. at 19. In reaching its decision, the court refused to enforce the previous disposition agreement between the couple that stated that the wife would receive the frozen embryos in the event the couple separated. The court reasoned that although the woman has to endure significantly more intrusive and physically trying procedures during the IVF process, the couple should nonetheless be given equal authority in preembryo disposition decisions because the man and woman are equal gamete providers. Id. at 22. Although agreements are usually enforceable, the court held that because of the change in circumstances between the parties, "[w]ere the wife to use the preembryos, [the husband] would face unwanted parenthood encompassing all of the financial, psychological, and legal responsibilities and consequences." Id. at 27. The court held that "[t]his would not only be unfair to the parent but also unfair to a child who would enter the world unwanted by one of his or her parents." Id. at 28. The court therefore refused to enforce the agreement and applied a balancing test instead, weighing the husband's interest in avoiding procreation against the wife's interest in procreating. Id. at 26-28.
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122
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84923754968
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Kass, 1995 WL 110368, at *4
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Kass, 1995 WL 110368, at *4.
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123
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84923754967
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See infra notes 116-18 and accompanying text
-
See infra notes 116-18 and accompanying text.
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-
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124
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0010790888
-
-
See Raoul Berger, Government by Judiciary: The Transformation of the Fourteenth Amendment (1977); Hugo LaFayette Black, A Constitutional Faith (1969); Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the Law (1990); Richard S. Kay, Adherence to the Original Intentions in Constitutional Adjudication: Three Objections and Responses, 82 Nw. U. L. Rev. 226 (1988); Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. Cin. L. Rev. 849 (1989).
-
(1977)
Government by Judiciary: The Transformation of the Fourteenth Amendment
-
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Berger, R.1
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125
-
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0346078045
-
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See Raoul Berger, Government by Judiciary: The Transformation of the Fourteenth Amendment (1977); Hugo LaFayette Black, A Constitutional Faith (1969); Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the Law (1990); Richard S. Kay, Adherence to the Original Intentions in Constitutional Adjudication: Three Objections and Responses, 82 Nw. U. L. Rev. 226 (1988); Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. Cin. L. Rev. 849 (1989).
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(1969)
A Constitutional Faith
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Black, H.L.1
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126
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84935322749
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See Raoul Berger, Government by Judiciary: The Transformation of the Fourteenth Amendment (1977); Hugo LaFayette Black, A Constitutional Faith (1969); Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the Law (1990); Richard S. Kay, Adherence to the Original Intentions in Constitutional Adjudication: Three Objections and Responses, 82 Nw. U. L. Rev. 226 (1988); Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. Cin. L. Rev. 849 (1989).
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(1990)
The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the Law
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Bork, R.H.1
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127
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60349119605
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Adherence to the Original Intentions in Constitutional Adjudication: Three Objections and Responses
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See Raoul Berger, Government by Judiciary: The Transformation of the Fourteenth Amendment (1977); Hugo LaFayette Black, A Constitutional Faith (1969); Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the Law (1990); Richard S. Kay, Adherence to the Original Intentions in Constitutional Adjudication: Three Objections and Responses, 82 Nw. U. L. Rev. 226 (1988); Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. Cin. L. Rev. 849 (1989).
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(1988)
Nw. U. L. Rev.
, vol.82
, pp. 226
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Kay, R.S.1
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128
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Originalism: The Lesser Evil
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See Raoul Berger, Government by Judiciary: The Transformation of the Fourteenth Amendment (1977); Hugo LaFayette Black, A Constitutional Faith (1969); Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the Law (1990); Richard S. Kay, Adherence to the Original Intentions in Constitutional Adjudication: Three Objections and Responses, 82 Nw. U. L. Rev. 226 (1988); Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. Cin. L. Rev. 849 (1989).
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(1989)
U. Cin. L. Rev.
, vol.57
, pp. 849
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Scalia, A.1
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129
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0003806709
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See Alexander Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch (1962); Laurence H. Tribe, Constitutional Choices (1985); William J. Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary Ratification, 27 S. Tex. L.J. 433 (1986); Ronald Dworkin, Unenumerated Rights: Whether and How Roe Should Be Overruled, 59 U. Chi. L. Rev. 381 (1992) [hereinafter Dworkin, Unenumerated Rights]; James E. Fleming, Constructing the Substantive Constitution, 72 Tex. L. Rev. 211 (1993).
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(1962)
The Least Dangerous Branch
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Bickel, A.1
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130
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0039275851
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See Alexander Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch (1962); Laurence H. Tribe, Constitutional Choices (1985); William J. Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary Ratification, 27 S. Tex. L.J. 433 (1986); Ronald Dworkin, Unenumerated Rights: Whether and How Roe Should Be Overruled, 59 U. Chi. L. Rev. 381 (1992) [hereinafter Dworkin, Unenumerated Rights]; James E. Fleming, Constructing the Substantive Constitution, 72 Tex. L. Rev. 211 (1993).
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(1985)
Constitutional Choices
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Tribe, L.H.1
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131
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1842756163
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The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary Ratification
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See Alexander Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch (1962); Laurence H. Tribe, Constitutional Choices (1985); William J. Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary Ratification, 27 S. Tex. L.J. 433 (1986); Ronald Dworkin, Unenumerated Rights: Whether and How Roe Should Be Overruled, 59 U. Chi. L. Rev. 381 (1992) [hereinafter Dworkin, Unenumerated Rights]; James E. Fleming, Constructing the Substantive Constitution, 72 Tex. L. Rev. 211 (1993).
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(1986)
S. Tex. L.J.
, vol.27
, pp. 433
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Brennan Jr., W.J.1
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132
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0027029394
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Unenumerated Rights: Whether and How Roe Should Be Overruled
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See Alexander Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch (1962); Laurence H. Tribe, Constitutional Choices (1985); William J. Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary Ratification, 27 S. Tex. L.J. 433 (1986); Ronald Dworkin, Unenumerated Rights: Whether and How Roe Should Be Overruled, 59 U. Chi. L. Rev. 381 (1992) [hereinafter Dworkin, Unenumerated Rights]; James E. Fleming, Constructing the Substantive Constitution, 72 Tex. L. Rev. 211 (1993).
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(1992)
U. Chi. L. Rev.
, vol.59
, pp. 381
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Dworkin, R.1
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133
-
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2442558773
-
-
hereinafter
-
See Alexander Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch (1962); Laurence H. Tribe, Constitutional Choices (1985); William J. Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary Ratification, 27 S. Tex. L.J. 433 (1986); Ronald Dworkin, Unenumerated Rights: Whether and How Roe Should Be Overruled, 59 U. Chi. L. Rev. 381 (1992) [hereinafter Dworkin, Unenumerated Rights]; James E. Fleming, Constructing the Substantive Constitution, 72 Tex. L. Rev. 211 (1993).
-
Unenumerated Rights
-
-
Dworkin1
-
134
-
-
85055294934
-
Constructing the Substantive Constitution
-
See Alexander Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch (1962); Laurence H. Tribe, Constitutional Choices (1985); William J. Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary Ratification, 27 S. Tex. L.J. 433 (1986); Ronald Dworkin, Unenumerated Rights: Whether and How Roe Should Be Overruled, 59 U. Chi. L. Rev. 381 (1992) [hereinafter Dworkin, Unenumerated Rights]; James E. Fleming, Constructing the Substantive Constitution, 72 Tex. L. Rev. 211 (1993).
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(1993)
Tex. L. Rev.
, vol.72
, pp. 211
-
-
Fleming, J.E.1
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135
-
-
84923754966
-
-
17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316 (1819)
-
17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316 (1819).
-
-
-
-
136
-
-
84923754965
-
-
Id. at 407
-
Id. at 407.
-
-
-
-
137
-
-
0011534472
-
The Originalism Debate: A Guide for the Perplexed
-
See Daniel A. Farber, The Originalism Debate: A Guide for the Perplexed, 49 Ohio St. L.J. 1085 (1989); James E. Fleming, Securing Deliberative Autonomy, 48 Stan. L. Rev. 1 (1995) [hereinafter Fleming, Securing Autonomy ]; Willard C. Shih, Note, Assisted Suicide, The Due Process Clause and "Fidelity in Translation" 63 Fordham L. Rev. 1245 (1995); see also David B. Anders, Note, Justices Harlan and Black Revisited: The Emerging Dispute Between Justice O 'Connor and Justice Scalia over Unenumerated Fundamental Rights, 61 Fordham L. Rev. 895, 897 (1993) (discussing originalism and fundamental rights as two major theories of constitutional interpretation). Anders points out that many Supreme Court Justices have adopted one of these two theories in interpreting the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. Clear originalists include: Justice White, see Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (White, J., dissenting); Justice Scalia, see Scalia, supra note 112; and Chief Justice Rehnquist, see William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 Tex. L. Rev. 693 (1976). Fundamental rights theorists include: Justices Blackmun, see Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 922 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); and Justice Stevens, see Casey, 505 U.S. at 911 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Anders, supra, at 897 n.15.
-
(1989)
Ohio St. L.J.
, vol.49
, pp. 1085
-
-
Farber, D.A.1
-
138
-
-
84937276073
-
Securing Deliberative Autonomy
-
See Daniel A. Farber, The Originalism Debate: A Guide for the Perplexed, 49 Ohio St. L.J. 1085 (1989); James E. Fleming, Securing Deliberative Autonomy, 48 Stan. L. Rev. 1 (1995) [hereinafter Fleming, Securing Autonomy ]; Willard C. Shih, Note, Assisted Suicide, The Due Process Clause and "Fidelity in Translation" 63 Fordham L. Rev. 1245 (1995); see also David B. Anders, Note, Justices Harlan and Black Revisited: The Emerging Dispute Between Justice O 'Connor and Justice Scalia over Unenumerated Fundamental Rights, 61 Fordham L. Rev. 895, 897 (1993) (discussing originalism and fundamental rights as two major theories of constitutional interpretation). Anders points out that many Supreme Court Justices have adopted one of these two theories in interpreting the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. Clear originalists include: Justice White, see Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (White, J., dissenting); Justice Scalia, see Scalia, supra note 112; and Chief Justice Rehnquist, see William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 Tex. L. Rev. 693 (1976). Fundamental rights theorists include: Justices Blackmun, see Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 922 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); and Justice Stevens, see Casey, 505 U.S. at 911 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Anders, supra, at 897 n.15.
-
(1995)
Stan. L. Rev.
, vol.48
, pp. 1
-
-
Fleming, J.E.1
-
139
-
-
84923752681
-
-
hereinafter
-
See Daniel A. Farber, The Originalism Debate: A Guide for the Perplexed, 49 Ohio St. L.J. 1085 (1989); James E. Fleming, Securing Deliberative Autonomy, 48 Stan. L. Rev. 1 (1995) [hereinafter Fleming, Securing Autonomy ]; Willard C. Shih, Note, Assisted Suicide, The Due Process Clause and "Fidelity in Translation" 63 Fordham L. Rev. 1245 (1995); see also David B. Anders, Note, Justices Harlan and Black Revisited: The Emerging Dispute Between Justice O 'Connor and Justice Scalia over Unenumerated Fundamental Rights, 61 Fordham L. Rev. 895, 897 (1993) (discussing originalism and fundamental rights as two major theories of constitutional interpretation). Anders points out that many Supreme Court Justices have adopted one of these two theories in interpreting the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. Clear originalists include: Justice White, see Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (White, J., dissenting); Justice Scalia, see Scalia, supra note 112; and Chief Justice Rehnquist, see William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 Tex. L. Rev. 693 (1976). Fundamental rights theorists include: Justices Blackmun, see Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 922 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); and Justice Stevens, see Casey, 505 U.S. at 911 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Anders, supra, at 897 n.15.
-
Securing Autonomy
-
-
Fleming1
-
140
-
-
0029258170
-
Assisted Suicide, the Due Process Clause and "Fidelity in Translation"
-
Note
-
See Daniel A. Farber, The Originalism Debate: A Guide for the Perplexed, 49 Ohio St. L.J. 1085 (1989); James E. Fleming, Securing Deliberative Autonomy, 48 Stan. L. Rev. 1 (1995) [hereinafter Fleming, Securing Autonomy ]; Willard C. Shih, Note, Assisted Suicide, The Due Process Clause and "Fidelity in Translation" 63 Fordham L. Rev. 1245 (1995); see also David B. Anders, Note, Justices Harlan and Black Revisited: The Emerging Dispute Between Justice O 'Connor and Justice Scalia over Unenumerated Fundamental Rights, 61 Fordham L. Rev. 895, 897 (1993) (discussing originalism and fundamental rights as two major theories of constitutional interpretation). Anders points out that many Supreme Court Justices have adopted one of these two theories in interpreting the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. Clear originalists include: Justice White, see Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (White, J., dissenting); Justice Scalia, see Scalia, supra note 112; and Chief Justice Rehnquist, see William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 Tex. L. Rev. 693 (1976). Fundamental rights theorists include: Justices Blackmun, see Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 922 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); and Justice Stevens, see Casey, 505 U.S. at 911 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Anders, supra, at 897 n.15.
-
(1995)
Fordham L. Rev.
, vol.63
, pp. 1245
-
-
Shih, W.C.1
-
141
-
-
1842507734
-
Justices Harlan and Black Revisited: The Emerging Dispute between Justice O 'Connor and Justice Scalia over Unenumerated Fundamental Rights
-
Note
-
See Daniel A. Farber, The Originalism Debate: A Guide for the Perplexed, 49 Ohio St. L.J. 1085 (1989); James E. Fleming, Securing Deliberative Autonomy, 48 Stan. L. Rev. 1 (1995) [hereinafter Fleming, Securing Autonomy ]; Willard C. Shih, Note, Assisted Suicide, The Due Process Clause and "Fidelity in Translation" 63 Fordham L. Rev. 1245 (1995); see also David B. Anders, Note, Justices Harlan and Black Revisited: The Emerging Dispute Between Justice O 'Connor and Justice Scalia over Unenumerated Fundamental Rights, 61 Fordham L. Rev. 895, 897 (1993) (discussing originalism and fundamental rights as two major theories of constitutional interpretation). Anders points out that many Supreme Court Justices have adopted one of these two theories in interpreting the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. Clear originalists include: Justice White, see Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (White, J., dissenting); Justice Scalia, see Scalia, supra note 112; and Chief Justice Rehnquist, see William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 Tex. L. Rev. 693 (1976). Fundamental rights theorists include: Justices Blackmun, see Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 922 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); and Justice Stevens, see Casey, 505 U.S. at 911 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Anders, supra, at 897 n.15.
-
(1993)
Fordham L. Rev.
, vol.61
, pp. 895
-
-
Anders, D.B.1
-
142
-
-
84874384191
-
The Notion of a Living Constitution
-
See Daniel A. Farber, The Originalism Debate: A Guide for the Perplexed, 49 Ohio St. L.J. 1085 (1989); James E. Fleming, Securing Deliberative Autonomy, 48 Stan. L. Rev. 1 (1995) [hereinafter Fleming, Securing Autonomy ]; Willard C. Shih, Note, Assisted Suicide, The Due Process Clause and "Fidelity in Translation" 63 Fordham L. Rev. 1245 (1995); see also David B. Anders, Note, Justices Harlan and Black Revisited: The Emerging Dispute Between Justice O 'Connor and Justice Scalia over Unenumerated Fundamental Rights, 61 Fordham L. Rev. 895, 897 (1993) (discussing originalism and fundamental rights as two major theories of constitutional interpretation). Anders points out that many Supreme Court Justices have adopted one of these two theories in interpreting the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. Clear originalists include: Justice White, see Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (White, J., dissenting); Justice Scalia, see Scalia, supra note 112; and Chief Justice Rehnquist, see William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 Tex. L. Rev. 693 (1976). Fundamental rights theorists include: Justices Blackmun, see Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 922 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); and Justice Stevens, see Casey, 505 U.S. at 911 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Anders, supra, at 897 n.15.
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(1976)
Tex. L. Rev.
, vol.54
, pp. 693
-
-
Rehnquist, W.H.1
-
143
-
-
84923754964
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See supra note 112
-
See supra note 112.
-
-
-
-
144
-
-
0004150971
-
-
supra note 28
-
See supra note 113; see also Dworkin, Life's Dominion, supra note 28, at 122-23, 158-59 (explaining this approach to constitutional interpretation.
-
Life's Dominion
, pp. 122-123
-
-
Dworkin1
-
145
-
-
84923754963
-
-
See Bork, supra note 112. at 144-46
-
See Bork, supra note 112. at 144-46.
-
-
-
-
146
-
-
84923754962
-
-
Id. at 146
-
Id. at 146.
-
-
-
-
147
-
-
84923754961
-
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Id. at 147; see Rehnquist, supra note 116, at 704-05
-
Id. at 147; see Rehnquist, supra note 116, at 704-05.
-
-
-
-
148
-
-
84923754960
-
-
See Scalia, supra note 112, at 862 (referring to himself as a "faint-hearted" originalist)
-
See Scalia, supra note 112, at 862 (referring to himself as a "faint-hearted" originalist).
-
-
-
-
149
-
-
84923754959
-
-
See Bork, supra note 112
-
See Bork, supra note 112.
-
-
-
-
150
-
-
84923754958
-
-
See id. at 143-46
-
See id. at 143-46.
-
-
-
-
151
-
-
84923754957
-
-
Id. at 146-53; Shih, supra note 116, at 1264
-
Id. at 146-53; Shih, supra note 116, at 1264.
-
-
-
-
152
-
-
84923754956
-
-
See Bork, supra note 112, at 146-47; see Shih, supra note 116, at 1264
-
See Bork, supra note 112, at 146-47; see Shih, supra note 116, at 1264.
-
-
-
-
153
-
-
84923754954
-
-
See Bork, supra note 112, at 144; see Shih, supra note 116, at 1264
-
See Bork, supra note 112, at 144; see Shih, supra note 116, at 1264.
-
-
-
-
154
-
-
84923754952
-
-
See Bork, supra note 112, at 151; see Shih, supra note 116, at 1264
-
See Bork, supra note 112, at 151; see Shih, supra note 116, at 1264.
-
-
-
-
155
-
-
84923754943
-
-
See Bork, supra note 112, at 178. For example, Judge Bork criticizes the Court's creation of substantive due process in Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), and Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) - the foundation cases for privacy rights. See infra notes 230-44 and accompanying text (discussing the line of Court cases that developed the modern right of privacy). He fears that substantive due process is "wholly without limits, as well as without legitimacy" and provides "a warrant for later Courts to legislate at will" with no limiting principle. Bork, supra note 112, at 49. Judge Bork castigates the Court for its right to privacy decisions, and specifically argues that "the Court had no business undertaking to give a substantive answer to the claim[s]" in Griswold and Roe. Id. at 225 (referring to Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) and Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973))
-
See Bork, supra note 112, at 178. For example, Judge Bork criticizes the Court's creation of substantive due process in Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), and Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) - the foundation cases for privacy rights. See infra notes 230-44 and accompanying text (discussing the line of Court cases that developed the modern right of privacy). He fears that substantive due process is "wholly without limits, as well as without legitimacy" and provides "a warrant for later Courts to legislate at will" with no limiting principle. Bork, supra note 112, at 49. Judge Bork castigates the Court for its right to privacy decisions, and specifically argues that "the Court had no business undertaking to give a substantive answer to the claim[s]" in Griswold and Roe. Id. at 225 (referring to Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) and Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)); see also Bork, supra note 112, at 95 (referring to the Griswold decision as the construction of a "Constitutional Time Bomb").
-
-
-
-
156
-
-
84923754942
-
-
Bork, supra note 112, at 159-60
-
Bork, supra note 112, at 159-60.
-
-
-
-
157
-
-
84923752681
-
-
supra note 116, Anders, supra note 116, at 899; Shih, supra note 116, at 1263
-
See Fleming, Securing Autonomy, supra note 116, at 60; Anders, supra note 116, at 899; Shih, supra note 116, at 1263.
-
Securing Autonomy
, pp. 60
-
-
Fleming1
-
158
-
-
84923754941
-
-
note
-
For various commentators advocating this approach, see supra note 113.
-
-
-
-
162
-
-
84923754940
-
-
Id.
-
Id.
-
-
-
-
163
-
-
84923754939
-
-
Id. at 166
-
Id. at 166.
-
-
-
-
164
-
-
84923754938
-
-
Id. at 160
-
Id. at 160.
-
-
-
-
165
-
-
0003650945
-
-
Id. at 166 (referring to U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1). For other advocates of a fundamental rights approach to procreative rights, see Laurence H. Tribe, Abortion: The Clash of Absolutes (1990) [hereinafter Tribe, Abortion ]; Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 Stan. L. Rev. 261 (1992); and Fleming, Securing Autonomy, supra note 116.
-
(1990)
Abortion: the Clash of Absolutes
-
-
Tribe, L.H.1
-
166
-
-
84923723797
-
-
hereinafter
-
Id. at 166 (referring to U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1). For other advocates of a fundamental rights approach to procreative rights, see Laurence H. Tribe, Abortion: The Clash of Absolutes (1990) [hereinafter Tribe, Abortion ]; Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 Stan. L. Rev. 261 (1992); and Fleming, Securing Autonomy, supra note 116.
-
Abortion
-
-
Tribe1
-
167
-
-
0026676114
-
Reasoning from the Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection
-
Id. at 166 (referring to U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1). For other advocates of a fundamental rights approach to procreative rights, see Laurence H. Tribe, Abortion: The Clash of Absolutes (1990) [hereinafter Tribe, Abortion ]; Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 Stan. L. Rev. 261 (1992); and Fleming, Securing Autonomy, supra note 116.
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(1992)
Stan. L. Rev.
, vol.44
, pp. 261
-
-
Siegel, R.1
-
168
-
-
84923752681
-
-
supra note 116
-
Id. at 166 (referring to U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1). For other advocates of a fundamental rights approach to procreative rights, see Laurence H. Tribe, Abortion: The Clash of Absolutes (1990) [hereinafter Tribe, Abortion ]; Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 Stan. L. Rev. 261 (1992); and Fleming, Securing Autonomy, supra note 116.
-
Securing Autonomy
-
-
Fleming1
-
169
-
-
0038751735
-
Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles
-
Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 781, 804 (1983). Professor Tushnet points out that fundamental rights (or as he calls it interpretivism) "goes wrong in thinking that the commonalities are greater than they really are, but we would go equally wrong if we denied that they exist." Id.
-
(1983)
Harv. L. Rev.
, vol.96
, pp. 781
-
-
Tushnet, M.V.1
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170
-
-
2442624164
-
-
Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 141 (Brennan, J., dissenting); supra note 1
-
Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 141 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Dworkin, Arduous Virtue, supra note 1, at 1253.
-
Arduous Virtue
, pp. 1253
-
-
Dworkin1
-
171
-
-
84923754937
-
-
Michael H., 491 U.S. at 127-28 n.6
-
Michael H., 491 U.S. at 127-28 n.6.
-
-
-
-
172
-
-
46649085906
-
Levels of Generality in the Definition of Rights
-
Professors Tribe and Dorf explain that "[a]lthough we have described the enterprise of designating fundamental rights as a question of how abstractly to portray rights, we do not posit a single dimension along which abstraction must be measured. A right may be broad along one dimension, while narrow along another." Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorf, Levels of Generality in the Definition of Rights, 57 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1057, 1067 (1990).
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(1990)
U. Chi. L. Rev.
, vol.57
, pp. 1057
-
-
Tribe, L.H.1
Dorf, M.C.2
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173
-
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0030534028
-
A Wolf in Sheep's Clothing?: A Critical Analysis of Justice Harlan's Substantive Due Process Formulation
-
See supra note 116; Note
-
See supra note 116; Anthony C. Cicia, Note, A Wolf in Sheep's Clothing?: A Critical Analysis of Justice Harlan's Substantive Due Process Formulation, 64 Fordham L. Rev. 2241, 2250 (1996).
-
(1996)
Fordham L. Rev.
, vol.64
, pp. 2241
-
-
Cicia, A.C.1
-
174
-
-
84923754936
-
-
Michael H., 491 U.S. at 127-28 n.6
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Michael H., 491 U.S. at 127-28 n.6.
-
-
-
-
175
-
-
84923754934
-
-
Id. at 136-157 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Similarly, Justice Harlan has argued that constitutional rights should not be viewed as "a series of isolated points," protecting specific narrow liberties, but rather as "a rational continuum which, broadly speaking, includes [substantial] freedom[s]." Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)
-
Id. at 136-157 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Similarly, Justice Harlan has argued that constitutional rights should not be viewed as "a series of isolated points," protecting specific narrow liberties, but rather as "a rational continuum which, broadly speaking, includes [substantial] freedom[s]." Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
-
-
-
-
176
-
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84923754932
-
-
491 U.S. 110 (1989) (plurality opinion)
-
491 U.S. 110 (1989) (plurality opinion).
-
-
-
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177
-
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84923754923
-
-
Id. at 122-30
-
Id. at 122-30.
-
-
-
-
178
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84923754922
-
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Id. at 122 (citing Justice Cardozo in Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934))
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Id. at 122 (citing Justice Cardozo in Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)).
-
-
-
-
179
-
-
84923754921
-
-
Id. (citing Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 544 (1977) (White, J., dissenting))
-
Id. (citing Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 544 (1977) (White, J., dissenting)).
-
-
-
-
180
-
-
84923754920
-
-
note
-
Justice Scalia found that liberty interests rest upon "historic respect - indeed, sanctity would not be too strong a term - traditionally accorded to the relationships that develop within the unitary family." Id. at 123. His rationale in reaching this conclusion was that "[previous] decisions establish that the Constitution protects the sanctity of the family precisely because the institution of the family is deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition." Id. at 124 (citing plurality opinion of Justice Powell in Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)).
-
-
-
-
181
-
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84923754919
-
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Id. at 122 n.2, 124 n.4, 127 n.6, 130; id. at 143 n.2, 144 n.3 (Brennan, J., dissenting)
-
Id. at 122 n.2, 124 n.4, 127 n.6, 130; id. at 143 n.2, 144 n.3 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
-
-
-
-
182
-
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84923754918
-
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Id. at 127-28 n.6
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Id. at 127-28 n.6.
-
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183
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84923754917
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Id. at 127 n.6
-
Id. at 127 n.6.
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-
-
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184
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84923754916
-
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Id. at 138 (Brennan, J., dissenting)
-
Id. at 138 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
-
-
-
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185
-
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84923754914
-
-
note
-
"It is not that tradition has been irrelevant to our prior decisions. Throughout our decisionmaking . . . runs the theme that certain interests and practices - freedom from physical restraint, marriage, childbearing, childrearing, and others - form the core of our definition of 'liberty.'" Id. at 139.
-
-
-
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186
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84923754912
-
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Id. at 141-42 (Brennan, J., dissenting)
-
Id. at 141-42 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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187
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84923754903
-
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Id. at 142-43
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Id. at 142-43.
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188
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84923754902
-
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Id.
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Id.
-
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189
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84923754901
-
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Id. at 139 (citing Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), and Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), as two of the decisions that would have come out differently)
-
Id. at 139 (citing Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), and Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), as two of the decisions that would have come out differently).
-
-
-
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190
-
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84923754900
-
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Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453
-
Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453.
-
-
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191
-
-
84923754899
-
-
AZ v. BZ, slip op. (Mass. P. Ct. Mar. 25, 1996) (no docket number) (order granting permanent injunction) (on file with the Fordham Law Review); Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 600 (Tenn. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 911 (1993)
-
AZ v. BZ, slip op. (Mass. P. Ct. Mar. 25, 1996) (no docket number) (order granting permanent injunction) (on file with the Fordham Law Review); Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 600 (Tenn. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 911 (1993).
-
-
-
-
192
-
-
84923754898
-
-
See supra part II.A
-
See supra part II.A.
-
-
-
-
193
-
-
0042578087
-
The Bork Nomination
-
Professor Dworkin has referred to Judge Bork, a well known advocate of the originalist approach, as being a "constitutional radical" who "uses original intention as alchemists once used phlogiston, to hide the fact that he has no theory at all." Ronald M. Dworkin, The Bork Nomination, 9 Cardozo L. Rev. 101, 101, 112 (1987). Likewise, original intent has been called "not a formula or a theory but only a slogan pursuant to which old decisions can be replaced by new ones." Philip B. Kurland, Bork: The Transformation of a Conservative Constitutionalist, 9 Cardozo L. Rev. 127, 128 (1987); see Shih, supra note 116, at 1265-67 (discussing the shortcomings of originalism).
-
(1987)
Cardozo L. Rev.
, vol.9
, pp. 101
-
-
Dworkin, R.M.1
-
194
-
-
84923753683
-
Bork: The Transformation of a Conservative Constitutionalist
-
Professor Dworkin has referred to Judge Bork, a well known advocate of the originalist approach, as being a "constitutional radical" who "uses original intention as alchemists once used phlogiston, to hide the fact that he has no theory at all." Ronald M. Dworkin, The Bork Nomination, 9 Cardozo L. Rev. 101, 101, 112 (1987). Likewise, original intent has been called "not a formula or a theory but only a slogan pursuant to which old decisions can be replaced by new ones." Philip B. Kurland, Bork: The Transformation of a Conservative Constitutionalist, 9 Cardozo L. Rev. 127, 128 (1987); see Shih, supra note 116, at 1265-67 (discussing the shortcomings of originalism).
-
(1987)
Cardozo L. Rev.
, vol.9
, pp. 127
-
-
Kurland, P.B.1
-
195
-
-
0004150971
-
-
supra note 28
-
Dworkin, Life's Dominion, supra note 28, at 127-29; Dworkin, Arduous Virtue, supra note 1, at 1253.
-
Life's Dominion
, pp. 127-129
-
-
Dworkin1
-
196
-
-
2442624164
-
-
supra note 1
-
Dworkin, Life's Dominion, supra note 28, at 127-29; Dworkin, Arduous Virtue, supra note 1, at 1253.
-
Arduous Virtue
, pp. 1253
-
-
Dworkin1
-
198
-
-
84923754897
-
-
Id. at 127-28
-
Id. at 127-28.
-
-
-
-
199
-
-
84923754896
-
-
Farber, supra note 116, at 1093
-
Farber, supra note 116, at 1093.
-
-
-
-
200
-
-
84923754894
-
-
Id. at 1104
-
Id. at 1104.
-
-
-
-
201
-
-
84923754892
-
-
Id.
-
Id.
-
-
-
-
202
-
-
84923754883
-
-
Scalia, supra note 112, at 862
-
Scalia, supra note 112, at 862.
-
-
-
-
203
-
-
84923754882
-
-
U.S. Const. amend. VIII
-
U.S. Const. amend. VIII.
-
-
-
-
204
-
-
2442624164
-
-
supra note 1
-
Dworkin, Arduous Virtue, supra note 1, at 1253-54.
-
Arduous Virtue
, pp. 1253-1254
-
-
Dworkin1
-
205
-
-
84923754881
-
-
Scalia, supra note 112, at 861
-
Scalia, supra note 112, at 861.
-
-
-
-
206
-
-
84923754880
-
-
Id. at 861-62
-
Id. at 861-62.
-
-
-
-
207
-
-
21744451134
-
The Importance of Humility in Judicial Review: A Comment on Ronald Dworkin's "Moral Reading" of the Constitution
-
Michael W. McConnell, The Importance of Humility in Judicial Review: A Comment on Ronald Dworkin's "Moral Reading" of the Constitution, 65 Fordham L. Rev. 1269, 1292 (1997).
-
(1997)
Fordham L. Rev.
, vol.65
, pp. 1269
-
-
McConnell, M.W.1
-
208
-
-
84923754879
-
-
Id.
-
Id.
-
-
-
-
209
-
-
84923754878
-
-
Id.
-
Id.
-
-
-
-
210
-
-
84923754877
-
-
note
-
Professor Farber points out that the framers spent much time with issues that were important to them, yet [l]ittle thought was given to questions that today hold greater interest. . . . Similarly, the debates about the fourteenth amendment focused on the now forgotten section 2 and 3, which were of immediate concern in the context of Reconstruction but had no lasting importance. Section 1 of the amendment, [containing the Due Process Clause] which today looms larger in judicial application than any other provision of the Constitution, received only the most cursory attention. Farber, supra note 116, at 1087-88.
-
-
-
-
211
-
-
59549105648
-
Sonnet LXV and the "Black Ink" of the Framers' Intention
-
Charles Fried, Sonnet LXV and the "Black Ink" of the Framers' Intention, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 751, 758-59 (1987).
-
(1987)
Harv. L. Rev.
, vol.100
, pp. 751
-
-
Fried, C.1
-
212
-
-
2442624164
-
-
supra note 1
-
For example, Professor Dworkin states that "[c]onstitutional interpretation is not mathematics, and no one but a fool would think his own constitutional judgments beyond any conceivable challenge." Dworkin, Arduous Virtue, supra note 1, at 1258.
-
Arduous Virtue
, pp. 1258
-
-
Dworkin1
-
213
-
-
84923754876
-
-
Bork, supra note 112, at 251-52
-
Bork, supra note 112, at 251-52.
-
-
-
-
214
-
-
84923754874
-
-
Id. at 252
-
Id. at 252.
-
-
-
-
215
-
-
2442588311
-
Life's Dominion: An Exchange
-
Shih, supra note 116, at 1268 Sept. 6
-
Shih, supra note 116, at 1268 (citing Jeffrey Rosen, Life's Dominion: An Exchange, The New Republic, Sept. 6, 1993, at 43 (colloquy with Ronald Dworkin)).
-
(1993)
The New Republic
, pp. 43
-
-
Rosen, J.1
-
217
-
-
84923754872
-
-
Anders, supra note 116, at 901
-
Anders, supra note 116, at 901.
-
-
-
-
218
-
-
84923754863
-
-
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972)
-
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
-
-
-
-
219
-
-
84923754862
-
-
262 U.S. 390 (1923)
-
262 U.S. 390 (1923).
-
-
-
-
220
-
-
84923754861
-
-
316 U.S. 535 (1942)
-
316 U.S. 535 (1942).
-
-
-
-
221
-
-
84923754860
-
-
381 U.S. 479 (1965)
-
381 U.S. 479 (1965).
-
-
-
-
222
-
-
84923754859
-
-
405 U.S. 438 (1972)
-
405 U.S. 438 (1972).
-
-
-
-
223
-
-
84923754858
-
-
Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 589 (Tenn. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 911 (1993)
-
Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 589 (Tenn. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 911 (1993).
-
-
-
-
224
-
-
84923754857
-
-
Id. at 590. See infra part III.B.1 for an explanation of why terminating a frozen embryo can be viewed as contraception. If a court applies an extremely narrow interpretation of levels of generality, the court might not analogize this act to contraception, but rather classify the act as something entirely new and different
-
Id. at 590. See infra part III.B.1 for an explanation of why terminating a frozen embryo can be viewed as contraception. If a court applies an extremely narrow interpretation of levels of generality, the court might not analogize this act to contraception, but rather classify the act as something entirely new and different.
-
-
-
-
225
-
-
84923754856
-
-
note
-
Although nothing in the original text of the Constitution grants any right to contraception, Justice Scalia, arguably the Court's most outspoken originalist, explicitly states in footnote six of Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (plurality opinion), that his analysis using the most specific level of tradition "is not inconsistent with the result in cases such as Griswold . . . or Eisenstadt." Id. at 128 n.6 (citing Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)). By comparing his Michael H. analysis to the results of Griswold and Eisenstadt, Justice Scalia strongly implies that these two cases were rightly decided, and therefore that both single and married persons are guaranteed the right to contraception.
-
-
-
-
226
-
-
0346619853
-
-
supra note 29
-
Professor Robertson points out: [R]ecognition of a right of single persons to conceive children would be seen as another foray into the thickets of substantive due process. . . . Although recognition of a right to procreate should extend to any means or technique of reproduction, the right has not yet been extended in this manner, and it is not inevitable that it will be. Defining and articulating the scope of the right to procreate will set the Supreme Court adrift in the largely unchartered waters of substantive due process. Robertson, Procreative Liberty, supra note 29, at 418-20.
-
Procreative Liberty
, pp. 418-420
-
-
Robertson1
-
227
-
-
84923754854
-
-
note
-
A close examination of the privacy decisions reveals that except for Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942), which examines involuntary sterilization in an equal protection context, all of the Court's right to privacy cases deal with restrictions on reproduction, not with questions over affirmative procreative rights or non-coital reproduction conflicts involving only IVF rights. In Skinner, the first case recognizing a right of privacy in reproduction, Justice Douglas determined that marriage and procreation were among the "basic civil rights of man." Id. at 541. The Court's decision preserved Skinner's reproductive capacity until such time as he could exercise it. Although Skinner dealt with the ability to cause conception, it was only in the context of state action that would have resulted in permanently sterilizing an individual, not in the context of affirmative procreative rights for one parent by forcing conception on the other parent. Indeed, the Court has only recognized the right to avoid involuntary sterilization, Skinner, 316 U.S. at 535; the right to employ contraception, Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); and the right to an abortion, Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (plurality opinion); Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132 (1976); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1975); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Eisenstadt, however, interpreted broadly, expressly extends procreative autonomy rights to an unmarried woman's right to beget - the right to conception. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 452.
-
-
-
-
228
-
-
84923754852
-
-
Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 911 (1993)
-
Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 911 (1993).
-
-
-
-
229
-
-
84923754803
-
-
Kass v. Kass, 1995 WL 110368 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 18, 1995) (no docket number)
-
Kass v. Kass, 1995 WL 110368 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 18, 1995) (no docket number).
-
-
-
-
230
-
-
84923754802
-
-
Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 603-04
-
Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 603-04.
-
-
-
-
231
-
-
84923754801
-
-
505 U.S. 833 (1992) (plurality opinion)
-
505 U.S. 833 (1992) (plurality opinion).
-
-
-
-
232
-
-
0030321879
-
An Equality Approach to Wrongful Birth Statutes
-
Note
-
See Stephanie S. Gold, Note, An Equality Approach to Wrongful Birth Statutes, 65 Fordham L. Rev. 1005, 1022 n.91 (1996) (pointing out that the term "'spousal notification' may be a misnomer," and that the term should be "husband notification" because it is only the woman who gets pregnant, and therefore, it is the woman who is forced to notify).
-
(1996)
Fordham L. Rev.
, vol.65
, Issue.91
, pp. 1005
-
-
Gold, S.S.1
-
233
-
-
84923754800
-
-
Casey, 505 U.S. at 895-98
-
Casey, 505 U.S. at 895-98.
-
-
-
-
234
-
-
0347880940
-
Reconsidering Abortion Law: Liberty, Equality, and the New Rhetoric of Planned Parenthood v. Casey
-
Id. at 851 (holding that a woman's decision to choose an abortion is "central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment"); see Erin Daly, Reconsidering Abortion Law: Liberty, Equality, and the New Rhetoric of Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 45 Am. U. L. Rev. 77, 136-37 (explaining how Casey expanded women's liberty rights); Gold, supra note 201, at 1033-37 (discussing the principles of equality established in Casey).
-
Am. U. L. Rev.
, vol.45
, pp. 77
-
-
Daly, E.1
-
235
-
-
84923754799
-
-
note
-
Although there is a fundamental distinction between abortion, where the embryo is inside the woman's body, and IVF, where the embryo is outside the woman's body, a court may very well take the position of the Kass court and hold that "it matters little whether the ovum/sperm union takes place in the private darkness of a fallopian tube or the public glare of a petri dish" and that therefore "an in vivo husband's rights and control over the procreative process ends with ejaculation." Kass v. Kass, 1995 WL 110368, at *3, *2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 18, 1995) (no docket number).
-
-
-
-
236
-
-
84923754798
-
-
See supra notes 238-44 and accompanying text
-
See supra notes 238-44 and accompanying text.
-
-
-
-
237
-
-
84923754797
-
-
note
-
In light of Casey's striking down Pennsylvania's spousal notification requirement, Kass's rationale of analogizing the termination of a frozen embryo to abortion even further establishes a woman's rights over a man in a frozen embryo dispute and increases the man's stake in analogizing this act to contraception.
-
-
-
-
238
-
-
84923754796
-
-
note
-
Contraception is a protected right for both the man and woman. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 443 (1972) (referring to the right of contraception as one belonging to "single persons" generally). The Supreme Court has consistently held, however, that even though the right to abortion is limited, a woman has a right to terminate the pregnancy before viability. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (plurality opinion); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
-
-
-
-
239
-
-
84923704272
-
-
supra note 6
-
Robertson, Embryos, supra note 6, at 970.
-
Embryos
, pp. 970
-
-
Robertson1
-
240
-
-
84923754795
-
-
note
-
This observation about Professor Robertson is stated in Carow, supra note 2, at 541-42.
-
-
-
-
241
-
-
84923704272
-
-
supra note 6
-
Robertson, Embryos, supra note 6, at 969.
-
Embryos
, pp. 969
-
-
Robertson1
-
242
-
-
84923743656
-
Ethical Considerations in the Use of New Reproductive Technologies
-
Id. (quoting American Fertility Society, Ethical Considerations in the Use of New Reproductive Technologies, 46 Fertility & Sterility (1986) (spec. supp.) [hereinafter American Fertility Society]).
-
(1986)
Fertility & Sterility
, vol.46
, Issue.SPEC. SUPPL.
-
-
-
243
-
-
84923754794
-
-
See Stedman, supra note 38, at 1488 ("The ectodermal cell layer covering the blastocyst which erodes the uterine mucosa and through which the embryo receives nourishment from the mother.")
-
See Stedman, supra note 38, at 1488 ("The ectodermal cell layer covering the blastocyst which erodes the uterine mucosa and through which the embryo receives nourishment from the mother.")
-
-
-
-
244
-
-
84923704272
-
-
supra note 6
-
Robertson, Embryos, supra note 6, at 969 (quoting American Fertility Society, supra note 211).
-
Embryos
, pp. 969
-
-
Robertson1
-
245
-
-
84923754793
-
-
Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 593 (Tenn. 1992) (quoting Dr. Jerome LeJeune, a French geneticist who testified at the Davis trial), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 911 (1993)
-
Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 593 (Tenn. 1992) (quoting Dr. Jerome LeJeune, a French geneticist who testified at the Davis trial), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 911 (1993).
-
-
-
-
246
-
-
84923704272
-
-
supra note 6
-
Robertson, Embryos, supra note 6, at 970.
-
Embryos
, pp. 970
-
-
Robertson1
-
247
-
-
84923754792
-
-
Id.
-
Id.
-
-
-
-
248
-
-
84923754791
-
-
Id.
-
Id.
-
-
-
-
249
-
-
84923754790
-
-
Id.
-
Id.
-
-
-
-
250
-
-
2442574514
-
Is an Embryo a Person?
-
Nov. 13
-
Charles A. Gardner, Is an Embryo a Person?, The Nation, Nov. 13, 1989, at 557; see also Tribe, Abortion, supra note 139, at 118 (quoting Dr. Gardner to advance the argument that a fertilized egg can not yet be classified as a person).
-
(1989)
The Nation
, pp. 557
-
-
Gardner, C.A.1
-
251
-
-
84923723797
-
-
supra note 139
-
Charles A. Gardner, Is an Embryo a Person?, The Nation, Nov. 13, 1989, at 557; see also Tribe, Abortion, supra note 139, at 118 (quoting Dr. Gardner to advance the argument that a fertilized egg can not yet be classified as a person).
-
Abortion
, pp. 118
-
-
Tribe1
-
252
-
-
84923754789
-
-
Gardner, supra note 219, at 558
-
Gardner, supra note 219, at 558.
-
-
-
-
253
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84923754788
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Id.
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Id.
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254
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84923754787
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Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 595 n.19 (Tenn. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 911 (1993) (citations omitted)
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Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 595 n.19 (Tenn. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 911 (1993) (citations omitted).
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255
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84923754786
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Id.
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Id.
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256
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84923754785
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Id.
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Id.
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257
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84923754784
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Id. at 593 (quoting Dr. Jerome LeJeune)
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Id. at 593 (quoting Dr. Jerome LeJeune).
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258
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25544469716
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FDA Panel Backs Contraceptive Pills for Emergency Use
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July 1
-
See Anita Womack, FDA Panel Backs Contraceptive Pills for Emergency Use, Wall. St. J., July 1, 1996, at B7C (reporting that "[a] unanimous Food and Drug Administration panel declared that contraceptive pills for emergency use, known as morning-after pills, are safe and effective in reducing unwanted pregnancies").
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(1996)
Wall. St. J.
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Womack, A.1
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259
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84923754783
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492 U.S. 490, 539 n.1 (1989) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
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492 U.S. 490, 539 n.1 (1989) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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260
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84923754782
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Id.
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Id.
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261
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2442603093
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Achieving Consistent Disposition of Frozen Embryos in Marital Dissolution under Florida Law
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Note
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See Brenda L. Henderson, Note, Achieving Consistent Disposition of Frozen Embryos in Marital Dissolution Under Florida Law, 17 Nova L. Rev. 549, 570 (1992) (pointing out that the IUD is a "form of contraception [that] destroys the fertilized ovum by preventing successful implantation in the uterus").
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(1992)
Nova L. Rev.
, vol.17
, pp. 549
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-
Henderson, B.L.1
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262
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1842455455
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The Conservatism of Justice Harlan
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Justice Louis Brandeis laid the foundation for the right to privacy when he recognized a right of protection of one's private life from government intrusion or "the right to be let alone - the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men." Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). With such a basis, Justice Harlan, in Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961), was the first Justice to expressly argue for a constitutional right to privacy. Id. at 522-55 (Harlan, J., dissenting). In Poe, the plaintiffs challenged Connecticut statutes prohibiting the use of contraceptive devices and the giving of medical advice on the use of such devices. The majority held that there was no justiciable controversy because state officials apparently had no intent to enforce the statutes. Id. at 501-09. In his dissent, Justice Harlan argued that the application of the statute to married persons would violate the Due Process Clause because the regulation was an "intolerable and unjustifiable invasion of privacy," id. at 539, by intruding upon "the most intimate details of the marital relation." Id. at 548. Commentators have cited Justice Harlan's dissent in Poe for the proposition that it created the right to privacy. See Charles Fried, The Conservatism of Justice Harlan, 36 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 33, 35 (1991); Gerald Gunther, Another View of Justice Harlan - A Comment on Fried and Ackerman, 36 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 67, 68 (1991)).
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(1991)
N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev.
, vol.36
, pp. 33
-
-
Fried, C.1
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263
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1842612146
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Another View of Justice Harlan - A Comment on Fried and Ackerman
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Justice Louis Brandeis laid the foundation for the right to privacy when he recognized a right of protection of one's private life from government intrusion or "the right to be let alone - the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men." Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). With such a basis, Justice Harlan, in Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961), was the first Justice to expressly argue for a constitutional right to privacy. Id. at 522-55 (Harlan, J., dissenting). In Poe, the plaintiffs challenged Connecticut statutes prohibiting the use of contraceptive devices and the giving of medical advice on the use of such devices. The majority held that there was no justiciable controversy because state officials apparently had no intent to enforce the statutes. Id. at 501-09. In his dissent, Justice Harlan argued that the application of the statute to married persons would violate the Due Process Clause because the regulation was an "intolerable and unjustifiable invasion of privacy," id. at 539, by intruding upon "the most intimate details of the marital relation." Id. at 548. Commentators have cited Justice Harlan's dissent in Poe for the proposition that it created the right to privacy. See Charles Fried, The Conservatism of Justice Harlan, 36 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 33, 35 (1991); Gerald Gunther, Another View of Justice Harlan - A Comment on Fried and Ackerman, 36 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 67, 68 (1991)).
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(1991)
N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev.
, vol.36
, pp. 67
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-
Gunther, G.1
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264
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84923754781
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262 U.S. 390 (1923)
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262 U.S. 390 (1923).
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265
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84923754780
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Id. at 401
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Id. at 401.
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266
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84923754779
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Id. at 399
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Id. at 399.
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267
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84923754778
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316 U.S. 535 (1942). While in form an equal protection case, the Supreme Court's opinion in Skinner carried forceful due process implications. Ronald D. Rotunda & John E. Nowak, Treatise on Constitutional Law: Substance and Procedure, § 18.27, at 300 (2d ed. 1992)
-
316 U.S. 535 (1942). While in form an equal protection case, the Supreme Court's opinion in Skinner carried forceful due process implications. Ronald D. Rotunda & John E. Nowak, Treatise on Constitutional Law: Substance and Procedure, § 18.27, at 300 (2d ed. 1992).
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268
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84923754777
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Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541. Under the statute, persons convicted of "offenses arising out of the violation of the prohibitory laws, revenue acts, embezzlement, or political offenses" did not have to undergo sterilization. Id. at 537
-
Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541. Under the statute, persons convicted of "offenses arising out of the violation of the prohibitory laws, revenue acts, embezzlement, or political offenses" did not have to undergo sterilization. Id. at 537.
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269
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84923754776
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Id. at 541
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Id. at 541.
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-
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270
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84923754775
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-
Rotunda & Nowak, supra note 234, § 18.27, at 300
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Rotunda & Nowak, supra note 234, § 18.27, at 300.
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-
-
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271
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84923754774
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-
381 U.S. 479 (1965)
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381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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-
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272
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84923754773
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Id. at 485-86. The Connecticut statute violated the established values of privacy in three ways: (1) it regulated a private marital relationship without a legitimate reason; (2) it gave the government the right to inquire into private marital relationships; and (3) it often required husbands and wives prosecuted under these statutes to testify to the private details of their marriage. Rotunda & Nowak, supra note 234, § 18.27, at 303
-
Id. at 485-86. The Connecticut statute violated the established values of privacy in three ways: (1) it regulated a private marital relationship without a legitimate reason; (2) it gave the government the right to inquire into private marital relationships; and (3) it often required husbands and wives prosecuted under these statutes to testify to the private details of their marriage. Rotunda & Nowak, supra note 234, § 18.27, at 303.
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-
-
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273
-
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0005150051
-
The Unfinished Business of the Warren Court
-
Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484-85. Professor Charles Black, explaining the rationale of Griswold, states: If our constitutional law could permit [a criminal ban on the use of contraceptives], then we might almost as well not have any law of constitutional limitations, partly because the thing is so outrageous in itself, and partly because a constitutional law inadequate to deal with such an outrage would be too feeble, in method and doctrine, to deal with a very great amount of equally outrageous material. Charles L. Black, Jr., The Unfinished Business of the Warren Court, 46 Wash. L. Rev. 3, 32 (1970).
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(1970)
Wash. L. Rev.
, vol.46
, pp. 3
-
-
Black Jr., C.L.1
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274
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84923754772
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405 U.S. 438 (1972)
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405 U.S. 438 (1972).
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-
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275
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84923754771
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Id. at 453
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Id. at 453.
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276
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84923754770
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Id.
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Id.
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277
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84923754769
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Id.
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Id.
-
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-
278
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84923754768
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-
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923)
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Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
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-
-
-
279
-
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84923754767
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-
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925)
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Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
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-
-
-
280
-
-
84923754766
-
-
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)
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Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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-
-
-
281
-
-
84923754765
-
-
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972)
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Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
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-
-
-
282
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84923754764
-
-
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132 (1976); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)
-
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132 (1976); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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-
-
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283
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84923754763
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-
See supra part III.B.1
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See supra part III.B.1
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-
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284
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84923754762
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Webster's, supra note 108, at 160
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Webster's, supra note 108, at 160.
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-
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285
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84923754761
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Id. at 163
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Id. at 163.
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287
-
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84923754760
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note
-
Doctrinally, the woman will argue that for the Constitution to be an effective tool in protecting individual liberties, it is essential for judges to interpret fundamental rights cases broadly, applying a fundamental rights interpretation of the Constitution, rather than a strict originalist approach.
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-
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288
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84923754759
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Kass v. Kass, 1995 WL 110368 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 18, 1995) (no docket number)
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Kass v. Kass, 1995 WL 110368 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 18, 1995) (no docket number).
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-
-
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289
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84923754758
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Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 911 (1993)
-
Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 911 (1993).
-
-
-
-
290
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84923754757
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Id. at 604. Davis cited Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988), in which the Court balanced the competing interests of a city in protecting an abortion doctor, and the people who picketed in front of the doctor's home. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 603 n.29. Frisby implies that when competing rights are involved, a court must balance the competing interests in order to equitably resolve the conflict
-
Id. at 604. Davis cited Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988), in which the Court balanced the competing interests of a city in protecting an abortion doctor, and the people who picketed in front of the doctor's home. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 603 n.29. Frisby implies that when competing rights are involved, a court must balance the competing interests in order to equitably resolve the conflict.
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-
-
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