메뉴 건너뛰기




Volumn 65, Issue 5, 1997, Pages 2205-2238

Frozen life's dominion: Extending reproductive autonomy rights to in vitro fertilization

(1)  Gunsburg, Samuel A a  

a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ARTICLE; CIVIL RIGHTS; CONTRACEPTION; CRYOPRESERVATION; DIVORCE; EMBRYO; FATHER; FEMALE; FERTILIZATION IN VITRO; HUMAN; LEGAL ASPECT; MALE; MOTHER; REPRODUCTION; UNITED STATES;

EID: 0031113773     PISSN: 0015704X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (1)

References (290)
  • 1
    • 84920564867 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • The Arduous Virtue of Fidelity: Originalism, Scalia, Tribe, and Nerve
    • Ronald Dworkin, The Arduous Virtue of Fidelity: Originalism, Scalia, Tribe, and Nerve, 65 Fordham L. Rev. 1249, 1249-50 (1997) [hereinafter Dworkin, Arduous Virtue].
    • (1997) Fordham L. Rev. , vol.65 , pp. 1249
    • Dworkin, R.1
  • 2
    • 2442624164 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • hereinafter
    • Ronald Dworkin, The Arduous Virtue of Fidelity: Originalism, Scalia, Tribe, and Nerve, 65 Fordham L. Rev. 1249, 1249-50 (1997) [hereinafter Dworkin, Arduous Virtue].
    • Arduous Virtue
    • Dworkin1
  • 3
    • 0345864037 scopus 로고
    • Davis v. Davis: An Inconsistent Exception to an Otherwise Sound Rule Advancing Procreational Freedom and Reproductive Technology
    • Jennifer L. Carow, Davis v. Davis: An Inconsistent Exception to an Otherwise Sound Rule Advancing Procreational Freedom and Reproductive Technology, 43 DePaul L. Rev. 523, 526 (1994) (citations omitted).
    • (1994) DePaul L. Rev. , vol.43 , pp. 523
    • Carow, J.L.1
  • 4
    • 84923755160 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Id.
    • Id.
  • 5
    • 84923755159 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Id.
    • Id.
  • 6
    • 0018280560 scopus 로고
    • The First Test-Tube Baby
    • July 31
    • The First Test-Tube Baby, Time, July 31, 1978, at 58.
    • (1978) Time , pp. 58
  • 7
    • 0022741116 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Embryos, Families, and Procreative Liberty: The Legal Structure of the New Reproduction
    • John A. Robertson, Embryos, Families, and Procreative Liberty: The Legal Structure of the New Reproduction, 59 S. Cal. L. Rev. 939, 948 (1986) [hereinafter Robertson, Embryos]; see infra part I (explaining the IVF procedure); see also Lesley Brown & John Brown, Our Miracle Called Louise: A Parents' Story (1979) (recounting the story of Louise Brown's parents in their own words); Robert Edwards & Patrick Steptoe, A Matter of Life: The Story of a Medical Breakthrough (1980) (providing the account of Louise Brown's birth from the doctors' perspective).
    • (1986) S. Cal. L. Rev. , vol.59 , pp. 939
    • Robertson, J.A.1
  • 8
    • 0022741116 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • hereinafter
    • John A. Robertson, Embryos, Families, and Procreative Liberty: The Legal Structure of the New Reproduction, 59 S. Cal. L. Rev. 939, 948 (1986) [hereinafter Robertson, Embryos]; see infra part I (explaining the IVF procedure); see also Lesley Brown & John Brown, Our Miracle Called Louise: A Parents' Story (1979) (recounting the story of Louise Brown's parents in their own words); Robert Edwards & Patrick Steptoe, A Matter of Life: The Story of a Medical Breakthrough (1980) (providing the account of Louise Brown's birth from the doctors' perspective).
    • Embryos
    • Robertson1
  • 9
    • 0022741116 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • John A. Robertson, Embryos, Families, and Procreative Liberty: The Legal Structure of the New Reproduction, 59 S. Cal. L. Rev. 939, 948 (1986) [hereinafter Robertson, Embryos]; see infra part I (explaining the IVF procedure); see also Lesley Brown & John Brown, Our Miracle Called Louise: A Parents' Story (1979) (recounting the story of Louise Brown's parents in their own words); Robert Edwards & Patrick Steptoe, A Matter of Life: The Story of a Medical Breakthrough (1980) (providing the account of Louise Brown's birth from the doctors' perspective).
    • (1979) Our Miracle Called Louise: A Parents' Story
    • Brown, L.1    Brown, J.2
  • 10
    • 0022741116 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • John A. Robertson, Embryos, Families, and Procreative Liberty: The Legal Structure of the New Reproduction, 59 S. Cal. L. Rev. 939, 948 (1986) [hereinafter Robertson, Embryos]; see infra part I (explaining the IVF procedure); see also Lesley Brown & John Brown, Our Miracle Called Louise: A Parents' Story (1979) (recounting the story of Louise Brown's parents in their own words); Robert Edwards & Patrick Steptoe, A Matter of Life: The Story of a Medical Breakthrough (1980) (providing the account of Louise Brown's birth from the doctors' perspective).
    • (1980) A Matter of Life: The Story of a Medical Breakthrough
    • Edwards, R.1    Steptoe, P.2
  • 11
    • 84923704272 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • supra note 6
    • Treatments range "from fertility drugs to tubal reconstruction by microsurgery and artificial insemination." Robertson, Embryos, supra note 6, at 947.
    • Embryos , pp. 947
    • Robertson1
  • 12
    • 84923755158 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Id.
    • Id.
  • 13
    • 84923755157 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See Kass v. Kass, 1995 WL 110368 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 18, 1995) (no docket number); Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 911 (1993); see AZ v. BZ, slip op. (Mass. P. Ct. Mar. 25, 1996) (no docket number) (order granting permanent injunction) (on file with the Fordham Law Review). Foreign courts also have addressed IVF conflicts. In a case of first impression, the Israeli Supreme Court resolved a frozen embryo disposition dispute. Joel Greenberg, Israeli Court Gives Wife the Right to Her Embryos, N.Y. Times, Sept. 13, 1996, at A10. In Nahmani v. Nahmani, the Israeli Supreme Court voted 7-4 that although both parents have reproductive rights over the embryo, the mother's right to be a parent prevailed over the father's right not to be a parent. Id. The court reasoned that implanting the embryos in the mother, who had previously undergone a hysterectomy, would afford her the only opportunity to become a parent. Id.
    • See Kass v. Kass, 1995 WL 110368 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 18, 1995) (no docket number); Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 911 (1993); see AZ v. BZ, slip op. (Mass. P. Ct. Mar. 25, 1996) (no docket number) (order granting permanent injunction) (on file with the Fordham Law Review). Foreign courts also have addressed IVF conflicts. In a case of first impression, the Israeli Supreme Court resolved a frozen embryo disposition dispute. Joel Greenberg, Israeli Court Gives Wife the Right to Her Embryos, N.Y. Times, Sept. 13, 1996, at A10. In Nahmani v. Nahmani, the Israeli Supreme Court voted 7-4 that although both parents have reproductive rights over the embryo, the mother's right to be a parent prevailed over the father's right not to be a parent. Id. The court reasoned that implanting the embryos in the mother, who had previously undergone a hysterectomy, would afford her the only opportunity to become a parent. Id.
  • 14
    • 84923755156 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See infra part I.A (detailing a description of the cryopreservation process)
    • See infra part I.A (detailing a description of the cryopreservation process).
  • 15
    • 0025620982 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Prior Agreements for Disposition of Frozen Embryos
    • John A. Robertson, Prior Agreements for Disposition of Frozen Embryos, 51 Ohio St. L.J. 407, 409-10 (1990) [hereinafter Robertson, Prior Agreements].
    • (1990) Ohio St. L.J. , vol.51 , pp. 407
    • Robertson, J.A.1
  • 16
    • 0025620982 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • hereinafter
    • John A. Robertson, Prior Agreements for Disposition of Frozen Embryos, 51 Ohio St. L.J. 407, 409-10 (1990) [hereinafter Robertson, Prior Agreements].
    • Prior Agreements
    • Robertson1
  • 17
    • 84936628259 scopus 로고
    • Market-Inalienability
    • One can argue that such agreements are unenforceable on the ground that reproductive rights are inalienable. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (holding that the Constitution can make contracts unenforceable even when they are not void ab initio); Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 1849 (1987) (discussing rights that are nonwaivable or nonrelinquishable); Robertson, Prior Agreements, supra note 11, at 418-19 (analogizing preconception agreements to abortion or child rearing agreements that are not binding); William Joseph Wagner, The Contractual Reallocation of Procreative Resources and Parental Rights: The Natural Endowment Critique, 41 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1, 12 (1990) (arguing that contractual reallocation of procreative resources and parental rights risks the structural breakdown of the American political tradition of respect for human dignity). In addition, contracts relinquishing parental rights through IVF agreements can be analogized to surrogacy contracts, which have been held to be illegal. See In re Baby M., 537 A.2d 1227, 1255 (N.J. 1988) (holding that unpaid surrogacy contracts are unenforceable); Martha A. Field, Surrogate Motherhood (1988) (discussing arguments for and against enforcing surrogacy contracts and arguing that if abortion and adoption contracts are unenforceable, the same rule should apply to surrogacy contracts); M. Celeste Schejbal-Vossmeyer, Comment, What Money Cannot Buy: Commercial Surrogacy and the Doctrine of Illegal Contracts, 32 St. Louis U. L.J. 1171, 1206 (1988) (arguing that "[g]iving a second party the right to control another person's reproductive capacity is contradictory" because it allows a party to waive his or her right so that another party can exercise it). But see Richard A. Posner, Sex and Reason 420-27 (1992) (applying an economic theory for surrogate contracts and advocating enforcement of cash transactions in the formation of family relationships).
    • (1987) Harv. L. Rev. , vol.100 , pp. 1849
    • Radin, M.J.1
  • 18
    • 0347125324 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • supra note 11
    • One can argue that such agreements are unenforceable on the ground that reproductive rights are inalienable. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (holding that the Constitution can make contracts unenforceable even when they are not void ab initio); Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 1849 (1987) (discussing rights that are nonwaivable or nonrelinquishable); Robertson, Prior Agreements, supra note 11, at 418-19 (analogizing preconception agreements to abortion or child rearing agreements that are not binding); William Joseph Wagner, The Contractual Reallocation of Procreative Resources and Parental Rights: The Natural Endowment Critique, 41 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1, 12 (1990) (arguing that contractual reallocation of procreative resources and parental rights risks the structural breakdown of the American political tradition of respect for human dignity). In addition, contracts relinquishing parental rights through IVF agreements can be analogized to surrogacy contracts, which have been held to be illegal. See In re Baby M., 537 A.2d 1227, 1255 (N.J. 1988) (holding that unpaid surrogacy contracts are unenforceable); Martha A. Field, Surrogate Motherhood (1988) (discussing arguments for and against enforcing surrogacy contracts and arguing that if abortion and adoption contracts are unenforceable, the same rule should apply to surrogacy contracts); M. Celeste Schejbal-Vossmeyer, Comment, What Money Cannot Buy: Commercial Surrogacy and the Doctrine of Illegal Contracts, 32 St. Louis U. L.J. 1171, 1206 (1988) (arguing that "[g]iving a second party the right to control another person's reproductive capacity is contradictory" because it allows a party to waive his or her right so that another party can exercise it). But see Richard A. Posner, Sex and Reason 420-27 (1992) (applying an economic theory for surrogate contracts and advocating enforcement of cash transactions in the formation of family relationships).
    • Prior Agreements , pp. 418-419
    • Robertson1
  • 19
    • 84964217666 scopus 로고
    • The Contractual Reallocation of Procreative Resources and Parental Rights: The Natural Endowment Critique
    • One can argue that such agreements are unenforceable on the ground that reproductive rights are inalienable. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (holding that the Constitution can make contracts unenforceable even when they are not void ab initio); Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 1849 (1987) (discussing rights that are nonwaivable or nonrelinquishable); Robertson, Prior Agreements, supra note 11, at 418-19 (analogizing preconception agreements to abortion or child rearing agreements that are not binding); William Joseph Wagner, The Contractual Reallocation of Procreative Resources and Parental Rights: The Natural Endowment Critique, 41 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1, 12 (1990) (arguing that contractual reallocation of procreative resources and parental rights risks the structural breakdown of the American political tradition of respect for human dignity). In addition, contracts relinquishing parental rights through IVF agreements can be analogized to surrogacy contracts, which have been held to be illegal. See In re Baby M., 537 A.2d 1227, 1255 (N.J. 1988) (holding that unpaid surrogacy contracts are unenforceable); Martha A. Field, Surrogate Motherhood (1988) (discussing arguments for and against enforcing surrogacy contracts and arguing that if abortion and adoption contracts are unenforceable, the same rule should apply to surrogacy contracts); M. Celeste Schejbal-Vossmeyer, Comment, What Money Cannot Buy: Commercial Surrogacy and the Doctrine of Illegal Contracts, 32 St. Louis U. L.J. 1171, 1206 (1988) (arguing that "[g]iving a second party the right to control another person's reproductive capacity is contradictory" because it allows a party to waive his or her right so that another party can exercise it). But see Richard A. Posner, Sex and Reason 420-27 (1992) (applying an economic theory for surrogate contracts and advocating enforcement of cash transactions in the formation of family relationships).
    • (1990) Case W. Res. L. Rev. , vol.41 , pp. 1
    • Wagner, W.J.1
  • 20
    • 0040377924 scopus 로고
    • One can argue that such agreements are unenforceable on the ground that reproductive rights are inalienable. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (holding that the Constitution can make contracts unenforceable even when they are not void ab initio); Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 1849 (1987) (discussing rights that are nonwaivable or nonrelinquishable); Robertson, Prior Agreements, supra note 11, at 418-19 (analogizing preconception agreements to abortion or child rearing agreements that are not binding); William Joseph Wagner, The Contractual Reallocation of Procreative Resources and Parental Rights: The Natural Endowment Critique, 41 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1, 12 (1990) (arguing that contractual reallocation of procreative resources and parental rights risks the structural breakdown of the American political tradition of respect for human dignity). In addition, contracts relinquishing parental rights through IVF agreements can be analogized to surrogacy contracts, which have been held to be illegal. See In re Baby M., 537 A.2d 1227, 1255 (N.J. 1988) (holding that unpaid surrogacy contracts are unenforceable); Martha A. Field, Surrogate Motherhood (1988) (discussing arguments for and against enforcing surrogacy contracts and arguing that if abortion and adoption contracts are unenforceable, the same rule should apply to surrogacy contracts); M. Celeste Schejbal-Vossmeyer, Comment, What Money Cannot Buy: Commercial Surrogacy and the Doctrine of Illegal Contracts, 32 St. Louis U. L.J. 1171, 1206 (1988) (arguing that "[g]iving a second party the right to control another person's reproductive capacity is contradictory" because it allows a party to waive his or her right so that another party can exercise it). But see Richard A. Posner, Sex and Reason 420-27 (1992) (applying an economic theory for surrogate contracts and advocating enforcement of cash transactions in the formation of family relationships).
    • (1988) Surrogate Motherhood
    • Field, M.A.1
  • 21
    • 2442491664 scopus 로고
    • What Money Cannot Buy: Commercial Surrogacy and the Doctrine of Illegal Contracts
    • Comment
    • One can argue that such agreements are unenforceable on the ground that reproductive rights are inalienable. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (holding that the Constitution can make contracts unenforceable even when they are not void ab initio); Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 1849 (1987) (discussing rights that are nonwaivable or nonrelinquishable); Robertson, Prior Agreements, supra note 11, at 418-19 (analogizing preconception agreements to abortion or child rearing agreements that are not binding); William Joseph Wagner, The Contractual Reallocation of Procreative Resources and Parental Rights: The Natural Endowment Critique, 41 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1, 12 (1990) (arguing that contractual reallocation of procreative resources and parental rights risks the structural breakdown of the American political tradition of respect for human dignity). In addition, contracts relinquishing parental rights through IVF agreements can be analogized to surrogacy contracts, which have been held to be illegal. See In re Baby M., 537 A.2d 1227, 1255 (N.J. 1988) (holding that unpaid surrogacy contracts are unenforceable); Martha A. Field, Surrogate Motherhood (1988) (discussing arguments for and against enforcing surrogacy contracts and arguing that if abortion and adoption contracts are unenforceable, the same rule should apply to surrogacy contracts); M. Celeste Schejbal-Vossmeyer, Comment, What Money Cannot Buy: Commercial Surrogacy and the Doctrine of Illegal Contracts, 32 St. Louis U. L.J. 1171, 1206 (1988) (arguing that "[g]iving a second party the right to control another person's reproductive capacity is contradictory" because it allows a party to waive his or her right so that another party can exercise it). But see Richard A. Posner, Sex and Reason 420-27 (1992) (applying an economic theory for surrogate contracts and advocating enforcement of cash transactions in the formation of family relationships).
    • (1988) St. Louis U. L.J. , vol.32 , pp. 1171
    • Celeste Schejbal-Vossmeyer, M.1
  • 22
    • 0004039332 scopus 로고
    • One can argue that such agreements are unenforceable on the ground that reproductive rights are inalienable. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (holding that the Constitution can make contracts unenforceable even when they are not void ab initio); Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 1849 (1987) (discussing rights that are nonwaivable or nonrelinquishable); Robertson, Prior Agreements, supra note 11, at 418-19 (analogizing preconception agreements to abortion or child rearing agreements that are not binding); William Joseph Wagner, The Contractual Reallocation of Procreative Resources and Parental Rights: The Natural Endowment Critique, 41 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1, 12 (1990) (arguing that contractual reallocation of procreative resources and parental rights risks the structural breakdown of the American political tradition of respect for human dignity). In addition, contracts relinquishing parental rights through IVF agreements can be analogized to surrogacy contracts, which have been held to be illegal. See In re Baby M., 537 A.2d 1227, 1255 (N.J. 1988) (holding that unpaid surrogacy contracts are unenforceable); Martha A. Field, Surrogate Motherhood (1988) (discussing arguments for and against enforcing surrogacy contracts and arguing that if abortion and adoption contracts are unenforceable, the same rule should apply to surrogacy contracts); M. Celeste Schejbal-Vossmeyer, Comment, What Money Cannot Buy: Commercial Surrogacy and the Doctrine of Illegal Contracts, 32 St. Louis U. L.J. 1171, 1206 (1988) (arguing that "[g]iving a second party the right to control another person's reproductive capacity is contradictory" because it allows a party to waive his or her right so that another party can exercise it). But see Richard A. Posner, Sex and Reason 420-27 (1992) (applying an economic theory for surrogate contracts and advocating enforcement of cash transactions in the formation of family relationships).
    • (1992) Sex and Reason , pp. 420-427
    • Posner, R.A.1
  • 23
    • 84923755154 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • In Davis, the court assumed the existence of reproductive autonomy rights, noting that "[f]or the purposes of this litigation it is sufficient to note that, whatever its ultimate constitutional boundaries, the right of procreational autonomy is composed of two rights of equal significance - the right to procreate and the right to avoid procreation. Undoubtedly, both are subject to protections and limitations." Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 601 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944)).
  • 24
    • 84923755152 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • In most frozen embryo conflicts, the mother seeks to implant the embryo and the father wishes to terminate the embryo. See, e.g., Kass v. Kass, 1995 WL 110368 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 18, 1995) (no docket number); see AZ v. BZ, slip op. (Mass. P. Ct. Mar. 25, 1996) (no docket number) (order granting permanent injunction) (on file with the Fordham Law Review). Although the right to affirmative procreation should apply equally to both the mother and the father, for purposes of simplicity and clarity this Note will refer to the mother as the party seeking to implant the frozen embryo, and the father as the party seeking to terminate it. It is important to note that if the roles were reversed and the man wished to implant the frozen embryo, a court could not force transfer of the frozen embryo to the woman's body over her objections because that would violate her bodily integrity. See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 71 (1976). The only option available to the man would be to have the frozen embryo implanted in a surrogate mother.
  • 25
    • 84923755143 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 911 (1993)
    • 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 911 (1993).
  • 26
    • 84923755142 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See infra part I.B.1 (providing a full discussion of Davis)
    • See infra part I.B.1 (providing a full discussion of Davis).
  • 27
    • 84923755141 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Kass, 1995 WL 110368. In contrast to Kass, a Massachusetts Probate and Family Court in 1996 held that because the mother and father are equal gamete providers, they should be given equal authority in decisions regarding frozen embryos. AZ v. BZ, slip op. at 22 (discussing Kass and Davis).
  • 28
    • 84923755140 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See infra part I.B.2 (discussing Kass in detail). Only one state, Louisiana, has enacted pertinent legislation regarding custody of frozen embryos by declaring that a dispute between parties over a cryopreserved IVF embryo should be resolved in the "best interest" of the embryo. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9:131 (West 1986)
    • See infra part I.B.2 (discussing Kass in detail). Only one state, Louisiana, has enacted pertinent legislation regarding custody of frozen embryos by declaring that a dispute between parties over a cryopreserved IVF embryo should be resolved in the "best interest" of the embryo. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9:131 (West 1986).
  • 29
    • 84923755139 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • The Supreme Court, invalidating a state statute prohibiting the distribution of birth control to unmarried adults, held that [i]f . . . the distribution of contraceptives to married persons cannot be prohibited, a ban on distribution to unmarried persons would be equally impermissible. . . . If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (emphasis omitted).
  • 30
    • 84923755138 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See infra notes 230-44 and accompanying text (outlining the Supreme Court's right to privacy cases establishing rights of reproductive autonomy)
    • See infra notes 230-44 and accompanying text (outlining the Supreme Court's right to privacy cases establishing rights of reproductive autonomy).
  • 31
    • 84923755137 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See infra notes 230-44 and accompanying text
    • See infra notes 230-44 and accompanying text.
  • 32
    • 84923755136 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992) (plurality opinion) (finding that the Constitution places limits on a state's right to interfere with a woman's decision to terminate her pregnancy); Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 509-10 (1989) (holding that although a woman has a right to choose an abortion, a state may refuse to allow public facilities to be used or public employees to participate in abortions); Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 686-91 (1977) (striking down a New York statute which limited the distribution of contraceptives); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (limiting a state's right to regulate abortions); Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453 (holding that individuals, whether single or married, have a right to use contraception); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (finding that married people have a right to use contraceptives)
    • Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992) (plurality opinion) (finding that the Constitution places limits on a state's right to interfere with a woman's decision to terminate her pregnancy); Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 509-10 (1989) (holding that although a woman has a right to choose an abortion, a state may refuse to allow public facilities to be used or public employees to participate in abortions); Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 686-91 (1977) (striking down a New York statute which limited the distribution of contraceptives); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (limiting a state's right to regulate abortions); Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453 (holding that individuals, whether single or married, have a right to use contraception); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (finding that married people have a right to use contraceptives).
  • 33
    • 84923755134 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Kass v. Kass, 1995 WL 110368, at *2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 18, 1995) (no docket number); Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 601 (Tenn. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 911 (1993)
    • Kass v. Kass, 1995 WL 110368, at *2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 18, 1995) (no docket number); Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 601 (Tenn. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 911 (1993).
  • 34
    • 84923755132 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 589-90; Kass, 1995 WL 110368, at *1
    • Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 589-90; Kass, 1995 WL 110368, at *1.
  • 35
    • 84923755123 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See infra notes 230-44 and accompanying text
    • See infra notes 230-44 and accompanying text.
  • 36
    • 84923755122 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See infra part I.B
    • See infra part I.B.
  • 37
    • 84923755121 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1
    • U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
  • 39
    • 0004150971 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • hereinafter
    • For a detailed explanation of this approach to constitutional interpretation, see Ronald Dworkin, Life's Dominion: An Argument About Abortion, Euthanasia, and Individual Freedom 122-23, 158-59 (1994) [hereinafter Dworkin, Life's Dominion],
    • Life's Dominion
    • Dworkin1
  • 40
    • 0020732129 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Procreative Liberty and the Control of Conception, Pregnancy, and Childbirth
    • John A. Robertson, Procreative Liberty and the Control of Conception, Pregnancy, and Childbirth, 69 Va. L. Rev. 405, 423 (1983) [hereinafter Robertson, Procreative Liberty].
    • (1983) Va. L. Rev. , vol.69 , pp. 405
    • Robertson, J.A.1
  • 41
    • 0020732129 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • hereinafter
    • John A. Robertson, Procreative Liberty and the Control of Conception, Pregnancy, and Childbirth, 69 Va. L. Rev. 405, 423 (1983) [hereinafter Robertson, Procreative Liberty].
    • Procreative Liberty
    • Robertson1
  • 43
    • 84923704272 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • supra note 6
    • Robertson, Embryos, supra note 6, at 948.
    • Embryos , pp. 948
    • Robertson1
  • 44
    • 84923755120 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Shortly before the surge of luteinizing hormone indicating ovulation - that the egg has been shed from the follicle - the woman takes another drug to guarantee that the egg matures. Several eggs are then aspirated - removed by suction - from the follicles by laparoscopy. After the eggs are examined for maturity, the mature eggs are mixed in a dish with sperm from the husband that has been examined and prepared for insemination. Id.
  • 45
    • 84923755119 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Id. at 968
    • Id. at 968.
  • 46
    • 84923755118 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • The term "preembryo" is used to describe the fertilized egg at this stage. See, e.g., AZ v. BZ, slip op. at 7 (Mass. P. Ct. Mar. 25, 1996) (no docket number) (order granting permanent injunction) (on file with the Fordham Law Review); Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 593 (Tenn. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 911 (1993).
  • 47
    • 84923704272 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • supra note 6
    • Robertson, Embryos, supra note 6, at 968.
    • Embryos , pp. 968
    • Robertson1
  • 48
    • 84923755117 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Id. at 948. The transfer of multiple fertilized eggs increases the chance of multiple gestation. It is optimal, however, to transfer no more than three or four eggs. Most programs, however, will transfer as many eggs as have been fertilized; as a result, they may aspirate or fertilize fewer eggs than are available to avoid transferring all the eggs. Id. at 948-49
    • Id. at 948. The transfer of multiple fertilized eggs increases the chance of multiple gestation. It is optimal, however, to transfer no more than three or four eggs. Most programs, however, will transfer as many eggs as have been fertilized; as a result, they may aspirate or fertilize fewer eggs than are available to avoid transferring all the eggs. Id. at 948-49.
  • 49
    • 84923755116 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Carow, supra note 2, at 529 & n.40
    • Carow, supra note 2, at 529 & n.40.
  • 50
    • 2442567381 scopus 로고
    • 23d ed. hereinafter Stedman
    • Laparoscopy, or peritoneoscopy, is the method by which the clinician examines the contents of the lining of the abdominal cavity. The clinician does this by passing an electrically lighted tubular instrument through the abdominal wall. Stedman's Medical Dictionary 1059 (23d ed. 1976) [hereinafter Stedman].
    • (1976) Medical Dictionary , vol.1059
    • Stedman1
  • 51
    • 84923755114 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Carow, supra note 2, at 529
    • Carow, supra note 2, at 529.
  • 52
    • 84923755112 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Id.
    • Id.
  • 53
    • 84923755103 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Id.
    • Id.
  • 55
    • 84923755102 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Carow, supra note 2, at 529-30
    • Carow, supra note 2, at 529-30.
  • 56
    • 84923755101 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 911 (1993)
    • 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 911 (1993).
  • 57
    • 84923755100 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Id. at 601, 603-04
    • Id. at 601, 603-04.
  • 58
    • 84923755099 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • 1995 WL 110368 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 18, 1995) (no docket number)
    • 1995 WL 110368 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 18, 1995) (no docket number).
  • 59
    • 84923755098 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Id. at *4
    • Id. at *4.
  • 60
    • 84923755097 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 591
    • Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 591.
  • 61
    • 84923755096 scopus 로고
    • Id. A tubal pregnancy occurs when the fertilized ovum implants in an area other than the endometrium, often in the fallopian tube. Carow, supra note 2, at 544 n.155 (citing 1 The Oxford Companion to Medicine 331 (John Walton et al. eds. 1986)).
    • (1986) The Oxford Companion to Medicine , vol.331
    • Walton, J.1
  • 62
    • 84923755094 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Davls, 842 S.W.2d at 591
    • Davls, 842 S.W.2d at 591.
  • 63
    • 84923755092 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Id. at 592
    • Id. at 592.
  • 64
    • 84923755083 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Id.
    • Id.
  • 65
    • 84923755082 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Davis v. Davis, No. E-14496, 1989 WL 140495, at *3 (Tenn. Cir. Ct. Sept. 21, 1989), rev'd, No. 180, 1990 WL 130807 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 13, 1990), aff'd, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 911 (1993). The court also analyzed whether the embryos were "beings" or "property that may become human beings." Id.
    • Davis v. Davis, No. E-14496, 1989 WL 140495, at *3 (Tenn. Cir. Ct. Sept. 21, 1989), rev'd, No. 180, 1990 WL 130807 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 13, 1990), aff'd, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 911 (1993). The court also analyzed whether the embryos were "beings" or "property that may become human beings." Id.
  • 66
    • 84923755081 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Davis, 1989 WL 140495, at *25
    • Davis, 1989 WL 140495, at *25.
  • 67
    • 84923755080 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Id. at *20
    • Id. at *20.
  • 68
    • 84923755079 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Id. at *11 (applying the doctrine of parens patriae, which attempts to protect the best interests of the child)
    • Id. at *11 (applying the doctrine of parens patriae, which attempts to protect the best interests of the child).
  • 69
    • 84923755078 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Id.
    • Id.
  • 70
    • 84923755077 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Davis v. Davis, No. 180, 1990 WL 130807, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 13, 1990), aff'd, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn, 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 911 (1993)
    • Davis v. Davis, No. 180, 1990 WL 130807, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 13, 1990), aff'd, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn, 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 911 (1993).
  • 71
    • 84923755076 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Id. at *2 (footnote omitted)
    • Id. at *2 (footnote omitted).
  • 72
    • 84923755074 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Id. at *1 (footnote omitted)
    • Id. at *1 (footnote omitted).
  • 73
    • 84923755072 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See id.
    • See id.
  • 74
    • 84923755063 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Id. at *2 (citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-5-106 (1980))
    • Id. at *2 (citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-5-106 (1980)).
  • 75
    • 84923755062 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Id. (citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-15-201 (1989))
    • Id. (citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-15-201 (1989)).
  • 76
    • 84923755061 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Id.
    • Id.
  • 77
    • 84923755060 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • 717 F. Supp. 421 (E.D. Va. 1989). The York court held that a Virginia clinic was obligated to return a frozen embryo to parents who wished to transfer the frozen embryo to a clinic in California. Id. at 425. The court's rationale was that a bailor-bailee relationship existed between the Virginia clinic and the parents, and that once the bailment ceased, the clinic was under an obligation to return the "property" to the parents. Id.
    • 717 F. Supp. 421 (E.D. Va. 1989). The York court held that a Virginia clinic was obligated to return a frozen embryo to parents who wished to transfer the frozen embryo to a clinic in California. Id. at 425. The court's rationale was that a bailor-bailee relationship existed between the Virginia clinic and the parents, and that once the bailment ceased, the clinic was under an obligation to return the "property" to the parents. Id.
  • 78
    • 84923755059 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See Davis, 1990 WL 130807, at *2 (citing Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942))
    • See Davis, 1990 WL 130807, at *2 (citing Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942)).
  • 79
    • 84923755058 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See id.
    • See id.
  • 80
    • 84923755057 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Id. at *3
    • Id. at *3.
  • 81
    • 84923755056 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 911 (1993)
    • See Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 911 (1993).
  • 82
    • 84923755054 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Id. at 594-95 (citing Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973))
    • Id. at 594-95 (citing Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)).
  • 83
    • 84923755052 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Id. (applying Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-15-201 (1989); Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-107 (1989); Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-210 (1989))
    • Id. (applying Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-15-201 (1989); Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-107 (1989); Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-210 (1989)).
  • 84
    • 0024966523 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • 717 F. Supp. 421 (E.D. Va. 1989)
    • 717 F. Supp. 421 (E.D. Va. 1989).
  • 85
    • 84923755002 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 596 (citing York v. York, 717 F. Supp. 421, 424-25 (E.D. Va. 1989))
    • Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 596 (citing York v. York, 717 F. Supp. 421, 424-25 (E.D. Va. 1989)).
  • 86
    • 84923755001 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Id. at 596-97 (citation omitted)
    • Id. at 596-97 (citation omitted).
  • 87
    • 84923755000 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Id. at 597
    • Id. at 597.
  • 88
    • 0037582615 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Ethical Considerations of the New Reproductive Technologies
    • Id.
    • Id. (citing American Fertility Society, Ethical Considerations of the New Reproductive Technologies, 53 Fertility & Sterility 34S-35S (Supp. 1990)).
    • Fertility & Sterility , vol.53 , Issue.1990 SUPPL.
  • 89
    • 84923754999 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • 262 U.S. 390 (1923)
    • 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
  • 90
    • 84923754998 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • 316 U.S. 535 (1942)
    • 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
  • 91
    • 84923754997 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • 410 U.S. 113 (1973)
    • 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
  • 92
    • 84923754996 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 601
    • Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 601.
  • 93
    • 84923754995 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • 321 U.S. 158 (1944)
    • 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
  • 94
    • 84923754994 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • 410 U.S. 113 (1973)
    • 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
  • 95
    • 84923754993 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 601 (using Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989), as a reference point for understanding procreative rights)
    • Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 601 (using Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989), as a reference point for understanding procreative rights).
  • 96
    • 84923754992 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Id. at 603-04 (citing Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988), in which the Court weighed the two parties' conflicting interests in reaching a conclusion)
    • Id. at 603-04 (citing Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988), in which the Court weighed the two parties' conflicting interests in reaching a conclusion).
  • 97
    • 84923754991 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Id. at 604
    • Id. at 604.
  • 98
    • 84923754990 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Id.
    • Id.
  • 99
    • 84923754989 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Id.
    • Id.
  • 100
    • 84923754988 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Id.
    • Id.
  • 101
    • 84923754987 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Id.
    • Id.
  • 102
    • 84923754986 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Id. at 603-04
    • Id. at 603-04.
  • 103
    • 84923754985 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Id. at 604
    • Id. at 604.
  • 104
    • 25544435666 scopus 로고
    • Embryo Fight Yields Few Answers: Disposal Disclosed: Embryos are Discarded in a Tennessee Case, but Legal and Ethical Questions Remain
    • June 14
    • Mark Curriden, Embryo Fight Yields Few Answers: Disposal Disclosed: Embryos Are Discarded in a Tennessee Case, but Legal and Ethical Questions Remain, Atlanta J. & Const., June 14, 1993, at A1.
    • (1993) Atlanta J. & Const.
    • Curriden, M.1
  • 105
    • 84923754984 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See AZ v. BZ, sup op. at 21 (Mass. P. Ct. Mar. 25, 1996) (no docket number) (order granting permanent injunction) (on file with the Fordham Law Review); Kristine E. Luongo, Comment, The Big Chill: Davis v. Davis and the Protection of "Potential Life"?, 29 New Eng. L. Rev. 1011 (1995)
    • See AZ v. BZ, sup op. at 21 (Mass. P. Ct. Mar. 25, 1996) (no docket number) (order granting permanent injunction) (on file with the Fordham Law Review); Kristine E. Luongo, Comment, The Big Chill: Davis v. Davis and the Protection of "Potential Life"?, 29 New Eng. L. Rev. 1011 (1995).
  • 106
    • 84923754983 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Kass v. Kass, 1995 WL 110368 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 18, 1995) (no docket number). Obviously, the New York court was not bound by Davis, which was decided in Tennessee
    • Kass v. Kass, 1995 WL 110368 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 18, 1995) (no docket number). Obviously, the New York court was not bound by Davis, which was decided in Tennessee.
  • 107
    • 84923754982 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Id. at *1
    • Id. at *1.
  • 108
    • 84923754981 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Id.
    • Id.
  • 109
    • 84923754980 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Id.
    • Id.
  • 110
    • 84923754979 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Id. at *3
    • Id. at *3.
  • 111
    • 84923754978 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Id. at *1
    • Id. at *1
  • 112
    • 84923754977 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Id. at *1
    • Id. at *1.
  • 113
    • 84923754976 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Id.
    • Id.
  • 114
    • 84923754975 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Id. at *1, *4. Like Davis, however, Kass determined that the constitutional guarantee of the right to privacy encompasses the right to procreate by referring to Supreme Court cases which have nothing to do with any affirmative procreative rights. Id. at *2 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923))
    • Id. at *1, *4. Like Davis, however, Kass determined that the constitutional guarantee of the right to privacy encompasses the right to procreate by referring to Supreme Court cases which have nothing to do with any affirmative procreative rights. Id. at *2 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923)).
  • 115
    • 84923754974 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Id. at *3. Beginning with an analysis of the preembryos' status, the judge concluded that while they were not persons, the preembryos were certainly not property within the ordinary sense of the term. Id. at *2. Because preembryos possess a unique status as "potential" life, the court refused to equate them with chattel such as "washing machines and jewelry." Id.
    • Id. at *3. Beginning with an analysis of the preembryos' status, the judge concluded that while they were not persons, the preembryos were certainly not property within the ordinary sense of the term. Id. at *2. Because preembryos possess a unique status as "potential" life, the court refused to equate them with chattel such as "washing machines and jewelry." Id.
  • 116
    • 84923754973 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See infra part III.B.1 (suggesting why it is a crucial and determining factor to the outcome of a frozen embryo conflict whether the court compares the termination of frozen embryos to abortion or contraception)
    • See infra part III.B.1 (suggesting why it is a crucial and determining factor to the outcome of a frozen embryo conflict whether the court compares the termination of frozen embryos to abortion or contraception).
  • 117
    • 84923754972 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 896 (1992) (plurality opinion); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 71 (1976)
    • See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 896 (1992) (plurality opinion); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 71 (1976).
  • 118
    • 84923754971 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Kass, 1995 WL 110368, at *2. The court reasoned that where a husband realizes that there might be a delay in implanting the embryos, his initial consent to the implantation should not be abolished nunc pro tunc merely because of a change in circumstances which could and should have been anticipated. Id. at *3; see also Casey, 505 U.S. at 896-97 (striking down spousal notification as a condition to an abortion)
    • Kass, 1995 WL 110368, at *2. The court reasoned that where a husband realizes that there might be a delay in implanting the embryos, his initial consent to the implantation should not be abolished nunc pro tunc merely because of a change in circumstances which could and should have been anticipated. Id. at *3; see also Casey, 505 U.S. at 896-97 (striking down spousal notification as a condition to an abortion).
  • 119
    • 84923754970 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Kass, 1995 WL 110368, at *3
    • Kass, 1995 WL 110368, at *3.
  • 121
    • 84923754969 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Kass, 1995 WL 110368, at *2. In contrast to Kass, a Massachusetts Probate and Family Court judge addressing a frozen embryo dispute held that because men and women are equal gamete providers, they should be given equal authority in decisions regarding frozen embryo disposition. AZ v. BZ, slip op. at 22 (Mass. P. Ct. Mar. 25, 1996) (no docket number) (order granting permanent injunction) (on file with the Fordham Law Review). Like the Kass and Davis courts, however, the Massachusetts court did not clearly explain its method of analyzing the reproductive autonomy rights of the two parties in a frozen embryo dispute. In AZ v. BZ, a couple who began treatment at an IVF clinic signed seven different consent forms stipulating that, should the couple separate, the embryos would be returned to the mother for implantation. Id. at 7-11. As a result of an embryo transfer, the mother became pregnant and eventually gave birth to twin daughters
    • Kass, 1995 WL 110368, at *2. In contrast to Kass, a Massachusetts Probate and Family Court judge addressing a frozen embryo dispute held that because men and women are equal gamete providers, they should be given equal authority in decisions regarding frozen embryo disposition. AZ v. BZ, slip op. at 22 (Mass. P. Ct. Mar. 25, 1996) (no docket number) (order granting permanent injunction) (on file with the Fordham Law Review). Like the Kass and Davis courts, however, the Massachusetts court did not clearly explain its method of analyzing the reproductive autonomy rights of the two parties in a frozen embryo dispute. In AZ v. BZ, a couple who began treatment at an IVF clinic signed seven different consent forms stipulating that, should the couple separate, the embryos would be returned to the mother for implantation. Id. at 7-11. As a result of an embryo transfer, the mother became pregnant and eventually gave birth to twin daughters. Id. at 14. Two vials of embryos remained frozen at the clinic. Id. Later, without informing her husband, the wife went to the clinic to have one of the two vials thawed and implanted in her body in an attempt to become pregnant again. Id. at 14-15. She did not, however, become pregnant from this procedure. Id. The couple separated and the husband filed for divorce, seeking an order enjoining his wife from using the remaining vial of frozen embryos. Id. at 15, 28. The Massachusetts court first analyzed the legal status of preembryos and held that it would not consider the embryos persons or property, but would instead accord them a special status. Id. at 17-19. As the court explained, this "interim category provides the gamete-providers the primary decision-making authority regarding the preembryo [and] recognizes the dual characteristics of the preembryos and will therefore be applied to the preembryos at issue." Id. at 19. In reaching its decision, the court refused to enforce the previous disposition agreement between the couple that stated that the wife would receive the frozen embryos in the event the couple separated. The court reasoned that although the woman has to endure significantly more intrusive and physically trying procedures during the IVF process, the couple should nonetheless be given equal authority in preembryo disposition decisions because the man and woman are equal gamete providers. Id. at 22. Although agreements are usually enforceable, the court held that because of the change in circumstances between the parties, "[w]ere the wife to use the preembryos, [the husband] would face unwanted parenthood encompassing all of the financial, psychological, and legal responsibilities and consequences." Id. at 27. The court held that "[t]his would not only be unfair to the parent but also unfair to a child who would enter the world unwanted by one of his or her parents." Id. at 28. The court therefore refused to enforce the agreement and applied a balancing test instead, weighing the husband's interest in avoiding procreation against the wife's interest in procreating. Id. at 26-28.
  • 122
    • 84923754968 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Kass, 1995 WL 110368, at *4
    • Kass, 1995 WL 110368, at *4.
  • 123
    • 84923754967 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See infra notes 116-18 and accompanying text
    • See infra notes 116-18 and accompanying text.
  • 124
    • 0010790888 scopus 로고
    • See Raoul Berger, Government by Judiciary: The Transformation of the Fourteenth Amendment (1977); Hugo LaFayette Black, A Constitutional Faith (1969); Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the Law (1990); Richard S. Kay, Adherence to the Original Intentions in Constitutional Adjudication: Three Objections and Responses, 82 Nw. U. L. Rev. 226 (1988); Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. Cin. L. Rev. 849 (1989).
    • (1977) Government by Judiciary: The Transformation of the Fourteenth Amendment
    • Berger, R.1
  • 125
    • 0346078045 scopus 로고
    • See Raoul Berger, Government by Judiciary: The Transformation of the Fourteenth Amendment (1977); Hugo LaFayette Black, A Constitutional Faith (1969); Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the Law (1990); Richard S. Kay, Adherence to the Original Intentions in Constitutional Adjudication: Three Objections and Responses, 82 Nw. U. L. Rev. 226 (1988); Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. Cin. L. Rev. 849 (1989).
    • (1969) A Constitutional Faith
    • Black, H.L.1
  • 126
    • 84935322749 scopus 로고
    • See Raoul Berger, Government by Judiciary: The Transformation of the Fourteenth Amendment (1977); Hugo LaFayette Black, A Constitutional Faith (1969); Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the Law (1990); Richard S. Kay, Adherence to the Original Intentions in Constitutional Adjudication: Three Objections and Responses, 82 Nw. U. L. Rev. 226 (1988); Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. Cin. L. Rev. 849 (1989).
    • (1990) The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the Law
    • Bork, R.H.1
  • 127
    • 60349119605 scopus 로고
    • Adherence to the Original Intentions in Constitutional Adjudication: Three Objections and Responses
    • See Raoul Berger, Government by Judiciary: The Transformation of the Fourteenth Amendment (1977); Hugo LaFayette Black, A Constitutional Faith (1969); Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the Law (1990); Richard S. Kay, Adherence to the Original Intentions in Constitutional Adjudication: Three Objections and Responses, 82 Nw. U. L. Rev. 226 (1988); Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. Cin. L. Rev. 849 (1989).
    • (1988) Nw. U. L. Rev. , vol.82 , pp. 226
    • Kay, R.S.1
  • 128
    • 0000098233 scopus 로고
    • Originalism: The Lesser Evil
    • See Raoul Berger, Government by Judiciary: The Transformation of the Fourteenth Amendment (1977); Hugo LaFayette Black, A Constitutional Faith (1969); Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the Law (1990); Richard S. Kay, Adherence to the Original Intentions in Constitutional Adjudication: Three Objections and Responses, 82 Nw. U. L. Rev. 226 (1988); Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. Cin. L. Rev. 849 (1989).
    • (1989) U. Cin. L. Rev. , vol.57 , pp. 849
    • Scalia, A.1
  • 129
    • 0003806709 scopus 로고
    • See Alexander Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch (1962); Laurence H. Tribe, Constitutional Choices (1985); William J. Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary Ratification, 27 S. Tex. L.J. 433 (1986); Ronald Dworkin, Unenumerated Rights: Whether and How Roe Should Be Overruled, 59 U. Chi. L. Rev. 381 (1992) [hereinafter Dworkin, Unenumerated Rights]; James E. Fleming, Constructing the Substantive Constitution, 72 Tex. L. Rev. 211 (1993).
    • (1962) The Least Dangerous Branch
    • Bickel, A.1
  • 130
    • 0039275851 scopus 로고
    • See Alexander Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch (1962); Laurence H. Tribe, Constitutional Choices (1985); William J. Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary Ratification, 27 S. Tex. L.J. 433 (1986); Ronald Dworkin, Unenumerated Rights: Whether and How Roe Should Be Overruled, 59 U. Chi. L. Rev. 381 (1992) [hereinafter Dworkin, Unenumerated Rights]; James E. Fleming, Constructing the Substantive Constitution, 72 Tex. L. Rev. 211 (1993).
    • (1985) Constitutional Choices
    • Tribe, L.H.1
  • 131
    • 1842756163 scopus 로고
    • The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary Ratification
    • See Alexander Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch (1962); Laurence H. Tribe, Constitutional Choices (1985); William J. Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary Ratification, 27 S. Tex. L.J. 433 (1986); Ronald Dworkin, Unenumerated Rights: Whether and How Roe Should Be Overruled, 59 U. Chi. L. Rev. 381 (1992) [hereinafter Dworkin, Unenumerated Rights]; James E. Fleming, Constructing the Substantive Constitution, 72 Tex. L. Rev. 211 (1993).
    • (1986) S. Tex. L.J. , vol.27 , pp. 433
    • Brennan Jr., W.J.1
  • 132
    • 0027029394 scopus 로고
    • Unenumerated Rights: Whether and How Roe Should Be Overruled
    • See Alexander Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch (1962); Laurence H. Tribe, Constitutional Choices (1985); William J. Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary Ratification, 27 S. Tex. L.J. 433 (1986); Ronald Dworkin, Unenumerated Rights: Whether and How Roe Should Be Overruled, 59 U. Chi. L. Rev. 381 (1992) [hereinafter Dworkin, Unenumerated Rights]; James E. Fleming, Constructing the Substantive Constitution, 72 Tex. L. Rev. 211 (1993).
    • (1992) U. Chi. L. Rev. , vol.59 , pp. 381
    • Dworkin, R.1
  • 133
    • 2442558773 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • hereinafter
    • See Alexander Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch (1962); Laurence H. Tribe, Constitutional Choices (1985); William J. Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary Ratification, 27 S. Tex. L.J. 433 (1986); Ronald Dworkin, Unenumerated Rights: Whether and How Roe Should Be Overruled, 59 U. Chi. L. Rev. 381 (1992) [hereinafter Dworkin, Unenumerated Rights]; James E. Fleming, Constructing the Substantive Constitution, 72 Tex. L. Rev. 211 (1993).
    • Unenumerated Rights
    • Dworkin1
  • 134
    • 85055294934 scopus 로고
    • Constructing the Substantive Constitution
    • See Alexander Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch (1962); Laurence H. Tribe, Constitutional Choices (1985); William J. Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary Ratification, 27 S. Tex. L.J. 433 (1986); Ronald Dworkin, Unenumerated Rights: Whether and How Roe Should Be Overruled, 59 U. Chi. L. Rev. 381 (1992) [hereinafter Dworkin, Unenumerated Rights]; James E. Fleming, Constructing the Substantive Constitution, 72 Tex. L. Rev. 211 (1993).
    • (1993) Tex. L. Rev. , vol.72 , pp. 211
    • Fleming, J.E.1
  • 135
    • 84923754966 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316 (1819)
    • 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316 (1819).
  • 136
    • 84923754965 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Id. at 407
    • Id. at 407.
  • 137
    • 0011534472 scopus 로고
    • The Originalism Debate: A Guide for the Perplexed
    • See Daniel A. Farber, The Originalism Debate: A Guide for the Perplexed, 49 Ohio St. L.J. 1085 (1989); James E. Fleming, Securing Deliberative Autonomy, 48 Stan. L. Rev. 1 (1995) [hereinafter Fleming, Securing Autonomy ]; Willard C. Shih, Note, Assisted Suicide, The Due Process Clause and "Fidelity in Translation" 63 Fordham L. Rev. 1245 (1995); see also David B. Anders, Note, Justices Harlan and Black Revisited: The Emerging Dispute Between Justice O 'Connor and Justice Scalia over Unenumerated Fundamental Rights, 61 Fordham L. Rev. 895, 897 (1993) (discussing originalism and fundamental rights as two major theories of constitutional interpretation). Anders points out that many Supreme Court Justices have adopted one of these two theories in interpreting the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. Clear originalists include: Justice White, see Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (White, J., dissenting); Justice Scalia, see Scalia, supra note 112; and Chief Justice Rehnquist, see William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 Tex. L. Rev. 693 (1976). Fundamental rights theorists include: Justices Blackmun, see Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 922 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); and Justice Stevens, see Casey, 505 U.S. at 911 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Anders, supra, at 897 n.15.
    • (1989) Ohio St. L.J. , vol.49 , pp. 1085
    • Farber, D.A.1
  • 138
    • 84937276073 scopus 로고
    • Securing Deliberative Autonomy
    • See Daniel A. Farber, The Originalism Debate: A Guide for the Perplexed, 49 Ohio St. L.J. 1085 (1989); James E. Fleming, Securing Deliberative Autonomy, 48 Stan. L. Rev. 1 (1995) [hereinafter Fleming, Securing Autonomy ]; Willard C. Shih, Note, Assisted Suicide, The Due Process Clause and "Fidelity in Translation" 63 Fordham L. Rev. 1245 (1995); see also David B. Anders, Note, Justices Harlan and Black Revisited: The Emerging Dispute Between Justice O 'Connor and Justice Scalia over Unenumerated Fundamental Rights, 61 Fordham L. Rev. 895, 897 (1993) (discussing originalism and fundamental rights as two major theories of constitutional interpretation). Anders points out that many Supreme Court Justices have adopted one of these two theories in interpreting the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. Clear originalists include: Justice White, see Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (White, J., dissenting); Justice Scalia, see Scalia, supra note 112; and Chief Justice Rehnquist, see William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 Tex. L. Rev. 693 (1976). Fundamental rights theorists include: Justices Blackmun, see Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 922 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); and Justice Stevens, see Casey, 505 U.S. at 911 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Anders, supra, at 897 n.15.
    • (1995) Stan. L. Rev. , vol.48 , pp. 1
    • Fleming, J.E.1
  • 139
    • 84923752681 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • hereinafter
    • See Daniel A. Farber, The Originalism Debate: A Guide for the Perplexed, 49 Ohio St. L.J. 1085 (1989); James E. Fleming, Securing Deliberative Autonomy, 48 Stan. L. Rev. 1 (1995) [hereinafter Fleming, Securing Autonomy ]; Willard C. Shih, Note, Assisted Suicide, The Due Process Clause and "Fidelity in Translation" 63 Fordham L. Rev. 1245 (1995); see also David B. Anders, Note, Justices Harlan and Black Revisited: The Emerging Dispute Between Justice O 'Connor and Justice Scalia over Unenumerated Fundamental Rights, 61 Fordham L. Rev. 895, 897 (1993) (discussing originalism and fundamental rights as two major theories of constitutional interpretation). Anders points out that many Supreme Court Justices have adopted one of these two theories in interpreting the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. Clear originalists include: Justice White, see Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (White, J., dissenting); Justice Scalia, see Scalia, supra note 112; and Chief Justice Rehnquist, see William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 Tex. L. Rev. 693 (1976). Fundamental rights theorists include: Justices Blackmun, see Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 922 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); and Justice Stevens, see Casey, 505 U.S. at 911 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Anders, supra, at 897 n.15.
    • Securing Autonomy
    • Fleming1
  • 140
    • 0029258170 scopus 로고
    • Assisted Suicide, the Due Process Clause and "Fidelity in Translation"
    • Note
    • See Daniel A. Farber, The Originalism Debate: A Guide for the Perplexed, 49 Ohio St. L.J. 1085 (1989); James E. Fleming, Securing Deliberative Autonomy, 48 Stan. L. Rev. 1 (1995) [hereinafter Fleming, Securing Autonomy ]; Willard C. Shih, Note, Assisted Suicide, The Due Process Clause and "Fidelity in Translation" 63 Fordham L. Rev. 1245 (1995); see also David B. Anders, Note, Justices Harlan and Black Revisited: The Emerging Dispute Between Justice O 'Connor and Justice Scalia over Unenumerated Fundamental Rights, 61 Fordham L. Rev. 895, 897 (1993) (discussing originalism and fundamental rights as two major theories of constitutional interpretation). Anders points out that many Supreme Court Justices have adopted one of these two theories in interpreting the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. Clear originalists include: Justice White, see Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (White, J., dissenting); Justice Scalia, see Scalia, supra note 112; and Chief Justice Rehnquist, see William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 Tex. L. Rev. 693 (1976). Fundamental rights theorists include: Justices Blackmun, see Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 922 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); and Justice Stevens, see Casey, 505 U.S. at 911 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Anders, supra, at 897 n.15.
    • (1995) Fordham L. Rev. , vol.63 , pp. 1245
    • Shih, W.C.1
  • 141
    • 1842507734 scopus 로고
    • Justices Harlan and Black Revisited: The Emerging Dispute between Justice O 'Connor and Justice Scalia over Unenumerated Fundamental Rights
    • Note
    • See Daniel A. Farber, The Originalism Debate: A Guide for the Perplexed, 49 Ohio St. L.J. 1085 (1989); James E. Fleming, Securing Deliberative Autonomy, 48 Stan. L. Rev. 1 (1995) [hereinafter Fleming, Securing Autonomy ]; Willard C. Shih, Note, Assisted Suicide, The Due Process Clause and "Fidelity in Translation" 63 Fordham L. Rev. 1245 (1995); see also David B. Anders, Note, Justices Harlan and Black Revisited: The Emerging Dispute Between Justice O 'Connor and Justice Scalia over Unenumerated Fundamental Rights, 61 Fordham L. Rev. 895, 897 (1993) (discussing originalism and fundamental rights as two major theories of constitutional interpretation). Anders points out that many Supreme Court Justices have adopted one of these two theories in interpreting the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. Clear originalists include: Justice White, see Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (White, J., dissenting); Justice Scalia, see Scalia, supra note 112; and Chief Justice Rehnquist, see William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 Tex. L. Rev. 693 (1976). Fundamental rights theorists include: Justices Blackmun, see Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 922 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); and Justice Stevens, see Casey, 505 U.S. at 911 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Anders, supra, at 897 n.15.
    • (1993) Fordham L. Rev. , vol.61 , pp. 895
    • Anders, D.B.1
  • 142
    • 84874384191 scopus 로고
    • The Notion of a Living Constitution
    • See Daniel A. Farber, The Originalism Debate: A Guide for the Perplexed, 49 Ohio St. L.J. 1085 (1989); James E. Fleming, Securing Deliberative Autonomy, 48 Stan. L. Rev. 1 (1995) [hereinafter Fleming, Securing Autonomy ]; Willard C. Shih, Note, Assisted Suicide, The Due Process Clause and "Fidelity in Translation" 63 Fordham L. Rev. 1245 (1995); see also David B. Anders, Note, Justices Harlan and Black Revisited: The Emerging Dispute Between Justice O 'Connor and Justice Scalia over Unenumerated Fundamental Rights, 61 Fordham L. Rev. 895, 897 (1993) (discussing originalism and fundamental rights as two major theories of constitutional interpretation). Anders points out that many Supreme Court Justices have adopted one of these two theories in interpreting the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. Clear originalists include: Justice White, see Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (White, J., dissenting); Justice Scalia, see Scalia, supra note 112; and Chief Justice Rehnquist, see William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 Tex. L. Rev. 693 (1976). Fundamental rights theorists include: Justices Blackmun, see Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 922 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); and Justice Stevens, see Casey, 505 U.S. at 911 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Anders, supra, at 897 n.15.
    • (1976) Tex. L. Rev. , vol.54 , pp. 693
    • Rehnquist, W.H.1
  • 143
    • 84923754964 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See supra note 112
    • See supra note 112.
  • 144
    • 0004150971 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • supra note 28
    • See supra note 113; see also Dworkin, Life's Dominion, supra note 28, at 122-23, 158-59 (explaining this approach to constitutional interpretation.
    • Life's Dominion , pp. 122-123
    • Dworkin1
  • 145
    • 84923754963 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See Bork, supra note 112. at 144-46
    • See Bork, supra note 112. at 144-46.
  • 146
    • 84923754962 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Id. at 146
    • Id. at 146.
  • 147
    • 84923754961 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Id. at 147; see Rehnquist, supra note 116, at 704-05
    • Id. at 147; see Rehnquist, supra note 116, at 704-05.
  • 148
    • 84923754960 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See Scalia, supra note 112, at 862 (referring to himself as a "faint-hearted" originalist)
    • See Scalia, supra note 112, at 862 (referring to himself as a "faint-hearted" originalist).
  • 149
    • 84923754959 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See Bork, supra note 112
    • See Bork, supra note 112.
  • 150
    • 84923754958 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See id. at 143-46
    • See id. at 143-46.
  • 151
    • 84923754957 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Id. at 146-53; Shih, supra note 116, at 1264
    • Id. at 146-53; Shih, supra note 116, at 1264.
  • 152
    • 84923754956 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See Bork, supra note 112, at 146-47; see Shih, supra note 116, at 1264
    • See Bork, supra note 112, at 146-47; see Shih, supra note 116, at 1264.
  • 153
    • 84923754954 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See Bork, supra note 112, at 144; see Shih, supra note 116, at 1264
    • See Bork, supra note 112, at 144; see Shih, supra note 116, at 1264.
  • 154
    • 84923754952 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See Bork, supra note 112, at 151; see Shih, supra note 116, at 1264
    • See Bork, supra note 112, at 151; see Shih, supra note 116, at 1264.
  • 155
    • 84923754943 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See Bork, supra note 112, at 178. For example, Judge Bork criticizes the Court's creation of substantive due process in Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), and Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) - the foundation cases for privacy rights. See infra notes 230-44 and accompanying text (discussing the line of Court cases that developed the modern right of privacy). He fears that substantive due process is "wholly without limits, as well as without legitimacy" and provides "a warrant for later Courts to legislate at will" with no limiting principle. Bork, supra note 112, at 49. Judge Bork castigates the Court for its right to privacy decisions, and specifically argues that "the Court had no business undertaking to give a substantive answer to the claim[s]" in Griswold and Roe. Id. at 225 (referring to Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) and Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973))
    • See Bork, supra note 112, at 178. For example, Judge Bork criticizes the Court's creation of substantive due process in Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), and Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) - the foundation cases for privacy rights. See infra notes 230-44 and accompanying text (discussing the line of Court cases that developed the modern right of privacy). He fears that substantive due process is "wholly without limits, as well as without legitimacy" and provides "a warrant for later Courts to legislate at will" with no limiting principle. Bork, supra note 112, at 49. Judge Bork castigates the Court for its right to privacy decisions, and specifically argues that "the Court had no business undertaking to give a substantive answer to the claim[s]" in Griswold and Roe. Id. at 225 (referring to Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) and Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)); see also Bork, supra note 112, at 95 (referring to the Griswold decision as the construction of a "Constitutional Time Bomb").
  • 156
    • 84923754942 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Bork, supra note 112, at 159-60
    • Bork, supra note 112, at 159-60.
  • 157
    • 84923752681 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • supra note 116, Anders, supra note 116, at 899; Shih, supra note 116, at 1263
    • See Fleming, Securing Autonomy, supra note 116, at 60; Anders, supra note 116, at 899; Shih, supra note 116, at 1263.
    • Securing Autonomy , pp. 60
    • Fleming1
  • 158
    • 84923754941 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • For various commentators advocating this approach, see supra note 113.
  • 162
    • 84923754940 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Id.
    • Id.
  • 163
    • 84923754939 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Id. at 166
    • Id. at 166.
  • 164
    • 84923754938 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Id. at 160
    • Id. at 160.
  • 165
    • 0003650945 scopus 로고
    • Id. at 166 (referring to U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1). For other advocates of a fundamental rights approach to procreative rights, see Laurence H. Tribe, Abortion: The Clash of Absolutes (1990) [hereinafter Tribe, Abortion ]; Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 Stan. L. Rev. 261 (1992); and Fleming, Securing Autonomy, supra note 116.
    • (1990) Abortion: the Clash of Absolutes
    • Tribe, L.H.1
  • 166
    • 84923723797 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • hereinafter
    • Id. at 166 (referring to U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1). For other advocates of a fundamental rights approach to procreative rights, see Laurence H. Tribe, Abortion: The Clash of Absolutes (1990) [hereinafter Tribe, Abortion ]; Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 Stan. L. Rev. 261 (1992); and Fleming, Securing Autonomy, supra note 116.
    • Abortion
    • Tribe1
  • 167
    • 0026676114 scopus 로고
    • Reasoning from the Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection
    • Id. at 166 (referring to U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1). For other advocates of a fundamental rights approach to procreative rights, see Laurence H. Tribe, Abortion: The Clash of Absolutes (1990) [hereinafter Tribe, Abortion ]; Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 Stan. L. Rev. 261 (1992); and Fleming, Securing Autonomy, supra note 116.
    • (1992) Stan. L. Rev. , vol.44 , pp. 261
    • Siegel, R.1
  • 168
    • 84923752681 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • supra note 116
    • Id. at 166 (referring to U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1). For other advocates of a fundamental rights approach to procreative rights, see Laurence H. Tribe, Abortion: The Clash of Absolutes (1990) [hereinafter Tribe, Abortion ]; Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 Stan. L. Rev. 261 (1992); and Fleming, Securing Autonomy, supra note 116.
    • Securing Autonomy
    • Fleming1
  • 169
    • 0038751735 scopus 로고
    • Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles
    • Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 781, 804 (1983). Professor Tushnet points out that fundamental rights (or as he calls it interpretivism) "goes wrong in thinking that the commonalities are greater than they really are, but we would go equally wrong if we denied that they exist." Id.
    • (1983) Harv. L. Rev. , vol.96 , pp. 781
    • Tushnet, M.V.1
  • 170
    • 2442624164 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 141 (Brennan, J., dissenting); supra note 1
    • Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 141 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Dworkin, Arduous Virtue, supra note 1, at 1253.
    • Arduous Virtue , pp. 1253
    • Dworkin1
  • 171
    • 84923754937 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Michael H., 491 U.S. at 127-28 n.6
    • Michael H., 491 U.S. at 127-28 n.6.
  • 172
    • 46649085906 scopus 로고
    • Levels of Generality in the Definition of Rights
    • Professors Tribe and Dorf explain that "[a]lthough we have described the enterprise of designating fundamental rights as a question of how abstractly to portray rights, we do not posit a single dimension along which abstraction must be measured. A right may be broad along one dimension, while narrow along another." Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorf, Levels of Generality in the Definition of Rights, 57 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1057, 1067 (1990).
    • (1990) U. Chi. L. Rev. , vol.57 , pp. 1057
    • Tribe, L.H.1    Dorf, M.C.2
  • 173
    • 0030534028 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • A Wolf in Sheep's Clothing?: A Critical Analysis of Justice Harlan's Substantive Due Process Formulation
    • See supra note 116; Note
    • See supra note 116; Anthony C. Cicia, Note, A Wolf in Sheep's Clothing?: A Critical Analysis of Justice Harlan's Substantive Due Process Formulation, 64 Fordham L. Rev. 2241, 2250 (1996).
    • (1996) Fordham L. Rev. , vol.64 , pp. 2241
    • Cicia, A.C.1
  • 174
    • 84923754936 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Michael H., 491 U.S. at 127-28 n.6
    • Michael H., 491 U.S. at 127-28 n.6.
  • 175
    • 84923754934 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Id. at 136-157 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Similarly, Justice Harlan has argued that constitutional rights should not be viewed as "a series of isolated points," protecting specific narrow liberties, but rather as "a rational continuum which, broadly speaking, includes [substantial] freedom[s]." Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)
    • Id. at 136-157 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Similarly, Justice Harlan has argued that constitutional rights should not be viewed as "a series of isolated points," protecting specific narrow liberties, but rather as "a rational continuum which, broadly speaking, includes [substantial] freedom[s]." Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
  • 176
    • 84923754932 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (plurality opinion)
    • 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (plurality opinion).
  • 177
    • 84923754923 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Id. at 122-30
    • Id. at 122-30.
  • 178
    • 84923754922 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Id. at 122 (citing Justice Cardozo in Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934))
    • Id. at 122 (citing Justice Cardozo in Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)).
  • 179
    • 84923754921 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Id. (citing Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 544 (1977) (White, J., dissenting))
    • Id. (citing Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 544 (1977) (White, J., dissenting)).
  • 180
    • 84923754920 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Justice Scalia found that liberty interests rest upon "historic respect - indeed, sanctity would not be too strong a term - traditionally accorded to the relationships that develop within the unitary family." Id. at 123. His rationale in reaching this conclusion was that "[previous] decisions establish that the Constitution protects the sanctity of the family precisely because the institution of the family is deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition." Id. at 124 (citing plurality opinion of Justice Powell in Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)).
  • 181
    • 84923754919 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Id. at 122 n.2, 124 n.4, 127 n.6, 130; id. at 143 n.2, 144 n.3 (Brennan, J., dissenting)
    • Id. at 122 n.2, 124 n.4, 127 n.6, 130; id. at 143 n.2, 144 n.3 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
  • 182
    • 84923754918 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Id. at 127-28 n.6
    • Id. at 127-28 n.6.
  • 183
    • 84923754917 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Id. at 127 n.6
    • Id. at 127 n.6.
  • 184
    • 84923754916 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Id. at 138 (Brennan, J., dissenting)
    • Id. at 138 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
  • 185
    • 84923754914 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • "It is not that tradition has been irrelevant to our prior decisions. Throughout our decisionmaking . . . runs the theme that certain interests and practices - freedom from physical restraint, marriage, childbearing, childrearing, and others - form the core of our definition of 'liberty.'" Id. at 139.
  • 186
    • 84923754912 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Id. at 141-42 (Brennan, J., dissenting)
    • Id. at 141-42 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
  • 187
    • 84923754903 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Id. at 142-43
    • Id. at 142-43.
  • 188
    • 84923754902 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Id.
    • Id.
  • 189
    • 84923754901 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Id. at 139 (citing Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), and Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), as two of the decisions that would have come out differently)
    • Id. at 139 (citing Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), and Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), as two of the decisions that would have come out differently).
  • 190
    • 84923754900 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453
    • Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453.
  • 191
    • 84923754899 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • AZ v. BZ, slip op. (Mass. P. Ct. Mar. 25, 1996) (no docket number) (order granting permanent injunction) (on file with the Fordham Law Review); Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 600 (Tenn. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 911 (1993)
    • AZ v. BZ, slip op. (Mass. P. Ct. Mar. 25, 1996) (no docket number) (order granting permanent injunction) (on file with the Fordham Law Review); Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 600 (Tenn. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 911 (1993).
  • 192
    • 84923754898 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See supra part II.A
    • See supra part II.A.
  • 193
    • 0042578087 scopus 로고
    • The Bork Nomination
    • Professor Dworkin has referred to Judge Bork, a well known advocate of the originalist approach, as being a "constitutional radical" who "uses original intention as alchemists once used phlogiston, to hide the fact that he has no theory at all." Ronald M. Dworkin, The Bork Nomination, 9 Cardozo L. Rev. 101, 101, 112 (1987). Likewise, original intent has been called "not a formula or a theory but only a slogan pursuant to which old decisions can be replaced by new ones." Philip B. Kurland, Bork: The Transformation of a Conservative Constitutionalist, 9 Cardozo L. Rev. 127, 128 (1987); see Shih, supra note 116, at 1265-67 (discussing the shortcomings of originalism).
    • (1987) Cardozo L. Rev. , vol.9 , pp. 101
    • Dworkin, R.M.1
  • 194
    • 84923753683 scopus 로고
    • Bork: The Transformation of a Conservative Constitutionalist
    • Professor Dworkin has referred to Judge Bork, a well known advocate of the originalist approach, as being a "constitutional radical" who "uses original intention as alchemists once used phlogiston, to hide the fact that he has no theory at all." Ronald M. Dworkin, The Bork Nomination, 9 Cardozo L. Rev. 101, 101, 112 (1987). Likewise, original intent has been called "not a formula or a theory but only a slogan pursuant to which old decisions can be replaced by new ones." Philip B. Kurland, Bork: The Transformation of a Conservative Constitutionalist, 9 Cardozo L. Rev. 127, 128 (1987); see Shih, supra note 116, at 1265-67 (discussing the shortcomings of originalism).
    • (1987) Cardozo L. Rev. , vol.9 , pp. 127
    • Kurland, P.B.1
  • 195
    • 0004150971 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • supra note 28
    • Dworkin, Life's Dominion, supra note 28, at 127-29; Dworkin, Arduous Virtue, supra note 1, at 1253.
    • Life's Dominion , pp. 127-129
    • Dworkin1
  • 196
    • 2442624164 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • supra note 1
    • Dworkin, Life's Dominion, supra note 28, at 127-29; Dworkin, Arduous Virtue, supra note 1, at 1253.
    • Arduous Virtue , pp. 1253
    • Dworkin1
  • 198
    • 84923754897 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Id. at 127-28
    • Id. at 127-28.
  • 199
    • 84923754896 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Farber, supra note 116, at 1093
    • Farber, supra note 116, at 1093.
  • 200
    • 84923754894 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Id. at 1104
    • Id. at 1104.
  • 201
    • 84923754892 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Id.
    • Id.
  • 202
    • 84923754883 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Scalia, supra note 112, at 862
    • Scalia, supra note 112, at 862.
  • 203
    • 84923754882 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • U.S. Const. amend. VIII
    • U.S. Const. amend. VIII.
  • 204
    • 2442624164 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • supra note 1
    • Dworkin, Arduous Virtue, supra note 1, at 1253-54.
    • Arduous Virtue , pp. 1253-1254
    • Dworkin1
  • 205
    • 84923754881 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Scalia, supra note 112, at 861
    • Scalia, supra note 112, at 861.
  • 206
    • 84923754880 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Id. at 861-62
    • Id. at 861-62.
  • 207
    • 21744451134 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • The Importance of Humility in Judicial Review: A Comment on Ronald Dworkin's "Moral Reading" of the Constitution
    • Michael W. McConnell, The Importance of Humility in Judicial Review: A Comment on Ronald Dworkin's "Moral Reading" of the Constitution, 65 Fordham L. Rev. 1269, 1292 (1997).
    • (1997) Fordham L. Rev. , vol.65 , pp. 1269
    • McConnell, M.W.1
  • 208
    • 84923754879 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Id.
    • Id.
  • 209
    • 84923754878 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Id.
    • Id.
  • 210
    • 84923754877 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Professor Farber points out that the framers spent much time with issues that were important to them, yet [l]ittle thought was given to questions that today hold greater interest. . . . Similarly, the debates about the fourteenth amendment focused on the now forgotten section 2 and 3, which were of immediate concern in the context of Reconstruction but had no lasting importance. Section 1 of the amendment, [containing the Due Process Clause] which today looms larger in judicial application than any other provision of the Constitution, received only the most cursory attention. Farber, supra note 116, at 1087-88.
  • 211
    • 59549105648 scopus 로고
    • Sonnet LXV and the "Black Ink" of the Framers' Intention
    • Charles Fried, Sonnet LXV and the "Black Ink" of the Framers' Intention, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 751, 758-59 (1987).
    • (1987) Harv. L. Rev. , vol.100 , pp. 751
    • Fried, C.1
  • 212
    • 2442624164 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • supra note 1
    • For example, Professor Dworkin states that "[c]onstitutional interpretation is not mathematics, and no one but a fool would think his own constitutional judgments beyond any conceivable challenge." Dworkin, Arduous Virtue, supra note 1, at 1258.
    • Arduous Virtue , pp. 1258
    • Dworkin1
  • 213
    • 84923754876 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Bork, supra note 112, at 251-52
    • Bork, supra note 112, at 251-52.
  • 214
    • 84923754874 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Id. at 252
    • Id. at 252.
  • 215
    • 2442588311 scopus 로고
    • Life's Dominion: An Exchange
    • Shih, supra note 116, at 1268 Sept. 6
    • Shih, supra note 116, at 1268 (citing Jeffrey Rosen, Life's Dominion: An Exchange, The New Republic, Sept. 6, 1993, at 43 (colloquy with Ronald Dworkin)).
    • (1993) The New Republic , pp. 43
    • Rosen, J.1
  • 217
    • 84923754872 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Anders, supra note 116, at 901
    • Anders, supra note 116, at 901.
  • 218
    • 84923754863 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972)
    • Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
  • 219
    • 84923754862 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • 262 U.S. 390 (1923)
    • 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
  • 220
    • 84923754861 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • 316 U.S. 535 (1942)
    • 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
  • 221
    • 84923754860 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • 381 U.S. 479 (1965)
    • 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
  • 222
    • 84923754859 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • 405 U.S. 438 (1972)
    • 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
  • 223
    • 84923754858 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 589 (Tenn. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 911 (1993)
    • Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 589 (Tenn. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 911 (1993).
  • 224
    • 84923754857 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Id. at 590. See infra part III.B.1 for an explanation of why terminating a frozen embryo can be viewed as contraception. If a court applies an extremely narrow interpretation of levels of generality, the court might not analogize this act to contraception, but rather classify the act as something entirely new and different
    • Id. at 590. See infra part III.B.1 for an explanation of why terminating a frozen embryo can be viewed as contraception. If a court applies an extremely narrow interpretation of levels of generality, the court might not analogize this act to contraception, but rather classify the act as something entirely new and different.
  • 225
    • 84923754856 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Although nothing in the original text of the Constitution grants any right to contraception, Justice Scalia, arguably the Court's most outspoken originalist, explicitly states in footnote six of Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (plurality opinion), that his analysis using the most specific level of tradition "is not inconsistent with the result in cases such as Griswold . . . or Eisenstadt." Id. at 128 n.6 (citing Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)). By comparing his Michael H. analysis to the results of Griswold and Eisenstadt, Justice Scalia strongly implies that these two cases were rightly decided, and therefore that both single and married persons are guaranteed the right to contraception.
  • 226
    • 0346619853 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • supra note 29
    • Professor Robertson points out: [R]ecognition of a right of single persons to conceive children would be seen as another foray into the thickets of substantive due process. . . . Although recognition of a right to procreate should extend to any means or technique of reproduction, the right has not yet been extended in this manner, and it is not inevitable that it will be. Defining and articulating the scope of the right to procreate will set the Supreme Court adrift in the largely unchartered waters of substantive due process. Robertson, Procreative Liberty, supra note 29, at 418-20.
    • Procreative Liberty , pp. 418-420
    • Robertson1
  • 227
    • 84923754854 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • A close examination of the privacy decisions reveals that except for Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942), which examines involuntary sterilization in an equal protection context, all of the Court's right to privacy cases deal with restrictions on reproduction, not with questions over affirmative procreative rights or non-coital reproduction conflicts involving only IVF rights. In Skinner, the first case recognizing a right of privacy in reproduction, Justice Douglas determined that marriage and procreation were among the "basic civil rights of man." Id. at 541. The Court's decision preserved Skinner's reproductive capacity until such time as he could exercise it. Although Skinner dealt with the ability to cause conception, it was only in the context of state action that would have resulted in permanently sterilizing an individual, not in the context of affirmative procreative rights for one parent by forcing conception on the other parent. Indeed, the Court has only recognized the right to avoid involuntary sterilization, Skinner, 316 U.S. at 535; the right to employ contraception, Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); and the right to an abortion, Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (plurality opinion); Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132 (1976); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1975); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Eisenstadt, however, interpreted broadly, expressly extends procreative autonomy rights to an unmarried woman's right to beget - the right to conception. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 452.
  • 228
    • 84923754852 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 911 (1993)
    • Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 911 (1993).
  • 229
    • 84923754803 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Kass v. Kass, 1995 WL 110368 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 18, 1995) (no docket number)
    • Kass v. Kass, 1995 WL 110368 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 18, 1995) (no docket number).
  • 230
    • 84923754802 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 603-04
    • Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 603-04.
  • 231
    • 84923754801 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (plurality opinion)
    • 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (plurality opinion).
  • 232
    • 0030321879 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • An Equality Approach to Wrongful Birth Statutes
    • Note
    • See Stephanie S. Gold, Note, An Equality Approach to Wrongful Birth Statutes, 65 Fordham L. Rev. 1005, 1022 n.91 (1996) (pointing out that the term "'spousal notification' may be a misnomer," and that the term should be "husband notification" because it is only the woman who gets pregnant, and therefore, it is the woman who is forced to notify).
    • (1996) Fordham L. Rev. , vol.65 , Issue.91 , pp. 1005
    • Gold, S.S.1
  • 233
    • 84923754800 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Casey, 505 U.S. at 895-98
    • Casey, 505 U.S. at 895-98.
  • 234
    • 0347880940 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Reconsidering Abortion Law: Liberty, Equality, and the New Rhetoric of Planned Parenthood v. Casey
    • Id. at 851 (holding that a woman's decision to choose an abortion is "central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment"); see Erin Daly, Reconsidering Abortion Law: Liberty, Equality, and the New Rhetoric of Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 45 Am. U. L. Rev. 77, 136-37 (explaining how Casey expanded women's liberty rights); Gold, supra note 201, at 1033-37 (discussing the principles of equality established in Casey).
    • Am. U. L. Rev. , vol.45 , pp. 77
    • Daly, E.1
  • 235
    • 84923754799 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Although there is a fundamental distinction between abortion, where the embryo is inside the woman's body, and IVF, where the embryo is outside the woman's body, a court may very well take the position of the Kass court and hold that "it matters little whether the ovum/sperm union takes place in the private darkness of a fallopian tube or the public glare of a petri dish" and that therefore "an in vivo husband's rights and control over the procreative process ends with ejaculation." Kass v. Kass, 1995 WL 110368, at *3, *2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 18, 1995) (no docket number).
  • 236
    • 84923754798 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See supra notes 238-44 and accompanying text
    • See supra notes 238-44 and accompanying text.
  • 237
    • 84923754797 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • In light of Casey's striking down Pennsylvania's spousal notification requirement, Kass's rationale of analogizing the termination of a frozen embryo to abortion even further establishes a woman's rights over a man in a frozen embryo dispute and increases the man's stake in analogizing this act to contraception.
  • 238
    • 84923754796 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Contraception is a protected right for both the man and woman. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 443 (1972) (referring to the right of contraception as one belonging to "single persons" generally). The Supreme Court has consistently held, however, that even though the right to abortion is limited, a woman has a right to terminate the pregnancy before viability. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (plurality opinion); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
  • 239
    • 84923704272 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • supra note 6
    • Robertson, Embryos, supra note 6, at 970.
    • Embryos , pp. 970
    • Robertson1
  • 240
    • 84923754795 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • This observation about Professor Robertson is stated in Carow, supra note 2, at 541-42.
  • 241
    • 84923704272 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • supra note 6
    • Robertson, Embryos, supra note 6, at 969.
    • Embryos , pp. 969
    • Robertson1
  • 242
    • 84923743656 scopus 로고
    • Ethical Considerations in the Use of New Reproductive Technologies
    • Id. (quoting American Fertility Society, Ethical Considerations in the Use of New Reproductive Technologies, 46 Fertility & Sterility (1986) (spec. supp.) [hereinafter American Fertility Society]).
    • (1986) Fertility & Sterility , vol.46 , Issue.SPEC. SUPPL.
  • 243
    • 84923754794 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See Stedman, supra note 38, at 1488 ("The ectodermal cell layer covering the blastocyst which erodes the uterine mucosa and through which the embryo receives nourishment from the mother.")
    • See Stedman, supra note 38, at 1488 ("The ectodermal cell layer covering the blastocyst which erodes the uterine mucosa and through which the embryo receives nourishment from the mother.")
  • 244
    • 84923704272 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • supra note 6
    • Robertson, Embryos, supra note 6, at 969 (quoting American Fertility Society, supra note 211).
    • Embryos , pp. 969
    • Robertson1
  • 245
    • 84923754793 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 593 (Tenn. 1992) (quoting Dr. Jerome LeJeune, a French geneticist who testified at the Davis trial), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 911 (1993)
    • Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 593 (Tenn. 1992) (quoting Dr. Jerome LeJeune, a French geneticist who testified at the Davis trial), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 911 (1993).
  • 246
    • 84923704272 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • supra note 6
    • Robertson, Embryos, supra note 6, at 970.
    • Embryos , pp. 970
    • Robertson1
  • 247
    • 84923754792 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Id.
    • Id.
  • 248
    • 84923754791 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Id.
    • Id.
  • 249
    • 84923754790 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Id.
    • Id.
  • 250
    • 2442574514 scopus 로고
    • Is an Embryo a Person?
    • Nov. 13
    • Charles A. Gardner, Is an Embryo a Person?, The Nation, Nov. 13, 1989, at 557; see also Tribe, Abortion, supra note 139, at 118 (quoting Dr. Gardner to advance the argument that a fertilized egg can not yet be classified as a person).
    • (1989) The Nation , pp. 557
    • Gardner, C.A.1
  • 251
    • 84923723797 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • supra note 139
    • Charles A. Gardner, Is an Embryo a Person?, The Nation, Nov. 13, 1989, at 557; see also Tribe, Abortion, supra note 139, at 118 (quoting Dr. Gardner to advance the argument that a fertilized egg can not yet be classified as a person).
    • Abortion , pp. 118
    • Tribe1
  • 252
    • 84923754789 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Gardner, supra note 219, at 558
    • Gardner, supra note 219, at 558.
  • 253
    • 84923754788 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Id.
    • Id.
  • 254
    • 84923754787 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 595 n.19 (Tenn. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 911 (1993) (citations omitted)
    • Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 595 n.19 (Tenn. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 911 (1993) (citations omitted).
  • 255
    • 84923754786 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Id.
    • Id.
  • 256
    • 84923754785 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Id.
    • Id.
  • 257
    • 84923754784 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Id. at 593 (quoting Dr. Jerome LeJeune)
    • Id. at 593 (quoting Dr. Jerome LeJeune).
  • 258
    • 25544469716 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • FDA Panel Backs Contraceptive Pills for Emergency Use
    • July 1
    • See Anita Womack, FDA Panel Backs Contraceptive Pills for Emergency Use, Wall. St. J., July 1, 1996, at B7C (reporting that "[a] unanimous Food and Drug Administration panel declared that contraceptive pills for emergency use, known as morning-after pills, are safe and effective in reducing unwanted pregnancies").
    • (1996) Wall. St. J.
    • Womack, A.1
  • 259
    • 84923754783 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • 492 U.S. 490, 539 n.1 (1989) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
    • 492 U.S. 490, 539 n.1 (1989) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
  • 260
    • 84923754782 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Id.
    • Id.
  • 261
    • 2442603093 scopus 로고
    • Achieving Consistent Disposition of Frozen Embryos in Marital Dissolution under Florida Law
    • Note
    • See Brenda L. Henderson, Note, Achieving Consistent Disposition of Frozen Embryos in Marital Dissolution Under Florida Law, 17 Nova L. Rev. 549, 570 (1992) (pointing out that the IUD is a "form of contraception [that] destroys the fertilized ovum by preventing successful implantation in the uterus").
    • (1992) Nova L. Rev. , vol.17 , pp. 549
    • Henderson, B.L.1
  • 262
    • 1842455455 scopus 로고
    • The Conservatism of Justice Harlan
    • Justice Louis Brandeis laid the foundation for the right to privacy when he recognized a right of protection of one's private life from government intrusion or "the right to be let alone - the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men." Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). With such a basis, Justice Harlan, in Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961), was the first Justice to expressly argue for a constitutional right to privacy. Id. at 522-55 (Harlan, J., dissenting). In Poe, the plaintiffs challenged Connecticut statutes prohibiting the use of contraceptive devices and the giving of medical advice on the use of such devices. The majority held that there was no justiciable controversy because state officials apparently had no intent to enforce the statutes. Id. at 501-09. In his dissent, Justice Harlan argued that the application of the statute to married persons would violate the Due Process Clause because the regulation was an "intolerable and unjustifiable invasion of privacy," id. at 539, by intruding upon "the most intimate details of the marital relation." Id. at 548. Commentators have cited Justice Harlan's dissent in Poe for the proposition that it created the right to privacy. See Charles Fried, The Conservatism of Justice Harlan, 36 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 33, 35 (1991); Gerald Gunther, Another View of Justice Harlan - A Comment on Fried and Ackerman, 36 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 67, 68 (1991)).
    • (1991) N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. , vol.36 , pp. 33
    • Fried, C.1
  • 263
    • 1842612146 scopus 로고
    • Another View of Justice Harlan - A Comment on Fried and Ackerman
    • Justice Louis Brandeis laid the foundation for the right to privacy when he recognized a right of protection of one's private life from government intrusion or "the right to be let alone - the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men." Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). With such a basis, Justice Harlan, in Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961), was the first Justice to expressly argue for a constitutional right to privacy. Id. at 522-55 (Harlan, J., dissenting). In Poe, the plaintiffs challenged Connecticut statutes prohibiting the use of contraceptive devices and the giving of medical advice on the use of such devices. The majority held that there was no justiciable controversy because state officials apparently had no intent to enforce the statutes. Id. at 501-09. In his dissent, Justice Harlan argued that the application of the statute to married persons would violate the Due Process Clause because the regulation was an "intolerable and unjustifiable invasion of privacy," id. at 539, by intruding upon "the most intimate details of the marital relation." Id. at 548. Commentators have cited Justice Harlan's dissent in Poe for the proposition that it created the right to privacy. See Charles Fried, The Conservatism of Justice Harlan, 36 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 33, 35 (1991); Gerald Gunther, Another View of Justice Harlan - A Comment on Fried and Ackerman, 36 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 67, 68 (1991)).
    • (1991) N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. , vol.36 , pp. 67
    • Gunther, G.1
  • 264
    • 84923754781 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • 262 U.S. 390 (1923)
    • 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
  • 265
    • 84923754780 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Id. at 401
    • Id. at 401.
  • 266
    • 84923754779 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Id. at 399
    • Id. at 399.
  • 267
    • 84923754778 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • 316 U.S. 535 (1942). While in form an equal protection case, the Supreme Court's opinion in Skinner carried forceful due process implications. Ronald D. Rotunda & John E. Nowak, Treatise on Constitutional Law: Substance and Procedure, § 18.27, at 300 (2d ed. 1992)
    • 316 U.S. 535 (1942). While in form an equal protection case, the Supreme Court's opinion in Skinner carried forceful due process implications. Ronald D. Rotunda & John E. Nowak, Treatise on Constitutional Law: Substance and Procedure, § 18.27, at 300 (2d ed. 1992).
  • 268
    • 84923754777 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541. Under the statute, persons convicted of "offenses arising out of the violation of the prohibitory laws, revenue acts, embezzlement, or political offenses" did not have to undergo sterilization. Id. at 537
    • Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541. Under the statute, persons convicted of "offenses arising out of the violation of the prohibitory laws, revenue acts, embezzlement, or political offenses" did not have to undergo sterilization. Id. at 537.
  • 269
    • 84923754776 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Id. at 541
    • Id. at 541.
  • 270
    • 84923754775 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Rotunda & Nowak, supra note 234, § 18.27, at 300
    • Rotunda & Nowak, supra note 234, § 18.27, at 300.
  • 271
    • 84923754774 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • 381 U.S. 479 (1965)
    • 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
  • 272
    • 84923754773 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Id. at 485-86. The Connecticut statute violated the established values of privacy in three ways: (1) it regulated a private marital relationship without a legitimate reason; (2) it gave the government the right to inquire into private marital relationships; and (3) it often required husbands and wives prosecuted under these statutes to testify to the private details of their marriage. Rotunda & Nowak, supra note 234, § 18.27, at 303
    • Id. at 485-86. The Connecticut statute violated the established values of privacy in three ways: (1) it regulated a private marital relationship without a legitimate reason; (2) it gave the government the right to inquire into private marital relationships; and (3) it often required husbands and wives prosecuted under these statutes to testify to the private details of their marriage. Rotunda & Nowak, supra note 234, § 18.27, at 303.
  • 273
    • 0005150051 scopus 로고
    • The Unfinished Business of the Warren Court
    • Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484-85. Professor Charles Black, explaining the rationale of Griswold, states: If our constitutional law could permit [a criminal ban on the use of contraceptives], then we might almost as well not have any law of constitutional limitations, partly because the thing is so outrageous in itself, and partly because a constitutional law inadequate to deal with such an outrage would be too feeble, in method and doctrine, to deal with a very great amount of equally outrageous material. Charles L. Black, Jr., The Unfinished Business of the Warren Court, 46 Wash. L. Rev. 3, 32 (1970).
    • (1970) Wash. L. Rev. , vol.46 , pp. 3
    • Black Jr., C.L.1
  • 274
    • 84923754772 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • 405 U.S. 438 (1972)
    • 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
  • 275
    • 84923754771 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Id. at 453
    • Id. at 453.
  • 276
    • 84923754770 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Id.
    • Id.
  • 277
    • 84923754769 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Id.
    • Id.
  • 278
    • 84923754768 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923)
    • Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
  • 279
    • 84923754767 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925)
    • Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
  • 280
    • 84923754766 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)
    • Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
  • 281
    • 84923754765 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972)
    • Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
  • 282
    • 84923754764 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132 (1976); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)
    • Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132 (1976); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
  • 283
    • 84923754763 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See supra part III.B.1
    • See supra part III.B.1
  • 284
    • 84923754762 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Webster's, supra note 108, at 160
    • Webster's, supra note 108, at 160.
  • 285
    • 84923754761 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Id. at 163
    • Id. at 163.
  • 287
    • 84923754760 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • Doctrinally, the woman will argue that for the Constitution to be an effective tool in protecting individual liberties, it is essential for judges to interpret fundamental rights cases broadly, applying a fundamental rights interpretation of the Constitution, rather than a strict originalist approach.
  • 288
    • 84923754759 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Kass v. Kass, 1995 WL 110368 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 18, 1995) (no docket number)
    • Kass v. Kass, 1995 WL 110368 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 18, 1995) (no docket number).
  • 289
    • 84923754758 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 911 (1993)
    • Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 911 (1993).
  • 290
    • 84923754757 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Id. at 604. Davis cited Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988), in which the Court balanced the competing interests of a city in protecting an abortion doctor, and the people who picketed in front of the doctor's home. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 603 n.29. Frisby implies that when competing rights are involved, a court must balance the competing interests in order to equitably resolve the conflict
    • Id. at 604. Davis cited Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988), in which the Court balanced the competing interests of a city in protecting an abortion doctor, and the people who picketed in front of the doctor's home. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 603 n.29. Frisby implies that when competing rights are involved, a court must balance the competing interests in order to equitably resolve the conflict.


* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.