The sociophilosophy of folk psychology

Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A

Volumn 28, Issue 1, 1997, Pages 1-25

  Kusch, Martin ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ARTICLE; HISTORY; PSYCHOLOGY; TRADITIONAL MEDICINE;

HISTORY, 20TH CENTURY; MEDICINE, TRADITIONAL; PSYCHOLOGY;

EID: 0031089256     PISSN: 00393681     EISSN: 18792510     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0039-3681(96)00012-X     Document Type: Article

References (151)

1. Different writers prefer different labels. E.g., K. V. Wilkes opts for 'common-sense psychology', in order to avoid confusion with W. Wundt's Völkerpsychologie; R. Bogdan opts for 'psychofolklore'. I have also seen 'belief-desire psychology'. Nevertheless, 'folk psychology' has become entrenched, and I shall use it throughout this paper. See K. V. Wilkes, 'Pragmatics in Science and Theory in Common Sense', Inquiry 27 (1984), 339-361; R. J. Bogdan, 'The Folklore of the Mind', in R. J. Bogdan (ed.), Mind and Common Sense: Philosophical Essays on Commonsense Psychology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 1-14; K. V. Wilkes, 'The Long Past and the Short History', ibid., pp. 144-160.
2. Different writers prefer different labels. E.g., K. V. Wilkes opts for 'common-sense psychology', in order to avoid confusion with W. Wundt's Völkerpsychologie; R. Bogdan opts for 'psychofolklore'. I have also seen 'belief-desire psychology'. Nevertheless, 'folk psychology' has become entrenched, and I shall use it throughout this paper. See K. V. Wilkes, 'Pragmatics in Science and Theory in Common Sense', Inquiry 27 (1984), 339-361; R. J. Bogdan, 'The Folklore of the Mind', in R. J. Bogdan (ed.), Mind and Common Sense: Philosophical Essays on Commonsense Psychology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 1-14; K. V. Wilkes, 'The Long Past and the Short History', ibid., pp. 144-160.
3. Different writers prefer different labels. E.g., K. V. Wilkes opts for 'common-sense psychology', in order to avoid confusion with W. Wundt's Völkerpsychologie; R. Bogdan opts for 'psychofolklore'. I have also seen 'belief-desire psychology'. Nevertheless, 'folk psychology' has become entrenched, and I shall use it throughout this paper. See K. V. Wilkes, 'Pragmatics in Science and Theory in Common Sense', Inquiry 27 (1984), 339-361; R. J. Bogdan, 'The Folklore of the Mind', in R. J. Bogdan (ed.), Mind and Common Sense: Philosophical Essays on Commonsense Psychology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 1-14; K. V. Wilkes, 'The Long Past and the Short History', ibid., pp. 144-160.
4. Collectivism is central in the sociology of scientific knowledge. See B. Barnes, T. S. Kuhn and Social Science (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982); D. Bloor, Knowledge and Social Imagery (London: Routledge, 1976), 'Durkheim and Mauss Revisited: Classification and the Sociology of Knowledge', Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 13 (1982), 267-297, Wittgenstein: A Social Theory of Knowledge (London: Macmillan, 1983) and Wittgenstein on Rules as Institutions (forthcoming); H. M. Collins, Changing Order: Replication and Induction in Scientific Practice (London: Sage, 1985); S. Shapin and S. Schaffer, Leviathan and the Air-Pump (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985); S. Shapin, A Social History of Truth: Gentility, Credibility, and Scientific Knowledge in Seventeenth-Century England (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994). Foucault's work can be read in the same collectivistic light. For an interpretation along this line, see M. Kusch, Foucault's Strata and Fields: An Investigation into Archaeological and Genealogical Science Studies (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1991).
5. Collectivism is central in the sociology of scientific knowledge. See B. Barnes, T. S. Kuhn and Social Science (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982); D. Bloor, Knowledge and Social Imagery (London: Routledge, 1976), 'Durkheim and Mauss Revisited: Classification and the Sociology of Knowledge', Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 13 (1982), 267-297, Wittgenstein: A Social Theory of Knowledge (London: Macmillan, 1983) and Wittgenstein on Rules as Institutions (forthcoming); H. M. Collins, Changing Order: Replication and Induction in Scientific Practice (London: Sage, 1985); S. Shapin and S. Schaffer, Leviathan and the Air-Pump (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985); S. Shapin, A Social History of Truth: Gentility, Credibility, and Scientific Knowledge in Seventeenth-Century England (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994). Foucault's work can be read in the same collectivistic light. For an interpretation along this line, see M. Kusch, Foucault's Strata and Fields: An Investigation into Archaeological and Genealogical Science Studies (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1991).
6. Collectivism is central in the sociology of scientific knowledge. See B. Barnes, T. S. Kuhn and Social Science (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982); D. Bloor, Knowledge and Social Imagery (London: Routledge, 1976), 'Durkheim and Mauss Revisited: Classification and the Sociology of Knowledge', Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 13 (1982), 267-297, Wittgenstein: A Social Theory of Knowledge (London: Macmillan, 1983) and Wittgenstein on Rules as Institutions (forthcoming); H. M. Collins, Changing Order: Replication and Induction in Scientific Practice (London: Sage, 1985); S. Shapin and S. Schaffer, Leviathan and the Air-Pump (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985); S. Shapin, A Social History of Truth: Gentility, Credibility, and Scientific Knowledge in Seventeenth-Century England (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994). Foucault's work can be read in the same collectivistic light. For an interpretation along this line, see M. Kusch, Foucault's Strata and Fields: An Investigation into Archaeological and Genealogical Science Studies (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1991).
7. Collectivism is central in the sociology of scientific knowledge. See B. Barnes, T. S. Kuhn and Social Science (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982); D. Bloor, Knowledge and Social Imagery (London: Routledge, 1976), 'Durkheim and Mauss Revisited: Classification and the Sociology of Knowledge', Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 13 (1982), 267-297, Wittgenstein: A Social Theory of Knowledge (London: Macmillan, 1983) and Wittgenstein on Rules as Institutions (forthcoming); H. M. Collins, Changing Order: Replication and Induction in Scientific Practice (London: Sage, 1985); S. Shapin and S. Schaffer, Leviathan and the Air-Pump (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985); S. Shapin, A Social History of Truth: Gentility, Credibility, and Scientific Knowledge in Seventeenth-Century England (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994). Foucault's work can be read in the same collectivistic light. For an interpretation along this line, see M. Kusch, Foucault's Strata and Fields: An Investigation into Archaeological and Genealogical Science Studies (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1991).
8. Collectivism is central in the sociology of scientific knowledge. See B. Barnes, T. S. Kuhn and Social Science (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982); D. Bloor, Knowledge and Social Imagery (London: Routledge, 1976), 'Durkheim and Mauss Revisited: Classification and the Sociology of Knowledge', Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 13 (1982), 267-297, Wittgenstein: A Social Theory of Knowledge (London: Macmillan, 1983) and Wittgenstein on Rules as Institutions (forthcoming); H. M. Collins, Changing Order: Replication and Induction in Scientific Practice (London: Sage, 1985); S. Shapin and S. Schaffer, Leviathan and the Air-Pump (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985); S. Shapin, A Social History of Truth: Gentility, Credibility, and Scientific Knowledge in Seventeenth-Century England (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994). Foucault's work can be read in the same collectivistic light. For an interpretation along this line, see M. Kusch, Foucault's Strata and Fields: An Investigation into Archaeological and Genealogical Science Studies (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1991).
9. Collectivism is central in the sociology of scientific knowledge. See B. Barnes, T. S. Kuhn and Social Science (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982); D. Bloor, Knowledge and Social Imagery (London: Routledge, 1976), 'Durkheim and Mauss Revisited: Classification and the Sociology of Knowledge', Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 13 (1982), 267-297, Wittgenstein: A Social Theory of Knowledge (London: Macmillan, 1983) and Wittgenstein on Rules as Institutions (forthcoming); H. M. Collins, Changing Order: Replication and Induction in Scientific Practice (London: Sage, 1985); S. Shapin and S. Schaffer, Leviathan and the Air-Pump (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985); S. Shapin, A Social History of Truth: Gentility, Credibility, and Scientific Knowledge in Seventeenth-Century England (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994). Foucault's work can be read in the same collectivistic light. For an interpretation along this line, see M. Kusch, Foucault's Strata and Fields: An Investigation into Archaeological and Genealogical Science Studies (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1991).
10. Collectivism is central in the sociology of scientific knowledge. See B. Barnes, T. S. Kuhn and Social Science (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982); D. Bloor, Knowledge and Social Imagery (London: Routledge, 1976), 'Durkheim and Mauss Revisited: Classification and the Sociology of Knowledge', Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 13 (1982), 267-297, Wittgenstein: A Social Theory of Knowledge (London: Macmillan, 1983) and Wittgenstein on Rules as Institutions (forthcoming); H. M. Collins, Changing Order: Replication and Induction in Scientific Practice (London: Sage, 1985); S. Shapin and S. Schaffer, Leviathan and the Air-Pump (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985); S. Shapin, A Social History of Truth: Gentility, Credibility, and Scientific Knowledge in Seventeenth-Century England (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994). Foucault's work can be read in the same collectivistic light. For an interpretation along this line, see M. Kusch, Foucault's Strata and Fields: An Investigation into Archaeological and Genealogical Science Studies (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1991).
11. Collectivism is central in the sociology of scientific knowledge. See B. Barnes, T. S. Kuhn and Social Science (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982); D. Bloor, Knowledge and Social Imagery (London: Routledge, 1976), 'Durkheim and Mauss Revisited: Classification and the Sociology of Knowledge', Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 13 (1982), 267-297, Wittgenstein: A Social Theory of Knowledge (London: Macmillan, 1983) and Wittgenstein on Rules as Institutions (forthcoming); H. M. Collins, Changing Order: Replication and Induction in Scientific Practice (London: Sage, 1985); S. Shapin and S. Schaffer, Leviathan and the Air-Pump (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985); S. Shapin, A Social History of Truth: Gentility, Credibility, and Scientific Knowledge in Seventeenth-Century England (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994). Foucault's work can be read in the same collectivistic light. For an interpretation along this line, see M. Kusch, Foucault's Strata and Fields: An Investigation into Archaeological and Genealogical Science Studies (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1991).
12. Collectivism is central in the sociology of scientific knowledge. See B. Barnes, T. S. Kuhn and Social Science (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982); D. Bloor, Knowledge and Social Imagery (London: Routledge, 1976), 'Durkheim and Mauss Revisited: Classification and the Sociology of Knowledge', Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 13 (1982), 267-297, Wittgenstein: A Social Theory of Knowledge (London: Macmillan, 1983) and Wittgenstein on Rules as Institutions (forthcoming); H. M. Collins, Changing Order: Replication and Induction in Scientific Practice (London: Sage, 1985); S. Shapin and S. Schaffer, Leviathan and the Air-Pump (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985); S. Shapin, A Social History of Truth: Gentility, Credibility, and Scientific Knowledge in Seventeenth-Century England (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994). Foucault's work can be read in the same collectivistic light. For an interpretation along this line, see M. Kusch, Foucault's Strata and Fields: An Investigation into Archaeological and Genealogical Science Studies (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1991).
13. For a more general discussion of sociophilosophy, see M. Kusch, 'Sociophilosophy and the Sociology of Philosophical Knowledge', in I. Niiniluoto (ed.), Methods of Philosophy and the History of Philosophy (Helsinki: Acta Philosophica Fennica, 1996, forthcoming).
14. take this expression from S. Shapin, ' "The Mind Is Its Own Place": Science and Solitude in Seventeenth-Century England', Science in Context 4 (1990), 191-218. Cf. M. Kusch, 'Recluse, Interlocutor, Interrogator: Natural and Social Order in Turn-of-the-Century Psychological Research Schools', Isis 86 (1995), 419-39.
15. take this expression from S. Shapin, ' "The Mind Is Its Own Place": Science and Solitude in Seventeenth-Century England', Science in Context 4 (1990), 191-218. Cf. M. Kusch, 'Recluse, Interlocutor, Interrogator: Natural and Social Order in Turn-of-the-Century Psychological Research Schools', Isis 86 (1995), 419-39.
16. take this happy expression from D. C. Dennett, Consciousness Explained (London: Penguin, 1991), p. 398.
17. See J. Fodor, Psychosemantics (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1987), pp. 132-133.
18. P. Churchland, Matter and Consciousness (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, rev. edn, 1988), p. 59. Churchland's version of the theory theory goes back to W. Sellars, 'Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind', Science, Perception and Reality (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963), pp. 127-196. (The paper was first published in 1956.)
19. P. Churchland, Matter and Consciousness (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, rev. edn, 1988), p. 59. Churchland's version of the theory theory goes back to W. Sellars, 'Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind', Science, Perception and Reality (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963), pp. 127-196. (The paper was first published in 1956.)
20. A. Gopnik and H. M. Wellman, 'The theory theory', in L. A. Hirschfeld and S. A. Gelman (eds), Mapping the Mind: Domain Specificity in Cognition and Culture (Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 257-293.
21. E.g. A. Gopnik, 'How We Know Our Minds: The Illusion of First-person Knowledge of Intentionality', Behavioural and Brain Sciences 16 (1993), 1-14. Precursors of this view include Dilthey and Skinner. See W. Dilthey, Der Aufbau der geschichtlichen Welt in den Geisteswissenschuften, Gesammelte Schriften, Vol. VII, G. Misch (ed.) (Leipzig and Berlin: Teubner, 1927), p. 87; B. F. Skinner, 'The Operational Analysis of Psychological Terms', in H. Feigl and M. Brodbeck (eds), Readings in the Philosophy of Science (New York, Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1953), pp. 585-595, here p. 593.
22. E.g. A. Gopnik, 'How We Know Our Minds: The Illusion of First-person Knowledge of Intentionality', Behavioural and Brain Sciences 16 (1993), 1-14. Precursors of this view include Dilthey and Skinner. See W. Dilthey, Der Aufbau der geschichtlichen Welt in den Geisteswissenschuften, Gesammelte Schriften, Vol. VII, G. Misch (ed.) (Leipzig and Berlin: Teubner, 1927), p. 87; B. F. Skinner, 'The Operational Analysis of Psychological Terms', in H. Feigl and M. Brodbeck (eds), Readings in the Philosophy of Science (New York, Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1953), pp. 585-595, here p. 593.
23. E.g. A. Gopnik, 'How We Know Our Minds: The Illusion of First-person Knowledge of Intentionality', Behavioural and Brain Sciences 16 (1993), 1-14. Precursors of this view include Dilthey and Skinner. See W. Dilthey, Der Aufbau der geschichtlichen Welt in den Geisteswissenschuften, Gesammelte Schriften, Vol. VII, G. Misch (ed.) (Leipzig and Berlin: Teubner, 1927), p. 87; B. F. Skinner, 'The Operational Analysis of Psychological Terms', in H. Feigl and M. Brodbeck (eds), Readings in the Philosophy of Science (New York, Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1953), pp. 585-595, here p. 593.
24. Wilkes, 'Pragmatics' (cf. note 1); A. I. Goldman, 'The Psychology of Folk Psychology', Behavioural and Brain Sciences 16 (1993), 15-28.
25. Wilkes, 'Pragmatics' (cf. note 1); A. I. Goldman, 'The Psychology of Folk Psychology', Behavioural and Brain Sciences 16 (1993), 15-28.
26. See Gopnik and Wellman, 'The theory theory' (ibid., note 8); P. L. Harris, 'Thinking by Children and Scientists: False Analogies and Neglected Similarities', Mapping the Mind, Hirschfeld and Gelman (eds) (cf. note 8), pp. 294-315; and S. A. Gelman, J. D. Coley and Gail M. Gottfried, 'Essentialist Beliefs in Children: The Acquisition of Concepts and Theories', ibid., pp. 341-365.
27. See Gopnik and Wellman, 'The theory theory' (ibid., note 8); P. L. Harris, 'Thinking by Children and Scientists: False Analogies and Neglected Similarities', Mapping the Mind, Hirschfeld and Gelman (eds) (cf. note 8), pp. 294-315; and S. A. Gelman, J. D. Coley and Gail M. Gottfried, 'Essentialist Beliefs in Children: The Acquisition of Concepts and Theories', ibid., pp. 341-365.
28. See Gopnik and Wellman, 'The theory theory' (ibid., note 8); P. L. Harris, 'Thinking by Children and Scientists: False Analogies and Neglected Similarities', Mapping the Mind, Hirschfeld and Gelman (eds) (cf. note 8), pp. 294-315; and S. A. Gelman, J. D. Coley and Gail M. Gottfried, 'Essentialist Beliefs in Children: The Acquisition of Concepts and Theories', ibid., pp. 341-365.
29. This is of course the position for which the Churchlands and S. Stich are best known. See P. M. Churchland, Scientific Realism and the Plasticity of Mind (Cambridge University Press, 1979), A Neurocomputational Perspective: The Nature of Mind and the Structure of Science (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1989), 'Folk psychology (2)', in S. Guttenplan (ed.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), pp. 308-316, The Engine of Reason, the Seat of the Soul: A Philosophical Journey into the Brain (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995), and Neurophilosophy: Toward a Unified Science of the Mind-Brain (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1985); S. P. Stich, From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science: The Case Against Belief (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1983); W. Ramsey, S. Stich and J. Garon, 'Connectionism, Eliminativism, and the Future of Folk Psychology', in J. D. Greenwood (ed.), The Future of Folk Psychology: Intentionality and Cognitive Science (Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 93-119. Stich's position has always been more guarded than the Churchland's. See especially his recent paper with I. Ravenscroft, 'What is Folk Psychology?', Cognition 50 (1994), 447-468. Many of the important criticisms of 'eliminativism' are collected in The Future of Folk Psychology, in Greenwood (ed.) (op. cit.): J. D. Greenwood, 'Reasons to Believe', pp. 70-92; J. Heil, 'Being Indiscrete', pp. 120-134; T. Horgan and J. Woodward, 'Folk Psychology is Here to Stay', pp. 149-175 (first published in 1985); S. Backburn, 'Losing Your Mind: Physics, Identify and Folk Burglar Prevention', pp. 196-225; J. Margolis, 'The Autonomy of Folk Psychology', pp. 242-262; R. McDonough, 'A Culturalist Account of Folk Psychology', pp. 263-288. See also J. R. Searle, The Rediscovery of the Mind (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992), pp. 58-63. I am especially impressed by arguments to the effect that eliminativism presupposes an outdated, positivist view of scientific change. See, e.g. S. Blackburn, 'Losing Your Mind' (op. cit.); J. Dupré, The Disorder of Things: Metaphysical Foundations of the Disunity of Science (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993); and J. E. Foss, 'Materialism, Reduction, Replacement, and the Place of Consciousness in Science', The Journal of Philosophy XCII (1995), 401-429. The eliminativist position was first influentially formulated by P. Feyerabend and R. Rorty. See P. Feyerabend, 'Materialism and the Mind-Body Problem', Review of Metaphysics 17 (1963), 49-66; R. Rorty, 'Mind-Body Identity, Privacy, and Categories', Review of Metaphysics 19 (1965), 24-54.
30. This is of course the position for which the Churchlands and S. Stich are best known. See P. M. Churchland, Scientific Realism and the Plasticity of Mind (Cambridge University Press, 1979), A Neurocomputational Perspective: The Nature of Mind and the Structure of Science (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1989), 'Folk psychology (2)', in S. Guttenplan (ed.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), pp. 308-316, The Engine of Reason, the Seat of the Soul: A Philosophical Journey into the Brain (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995), and Neurophilosophy: Toward a Unified Science of the Mind-Brain (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1985); S. P. Stich, From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science: The Case Against Belief (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1983); W. Ramsey, S. Stich and J. Garon, 'Connectionism, Eliminativism, and the Future of Folk Psychology', in J. D. Greenwood (ed.), The Future of Folk Psychology: Intentionality and Cognitive Science (Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 93-119. Stich's position has always been more guarded than the Churchland's. See especially his recent paper with I. Ravenscroft, 'What is Folk Psychology?', Cognition 50 (1994), 447-468. Many of the important criticisms of 'eliminativism' are collected in The Future of Folk Psychology, in Greenwood (ed.) (op. cit.): J. D. Greenwood, 'Reasons to Believe', pp. 70-92; J. Heil, 'Being Indiscrete', pp. 120-134; T. Horgan and J. Woodward, 'Folk Psychology is Here to Stay', pp. 149-175 (first published in 1985); S. Backburn, 'Losing Your Mind: Physics, Identify and Folk Burglar Prevention', pp. 196-225; J. Margolis, 'The Autonomy of Folk Psychology', pp. 242-262; R. McDonough, 'A Culturalist Account of Folk Psychology', pp. 263-288. See also J. R. Searle, The Rediscovery of the Mind (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992), pp. 58-63. I am especially impressed by arguments to the effect that eliminativism presupposes an outdated, positivist view of scientific change. See, e.g. S. Blackburn, 'Losing Your Mind' (op. cit.); J. Dupré, The Disorder of Things: Metaphysical Foundations of the Disunity of Science (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993); and J. E. Foss, 'Materialism, Reduction, Replacement, and the Place of Consciousness in Science', The Journal of Philosophy XCII (1995), 401-429. The eliminativist position was first influentially formulated by P. Feyerabend and R. Rorty. See P. Feyerabend, 'Materialism and the Mind-Body Problem', Review of Metaphysics 17 (1963), 49-66; R. Rorty, 'Mind-Body Identity, Privacy, and Categories', Review of Metaphysics 19 (1965), 24-54.
31. This is of course the position for which the Churchlands and S. Stich are best known. See P. M. Churchland, Scientific Realism and the Plasticity of Mind (Cambridge University Press, 1979), A Neurocomputational Perspective: The Nature of Mind and the Structure of Science (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1989), 'Folk psychology (2)', in S. Guttenplan (ed.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), pp. 308-316, The Engine of Reason, the Seat of the Soul: A Philosophical Journey into the Brain (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995), and Neurophilosophy: Toward a Unified Science of the Mind-Brain (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1985); S. P. Stich, From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science: The Case Against Belief (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1983); W. Ramsey, S. Stich and J. Garon, 'Connectionism, Eliminativism, and the Future of Folk Psychology', in J. D. Greenwood (ed.), The Future of Folk Psychology: Intentionality and Cognitive Science (Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 93-119. Stich's position has always been more guarded than the Churchland's. See especially his recent paper with I. Ravenscroft, 'What is Folk Psychology?', Cognition 50 (1994), 447-468. Many of the important criticisms of 'eliminativism' are collected in The Future of Folk Psychology, in Greenwood (ed.) (op. cit.): J. D. Greenwood, 'Reasons to Believe', pp. 70-92; J. Heil, 'Being Indiscrete', pp. 120-134; T. Horgan and J. Woodward, 'Folk Psychology is Here to Stay', pp. 149-175 (first published in 1985); S. Backburn, 'Losing Your Mind: Physics, Identify and Folk Burglar Prevention', pp. 196-225; J. Margolis, 'The Autonomy of Folk Psychology', pp. 242-262; R. McDonough, 'A Culturalist Account of Folk Psychology', pp. 263-288. See also J. R. Searle, The Rediscovery of the Mind (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992), pp. 58-63. I am especially impressed by arguments to the effect that eliminativism presupposes an outdated, positivist view of scientific change. See, e.g. S. Blackburn, 'Losing Your Mind' (op. cit.); J. Dupré, The Disorder of Things: Metaphysical Foundations of the Disunity of Science (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993); and J. E. Foss, 'Materialism, Reduction, Replacement, and the Place of Consciousness in Science', The Journal of Philosophy XCII (1995), 401-429. The eliminativist position was first influentially formulated by P. Feyerabend and R. Rorty. See P. Feyerabend, 'Materialism and the Mind-Body Problem', Review of Metaphysics 17 (1963), 49-66; R. Rorty, 'Mind-Body Identity, Privacy, and Categories', Review of Metaphysics 19 (1965), 24-54.
32. This is of course the position for which the Churchlands and S. Stich are best known. See P. M. Churchland, Scientific Realism and the Plasticity of Mind (Cambridge University Press, 1979), A Neurocomputational Perspective: The Nature of Mind and the Structure of Science (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1989), 'Folk psychology (2)', in S. Guttenplan (ed.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), pp. 308-316, The Engine of Reason, the Seat of the Soul: A Philosophical Journey into the Brain (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995), and Neurophilosophy: Toward a Unified Science of the Mind-Brain (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1985); S. P. Stich, From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science: The Case Against Belief (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1983); W. Ramsey, S. Stich and J. Garon, 'Connectionism, Eliminativism, and the Future of Folk Psychology', in J. D. Greenwood (ed.), The Future of Folk Psychology: Intentionality and Cognitive Science (Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 93-119. Stich's position has always been more guarded than the Churchland's. See especially his recent paper with I. Ravenscroft, 'What is Folk Psychology?', Cognition 50 (1994), 447-468. Many of the important criticisms of 'eliminativism' are collected in The Future of Folk Psychology, in Greenwood (ed.) (op. cit.): J. D. Greenwood, 'Reasons to Believe', pp. 70-92; J. Heil, 'Being Indiscrete', pp. 120-134; T. Horgan and J. Woodward, 'Folk Psychology is Here to Stay', pp. 149-175 (first published in 1985); S. Backburn, 'Losing Your Mind: Physics, Identify and Folk Burglar Prevention', pp. 196-225; J. Margolis, 'The Autonomy of Folk Psychology', pp. 242-262; R. McDonough, 'A Culturalist Account of Folk Psychology', pp. 263-288. See also J. R. Searle, The Rediscovery of the Mind (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992), pp. 58-63. I am especially impressed by arguments to the effect that eliminativism presupposes an outdated, positivist view of scientific change. See, e.g. S. Blackburn, 'Losing Your Mind' (op. cit.); J. Dupré, The Disorder of Things: Metaphysical Foundations of the Disunity of Science (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993); and J. E. Foss, 'Materialism, Reduction, Replacement, and the Place of Consciousness in Science', The Journal of Philosophy XCII (1995), 401-429. The eliminativist position was first influentially formulated by P. Feyerabend and R. Rorty. See P. Feyerabend, 'Materialism and the Mind-Body Problem', Review of Metaphysics 17 (1963), 49-66; R. Rorty, 'Mind-Body Identity, Privacy, and Categories', Review of Metaphysics 19 (1965), 24-54.
33. This is of course the position for which the Churchlands and S. Stich are best known. See P. M. Churchland, Scientific Realism and the Plasticity of Mind (Cambridge University Press, 1979), A Neurocomputational Perspective: The Nature of Mind and the Structure of Science (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1989), 'Folk psychology (2)', in S. Guttenplan (ed.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), pp. 308-316, The Engine of Reason, the Seat of the Soul: A Philosophical Journey into the Brain (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995), and Neurophilosophy: Toward a Unified Science of the Mind-Brain (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1985); S. P. Stich, From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science: The Case Against Belief (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1983); W. Ramsey, S. Stich and J. Garon, 'Connectionism, Eliminativism, and the Future of Folk Psychology', in J. D. Greenwood (ed.), The Future of Folk Psychology: Intentionality and Cognitive Science (Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 93-119. Stich's position has always been more guarded than the Churchland's. See especially his recent paper with I. Ravenscroft, 'What is Folk Psychology?', Cognition 50 (1994), 447-468. Many of the important criticisms of 'eliminativism' are collected in The Future of Folk Psychology, in Greenwood (ed.) (op. cit.): J. D. Greenwood, 'Reasons to Believe', pp. 70-92; J. Heil, 'Being Indiscrete', pp. 120-134; T. Horgan and J. Woodward, 'Folk Psychology is Here to Stay', pp. 149-175 (first published in 1985); S. Backburn, 'Losing Your Mind: Physics, Identify and Folk Burglar Prevention', pp. 196-225; J. Margolis, 'The Autonomy of Folk Psychology', pp. 242-262; R. McDonough, 'A Culturalist Account of Folk Psychology', pp. 263-288. See also J. R. Searle, The Rediscovery of the Mind (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992), pp. 58-63. I am especially impressed by arguments to the effect that eliminativism presupposes an outdated, positivist view of scientific change. See, e.g. S. Blackburn, 'Losing Your Mind' (op. cit.); J. Dupré, The Disorder of Things: Metaphysical Foundations of the Disunity of Science (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993); and J. E. Foss, 'Materialism, Reduction, Replacement, and the Place of Consciousness in Science', The Journal of Philosophy XCII (1995), 401-429. The eliminativist position was first influentially formulated by P. Feyerabend and R. Rorty. See P. Feyerabend, 'Materialism and the Mind-Body Problem', Review of Metaphysics 17 (1963), 49-66; R. Rorty, 'Mind-Body Identity, Privacy, and Categories', Review of Metaphysics 19 (1965), 24-54.
34. This is of course the position for which the Churchlands and S. Stich are best known. See P. M. Churchland, Scientific Realism and the Plasticity of Mind (Cambridge University Press, 1979), A Neurocomputational Perspective: The Nature of Mind and the Structure of Science (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1989), 'Folk psychology (2)', in S. Guttenplan (ed.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), pp. 308-316, The Engine of Reason, the Seat of the Soul: A Philosophical Journey into the Brain (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995), and Neurophilosophy: Toward a Unified Science of the Mind-Brain (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1985); S. P. Stich, From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science: The Case Against Belief (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1983); W. Ramsey, S. Stich and J. Garon, 'Connectionism, Eliminativism, and the Future of Folk Psychology', in J. D. Greenwood (ed.), The Future of Folk Psychology: Intentionality and Cognitive Science (Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 93-119. Stich's position has always been more guarded than the Churchland's. See especially his recent paper with I. Ravenscroft, 'What is Folk Psychology?', Cognition 50 (1994), 447-468. Many of the important criticisms of 'eliminativism' are collected in The Future of Folk Psychology, in Greenwood (ed.) (op. cit.): J. D. Greenwood, 'Reasons to Believe', pp. 70-92; J. Heil, 'Being Indiscrete', pp. 120-134; T. Horgan and J. Woodward, 'Folk Psychology is Here to Stay', pp. 149-175 (first published in 1985); S. Backburn, 'Losing Your Mind: Physics, Identify and Folk Burglar Prevention', pp. 196-225; J. Margolis, 'The Autonomy of Folk Psychology', pp. 242-262; R. McDonough, 'A Culturalist Account of Folk Psychology', pp. 263-288. See also J. R. Searle, The Rediscovery of the Mind (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992), pp. 58-63. I am especially impressed by arguments to the effect that eliminativism presupposes an outdated, positivist view of scientific change. See, e.g. S. Blackburn, 'Losing Your Mind' (op. cit.); J. Dupré, The Disorder of Things: Metaphysical Foundations of the Disunity of Science (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993); and J. E. Foss, 'Materialism, Reduction, Replacement, and the Place of Consciousness in Science', The Journal of Philosophy XCII (1995), 401-429. The eliminativist position was first influentially formulated by P. Feyerabend and R. Rorty. See P. Feyerabend, 'Materialism and the Mind-Body Problem', Review of Metaphysics 17 (1963), 49-66; R. Rorty, 'Mind-Body Identity, Privacy, and Categories', Review of Metaphysics 19 (1965), 24-54.
35. This is of course the position for which the Churchlands and S. Stich are best known. See P. M. Churchland, Scientific Realism and the Plasticity of Mind (Cambridge University Press, 1979), A Neurocomputational Perspective: The Nature of Mind and the Structure of Science (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1989), 'Folk psychology (2)', in S. Guttenplan (ed.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), pp. 308-316, The Engine of Reason, the Seat of the Soul: A Philosophical Journey into the Brain (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995), and Neurophilosophy: Toward a Unified Science of the Mind-Brain (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1985); S. P. Stich, From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science: The Case Against Belief (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1983); W. Ramsey, S. Stich and J. Garon, 'Connectionism, Eliminativism, and the Future of Folk Psychology', in J. D. Greenwood (ed.), The Future of Folk Psychology: Intentionality and Cognitive Science (Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 93-119. Stich's position has always been more guarded than the Churchland's. See especially his recent paper with I. Ravenscroft, 'What is Folk Psychology?', Cognition 50 (1994), 447-468. Many of the important criticisms of 'eliminativism' are collected in The Future of Folk Psychology, in Greenwood (ed.) (op. cit.): J. D. Greenwood, 'Reasons to Believe', pp. 70-92; J. Heil, 'Being Indiscrete', pp. 120-134; T. Horgan and J. Woodward, 'Folk Psychology is Here to Stay', pp. 149-175 (first published in 1985); S. Backburn, 'Losing Your Mind: Physics, Identify and Folk Burglar Prevention', pp. 196-225; J. Margolis, 'The Autonomy of Folk Psychology', pp. 242-262; R. McDonough, 'A Culturalist Account of Folk Psychology', pp. 263-288. See also J. R. Searle, The Rediscovery of the Mind (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992), pp. 58-63. I am especially impressed by arguments to the effect that eliminativism presupposes an outdated, positivist view of scientific change. See, e.g. S. Blackburn, 'Losing Your Mind' (op. cit.); J. Dupré, The Disorder of Things: Metaphysical Foundations of the Disunity of Science (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993); and J. E. Foss, 'Materialism, Reduction, Replacement, and the Place of Consciousness in Science', The Journal of Philosophy XCII (1995), 401-429. The eliminativist position was first influentially formulated by P. Feyerabend and R. Rorty. See P. Feyerabend, 'Materialism and the Mind-Body Problem', Review of Metaphysics 17 (1963), 49-66; R. Rorty, 'Mind-Body Identity, Privacy, and Categories', Review of Metaphysics 19 (1965), 24-54.
36. This is of course the position for which the Churchlands and S. Stich are best known. See P. M. Churchland, Scientific Realism and the Plasticity of Mind (Cambridge University Press, 1979), A Neurocomputational Perspective: The Nature of Mind and the Structure of Science (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1989), 'Folk psychology (2)', in S. Guttenplan (ed.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), pp. 308-316, The Engine of Reason, the Seat of the Soul: A Philosophical Journey into the Brain (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995), and Neurophilosophy: Toward a Unified Science of the Mind-Brain (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1985); S. P. Stich, From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science: The Case Against Belief (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1983); W. Ramsey, S. Stich and J. Garon, 'Connectionism, Eliminativism, and the Future of Folk Psychology', in J. D. Greenwood (ed.), The Future of Folk Psychology: Intentionality and Cognitive Science (Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 93-119. Stich's position has always been more guarded than the Churchland's. See especially his recent paper with I. Ravenscroft, 'What is Folk Psychology?', Cognition 50 (1994), 447-468. Many of the important criticisms of 'eliminativism' are collected in The Future of Folk Psychology, in Greenwood (ed.) (op. cit.): J. D. Greenwood, 'Reasons to Believe', pp. 70-92; J. Heil, 'Being Indiscrete', pp. 120-134; T. Horgan and J. Woodward, 'Folk Psychology is Here to Stay', pp. 149-175 (first published in 1985); S. Backburn, 'Losing Your Mind: Physics, Identify and Folk Burglar Prevention', pp. 196-225; J. Margolis, 'The Autonomy of Folk Psychology', pp. 242-262; R. McDonough, 'A Culturalist Account of Folk Psychology', pp. 263-288. See also J. R. Searle, The Rediscovery of the Mind (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992), pp. 58-63. I am especially impressed by arguments to the effect that eliminativism presupposes an outdated, positivist view of scientific change. See, e.g. S. Blackburn, 'Losing Your Mind' (op. cit.); J. Dupré, The Disorder of Things: Metaphysical Foundations of the Disunity of Science (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993); and J. E. Foss, 'Materialism, Reduction, Replacement, and the Place of Consciousness in Science', The Journal of Philosophy XCII (1995), 401-429. The eliminativist position was first influentially formulated by P. Feyerabend and R. Rorty. See P. Feyerabend, 'Materialism and the Mind-Body Problem', Review of Metaphysics 17 (1963), 49-66; R. Rorty, 'Mind-Body Identity, Privacy, and Categories', Review of Metaphysics 19 (1965), 24-54.
37. This is of course the position for which the Churchlands and S. Stich are best known. See P. M. Churchland, Scientific Realism and the Plasticity of Mind (Cambridge University Press, 1979), A Neurocomputational Perspective: The Nature of Mind and the Structure of Science (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1989), 'Folk psychology (2)', in S. Guttenplan (ed.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), pp. 308-316, The Engine of Reason, the Seat of the Soul: A Philosophical Journey into the Brain (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995), and Neurophilosophy: Toward a Unified Science of the Mind-Brain (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1985); S. P. Stich, From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science: The Case Against Belief (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1983); W. Ramsey, S. Stich and J. Garon, 'Connectionism, Eliminativism, and the Future of Folk Psychology', in J. D. Greenwood (ed.), The Future of Folk Psychology: Intentionality and Cognitive Science (Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 93-119. Stich's position has always been more guarded than the Churchland's. See especially his recent paper with I. Ravenscroft, 'What is Folk Psychology?', Cognition 50 (1994), 447-468. Many of the important criticisms of 'eliminativism' are collected in The Future of Folk Psychology, in Greenwood (ed.) (op. cit.): J. D. Greenwood, 'Reasons to Believe', pp. 70-92; J. Heil, 'Being Indiscrete', pp. 120-134; T. Horgan and J. Woodward, 'Folk Psychology is Here to Stay', pp. 149-175 (first published in 1985); S. Backburn, 'Losing Your Mind: Physics, Identify and Folk Burglar Prevention', pp. 196-225; J. Margolis, 'The Autonomy of Folk Psychology', pp. 242-262; R. McDonough, 'A Culturalist Account of Folk Psychology', pp. 263-288. See also J. R. Searle, The Rediscovery of the Mind (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992), pp. 58-63. I am especially impressed by arguments to the effect that eliminativism presupposes an outdated, positivist view of scientific change. See, e.g. S. Blackburn, 'Losing Your Mind' (op. cit.); J. Dupré, The Disorder of Things: Metaphysical Foundations of the Disunity of Science (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993); and J. E. Foss, 'Materialism, Reduction, Replacement, and the Place of Consciousness in Science', The Journal of Philosophy XCII (1995), 401-429. The eliminativist position was first influentially formulated by P. Feyerabend and R. Rorty. See P. Feyerabend, 'Materialism and the Mind-Body Problem', Review of Metaphysics 17 (1963), 49-66; R. Rorty, 'Mind-Body Identity, Privacy, and Categories', Review of Metaphysics 19 (1965), 24-54.
38. This is of course the position for which the Churchlands and S. Stich are best known. See P. M. Churchland, Scientific Realism and the Plasticity of Mind (Cambridge University Press, 1979), A Neurocomputational Perspective: The Nature of Mind and the Structure of Science (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1989), 'Folk psychology (2)', in S. Guttenplan (ed.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), pp. 308-316, The Engine of Reason, the Seat of the Soul: A Philosophical Journey into the Brain (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995), and Neurophilosophy: Toward a Unified Science of the Mind-Brain (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1985); S. P. Stich, From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science: The Case Against Belief (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1983); W. Ramsey, S. Stich and J. Garon, 'Connectionism, Eliminativism, and the Future of Folk Psychology', in J. D. Greenwood (ed.), The Future of Folk Psychology: Intentionality and Cognitive Science (Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 93-119. Stich's position has always been more guarded than the Churchland's. See especially his recent paper with I. Ravenscroft, 'What is Folk Psychology?', Cognition 50 (1994), 447-468. Many of the important criticisms of 'eliminativism' are collected in The Future of Folk Psychology, in Greenwood (ed.) (op. cit.): J. D. Greenwood, 'Reasons to Believe', pp. 70-92; J. Heil, 'Being Indiscrete', pp. 120-134; T. Horgan and J. Woodward, 'Folk Psychology is Here to Stay', pp. 149-175 (first published in 1985); S. Backburn, 'Losing Your Mind: Physics, Identify and Folk Burglar Prevention', pp. 196-225; J. Margolis, 'The Autonomy of Folk Psychology', pp. 242-262; R. McDonough, 'A Culturalist Account of Folk Psychology', pp. 263-288. See also J. R. Searle, The Rediscovery of the Mind (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992), pp. 58-63. I am especially impressed by arguments to the effect that eliminativism presupposes an outdated, positivist view of scientific change. See, e.g. S. Blackburn, 'Losing Your Mind' (op. cit.); J. Dupré, The Disorder of Things: Metaphysical Foundations of the Disunity of Science (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993); and J. E. Foss, 'Materialism, Reduction, Replacement, and the Place of Consciousness in Science', The Journal of Philosophy XCII (1995), 401-429. The eliminativist position was first influentially formulated by P. Feyerabend and R. Rorty. See P. Feyerabend, 'Materialism and the Mind-Body Problem', Review of Metaphysics 17 (1963), 49-66; R. Rorty, 'Mind-Body Identity, Privacy, and Categories', Review of Metaphysics 19 (1965), 24-54.
39. This is of course the position for which the Churchlands and S. Stich are best known. See P. M. Churchland, Scientific Realism and the Plasticity of Mind (Cambridge University Press, 1979), A Neurocomputational Perspective: The Nature of Mind and the Structure of Science (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1989), 'Folk psychology (2)', in S. Guttenplan (ed.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), pp. 308-316, The Engine of Reason, the Seat of the Soul: A Philosophical Journey into the Brain (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995), and Neurophilosophy: Toward a Unified Science of the Mind-Brain (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1985); S. P. Stich, From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science: The Case Against Belief (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1983); W. Ramsey, S. Stich and J. Garon, 'Connectionism, Eliminativism, and the Future of Folk Psychology', in J. D. Greenwood (ed.), The Future of Folk Psychology: Intentionality and Cognitive Science (Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 93-119. Stich's position has always been more guarded than the Churchland's. See especially his recent paper with I. Ravenscroft, 'What is Folk Psychology?', Cognition 50 (1994), 447-468. Many of the important criticisms of 'eliminativism' are collected in The Future of Folk Psychology, in Greenwood (ed.) (op. cit.): J. D. Greenwood, 'Reasons to Believe', pp. 70-92; J. Heil, 'Being Indiscrete', pp. 120-134; T. Horgan and J. Woodward, 'Folk Psychology is Here to Stay', pp. 149-175 (first published in 1985); S. Backburn, 'Losing Your Mind: Physics, Identify and Folk Burglar Prevention', pp. 196-225; J. Margolis, 'The Autonomy of Folk Psychology', pp. 242-262; R. McDonough, 'A Culturalist Account of Folk Psychology', pp. 263-288. See also J. R. Searle, The Rediscovery of the Mind (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992), pp. 58-63. I am especially impressed by arguments to the effect that eliminativism presupposes an outdated, positivist view of scientific change. See, e.g. S. Blackburn, 'Losing Your Mind' (op. cit.); J. Dupré, The Disorder of Things: Metaphysical Foundations of the Disunity of Science (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993); and J. E. Foss, 'Materialism, Reduction, Replacement, and the Place of Consciousness in Science', The Journal of Philosophy XCII (1995), 401-429. The eliminativist position was first influentially formulated by P. Feyerabend and R. Rorty. See P. Feyerabend, 'Materialism and the Mind-Body Problem', Review of Metaphysics 17 (1963), 49-66; R. Rorty, 'Mind-Body Identity, Privacy, and Categories', Review of Metaphysics 19 (1965), 24-54.
40. This is of course the position for which the Churchlands and S. Stich are best known. See P. M. Churchland, Scientific Realism and the Plasticity of Mind (Cambridge University Press, 1979), A Neurocomputational Perspective: The Nature of Mind and the Structure of Science (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1989), 'Folk psychology (2)', in S. Guttenplan (ed.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), pp. 308-316, The Engine of Reason, the Seat of the Soul: A Philosophical Journey into the Brain (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995), and Neurophilosophy: Toward a Unified Science of the Mind-Brain (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1985); S. P. Stich, From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science: The Case Against Belief (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1983); W. Ramsey, S. Stich and J. Garon, 'Connectionism, Eliminativism, and the Future of Folk Psychology', in J. D. Greenwood (ed.), The Future of Folk Psychology: Intentionality and Cognitive Science (Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 93-119. Stich's position has always been more guarded than the Churchland's. See especially his recent paper with I. Ravenscroft, 'What is Folk Psychology?', Cognition 50 (1994), 447-468. Many of the important criticisms of 'eliminativism' are collected in The Future of Folk Psychology, in Greenwood (ed.) (op. cit.): J. D. Greenwood, 'Reasons to Believe', pp. 70-92; J. Heil, 'Being Indiscrete', pp. 120-134; T. Horgan and J. Woodward, 'Folk Psychology is Here to Stay', pp. 149-175 (first published in 1985); S. Backburn, 'Losing Your Mind: Physics, Identify and Folk Burglar Prevention', pp. 196-225; J. Margolis, 'The Autonomy of Folk Psychology', pp. 242-262; R. McDonough, 'A Culturalist Account of Folk Psychology', pp. 263-288. See also J. R. Searle, The Rediscovery of the Mind (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992), pp. 58-63. I am especially impressed by arguments to the effect that eliminativism presupposes an outdated, positivist view of scientific change. See, e.g. S. Blackburn, 'Losing Your Mind' (op. cit.); J. Dupré, The Disorder of Things: Metaphysical Foundations of the Disunity of Science (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993); and J. E. Foss, 'Materialism, Reduction, Replacement, and the Place of Consciousness in Science', The Journal of Philosophy XCII (1995), 401-429. The eliminativist position was first influentially formulated by P. Feyerabend and R. Rorty. See P. Feyerabend, 'Materialism and the Mind-Body Problem', Review of Metaphysics 17 (1963), 49-66; R. Rorty, 'Mind-Body Identity, Privacy, and Categories', Review of Metaphysics 19 (1965), 24-54.
41. This is of course the position for which the Churchlands and S. Stich are best known. See P. M. Churchland, Scientific Realism and the Plasticity of Mind (Cambridge University Press, 1979), A Neurocomputational Perspective: The Nature of Mind and the Structure of Science (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1989), 'Folk psychology (2)', in S. Guttenplan (ed.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), pp. 308-316, The Engine of Reason, the Seat of the Soul: A Philosophical Journey into the Brain (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995), and Neurophilosophy: Toward a Unified Science of the Mind-Brain (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1985); S. P. Stich, From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science: The Case Against Belief (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1983); W. Ramsey, S. Stich and J. Garon, 'Connectionism, Eliminativism, and the Future of Folk Psychology', in J. D. Greenwood (ed.), The Future of Folk Psychology: Intentionality and Cognitive Science (Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 93-119. Stich's position has always been more guarded than the Churchland's. See especially his recent paper with I. Ravenscroft, 'What is Folk Psychology?', Cognition 50 (1994), 447-468. Many of the important criticisms of 'eliminativism' are collected in The Future of Folk Psychology, in Greenwood (ed.) (op. cit.): J. D. Greenwood, 'Reasons to Believe', pp. 70-92; J. Heil, 'Being Indiscrete', pp. 120-134; T. Horgan and J. Woodward, 'Folk Psychology is Here to Stay', pp. 149-175 (first published in 1985); S. Backburn, 'Losing Your Mind: Physics, Identify and Folk Burglar Prevention', pp. 196-225; J. Margolis, 'The Autonomy of Folk Psychology', pp. 242-262; R. McDonough, 'A Culturalist Account of Folk Psychology', pp. 263-288. See also J. R. Searle, The Rediscovery of the Mind (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992), pp. 58-63. I am especially impressed by arguments to the effect that eliminativism presupposes an outdated, positivist view of scientific change. See, e.g. S. Blackburn, 'Losing Your Mind' (op. cit.); J. Dupré, The Disorder of Things: Metaphysical Foundations of the Disunity of Science (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993); and J. E. Foss, 'Materialism, Reduction, Replacement, and the Place of Consciousness in Science', The Journal of Philosophy XCII (1995), 401-429. The eliminativist position was first influentially formulated by P. Feyerabend and R. Rorty. See P. Feyerabend, 'Materialism and the Mind-Body Problem', Review of Metaphysics 17 (1963), 49-66; R. Rorty, 'Mind-Body Identity, Privacy, and Categories', Review of Metaphysics 19 (1965), 24-54.
42. This is of course the position for which the Churchlands and S. Stich are best known. See P. M. Churchland, Scientific Realism and the Plasticity of Mind (Cambridge University Press, 1979), A Neurocomputational Perspective: The Nature of Mind and the Structure of Science (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1989), 'Folk psychology (2)', in S. Guttenplan (ed.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), pp. 308-316, The Engine of Reason, the Seat of the Soul: A Philosophical Journey into the Brain (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995), and Neurophilosophy: Toward a Unified Science of the Mind-Brain (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1985); S. P. Stich, From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science: The Case Against Belief (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1983); W. Ramsey, S. Stich and J. Garon, 'Connectionism, Eliminativism, and the Future of Folk Psychology', in J. D. Greenwood (ed.), The Future of Folk Psychology: Intentionality and Cognitive Science (Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 93-119. Stich's position has always been more guarded than the Churchland's. See especially his recent paper with I. Ravenscroft, 'What is Folk Psychology?', Cognition 50 (1994), 447-468. Many of the important criticisms of 'eliminativism' are collected in The Future of Folk Psychology, in Greenwood (ed.) (op. cit.): J. D. Greenwood, 'Reasons to Believe', pp. 70-92; J. Heil, 'Being Indiscrete', pp. 120-134; T. Horgan and J. Woodward, 'Folk Psychology is Here to Stay', pp. 149-175 (first published in 1985); S. Backburn, 'Losing Your Mind: Physics, Identify and Folk Burglar Prevention', pp. 196-225; J. Margolis, 'The Autonomy of Folk Psychology', pp. 242-262; R. McDonough, 'A Culturalist Account of Folk Psychology', pp. 263-288. See also J. R. Searle, The Rediscovery of the Mind (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992), pp. 58-63. I am especially impressed by arguments to the effect that eliminativism presupposes an outdated, positivist view of scientific change. See, e.g. S. Blackburn, 'Losing Your Mind' (op. cit.); J. Dupré, The Disorder of Things: Metaphysical Foundations of the Disunity of Science (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993); and J. E. Foss, 'Materialism, Reduction, Replacement, and the Place of Consciousness in Science', The Journal of Philosophy XCII (1995), 401-429. The eliminativist position was first influentially formulated by P. Feyerabend and R. Rorty. See P. Feyerabend, 'Materialism and the Mind-Body Problem', Review of Metaphysics 17 (1963), 49-66; R. Rorty, 'Mind-Body Identity, Privacy, and Categories', Review of Metaphysics 19 (1965), 24-54.
43. This is of course the position for which the Churchlands and S. Stich are best known. See P. M. Churchland, Scientific Realism and the Plasticity of Mind (Cambridge University Press, 1979), A Neurocomputational Perspective: The Nature of Mind and the Structure of Science (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1989), 'Folk psychology (2)', in S. Guttenplan (ed.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), pp. 308-316, The Engine of Reason, the Seat of the Soul: A Philosophical Journey into the Brain (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995), and Neurophilosophy: Toward a Unified Science of the Mind-Brain (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1985); S. P. Stich, From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science: The Case Against Belief (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1983); W. Ramsey, S. Stich and J. Garon, 'Connectionism, Eliminativism, and the Future of Folk Psychology', in J. D. Greenwood (ed.), The Future of Folk Psychology: Intentionality and Cognitive Science (Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 93-119. Stich's position has always been more guarded than the Churchland's. See especially his recent paper with I. Ravenscroft, 'What is Folk Psychology?', Cognition 50 (1994), 447-468. Many of the important criticisms of 'eliminativism' are collected in The Future of Folk Psychology, in Greenwood (ed.) (op. cit.): J. D. Greenwood, 'Reasons to Believe', pp. 70-92; J. Heil, 'Being Indiscrete', pp. 120-134; T. Horgan and J. Woodward, 'Folk Psychology is Here to Stay', pp. 149-175 (first published in 1985); S. Backburn, 'Losing Your Mind: Physics, Identify and Folk Burglar Prevention', pp. 196-225; J. Margolis, 'The Autonomy of Folk Psychology', pp. 242-262; R. McDonough, 'A Culturalist Account of Folk Psychology', pp. 263-288. See also J. R. Searle, The Rediscovery of the Mind (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992), pp. 58-63. I am especially impressed by arguments to the effect that eliminativism presupposes an outdated, positivist view of scientific change. See, e.g. S. Blackburn, 'Losing Your Mind' (op. cit.); J. Dupré, The Disorder of Things: Metaphysical Foundations of the Disunity of Science (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993); and J. E. Foss, 'Materialism, Reduction, Replacement, and the Place of Consciousness in Science', The Journal of Philosophy XCII (1995), 401-429. The eliminativist position was first influentially formulated by P. Feyerabend and R. Rorty. See P. Feyerabend, 'Materialism and the Mind-Body Problem', Review of Metaphysics 17 (1963), 49-66; R. Rorty, 'Mind-Body Identity, Privacy, and Categories', Review of Metaphysics 19 (1965), 24-54.
44. This is of course the position for which the Churchlands and S. Stich are best known. See P. M. Churchland, Scientific Realism and the Plasticity of Mind (Cambridge University Press, 1979), A Neurocomputational Perspective: The Nature of Mind and the Structure of Science (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1989), 'Folk psychology (2)', in S. Guttenplan (ed.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), pp. 308-316, The Engine of Reason, the Seat of the Soul: A Philosophical Journey into the Brain (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995), and Neurophilosophy: Toward a Unified Science of the Mind-Brain (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1985); S. P. Stich, From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science: The Case Against Belief (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1983); W. Ramsey, S. Stich and J. Garon, 'Connectionism, Eliminativism, and the Future of Folk Psychology', in J. D. Greenwood (ed.), The Future of Folk Psychology: Intentionality and Cognitive Science (Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 93-119. Stich's position has always been more guarded than the Churchland's. See especially his recent paper with I. Ravenscroft, 'What is Folk Psychology?', Cognition 50 (1994), 447-468. Many of the important criticisms of 'eliminativism' are collected in The Future of Folk Psychology, in Greenwood (ed.) (op. cit.): J. D. Greenwood, 'Reasons to Believe', pp. 70-92; J. Heil, 'Being Indiscrete', pp. 120-134; T. Horgan and J. Woodward, 'Folk Psychology is Here to Stay', pp. 149-175 (first published in 1985); S. Backburn, 'Losing Your Mind: Physics, Identify and Folk Burglar Prevention', pp. 196-225; J. Margolis, 'The Autonomy of Folk Psychology', pp. 242-262; R. McDonough, 'A Culturalist Account of Folk Psychology', pp. 263-288. See also J. R. Searle, The Rediscovery of the Mind (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992), pp. 58-63. I am especially impressed by arguments to the effect that eliminativism presupposes an outdated, positivist view of scientific change. See, e.g. S. Blackburn, 'Losing Your Mind' (op. cit.); J. Dupré, The Disorder of Things: Metaphysical Foundations of the Disunity of Science (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993); and J. E. Foss, 'Materialism, Reduction, Replacement, and the Place of Consciousness in Science', The Journal of Philosophy XCII (1995), 401-429. The eliminativist position was first influentially formulated by P. Feyerabend and R. Rorty. See P. Feyerabend, 'Materialism and the Mind-Body Problem', Review of Metaphysics 17 (1963), 49-66; R. Rorty, 'Mind-Body Identity, Privacy, and Categories', Review of Metaphysics 19 (1965), 24-54.
45. This is of course the position for which the Churchlands and S. Stich are best known. See P. M. Churchland, Scientific Realism and the Plasticity of Mind (Cambridge University Press, 1979), A Neurocomputational Perspective: The Nature of Mind and the Structure of Science (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1989), 'Folk psychology (2)', in S. Guttenplan (ed.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), pp. 308-316, The Engine of Reason, the Seat of the Soul: A Philosophical Journey into the Brain (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995), and Neurophilosophy: Toward a Unified Science of the Mind-Brain (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1985); S. P. Stich, From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science: The Case Against Belief (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1983); W. Ramsey, S. Stich and J. Garon, 'Connectionism, Eliminativism, and the Future of Folk Psychology', in J. D. Greenwood (ed.), The Future of Folk Psychology: Intentionality and Cognitive Science (Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 93-119. Stich's position has always been more guarded than the Churchland's. See especially his recent paper with I. Ravenscroft, 'What is Folk Psychology?', Cognition 50 (1994), 447-468. Many of the important criticisms of 'eliminativism' are collected in The Future of Folk Psychology, in Greenwood (ed.) (op. cit.): J. D. Greenwood, 'Reasons to Believe', pp. 70-92; J. Heil, 'Being Indiscrete', pp. 120-134; T. Horgan and J. Woodward, 'Folk Psychology is Here to Stay', pp. 149-175 (first published in 1985); S. Backburn, 'Losing Your Mind: Physics, Identify and Folk Burglar Prevention', pp. 196-225; J. Margolis, 'The Autonomy of Folk Psychology', pp. 242-262; R. McDonough, 'A Culturalist Account of Folk Psychology', pp. 263-288.
46. This is of course the position for which the Churchlands and S. Stich are best known. See P. M. Churchland, Scientific Realism and the Plasticity of Mind (Cambridge University Press, 1979), A Neurocomputational Perspective: The Nature of Mind and the Structure of Science (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1989), 'Folk psychology (2)', in S. Guttenplan (ed.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), pp. 308-316, The Engine of Reason, the Seat of the Soul: A Philosophical Journey into the Brain (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995), and Neurophilosophy: Toward a Unified Science of the Mind-Brain (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1985); S. P. Stich, From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science: The Case Against Belief (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1983); W. Ramsey, S. Stich and J. Garon, 'Connectionism, Eliminativism, and the Future of Folk Psychology', in J. D. Greenwood (ed.), The Future of Folk Psychology: Intentionality and Cognitive Science (Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 93-119. Stich's position has always been more guarded than the Churchland's. See especially his recent paper with I. Ravenscroft, 'What is Folk Psychology?', Cognition 50 (1994), 447-468. Many of the important criticisms of 'eliminativism' are collected in The Future of Folk Psychology, in Greenwood (ed.) (op. cit.): J. D. Greenwood, 'Reasons to Believe', pp. 70-92; J. Heil, 'Being Indiscrete', pp. 120-134; T. Horgan and J. Woodward, 'Folk Psychology is Here to Stay', pp. 149-175 (first published in 1985); S. Backburn, 'Losing Your Mind: Physics, Identify and Folk Burglar Prevention', pp. 196-225; J. Margolis, 'The Autonomy of Folk Psychology', pp. 242-262; R. McDonough, 'A Culturalist Account of Folk Psychology', pp. 263-288. See also J. R. Searle, The Rediscovery of the Mind (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992), pp. 58-63. I am especially impressed by arguments to the effect that eliminativism presupposes an outdated, positivist view of scientific change. See, e.g. S. Blackburn, 'Losing Your Mind' (op. cit.); J. Dupré, The Disorder of Things: Metaphysical Foundations of the Disunity of Science (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993); and J. E. Foss, 'Materialism, Reduction, Replacement, and the Place of Consciousness in Science', The Journal of Philosophy XCII (1995), 401-429. The eliminativist position was first influentially formulated by P. Feyerabend and R. Rorty. See P. Feyerabend, 'Materialism and the Mind-Body Problem', Review of Metaphysics 17 (1963), 49-66; R. Rorty, 'Mind-Body Identity, Privacy, and Categories', Review of Metaphysics 19 (1965), 24-54.
47. This is of course the position for which the Churchlands and S. Stich are best known. See P. M. Churchland, Scientific Realism and the Plasticity of Mind (Cambridge University Press, 1979), A Neurocomputational Perspective: The Nature of Mind and the Structure of Science (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1989), 'Folk psychology (2)', in S. Guttenplan (ed.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), pp. 308-316, The Engine of Reason, the Seat of the Soul: A Philosophical Journey into the Brain (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995), and Neurophilosophy: Toward a Unified Science of the Mind-Brain (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1985); S. P. Stich, From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science: The Case Against Belief (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1983); W. Ramsey, S. Stich and J. Garon, 'Connectionism, Eliminativism, and the Future of Folk Psychology', in J. D. Greenwood (ed.), The Future of Folk Psychology: Intentionality and Cognitive Science (Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 93-119. Stich's position has always been more guarded than the Churchland's. See especially his recent paper with I. Ravenscroft, 'What is Folk Psychology?', Cognition 50 (1994), 447-468. Many of the important criticisms of 'eliminativism' are collected in The Future of Folk Psychology, in Greenwood (ed.) (op. cit.): J. D. Greenwood, 'Reasons to Believe', pp. 70-92; J. Heil, 'Being Indiscrete', pp. 120-134; T. Horgan and J. Woodward, 'Folk Psychology is Here to Stay', pp. 149-175 (first published in 1985); S. Backburn, 'Losing Your Mind: Physics, Identify and Folk Burglar Prevention', pp. 196-225; J. Margolis, 'The Autonomy of Folk Psychology', pp. 242-262; R. McDonough, 'A Culturalist Account of Folk Psychology', pp. 263-288. See also J. R. Searle, The Rediscovery of the Mind (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992), pp. 58-63. I am especially impressed by arguments to the effect that eliminativism presupposes an outdated, positivist view of scientific change. See, e.g. S. Blackburn, 'Losing Your Mind' (op. cit.); J. Dupré, The Disorder of Things: Metaphysical Foundations of the Disunity of Science (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993); and J. E. Foss, 'Materialism, Reduction, Replacement, and the Place of Consciousness in Science', The Journal of Philosophy XCII (1995), 401-429. The eliminativist position was first influentially formulated by P. Feyerabend and R. Rorty. See P. Feyerabend, 'Materialism and the Mind-Body Problem', Review of Metaphysics 17 (1963), 49-66; R. Rorty, 'Mind-Body Identity, Privacy, and Categories', Review of Metaphysics 19 (1965), 24-54.
48. This is of course the position for which the Churchlands and S. Stich are best known. See P. M. Churchland, Scientific Realism and the Plasticity of Mind (Cambridge University Press, 1979), A Neurocomputational Perspective: The Nature of Mind and the Structure of Science (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1989), 'Folk psychology (2)', in S. Guttenplan (ed.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), pp. 308-316, The Engine of Reason, the Seat of the Soul: A Philosophical Journey into the Brain (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995), and Neurophilosophy: Toward a Unified Science of the Mind-Brain (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1985); S. P. Stich, From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science: The Case Against Belief (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1983); W. Ramsey, S. Stich and J. Garon, 'Connectionism, Eliminativism, and the Future of Folk Psychology', in J. D. Greenwood (ed.), The Future of Folk Psychology: Intentionality and Cognitive Science (Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 93-119. Stich's position has always been more guarded than the Churchland's. See especially his recent paper with I. Ravenscroft, 'What is Folk Psychology?', Cognition 50 (1994), 447-468. Many of the important criticisms of 'eliminativism' are collected in The Future of Folk Psychology, in Greenwood (ed.) (op. cit.): J. D. Greenwood, 'Reasons to Believe', pp. 70-92; J. Heil, 'Being Indiscrete', pp. 120-134; T. Horgan and J. Woodward, 'Folk Psychology is Here to Stay', pp. 149-175 (first published in 1985); S. Backburn, 'Losing Your Mind: Physics, Identify and Folk Burglar Prevention', pp. 196-225; J. Margolis, 'The Autonomy of Folk Psychology', pp. 242-262; R. McDonough, 'A Culturalist Account of Folk Psychology', pp. 263-288. See also J. R. Searle, The Rediscovery of the Mind (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992), pp. 58-63. I am especially impressed by arguments to the effect that eliminativism presupposes an outdated, positivist view of scientific change. See, e.g. S. Blackburn, 'Losing Your Mind' (op. cit.); J. Dupré, The Disorder of Things: Metaphysical Foundations of the Disunity of Science (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993); and J. E. Foss, 'Materialism, Reduction, Replacement, and the Place of Consciousness in Science', The Journal of Philosophy XCII (1995), 401-429. The eliminativist position was first influentially formulated by P. Feyerabend and R. Rorty. See P. Feyerabend, 'Materialism and the Mind-Body Problem', Review of Metaphysics 17 (1963), 49-66; R. Rorty, 'Mind-Body Identity, Privacy, and Categories', Review of Metaphysics 19 (1965), 24-54.
49. This is of course the position for which the Churchlands and S. Stich are best known. See P. M. Churchland, Scientific Realism and the Plasticity of Mind (Cambridge University Press, 1979), A Neurocomputational Perspective: The Nature of Mind and the Structure of Science (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1989), 'Folk psychology (2)', in S. Guttenplan (ed.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), pp. 308-316, The Engine of Reason, the Seat of the Soul: A Philosophical Journey into the Brain (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995), and Neurophilosophy: Toward a Unified Science of the Mind-Brain (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1985); S. P. Stich, From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science: The Case Against Belief (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1983); W. Ramsey, S. Stich and J. Garon, 'Connectionism, Eliminativism, and the Future of Folk Psychology', in J. D. Greenwood (ed.), The Future of Folk Psychology: Intentionality and Cognitive Science (Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 93-119. Stich's position has always been more guarded than the Churchland's. See especially his recent paper with I. Ravenscroft, 'What is Folk Psychology?', Cognition 50 (1994), 447-468. Many of the important criticisms of 'eliminativism' are collected in The Future of Folk Psychology, in Greenwood (ed.) (op. cit.): J. D. Greenwood, 'Reasons to Believe', pp. 70-92; J. Heil, 'Being Indiscrete', pp. 120-134; T. Horgan and J. Woodward, 'Folk Psychology is Here to Stay', pp. 149-175 (first published in 1985); S. Backburn, 'Losing Your Mind: Physics, Identify and Folk Burglar Prevention', pp. 196-225; J. Margolis, 'The Autonomy of Folk Psychology', pp. 242-262; R. McDonough, 'A Culturalist Account of Folk Psychology', pp. 263-288. See also J. R. Searle, The Rediscovery of the Mind (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992), pp. 58-63. I am especially impressed by arguments to the effect that eliminativism presupposes an outdated, positivist view of scientific change. See, e.g. S. Blackburn, 'Losing Your Mind' (op. cit.); J. Dupré, The Disorder of Things: Metaphysical Foundations of the Disunity of Science (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993); and J. E. Foss, 'Materialism, Reduction, Replacement, and the Place of Consciousness in Science', The Journal of Philosophy XCII (1995), 401-429. The eliminativist position was first influentially formulated by P. Feyerabend and R. Rorty. See P. Feyerabend, 'Materialism and the Mind-Body Problem', Review of Metaphysics 17 (1963), 49-66; R. Rorty, 'Mind-Body Identity, Privacy, and Categories', Review of Metaphysics 19 (1965), 24-54.
50. There are already several versions of this idea in circulation. Key early statements of this view are R. M. Gordon, 'Folk Psychology as Simulation', Mind and Language 1 (1986), 158-171; and A. I. Goldman, 'Interpretation Psychologized', Mind and Language 4 (1989), 161-185. Most of the recent debate over the simulation theory can be found in three anthologies: Mapping the Mind, Hirschfeld and Gelman (eds) (ibid., note 8); M. Davies and T. Stone (eds), Folk Psychology (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995). Mental Simulation (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995).
51. There are already several versions of this idea in circulation. Key early statements of this view are R. M. Gordon, 'Folk Psychology as Simulation', Mind and Language 1 (1986), 158-171; and A. I. Goldman, 'Interpretation Psychologized', Mind and Language 4 (1989), 161-185. Most of the recent debate over the simulation theory can be found in three anthologies: Mapping the Mind, Hirschfeld and Gelman (eds) (ibid., note 8); M. Davies and T. Stone (eds), Folk Psychology (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995). Mental Simulation (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995).
52. There are already several versions of this idea in circulation. Key early statements of this view are R. M. Gordon, 'Folk Psychology as Simulation', Mind and Language 1 (1986), 158-171; and A. I. Goldman, 'Interpretation Psychologized', Mind and Language 4 (1989), 161-185. Most of the recent debate over the simulation theory can be found in three anthologies: Mapping the Mind, Hirschfeld and Gelman (eds) (ibid., note 8); M. Davies and T. Stone (eds), Folk Psychology (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995). Mental Simulation (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995).
53. There are already several versions of this idea in circulation. Key early statements of this view are R. M. Gordon, 'Folk Psychology as Simulation', Mind and Language 1 (1986), 158-171; and A. I. Goldman, 'Interpretation Psychologized', Mind and Language 4 (1989), 161-185. Most of the recent debate over the simulation theory can be found in three anthologies: Mapping the Mind, Hirschfeld and Gelman (eds) (ibid., note 8); M. Davies and T. Stone (eds), Folk Psychology (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995). Mental Simulation (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995).
54. There are already several versions of this idea in circulation. Key early statements of this view are R. M. Gordon, 'Folk Psychology as Simulation', Mind and Language 1 (1986), 158-171; and A. I. Goldman, 'Interpretation Psychologized', Mind and Language 4 (1989), 161-185. Most of the recent debate over the simulation theory can be found in three anthologies: Mapping the Mind, Hirschfeld and Gelman (eds) (ibid., note 8); M. Davies and T. Stone (eds), Folk Psychology (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995). Mental Simulation (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995).
55. A point forcefully made by P. M. S. Hacker, 'Methodology in Philosophy of Psychology' (unpublished). Other Wittgensteinian criticisms of the theory theory include R. A. Sharpe, Making the Human Mind (London: Routledge, 1990); and R. McDonough, 'A Culturalist Account of Folk Psychology' (ibid., note 12). I hasten to acknowledge that there are similarities between my sociophilosophy of folk psychology and some of the Wittgensteinian construals. The main differences are that at least these Wittgensteinians lack a clear notion of social institution, and that they treat current linguistic use as sacrosant. In this sense they deserve the title of 'reactionaries' of contemporary philosophy. See S. Shanker, 'The Enduring Relevance of Wittgenstein's Remarks on Intentions', in J. Hyman (ed.), Investigating Psychology: Sciences of the Mind After Wittgenstein (London: Routledge, 1991), pp. 67-94, here p. 67. Cf. D. Bloor, 'Left and Right Wittgensteinians', in A. Pickering (ed.), Science as Practice and Culture (Chicago University Press, 1992), pp. 266-282.
56. A point forcefully made by P. M. S. Hacker, 'Methodology in Philosophy of Psychology' (unpublished). Other Wittgensteinian criticisms of the theory theory include R. A. Sharpe, Making the Human Mind (London: Routledge, 1990); and R. McDonough, 'A Culturalist Account of Folk Psychology' (ibid., note 12). I hasten to acknowledge that there are similarities between my sociophilosophy of folk psychology and some of the Wittgensteinian construals. The main differences are that at least these Wittgensteinians lack a clear notion of social institution, and that they treat current linguistic use as sacrosant. In this sense they deserve the title of 'reactionaries' of contemporary philosophy. See S. Shanker, 'The Enduring Relevance of Wittgenstein's Remarks on Intentions', in J. Hyman (ed.), Investigating Psychology: Sciences of the Mind After Wittgenstein (London: Routledge, 1991), pp. 67-94, here p. 67. Cf. D. Bloor, 'Left and Right Wittgensteinians', in A. Pickering (ed.), Science as Practice and Culture (Chicago University Press, 1992), pp. 266-282.
57. A point forcefully made by P. M. S. Hacker, 'Methodology in Philosophy of Psychology' (unpublished). Other Wittgensteinian criticisms of the theory theory include R. A. Sharpe, Making the Human Mind (London: Routledge, 1990); and R. McDonough, 'A Culturalist Account of Folk Psychology' (ibid., note 12). I hasten to acknowledge that there are similarities between my sociophilosophy of folk psychology and some of the Wittgensteinian construals. The main differences are that at least these Wittgensteinians lack a clear notion of social institution, and that they treat current linguistic use as sacrosant. In this sense they deserve the title of 'reactionaries' of contemporary philosophy. See S. Shanker, 'The Enduring Relevance of Wittgenstein's Remarks on Intentions', in J. Hyman (ed.), Investigating Psychology: Sciences of the Mind After Wittgenstein (London: Routledge, 1991), pp. 67-94, here p. 67. Cf. D. Bloor, 'Left and Right Wittgensteinians', in A. Pickering (ed.), Science as Practice and Culture (Chicago University Press, 1992), pp. 266-282.
58. A point forcefully made by P. M. S. Hacker, 'Methodology in Philosophy of Psychology' (unpublished). Other Wittgensteinian criticisms of the theory theory include R. A. Sharpe, Making the Human Mind (London: Routledge, 1990); and R. McDonough, 'A Culturalist Account of Folk Psychology' (ibid., note 12). I hasten to acknowledge that there are similarities between my sociophilosophy of folk psychology and some of the Wittgensteinian construals. The main differences are that at least these Wittgensteinians lack a clear notion of social institution, and that they treat current linguistic use as sacrosant. In this sense they deserve the title of 'reactionaries' of contemporary philosophy. See S. Shanker, 'The Enduring Relevance of Wittgenstein's Remarks on Intentions', in J. Hyman (ed.), Investigating Psychology: Sciences of the Mind After Wittgenstein (London: Routledge, 1991), pp. 67-94, here p. 67. Cf. D. Bloor, 'Left and Right Wittgensteinians', in A. Pickering (ed.), Science as Practice and Culture (Chicago University Press, 1992), pp. 266-282.
59. A point forcefully made by P. M. S. Hacker, 'Methodology in Philosophy of Psychology' (unpublished). Other Wittgensteinian criticisms of the theory theory include R. A. Sharpe, Making the Human Mind (London: Routledge, 1990); and R. McDonough, 'A Culturalist Account of Folk Psychology' (ibid., note 12). I hasten to acknowledge that there are similarities between my sociophilosophy of folk psychology and some of the Wittgensteinian construals. The main differences are that at least these Wittgensteinians lack a clear notion of social institution, and that they treat current linguistic use as sacrosant. In this sense they deserve the title of 'reactionaries' of contemporary philosophy. See S. Shanker, 'The Enduring Relevance of Wittgenstein's Remarks on Intentions', in J. Hyman (ed.), Investigating Psychology: Sciences of the Mind After Wittgenstein (London: Routledge, 1991), pp. 67-94, here p. 67. Cf. D. Bloor, 'Left and Right Wittgensteinians', in A. Pickering (ed.), Science as Practice and Culture (Chicago University Press, 1992), pp. 266-282.
60. Wilkes, 'Pragmatics' (ibid., note 1); D. C. Dennett, 'Two Contrasts: Folk Craft Versus Folk Science, and Belief Versus Opinion', in The Future of Folk Psychology, Greenwood (ed.) (cf. note 12), pp. 135-148.
61. Wilkes, 'Pragmatics' (ibid., note 1); D. C. Dennett, 'Two Contrasts: Folk Craft Versus Folk Science, and Belief Versus Opinion', in The Future of Folk Psychology, Greenwood (ed.) (cf. note 12), pp. 135-148.
62. For an exposition and criticism of the 'neo-Rylean' position, see F. Egan, 'Folk Psychology and Cognitive Architecture', Philosophy of Science 62 (1995), 179-196.
63. Hacker, 'Methodology' (cf. note 14).
64. See Fodor, Psychosemantics (cf. note 6).
65. This neologism is due to Heil, 'Being Indiscrete' (cf. note 12).
66. See the studies cited in note 2 above.
67. A point frequently made by Paul Churchland. See, e.g., A Neurocomputational Perspective (cf. note 12), p. 2.
68. Ibid., p. 66.
69. Fodor, Psychosemantics (cf. note 6), p. 132; Churchland, A Neurocomputational Perspective (cf. note 12), passim.
70. Fodor, Psychosemantics (cf. note 6), p. 132; Churchland, A Neurocomputational Perspective (cf. note 12), passim.
71. Wilkes, 'Pragmatics' (cf. note 1), p. 360.
72. In this section, I draw heavily on G. E. M. Anscombe, 'The Question of Linguistic Idealism', Acta Philosophica Fennica 28, 188 215; B. Barnes, 'Social Life as Bootstrapped Induction', Sociology 4 (1982), 524-545, The Nature of Power (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1988), Social Theory (forthcoming); D. Bloor, Wittgenstein on Rules as Institutions (forthcoming), 'Idealism and the Social Character of Meaning' (unpublished), 'Idealism and the Sociology of Knowledge' (unpublished); J. Searle, The Construction of Social Reality (London: Allen Lane, 1995); E. Lagerspetz, The Opposite Mirrors: An Essay on the Conventionalist Theory of Institutions (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1995).
73. In this section, I draw heavily on G. E. M. Anscombe, 'The Question of Linguistic Idealism', Acta Philosophica Fennica 28, 188 215; B. Barnes, 'Social Life as Bootstrapped Induction', Sociology 4 (1982), 524-545, The Nature of Power (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1988), Social Theory (forthcoming); D. Bloor, Wittgenstein on Rules as Institutions (forthcoming), 'Idealism and the Social Character of Meaning' (unpublished), 'Idealism and the Sociology of Knowledge' (unpublished); J. Searle, The Construction of Social Reality (London: Allen Lane, 1995); E. Lagerspetz, The Opposite Mirrors: An Essay on the Conventionalist Theory of Institutions (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1995).
74. In this section, I draw heavily on G. E. M. Anscombe, 'The Question of Linguistic Idealism', Acta Philosophica Fennica 28, 188 215; B. Barnes, 'Social Life as Bootstrapped Induction', Sociology 4 (1982), 524-545, The Nature of Power (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1988), Social Theory (forthcoming); D. Bloor, Wittgenstein on Rules as Institutions (forthcoming), 'Idealism and the Social Character of Meaning' (unpublished), 'Idealism and the Sociology of Knowledge' (unpublished); J. Searle, The Construction of Social Reality (London: Allen Lane, 1995); E. Lagerspetz, The Opposite Mirrors: An Essay on the Conventionalist Theory of Institutions (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1995).
75. In this section, I draw heavily on G. E. M. Anscombe, 'The Question of Linguistic Idealism', Acta Philosophica Fennica 28, 188 215; B. Barnes, 'Social Life as Bootstrapped Induction', Sociology 4 (1982), 524-545, The Nature of Power (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1988), Social Theory (forthcoming); D. Bloor, Wittgenstein on Rules as Institutions (forthcoming), 'Idealism and the Social Character of Meaning' (unpublished), 'Idealism and the Sociology of Knowledge' (unpublished); J. Searle, The Construction of Social Reality (London: Allen Lane, 1995); E. Lagerspetz, The Opposite Mirrors: An Essay on the Conventionalist Theory of Institutions (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1995).
76. In this section, I draw heavily on G. E. M. Anscombe, 'The Question of Linguistic Idealism', Acta Philosophica Fennica 28, 188 215; B. Barnes, 'Social Life as Bootstrapped Induction', Sociology 4 (1982), 524-545, The Nature of Power (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1988), Social Theory (forthcoming); D. Bloor, Wittgenstein on Rules as Institutions (forthcoming), 'Idealism and the Social Character of Meaning' (unpublished), 'Idealism and the Sociology of Knowledge' (unpublished); J. Searle, The Construction of Social Reality (London: Allen Lane, 1995); E. Lagerspetz, The Opposite Mirrors: An Essay on the Conventionalist Theory of Institutions (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1995).
77. In this section, I draw heavily on G. E. M. Anscombe, 'The Question of Linguistic Idealism', Acta Philosophica Fennica 28, 188 215; B. Barnes, 'Social Life as Bootstrapped Induction', Sociology 4 (1982), 524-545, The Nature of Power (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1988), Social Theory (forthcoming); D. Bloor, Wittgenstein on Rules as Institutions (forthcoming), 'Idealism and the Social Character of Meaning' (unpublished), 'Idealism and the Sociology of Knowledge' (unpublished); J. Searle, The Construction of Social Reality (London: Allen Lane, 1995); E. Lagerspetz, The Opposite Mirrors: An Essay on the Conventionalist Theory of Institutions (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1995).
78. In this section, I draw heavily on G. E. M. Anscombe, 'The Question of Linguistic Idealism', Acta Philosophica Fennica 28, 188 215; B. Barnes, 'Social Life as Bootstrapped Induction', Sociology 4 (1982), 524-545, The Nature of Power (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1988), Social Theory (forthcoming); D. Bloor, Wittgenstein on Rules as Institutions (forthcoming), 'Idealism and the Social Character of Meaning' (unpublished), 'Idealism and the Sociology of Knowledge' (unpublished); J. Searle, The Construction of Social Reality (London: Allen Lane, 1995); E. Lagerspetz, The Opposite Mirrors: An Essay on the Conventionalist Theory of Institutions (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1995).
79. In this section, I draw heavily on G. E. M. Anscombe, 'The Question of Linguistic Idealism', Acta Philosophica Fennica 28, 188 215; B. Barnes, 'Social Life as Bootstrapped Induction', Sociology 4 (1982), 524-545, The Nature of Power (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1988), Social Theory (forthcoming); D. Bloor, Wittgenstein on Rules as Institutions (forthcoming), 'Idealism and the Social Character of Meaning' (unpublished), 'Idealism and the Sociology of Knowledge' (unpublished); J. Searle, The Construction of Social Reality (London: Allen Lane, 1995); E. Lagerspetz, The Opposite Mirrors: An Essay on the Conventionalist Theory of Institutions (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1995).
80. The notion of mutual belief can be rendered precisely. See, e.g. M. Colombetti, 'Formal Semantics for Mutual Belief, Artificial Intelligence 62 (1993), 341-353.
81. This point is forcefully made by Bloor, 'Idealism and the Sociology of Knowledge' (cf. note 26).
82. take this formulation from Barnes, Social Theory (cf. note 25), Chap. 3.
83. No-one has emphasised this aspect of languages and theories more forcefully than Mary Hesse. See M. B. Hesse, 'Is There an Independent Observation Language?', in R. G. Colodny (ed.), The Nature and Function of Scientific Theories: Essays in Contemporary Science and Philosophy (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1970), pp. 35-78, The Structure of Scientific Inference (London: Macmillan, 1974); M. A. Arbib and M. B. Hesse, The Construction of Reality (Cambridge University Press, 1986).
84. No-one has emphasised this aspect of languages and theories more forcefully than Mary Hesse. See M. B. Hesse, 'Is There an Independent Observation Language?', in R. G. Colodny (ed.), The Nature and Function of Scientific Theories: Essays in Contemporary Science and Philosophy (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1970), pp. 35-78, The Structure of Scientific Inference (London: Macmillan, 1974); M. A. Arbib and M. B. Hesse, The Construction of Reality (Cambridge University Press, 1986).
85. No-one has emphasised this aspect of languages and theories more forcefully than Mary Hesse. See M. B. Hesse, 'Is There an Independent Observation Language?', in R. G. Colodny (ed.), The Nature and Function of Scientific Theories: Essays in Contemporary Science and Philosophy (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1970), pp. 35-78, The Structure of Scientific Inference (London: Macmillan, 1974); M. A. Arbib and M. B. Hesse, The Construction of Reality (Cambridge University Press, 1986).
86. D. Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), pp. 516-525. For a recent restatement in the light of Wittgenstein's work, see Bloor, Wittgenstein on Rules (cf. note 2).
87. D. Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), pp. 516-525. For a recent restatement in the light of Wittgenstein's work, see Bloor, Wittgenstein on Rules (cf. note 2).
88. For a different way of linking morality and psychology, see N. C. Much and R. Harre, 'How Psychologies 'Secrete' Moralities', New Ideas in Psychology 12 (1994), 291-321.
89. See R. E. Nisbett and T. D. Wilson, 'Telling More Than We Can Know: Verbal Reports on Mental Processes', Psychological Review 84 (1977), 231-259. This paper is often cited as if it were the 'ultimate refutation' of introspective psychology. It is worth noting, however, that some of its central contentions are controversial amongst experimentalists. For critical discussions, and further developement, see, e.g. E. R. Smith and F. D. Miller, 'Limits on Perception of Cognitive Processes: A Reply to Nisbett and Wilson', Psychological Review 85 (1978), 355-362; K. A. Ericsson and H. A. Simon, 'Verbal Reports as Data', Psychological Review 87 (1980), 215-251; P. White, 'Limitations on Verbal Reports of Internal Events: A Refutation of Nisbett and Wilson and of Bern', Psychological Review 87 (1980), 105-112, Protocol Analysis: Verbal Reports as Data (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1984); W. Lyons, The Disappearance of Introspection (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1986); C. Færch and G. Kasper (eds), Introspection in Second Language Research (Philadelphia: Multilingual Matters, 1987); P. A. White, 'Knowing More About What We Can Tell: "Introspective Access" and Causal Report Accuracy 10 Years Later', British Journal of Psychology 79 (1988), 13-45; R. T. Hurlburt, Sampling Normal and Schizophrenic Inner Experience (New York: Plenum Press, 1990); R. B. K. Howe, 'Introspection: A Reassessment', New Ideas in Psychology 9 (1991), 25-44; W. Lyons, 'Introspection - A Two-level or One-level Account?: A Response to Howe', New Ideas in Psychology 9 (1991), 51-55; Goldman, 'The Psychology of Folk Psychology' (cf. note 12). Cf. also Chap. 5 of Dennett, Consciousness Explained (cf. note 5).
90. See R. E. Nisbett and T. D. Wilson, 'Telling More Than We Can Know: Verbal Reports on Mental Processes', Psychological Review 84 (1977), 231-259. This paper is often cited as if it were the 'ultimate refutation' of introspective psychology. It is worth noting, however, that some of its central contentions are controversial amongst experimentalists. For critical discussions, and further developement, see, e.g. E. R. Smith and F. D. Miller, 'Limits on Perception of Cognitive Processes: A Reply to Nisbett and Wilson', Psychological Review 85 (1978), 355-362; K. A. Ericsson and H. A. Simon, 'Verbal Reports as Data', Psychological Review 87 (1980), 215-251; P. White, 'Limitations on Verbal Reports of Internal Events: A Refutation of Nisbett and Wilson and of Bern', Psychological Review 87 (1980), 105-112, Protocol Analysis: Verbal Reports as Data (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1984); W. Lyons, The Disappearance of Introspection (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1986); C. Færch and G. Kasper (eds), Introspection in Second Language Research (Philadelphia: Multilingual Matters, 1987); P. A. White, 'Knowing More About What We Can Tell: "Introspective Access" and Causal Report Accuracy 10 Years Later', British Journal of Psychology 79 (1988), 13-45; R. T. Hurlburt, Sampling Normal and Schizophrenic Inner Experience (New York: Plenum Press, 1990); R. B. K. Howe, 'Introspection: A Reassessment', New Ideas in Psychology 9 (1991), 25-44; W. Lyons, 'Introspection - A Two-level or One-level Account?: A Response to Howe', New Ideas in Psychology 9 (1991), 51-55; Goldman, 'The Psychology of Folk Psychology' (cf. note 12). Cf. also Chap. 5 of Dennett, Consciousness Explained (cf. note 5).
91. See R. E. Nisbett and T. D. Wilson, 'Telling More Than We Can Know: Verbal Reports on Mental Processes', Psychological Review 84 (1977), 231-259. This paper is often cited as if it were the 'ultimate refutation' of introspective psychology. It is worth noting, however, that some of its central contentions are controversial amongst experimentalists. For critical discussions, and further developement, see, e.g. E. R. Smith and F. D. Miller, 'Limits on Perception of Cognitive Processes: A Reply to Nisbett and Wilson', Psychological Review 85 (1978), 355-362; K. A. Ericsson and H. A. Simon, 'Verbal Reports as Data', Psychological Review 87 (1980), 215-251; P. White, 'Limitations on Verbal Reports of Internal Events: A Refutation of Nisbett and Wilson and of Bern', Psychological Review 87 (1980), 105-112, Protocol Analysis: Verbal Reports as Data (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1984); W. Lyons, The Disappearance of Introspection (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1986); C. Færch and G. Kasper (eds), Introspection in Second Language Research (Philadelphia: Multilingual Matters, 1987); P. A. White, 'Knowing More About What We Can Tell: "Introspective Access" and Causal Report Accuracy 10 Years Later', British Journal of Psychology 79 (1988), 13-45; R. T. Hurlburt, Sampling Normal and Schizophrenic Inner Experience (New York: Plenum Press, 1990); R. B. K. Howe, 'Introspection: A Reassessment', New Ideas in Psychology 9 (1991), 25-44; W. Lyons, 'Introspection - A Two-level or One-level Account?: A Response to Howe', New Ideas in Psychology 9 (1991), 51-55; Goldman, 'The Psychology of Folk Psychology' (cf. note 12). Cf. also Chap. 5 of Dennett, Consciousness Explained (cf. note 5).
92. See R. E. Nisbett and T. D. Wilson, 'Telling More Than We Can Know: Verbal Reports on Mental Processes', Psychological Review 84 (1977), 231-259. This paper is often cited as if it were the 'ultimate refutation' of introspective psychology. It is worth noting, however, that some of its central contentions are controversial amongst experimentalists. For critical discussions, and further developement, see, e.g. E. R. Smith and F. D. Miller, 'Limits on Perception of Cognitive Processes: A Reply to Nisbett and Wilson', Psychological Review 85 (1978), 355-362; K. A. Ericsson and H. A. Simon, 'Verbal Reports as Data', Psychological Review 87 (1980), 215-251; P. White, 'Limitations on Verbal Reports of Internal Events: A Refutation of Nisbett and Wilson and of Bern', Psychological Review 87 (1980), 105-112, Protocol Analysis: Verbal Reports as Data (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1984); W. Lyons, The Disappearance of Introspection (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1986); C. Færch and G. Kasper (eds), Introspection in Second Language Research (Philadelphia: Multilingual Matters, 1987); P. A. White, 'Knowing More About What We Can Tell: "Introspective Access" and Causal Report Accuracy 10 Years Later', British Journal of Psychology 79 (1988), 13-45; R. T. Hurlburt, Sampling Normal and Schizophrenic Inner Experience (New York: Plenum Press, 1990); R. B. K. Howe, 'Introspection: A Reassessment', New Ideas in Psychology 9 (1991), 25-44; W. Lyons, 'Introspection - A Two-level or One-level Account?: A Response to Howe', New Ideas in Psychology 9 (1991), 51-55; Goldman, 'The Psychology of Folk Psychology' (cf. note 12). Cf. also Chap. 5 of Dennett, Consciousness Explained (cf. note 5).
93. See R. E. Nisbett and T. D. Wilson, 'Telling More Than We Can Know: Verbal Reports on Mental Processes', Psychological Review 84 (1977), 231-259. This paper is often cited as if it were the 'ultimate refutation' of introspective psychology. It is worth noting, however, that some of its central contentions are controversial amongst experimentalists. For critical discussions, and further developement, see, e.g. E. R. Smith and F. D. Miller, 'Limits on Perception of Cognitive Processes: A Reply to Nisbett and Wilson', Psychological Review 85 (1978), 355-362; K. A. Ericsson and H. A. Simon, 'Verbal Reports as Data', Psychological Review 87 (1980), 215-251; P. White, 'Limitations on Verbal Reports of Internal Events: A Refutation of Nisbett and Wilson and of Bern', Psychological Review 87 (1980), 105-112, Protocol Analysis: Verbal Reports as Data (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1984); W. Lyons, The Disappearance of Introspection (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1986); C. Færch and G. Kasper (eds), Introspection in Second Language Research (Philadelphia: Multilingual Matters, 1987); P. A. White, 'Knowing More About What We Can Tell: "Introspective Access" and Causal Report Accuracy 10 Years Later', British Journal of Psychology 79 (1988), 13-45; R. T. Hurlburt, Sampling Normal and Schizophrenic Inner Experience (New York: Plenum Press, 1990); R. B. K. Howe, 'Introspection: A Reassessment', New Ideas in Psychology 9 (1991), 25-44; W. Lyons, 'Introspection - A Two-level or One-level Account?: A Response to Howe', New Ideas in Psychology 9 (1991), 51-55; Goldman, 'The Psychology of Folk Psychology' (cf. note 12). Cf. also Chap. 5 of Dennett, Consciousness Explained (cf. note 5).
94. See R. E. Nisbett and T. D. Wilson, 'Telling More Than We Can Know: Verbal Reports on Mental Processes', Psychological Review 84 (1977), 231-259. This paper is often cited as if it were the 'ultimate refutation' of introspective psychology. It is worth noting, however, that some of its central contentions are controversial amongst experimentalists. For critical discussions, and further developement, see, e.g. E. R. Smith and F. D. Miller, 'Limits on Perception of Cognitive Processes: A Reply to Nisbett and Wilson', Psychological Review 85 (1978), 355-362; K. A. Ericsson and H. A. Simon, 'Verbal Reports as Data', Psychological Review 87 (1980), 215-251; P. White, 'Limitations on Verbal Reports of Internal Events: A Refutation of Nisbett and Wilson and of Bern', Psychological Review 87 (1980), 105-112, Protocol Analysis: Verbal Reports as Data (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1984); W. Lyons, The Disappearance of Introspection (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1986); C. Færch and G. Kasper (eds), Introspection in Second Language Research (Philadelphia: Multilingual Matters, 1987); P. A. White, 'Knowing More About What We Can Tell: "Introspective Access" and Causal Report Accuracy 10 Years Later', British Journal of Psychology 79 (1988), 13-45; R. T. Hurlburt, Sampling Normal and Schizophrenic Inner Experience (New York: Plenum Press, 1990); R. B. K. Howe, 'Introspection: A Reassessment', New Ideas in Psychology 9 (1991), 25-44; W. Lyons, 'Introspection - A Two-level or One-level Account?: A Response to Howe', New Ideas in Psychology 9 (1991), 51-55; Goldman, 'The Psychology of Folk Psychology' (cf. note 12). Cf. also Chap. 5 of Dennett, Consciousness Explained (cf. note 5).
95. See R. E. Nisbett and T. D. Wilson, 'Telling More Than We Can Know: Verbal Reports on Mental Processes', Psychological Review 84 (1977), 231-259. This paper is often cited as if it were the 'ultimate refutation' of introspective psychology. It is worth noting, however, that some of its central contentions are controversial amongst experimentalists. For critical discussions, and further developement, see, e.g. E. R. Smith and F. D. Miller, 'Limits on Perception of Cognitive Processes: A Reply to Nisbett and Wilson', Psychological Review 85 (1978), 355-362; K. A. Ericsson and H. A. Simon, 'Verbal Reports as Data', Psychological Review 87 (1980), 215-251; P. White, 'Limitations on Verbal Reports of Internal Events: A Refutation of Nisbett and Wilson and of Bern', Psychological Review 87 (1980), 105-112, Protocol Analysis: Verbal Reports as Data (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1984); W. Lyons, The Disappearance of Introspection (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1986); C. Færch and G. Kasper (eds), Introspection in Second Language Research (Philadelphia: Multilingual Matters, 1987); P. A. White, 'Knowing More About What We Can Tell: "Introspective Access" and Causal Report Accuracy 10 Years Later', British Journal of Psychology 79 (1988), 13-45; R. T. Hurlburt, Sampling Normal and Schizophrenic Inner Experience (New York: Plenum Press, 1990); R. B. K. Howe, 'Introspection: A Reassessment', New Ideas in Psychology 9 (1991), 25-44; W. Lyons, 'Introspection - A Two-level or One-level Account?: A Response to Howe', New Ideas in Psychology 9 (1991), 51-55; Goldman, 'The Psychology of Folk Psychology' (cf. note 12). Cf. also Chap. 5 of Dennett, Consciousness Explained (cf. note 5).
96. See R. E. Nisbett and T. D. Wilson, 'Telling More Than We Can Know: Verbal Reports on Mental Processes', Psychological Review 84 (1977), 231-259. This paper is often cited as if it were the 'ultimate refutation' of introspective psychology. It is worth noting, however, that some of its central contentions are controversial amongst experimentalists. For critical discussions, and further developement, see, e.g. E. R. Smith and F. D. Miller, 'Limits on Perception of Cognitive Processes: A Reply to Nisbett and Wilson', Psychological Review 85 (1978), 355-362; K. A. Ericsson and H. A. Simon, 'Verbal Reports as Data', Psychological Review 87 (1980), 215-251; P. White, 'Limitations on Verbal Reports of Internal Events: A Refutation of Nisbett and Wilson and of Bern', Psychological Review 87 (1980), 105-112, Protocol Analysis: Verbal Reports as Data (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1984); W. Lyons, The Disappearance of Introspection (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1986); C. Færch and G. Kasper (eds), Introspection in Second Language Research (Philadelphia: Multilingual Matters, 1987); P. A. White, 'Knowing More About What We Can Tell: "Introspective Access" and Causal Report Accuracy 10 Years Later', British Journal of Psychology 79 (1988), 13-45; R. T. Hurlburt, Sampling Normal and Schizophrenic Inner Experience (New York: Plenum Press, 1990); R. B. K. Howe, 'Introspection: A Reassessment', New Ideas in Psychology 9 (1991), 25-44; W. Lyons, 'Introspection - A Two-level or One-level Account?: A Response to Howe', New Ideas in Psychology 9 (1991), 51-55; Goldman, 'The Psychology of Folk Psychology' (cf. note 12). Cf. also Chap. 5 of Dennett, Consciousness Explained (cf. note 5).
97. See R. E. Nisbett and T. D. Wilson, 'Telling More Than We Can Know: Verbal Reports on Mental Processes', Psychological Review 84 (1977), 231-259. This paper is often cited as if it were the 'ultimate refutation' of introspective psychology. It is worth noting, however, that some of its central contentions are controversial amongst experimentalists. For critical discussions, and further developement, see, e.g. E. R. Smith and F. D. Miller, 'Limits on Perception of Cognitive Processes: A Reply to Nisbett and Wilson', Psychological Review 85 (1978), 355-362; K. A. Ericsson and H. A. Simon, 'Verbal Reports as Data', Psychological Review 87 (1980), 215-251; P. White, 'Limitations on Verbal Reports of Internal Events: A Refutation of Nisbett and Wilson and of Bern', Psychological Review 87 (1980), 105-112, Protocol Analysis: Verbal Reports as Data (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1984); W. Lyons, The Disappearance of Introspection (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1986); C. Færch and G. Kasper (eds), Introspection in Second Language Research (Philadelphia: Multilingual Matters, 1987); P. A. White, 'Knowing More About What We Can Tell: "Introspective Access" and Causal Report Accuracy 10 Years Later', British Journal of Psychology 79 (1988), 13-45; R. T. Hurlburt, Sampling Normal and Schizophrenic Inner Experience (New York: Plenum Press, 1990); R. B. K. Howe, 'Introspection: A Reassessment', New Ideas in Psychology 9 (1991), 25-44; W. Lyons, 'Introspection - A Two-level or One-level Account?: A Response to Howe', New Ideas in Psychology 9 (1991), 51-55; Goldman, 'The Psychology of Folk Psychology' (cf. note 12). Cf. also Chap. 5 of Dennett, Consciousness Explained (cf. note 5).
98. See R. E. Nisbett and T. D. Wilson, 'Telling More Than We Can Know: Verbal Reports on Mental Processes', Psychological Review 84 (1977), 231-259. This paper is often cited as if it were the 'ultimate refutation' of introspective psychology. It is worth noting, however, that some of its central contentions are controversial amongst experimentalists. For critical discussions, and further developement, see, e.g. E. R. Smith and F. D. Miller, 'Limits on Perception of Cognitive Processes: A Reply to Nisbett and Wilson', Psychological Review 85 (1978), 355-362; K. A. Ericsson and H. A. Simon, 'Verbal Reports as Data', Psychological Review 87 (1980), 215-251; P. White, 'Limitations on Verbal Reports of Internal Events: A Refutation of Nisbett and Wilson and of Bern', Psychological Review 87 (1980), 105-112, Protocol Analysis: Verbal Reports as Data (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1984); W. Lyons, The Disappearance of Introspection (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1986); C. Færch and G. Kasper (eds), Introspection in Second Language Research (Philadelphia: Multilingual Matters, 1987); P. A. White, 'Knowing More About What We Can Tell: "Introspective Access" and Causal Report Accuracy 10 Years Later', British Journal of Psychology 79 (1988), 13-45; R. T. Hurlburt, Sampling Normal and Schizophrenic Inner Experience (New York: Plenum Press, 1990); R. B. K. Howe, 'Introspection: A Reassessment', New Ideas in Psychology 9 (1991), 25-44; W. Lyons, 'Introspection - A Two-level or One-level Account?: A Response to Howe', New Ideas in Psychology 9 (1991), 51-55; Goldman, 'The Psychology of Folk Psychology' (cf. note 12). Cf. also Chap. 5 of Dennett, Consciousness Explained (cf. note 5).
99. See R. E. Nisbett and T. D. Wilson, 'Telling More Than We Can Know: Verbal Reports on Mental Processes', Psychological Review 84 (1977), 231-259. This paper is often cited as if it were the 'ultimate refutation' of introspective psychology. It is worth noting, however, that some of its central contentions are controversial amongst experimentalists. For critical discussions, and further developement, see, e.g. E. R. Smith and F. D. Miller, 'Limits on Perception of Cognitive Processes: A Reply to Nisbett and Wilson', Psychological Review 85 (1978), 355-362; K. A. Ericsson and H. A. Simon, 'Verbal Reports as Data', Psychological Review 87 (1980), 215-251; P. White, 'Limitations on Verbal Reports of Internal Events: A Refutation of Nisbett and Wilson and of Bern', Psychological Review 87 (1980), 105-112, Protocol Analysis: Verbal Reports as Data (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1984); W. Lyons, The Disappearance of Introspection (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1986); C. Færch and G. Kasper (eds), Introspection in Second Language Research (Philadelphia: Multilingual Matters, 1987); P. A. White, 'Knowing More About What We Can Tell: "Introspective Access" and Causal Report Accuracy 10 Years Later', British Journal of Psychology 79 (1988), 13-45; R. T. Hurlburt, Sampling Normal and Schizophrenic Inner Experience (New York: Plenum Press, 1990); R. B. K. Howe, 'Introspection: A Reassessment', New Ideas in Psychology 9 (1991), 25-44; W. Lyons, 'Introspection - A Two-level or One-level Account?: A Response to Howe', New Ideas in Psychology 9 (1991), 51-55; Goldman, 'The Psychology of Folk Psychology' (cf. note 12). Cf. also Chap. 5 of Dennett, Consciousness Explained (cf. note 5).
100. See R. E. Nisbett and T. D. Wilson, 'Telling More Than We Can Know: Verbal Reports on Mental Processes', Psychological Review 84 (1977), 231-259. This paper is often cited as if it were the 'ultimate refutation' of introspective psychology. It is worth noting, however, that some of its central contentions are controversial amongst experimentalists. For critical discussions, and further developement, see, e.g. E. R. Smith and F. D. Miller, 'Limits on Perception of Cognitive Processes: A Reply to Nisbett and Wilson', Psychological Review 85 (1978), 355-362; K. A. Ericsson and H. A. Simon, 'Verbal Reports as Data', Psychological Review 87 (1980), 215-251; P. White, 'Limitations on Verbal Reports of Internal Events: A Refutation of Nisbett and Wilson and of Bern', Psychological Review 87 (1980), 105-112, Protocol Analysis: Verbal Reports as Data (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1984); W. Lyons, The Disappearance of Introspection (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1986); C. Færch and G. Kasper (eds), Introspection in Second Language Research (Philadelphia: Multilingual Matters, 1987); P. A. White, 'Knowing More About What We Can Tell: "Introspective Access" and Causal Report Accuracy 10 Years Later', British Journal of Psychology 79 (1988), 13-45; R. T. Hurlburt, Sampling Normal and Schizophrenic Inner Experience (New York: Plenum Press, 1990); R. B. K. Howe, 'Introspection: A Reassessment', New Ideas in Psychology 9 (1991), 25-44; W. Lyons, 'Introspection - A Two-level or One-level Account?: A Response to Howe', New Ideas in Psychology 9 (1991), 51-55; Goldman, 'The Psychology of Folk Psychology' (cf. note 12). Cf. also Chap. 5 of Dennett, Consciousness Explained (cf. note 5).
101. See R. E. Nisbett and T. D. Wilson, 'Telling More Than We Can Know: Verbal Reports on Mental Processes', Psychological Review 84 (1977), 231-259. This paper is often cited as if it were the 'ultimate refutation' of introspective psychology. It is worth noting, however, that some of its central contentions are controversial amongst experimentalists. For critical discussions, and further developement, see, e.g. E. R. Smith and F. D. Miller, 'Limits on Perception of Cognitive Processes: A Reply to Nisbett and Wilson', Psychological Review 85 (1978), 355-362; K. A. Ericsson and H. A. Simon, 'Verbal Reports as Data', Psychological Review 87 (1980), 215-251; P. White, 'Limitations on Verbal Reports of Internal Events: A Refutation of Nisbett and Wilson and of Bern', Psychological Review 87 (1980), 105-112, Protocol Analysis: Verbal Reports as Data (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1984); W. Lyons, The Disappearance of Introspection (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1986); C. Færch and G. Kasper (eds), Introspection in Second Language Research (Philadelphia: Multilingual Matters, 1987); P. A. White, 'Knowing More About What We Can Tell: "Introspective Access" and Causal Report Accuracy 10 Years Later', British Journal of Psychology 79 (1988), 13-45; R. T. Hurlburt, Sampling Normal and Schizophrenic Inner Experience (New York: Plenum Press, 1990); R. B. K. Howe, 'Introspection: A Reassessment', New Ideas in Psychology 9 (1991), 25-44; W. Lyons, 'Introspection - A Two-level or One-level Account?: A Response to Howe', New Ideas in Psychology 9 (1991), 51-55; Goldman, 'The Psychology of Folk Psychology' (cf. note 12). Cf. also Chap. 5 of Dennett, Consciousness Explained (cf. note 5).
102. Some regard this as an insurmountable problem for eliminativism. I do not. For discussion see, e.g. Heil, 'Being indiscrete' (cf. note 12); A. Rosenberg, 'How Is Eliminative Materialism Possible?', Mind and Common Sense, Bogdan (ed.) (cf. note 1), pp. 123-143; J. Bennett, 'Analysis Without Noise', ibid., pp. 15-36.
103. Some regard this as an insurmountable problem for eliminativism. I do not. For discussion see, e.g. Heil, 'Being indiscrete' (cf. note 12); A. Rosenberg, 'How Is Eliminative Materialism Possible?', Mind and Common Sense, Bogdan (ed.) (cf. note 1), pp. 123-143; J. Bennett, 'Analysis Without Noise', ibid., pp. 15-36.
104. Some regard this as an insurmountable problem for eliminativism. I do not. For discussion see, e.g. Heil, 'Being indiscrete' (cf. note 12); A. Rosenberg, 'How Is Eliminative Materialism Possible?', Mind and Common Sense, Bogdan (ed.) (cf. note 1), pp. 123-143; J. Bennett, 'Analysis Without Noise', ibid., pp. 15-36.
105. Its revisability and improvability is emphasised by J. Glover, I: The Philosophy and Psychology of Personal Identity (London: Allen Lane. 1988), pp. 209-211.
106. See J. S. Hunter, The National System of Scientific Measurement', Science 210 (1980), 867-875.
107. See P. Heelas and A. Lock (eds), Indigenous Psychologies: The Anthropology of the Self (London: Academic Press, 1981).
108. R. Needham, Belief, Language, and Experience (Oxford: Blackwell, 1972).
109. R. G. Lienhardt, Divinity and Experience (London: Oxford University Press, 1961).
110. R. Needham, 'Inner States as Universals: Sceptical Reflections on Human Nature', Indigenous Psychologies, Heelas and Lock (eds) (cf. note 36), pp. 65-78.
111. S. Howell, 'Rules Not Words', Indigenous Psychologies, Heelas and Lock (eds) (cf. note 36), pp. 133-143.
112. J. Smith, 'Self and Experience in Maori Culture', Indigenous Psychologies, Heelas and Lock (eds) (cf. note 36), pp. 145-159.
113. J. A. Russell, 'Culture and the Categorisation of Emotions', Psychological Bulletin 110 (1991), pp. 426-450; R. Harré (ed.), The Social Construction of Emotions (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986).
114. J. A. Russell, 'Culture and the Categorisation of Emotions', Psychological Bulletin 110 (1991), pp. 426-450; R. Harré (ed.), The Social Construction of Emotions (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986).
115. R. Harre, 'Psychological Variety', Indigenous Psychologies, Heelas and Lock (eds) (cf. note 36), pp. 79-103, here p. 85.
116. Bennett, 'Analysis Without Noise' (cf. note 33), p. 20. This section is greatly indebted to comments and suggestions by David Bloor.
117. By German hermeneutic philosophers of the nineteenth century, like Schleiermacher or Dilthey. See e.g. H.-G. Gadamer, Truth and Method (London: Sheed & Ward, 1975 (first published in 1960)). This observation is not new. See, e.g. Goldman, 'Interpretation' (cf. note 13).
118. By German hermeneutic philosophers of the nineteenth century, like Schleiermacher or Dilthey. See e.g. H.-G. Gadamer, Truth and Method (London: Sheed & Ward, 1975 (first published in 1960)). This observation is not new. See, e.g. Goldman, 'Interpretation' (cf. note 13).
119. These ideas are central in ethnometholodogy. See, e.g. H. Garfinkel, Studies in Ethnomethodology (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1984 (first published in 1967)).
120. J. R. Searle, 'Collective Intentions and Actions', in P. R. Cohen, J. Morgan and M. Pollock (eds). Intentions in Communication (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1990), pp. 401-415.
121. A point much emphasised in Searle, Construction (cf. note 25), p. 24.
122. For work on the calibration of instruments, see N. Jardine, The Scenes of Inquiry (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986). For the concept of 'interpretation function', see, e.g. Churchland, Scientific Realism (cf. note 12), p. 108-110. I take the term 'priming' from Barnes, 'Social Life' (cf. note 25).
123. For work on the calibration of instruments, see N. Jardine, The Scenes of Inquiry (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986). For the concept of 'interpretation function', see, e.g. Churchland, Scientific Realism (cf. note 12), p. 108-110. I take the term 'priming' from Barnes, 'Social Life' (cf. note 25).
124. For work on the calibration of instruments, see N. Jardine, The Scenes of Inquiry (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986). For the concept of 'interpretation function', see, e.g. Churchland, Scientific Realism (cf. note 12), p. 108-110. I take the term 'priming' from Barnes, 'Social Life' (cf. note 25).
125. borrow the concept of artificial kind from S. Guttenplan, 'Natural Kind', A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind, Guttenplan (ed.) (cf. note 12), pp. 449-450.
126. The analysis of social and natural kind terms given here owes almost everything to the writings of Barry Barnes and David Bloor (cf. note 25). The idea that natural kind terms do not change the things that are being classified comes from I. Hacking. His 'human kinds' are similar to my 'folk psychological, artificial kinds'. Hacking's conception is, however, insufficiently 'materialistic' in that he does not study the ways in which shaping the human body shapes the human mind. See I. Hacking, 'World-Making by Kind-Making: Child-Abuse for Example', in M. Douglas and D. Hull (eds), How Classification Works: Nelson Goodman Among the Social Sciences (Edinburgh University Press, 1992), pp. 180-238,
127. Rewriting the Soul: Multiple Personality and the Sciences of Memory (Princeton University Press, 1995).
128. This claim is often made by Wittgensteinians. See e.g. Hacker, 'Methodology' (cf. note 16). See also, e.g. C. Taylor, 'What is Human Agency?', T. Mischel (ed.), The Self: Psychological and Philosophical Issues (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1977), pp. 103-142.
129. This claim is often made by Wittgensteinians. See e.g. Hacker, 'Methodology' (cf. note 16). See also, e.g. C. Taylor, 'What is Human Agency?', T. Mischel (ed.), The Self: Psychological and Philosophical Issues (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1977), pp. 103-142.
130. take the 'representing-intervening' opposition from I. Hacking, Representing and Intervening: Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science (Cambridge University Press, 1983).
131. The distinction between 'making' and 'remaking' comes from I. Hacking: 'We remake the world, but we make up people'. I insist on the obvious point that people are part of the world. See I. Hacking, 'Five Parables', in R. Rorty, J. B. Schneewind and Q. Skinner (eds), Philosophy in History (Cambridge University Press, 1984), pp. 103-124, here p. 124.
132. No book has impressed this point on me as strongly as R. R. Desjarlais, Body and Emotion: The Aesthetics of Illness and Healing in the Nepal Himalayas (University of Pennsylvania Press, 1992).
133. W. P. Chapman and C. M. Jones, 'Variations in Cutaneous Pain Sensitivity in Normal Subjects', The Journal of Clinical Investigation 23 (1944), 81-91. Cf. N. Grahek, 'The Sensory Dimension of Pain', Philosophical Studies 79 (1995), 167-184; and N. Nelkin, 'Pains and Pain Sensations', The Journal of Philosophy LXXXIII (1986), 129-148.
134. W. P. Chapman and C. M. Jones, 'Variations in Cutaneous Pain Sensitivity in Normal Subjects', The Journal of Clinical Investigation 23 (1944), 81-91. Cf. N. Grahek, 'The Sensory Dimension of Pain', Philosophical Studies 79 (1995), 167-184; and N. Nelkin, 'Pains and Pain Sensations', The Journal of Philosophy LXXXIII (1986), 129-148.
135. W. P. Chapman and C. M. Jones, 'Variations in Cutaneous Pain Sensitivity in Normal Subjects', The Journal of Clinical Investigation 23 (1944), 81-91. Cf. N. Grahek, 'The Sensory Dimension of Pain', Philosophical Studies 79 (1995), 167-184; and N. Nelkin, 'Pains and Pain Sensations', The Journal of Philosophy LXXXIII (1986), 129-148.
136. E. R. Kandel and R. D. Hawkins, 'The Biological Basis of Learning and Individuality', Mind and Brain: Readings From Scientific American Magazine (New York: Freeman & Co., 1993): pp. 40-53. See also R. Harré and G. Gillett, The Discursive Mind (London: Sage, 1994), pp. 80-96.
137. E. R. Kandel and R. D. Hawkins, 'The Biological Basis of Learning and Individuality', Mind and Brain: Readings From Scientific American Magazine (New York: Freeman & Co., 1993): pp. 40-53. See also R. Harré and G. Gillett, The Discursive Mind (London: Sage, 1994), pp. 80-96.
138. G. E. M. Anscombe, 'The First Person', Q. Cassam (ed.), Self-Knowledge (Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. 140-159.(Anscombe's paper was first published in 1975.)
139. Ibid., p. 154.
140. Other critics have argued that Anscombe's list of possible solutions is incomplete in other respects. C. McGinn and J. Glover miss a consideration of the possibility that 'I' is like 'now' or 'here'. See, e.g. C. McGinn, The Subjective View: Secondary Qualities and Indexical Thoughts (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), p. 54; Glover, I (cf. note 34), p. 206. There are some affinities between my account and that of R. Harré in his The Social Construction of Selves', in K. Yardley and T. Honess (eds), Self and Indentity: Psychosocial Perspectives (Chichester, NY: Wiley, 1987), pp. 41-52. Harré gestures a bit vaguely in the direction of self-referentiality.
141. Other critics have argued that Anscombe's list of possible solutions is incomplete in other respects. C. McGinn and J. Glover miss a consideration of the possibility that 'I' is like 'now' or 'here'. See, e.g. C. McGinn, The Subjective View: Secondary Qualities and Indexical Thoughts (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), p. 54; Glover, I (cf. note 34), p. 206. There are some affinities between my account and that of R. Harré in his The Social Construction of Selves', in K. Yardley and T. Honess (eds), Self and Indentity: Psychosocial Perspectives (Chichester, NY: Wiley, 1987), pp. 41-52. Harré gestures a bit vaguely in the direction of self-referentiality.
142. Other critics have argued that Anscombe's list of possible solutions is incomplete in other respects. C. McGinn and J. Glover miss a consideration of the possibility that 'I' is like 'now' or 'here'. See, e.g. C. McGinn, The Subjective View: Secondary Qualities and Indexical Thoughts (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), p. 54; Glover, I (cf. note 34), p. 206. There are some affinities between my account and that of R. Harré in his The Social Construction of Selves', in K. Yardley and T. Honess (eds), Self and Indentity: Psychosocial Perspectives (Chichester, NY: Wiley, 1987), pp. 41-52. Harré gestures a bit vaguely in the direction of self-referentiality.
143. take the idea of performative contradiction from J. Hintikka, 'Cogito, Ergo Sum: Inference or Performance?', in G. J. D. Moyal (ed.), René Descartes: Critical Assessments, Volume II (London: Routledge, 1991), pp. 162-184.(Hintikka's paper was first published in 1962.)
144. For a discussion of Gassendi's objections, see K. Merrill, 'Did Descartes Misunderstand the Cogito?', in René Descartes (ed.) Moyal (cf. note 61), pp. 261-269.
145. J. Echemendy, 'The Cartesian Circle: Circulus ex tempore', Studio Cartesiana 2 (1981), 5-42.
146. E. Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life (London, Allen & Unwin, 1971 (first published in 1915)).
147. This happy phrase is Searle's. See Searle, Construction (cf. note 25), passim.
148. See. for example, L. Febvre, The Problem of Unbelief in the Sixteenth Century: The Religion of Rabelais (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982 (first published in 1942)); and M. Bloch, Feudal Society (London: Routledge & Kegan, 1962 (first published in 1936)). See also M. D. Altschule, 'Acedia: Its Evolution from Deadly Sin to Psychiatric Syndrome', British Journal of Psychiatry 111 (1965), 117-119.
149. See. for example, L. Febvre, The Problem of Unbelief in the Sixteenth Century: The Religion of Rabelais (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982 (first published in 1942)); and M. Bloch, Feudal Society (London: Routledge & Kegan, 1962 (first published in 1936)). See also M. D. Altschule, 'Acedia: Its Evolution from Deadly Sin to Psychiatric Syndrome', British Journal of Psychiatry 111 (1965), 117-119.
150. See. for example, L. Febvre, The Problem of Unbelief in the Sixteenth Century: The Religion of Rabelais (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982 (first published in 1942)); and M. Bloch, Feudal Society (London: Routledge & Kegan, 1962 (first published in 1936)). See also M. D. Altschule, 'Acedia: Its Evolution from Deadly Sin to Psychiatric Syndrome', British Journal of Psychiatry 111 (1965), 117-119.
151. Paul Churchland invokes the case of psychoanalysis against those who doubt 'that the vocabulary of a sophisticated science could ever gain general use'. See Churchland, The Engine of Reason (cf. note 12), p. 323. 1 am not convinced that the case of psychoanalysis can support Churchland's hopes concerning neuralese. After all, psychoanalysis is still fairly close to our received belief-desire folk psychology.