Interval measures of power

Mathematical social sciences

Volumn 33, Issue 1, 1997, Pages 23-74

  Taylor, Alan ^a   Zwicker, William ^a  

^a UNION COLLEGE   (United States)

Author keywords

Power; Power index; Simple game; Voting; Weighted voting game

Indexed keywords

EID: 0031073391     PISSN: 01654896     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0165-4896(96)00818-9     Document Type: Article

References (29)

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