A regulatory regime for innovation in the communications industries

Telecommunications Policy

Volumn 21, Issue 1, 1997, Pages 35-45

  Antonelli, Cristiano ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SASSARI   (Italy)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS; LAWS AND LEGISLATION; TELECOMMUNICATION CONTROL; TELECOMMUNICATION NETWORKS; UTILITY RATES;

TECHNOLOGICAL EXTERNALITIES;

TELECOMMUNICATION SERVICES;

EID: 0031069147     PISSN: 03085961     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0308-5961(96)00063-8     Document Type: Article

References (46)

1. See Huber, P, Kellog, M and Thorne, J The Geodesic Report II: Report on Competition in the Telephone Industry Washington (1993); Crandall, RW and Flamm, K (eds) Changing the Rules: Technological Change International Competition and Regulation in Communications Brookings, Washington (1987); Crandall, RW After the Breakup: The US Telecommunications Industry in a More Competitive Era Brookings, Washington (1991); Crandall, RW and Waverman, L Talk is Cheap, The Promise of a Regulatory Regime in North American Telecommunications Brookings, Washington (1995).
2. See Huber, P, Kellog, M and Thorne, J The Geodesic Report II: Report on Competition in the Telephone Industry Washington (1993); Crandall, RW and Flamm, K (eds) Changing the Rules: Technological Change International Competition and Regulation in Communications Brookings, Washington (1987); Crandall, RW After the Breakup: The US Telecommunications Industry in a More Competitive Era Brookings, Washington (1991); Crandall, RW and Waverman, L Talk is Cheap, The Promise of a Regulatory Regime in North American Telecommunications Brookings, Washington (1995).
3. See Huber, P, Kellog, M and Thorne, J The Geodesic Report II: Report on Competition in the Telephone Industry Washington (1993); Crandall, RW and Flamm, K (eds) Changing the Rules: Technological Change International Competition and Regulation in Communications Brookings, Washington (1987); Crandall, RW After the Breakup: The US Telecommunications Industry in a More Competitive Era Brookings, Washington (1991); Crandall, RW and Waverman, L Talk is Cheap, The Promise of a Regulatory Regime in North American Telecommunications Brookings, Washington (1995).
4. See Huber, P, Kellog, M and Thorne, J The Geodesic Report II: Report on Competition in the Telephone Industry Washington (1993); Crandall, RW and Flamm, K (eds) Changing the Rules: Technological Change International Competition and Regulation in Communications Brookings, Washington (1987); Crandall, RW After the Breakup: The US Telecommunications Industry in a More Competitive Era Brookings, Washington (1991); Crandall, RW and Waverman, L Talk is Cheap, The Promise of a Regulatory Regime in North American Telecommunications Brookings, Washington (1995).
5. The wave of mergers and acquisitions which have been taking place in the United States and globally in the nineties however would suggest that many managers still believe that economies of size are extremely important in this industry.
6. Mansell, R The New Telecommunications Sage Publications, New York (1994).
7. Antonelli, C (ed.), The Economics of Information Networks Elsevier, Amsterdam (1992) and Antonelli, C The Economics of Localized Technological Change and Industrial Dynamics Kluwer Academic Publishers, Boston (1995).
8. Antonelli, C (ed.), The Economics of Information Networks Elsevier, Amsterdam (1992) and Antonelli, C The Economics of Localized Technological Change and Industrial Dynamics Kluwer Academic Publishers, Boston (1995).
9. Beniger, JR The Control Revolution: Technological and Economic Origins of the Information Society Harvard University Press, Cambridge (1986); Antonelli, C (ed.), New Information Technology and Industrial Change Kluwer Academic Publishers, Boston (1988); Allen, T and Scott Morton, MS (eds), Information Technology and the Corporation of the 90s Oxford University Press, Oxford (1994); Chandler, A Scale and scope. The Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism Harvard University Press, Cambridge (1992); Scott Morton, MS (ed.), The Corporation of the 1990s Oxford University Press, Oxford (1991); Brynjolfsson, E and Hitt, L 'Information technology as a factor of production: the role of differences among firms' Economics of Innovation and New Technology, 1995 3 183-201; Antonelli, C and Marchionatti, R 'Technological and organisational change in a process of industrial rejuvenation. The case of the Italian cotton textile industry. Cambridge Journal of Economies 1997 (forthcoming).
10. Beniger, JR The Control Revolution: Technological and Economic Origins of the Information Society Harvard University Press, Cambridge (1986); Antonelli, C (ed.), New Information Technology and Industrial Change Kluwer Academic Publishers, Boston (1988); Allen, T and Scott Morton, MS (eds), Information Technology and the Corporation of the 90s Oxford University Press, Oxford (1994); Chandler, A Scale and scope. The Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism Harvard University Press, Cambridge (1992); Scott Morton, MS (ed.), The Corporation of the 1990s Oxford University Press, Oxford (1991); Brynjolfsson, E and Hitt, L 'Information technology as a factor of production: the role of differences among firms' Economics of Innovation and New Technology, 1995 3 183-201; Antonelli, C and Marchionatti, R 'Technological and organisational change in a process of industrial rejuvenation. The case of the Italian cotton textile industry. Cambridge Journal of Economies 1997 (forthcoming).
11. Beniger, JR The Control Revolution: Technological and Economic Origins of the Information Society Harvard University Press, Cambridge (1986); Antonelli, C (ed.), New Information Technology and Industrial Change Kluwer Academic Publishers, Boston (1988); Allen, T and Scott Morton, MS (eds), Information Technology and the Corporation of the 90s Oxford University Press, Oxford (1994); Chandler, A Scale and scope. The Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism Harvard University Press, Cambridge (1992); Scott Morton, MS (ed.), The Corporation of the 1990s Oxford University Press, Oxford (1991); Brynjolfsson, E and Hitt, L 'Information technology as a factor of production: the role of differences among firms' Economics of Innovation and New Technology, 1995 3 183-201; Antonelli, C and Marchionatti, R 'Technological and organisational change in a process of industrial rejuvenation. The case of the Italian cotton textile industry. Cambridge Journal of Economies 1997 (forthcoming).
12. Beniger, JR The Control Revolution: Technological and Economic Origins of the Information Society Harvard University Press, Cambridge (1986); Antonelli, C (ed.), New Information Technology and Industrial Change Kluwer Academic Publishers, Boston (1988); Allen, T and Scott Morton, MS (eds), Information Technology and the Corporation of the 90s Oxford University Press, Oxford (1994); Chandler, A Scale and scope. The Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism Harvard University Press, Cambridge (1992); Scott Morton, MS (ed.), The Corporation of the 1990s Oxford University Press, Oxford (1991); Brynjolfsson, E and Hitt, L 'Information technology as a factor of production: the role of differences among firms' Economics of Innovation and New Technology, 1995 3 183-201; Antonelli, C and Marchionatti, R 'Technological and organisational change in a process of industrial rejuvenation. The case of the Italian cotton textile industry. Cambridge Journal of Economies 1997 (forthcoming).
13. Beniger, JR The Control Revolution: Technological and Economic Origins of the Information Society Harvard University Press, Cambridge (1986); Antonelli, C (ed.), New Information Technology and Industrial Change Kluwer Academic Publishers, Boston (1988); Allen, T and Scott Morton, MS (eds), Information Technology and the Corporation of the 90s Oxford University Press, Oxford (1994); Chandler, A Scale and scope. The Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism Harvard University Press, Cambridge (1992); Scott Morton, MS (ed.), The Corporation of the 1990s Oxford University Press, Oxford (1991); Brynjolfsson, E and Hitt, L 'Information technology as a factor of production: the role of differences among firms' Economics of Innovation and New Technology, 1995 3 183-201; Antonelli, C and Marchionatti, R 'Technological and organisational change in a process of industrial rejuvenation. The case of the Italian cotton textile industry. Cambridge Journal of Economies 1997 (forthcoming).
14. Beniger, JR The Control Revolution: Technological and Economic Origins of the Information Society Harvard University Press, Cambridge (1986); Antonelli, C (ed.), New Information Technology and Industrial Change Kluwer Academic Publishers, Boston (1988); Allen, T and Scott Morton, MS (eds), Information Technology and the Corporation of the 90s Oxford University Press, Oxford (1994); Chandler, A Scale and scope. The Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism Harvard University Press, Cambridge (1992); Scott Morton, MS (ed.), The Corporation of the 1990s Oxford University Press, Oxford (1991); Brynjolfsson, E and Hitt, L 'Information technology as a factor of production: the role of differences among firms' Economics of Innovation and New Technology, 1995 3 183-201; Antonelli, C and Marchionatti, R 'Technological and organisational change in a process of industrial rejuvenation. The case of the Italian cotton textile industry. Cambridge Journal of Economies 1997 (forthcoming).
15. Beniger, JR The Control Revolution: Technological and Economic Origins of the Information Society Harvard University Press, Cambridge (1986); Antonelli, C (ed.), New Information Technology and Industrial Change Kluwer Academic Publishers, Boston (1988); Allen, T and Scott Morton, MS (eds), Information Technology and the Corporation of the 90s Oxford University Press, Oxford (1994); Chandler, A Scale and scope. The Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism Harvard University Press, Cambridge (1992); Scott Morton, MS (ed.), The Corporation of the 1990s Oxford University Press, Oxford (1991); Brynjolfsson, E and Hitt, L 'Information technology as a factor of production: the role of differences among firms' Economics of Innovation and New Technology, 1995 3 183-201; Antonelli, C and Marchionatti, R 'Technological and organisational change in a process of industrial rejuvenation. The case of the Italian cotton textile industry. Cambridge Journal of Economies 1997 (forthcoming).
16. Brousseau, E, Petit, P and Phan, D (eds), Mutations des Telecommunications & Reorganisation des Activités et des Marchés Economica, Paris (1996); Garrone, P 'The adoption of technological innovations: dynamic and cumulative effects in telecommunications networks' Economics of Innovation and New Technology 1995 4 1-16; Majumdar, SK 'Bandwagon influences and installed-base conversion in US telecommunications' Economics of Innovation and New Technology 1996 4 113-123
17. Brousseau, E, Petit, P and Phan, D (eds), Mutations des Telecommunications & Reorganisation des Activités et des Marchés Economica, Paris (1996); Garrone, P 'The adoption of technological innovations: dynamic and cumulative effects in telecommunications networks' Economics of Innovation and New Technology 1995 4 1-16; Majumdar, SK 'Bandwagon influences and installed-base conversion in US telecommunications' Economics of Innovation and New Technology 1996 4 113-123
18. Brousseau, E, Petit, P and Phan, D (eds), Mutations des Telecommunications & Reorganisation des Activités et des Marchés Economica, Paris (1996); Garrone, P 'The adoption of technological innovations: dynamic and cumulative effects in telecommunications networks' Economics of Innovation and New Technology 1995 4 1-16; Majumdar, SK 'Bandwagon influences and installed-base conversion in US telecommunications' Economics of Innovation and New Technology 1996 4 113-123
19. See Antonelli C The Network of Networks: Localized Technological Change in Telecommunications and Productivity Growth. Paper presented at the Second Annual Conference of the Consortium for Research on Telecommunications Policy, Evanston, May 1996: 'Public policy and corporate strategy for the information economy'.
20. See Curien, N and Gensollen, M Economie des Telecommunications Ouverture et Reglementation Economica, Paris (1992); Braeutigam RR and Panzar, JC 'Effects of the change from Rate-of-Return to-Price-Cap Regulation' American Economic Review 1993 83 191-198; Spulber, DF Regulation and Markets. MIT Press, Cambridge (1993); and Train, KE Optimal Regulation: The Economic Theory of Natural Monopoly MIT Press, Cambridge (1991); Crandall, RW and Waverman, L Talk is Cheap. The Promise of a Regulatory Regime in North American Telecommunications Brookings, Washington (1995)
21. See Curien, N and Gensollen, M Economie des Telecommunications Ouverture et Reglementation Economica, Paris (1992); Braeutigam RR and Panzar, JC 'Effects of the change from Rate-of-Return to-Price-Cap Regulation' American Economic Review 1993 83 191-198; Spulber, DF Regulation and Markets. MIT Press, Cambridge (1993); and Train, KE Optimal Regulation: The Economic Theory of Natural Monopoly MIT Press, Cambridge (1991); Crandall, RW and Waverman, L Talk is Cheap. The Promise of a Regulatory Regime in North American Telecommunications Brookings, Washington (1995)
22. See Curien, N and Gensollen, M Economie des Telecommunications Ouverture et Reglementation Economica, Paris (1992); Braeutigam RR and Panzar, JC 'Effects of the change from Rate-of-Return to-Price-Cap Regulation' American Economic Review 1993 83 191-198; Spulber, DF Regulation and Markets. MIT Press, Cambridge (1993); and Train, KE Optimal Regulation: The Economic Theory of Natural Monopoly MIT Press, Cambridge (1991); Crandall, RW and Waverman, L Talk is Cheap. The Promise of a Regulatory Regime in North American Telecommunications Brookings, Washington (1995)
23. See Curien, N and Gensollen, M Economie des Telecommunications Ouverture et Reglementation Economica, Paris (1992); Braeutigam RR and Panzar, JC 'Effects of the change from Rate-of-Return to-Price-Cap Regulation' American Economic Review 1993 83 191-198; Spulber, DF Regulation and Markets. MIT Press, Cambridge (1993); and Train, KE Optimal Regulation: The Economic Theory of Natural Monopoly MIT Press, Cambridge (1991); Crandall, RW and Waverman, L Talk is Cheap. The Promise of a Regulatory Regime in North American Telecommunications Brookings, Washington (1995)
24. See Curien, N and Gensollen, M Economie des Telecommunications Ouverture et Reglementation Economica, Paris (1992); Braeutigam RR and Panzar, JC 'Effects of the change from Rate-of-Return to-Price-Cap Regulation' American Economic Review 1993 83 191-198; Spulber, DF Regulation and Markets. MIT Press, Cambridge (1993); and Train, KE Optimal Regulation: The Economic Theory of Natural Monopoly MIT Press, Cambridge (1991); Crandall, RW and Waverman, L Talk is Cheap. The Promise of a Regulatory Regime in North American Telecommunications Brookings, Washington (1995)
25. See Taylor, LD Telecommunications Demand in Theory and Practice Kluwer Economic Publishers (1994), for an extensive review of the available empirical literature.
26. See Antonelli C, The Economics of Localized Technological Change and Industrial Dynamics Kluwer Academic Publishers, Boston (1995) and Antonelli, C 'Localized technological change in the network of networks: the interaction between regulation and the evolution of technology in telecommunications' Industrial and Corporate Change 1995 4 737-754
27. See Antonelli C, The Economics of Localized Technological Change and Industrial Dynamics Kluwer Academic Publishers, Boston (1995) and Antonelli, C 'Localized technological change in the network of networks: the interaction between regulation and the evolution of technology in telecommunications' Industrial and Corporate Change 1995 4 737-754
28. See Stiglitz, J 'Technological change sunk costs and competition' Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1987 3 883-937
29. d/(1-1/e)>1 This result is extremely important for our analysis because it can be used to show that vertical integration of telecommunications carriers, specializing in the delivery of the hard-network, into the provision of communication services is likely to lead to an increase in the final prices of the communication services. Such an increase is always significant when the marginal costs of producing all inputs are constant and are larger, the smaller is the share of the cost of the final service that is due to the monopolized input, and the smaller is the demand elasticity for the final product. Vertical integration provides benefits, in terms of the absence of double marginalization, only when input costs are not constant, the elasticity of substitution between inputs is less than the elasticity of demand for the final product and the marginal cost schedule for the monopolized input is downward sloping. The fast rates of technological change in the production of telecommunications services have, however, provided such a variety of alternative modes of delivering such a variety of final products that the elasticity of substitution between inputs, usually assumed in the proximity of O, typical of a fixed proportions production process, has now much larger values. These are typical of a highly variable proportions production process. Hence vertical integration in the production of telecommunications services is likely to exert negative effects especially because of, and after, the recent wave of technological changes (see Vickers, J 'Competition and regulation in vertically related markets' Journal of Industrial Economics 1995 62 1-17)
30. d/(1-1/e)>1 This result is extremely important for our analysis because it can be used to show that vertical integration of telecommunications carriers, specializing in the delivery of the hard-network, into the provision of communication services is likely to lead to an increase in the final prices of the communication services. Such an increase is always significant when the marginal costs of producing all inputs are constant and are larger, the smaller is the share of the cost of the final service that is due to the monopolized input, and the smaller is the demand elasticity for the final product. Vertical integration provides benefits, in terms of the absence of double marginalization, only when input costs are not constant, the elasticity of substitution between inputs is less than the elasticity of demand for the final product and the marginal cost schedule for the monopolized input is downward sloping. The fast rates of technological change in the production of telecommunications services have, however, provided such a variety of alternative modes of delivering such a variety of final products that the elasticity of substitution between inputs, usually assumed in the proximity of O, typical of a fixed proportions production process, has now much larger values. These are typical of a highly variable proportions production process. Hence vertical integration in the production of telecommunications services is likely to exert negative effects especially because of, and after, the recent wave of technological changes (see Vickers, J 'Competition and regulation in vertically related markets' Journal of Industrial Economics 1995 62 1-17)
31. Noam, E Telecommunications in Europe Oxford University Press, Oxford (1992), and Noam, E 'Beyond liberalization I, II, III' Telecommunications Policy 1994 18 286-294; 435-452; 687-704
32. Noam, E Telecommunications in Europe Oxford University Press, Oxford (1992), and Noam, E 'Beyond liberalization I, II, III' Telecommunications Policy 1994 18 286-294; 435-452; 687-704
33. See Arthur, B Increasing Returns and Path Dependence in the Economy Michigan University Press, Ann Arbor (1995); Rosenberg, N Exploring the Black Box (Chapter 11: Telecommunications: complex, uncertain and path dependent), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (1994); and more specifically for an interesting application of this analysis to the communication technologies Johnson, LL Towards Competition in the Cable Industry MIT Press, Cambridge (1994).
34. See Arthur, B Increasing Returns and Path Dependence in the Economy Michigan University Press, Ann Arbor (1995); Rosenberg, N Exploring the Black Box (Chapter 11: Telecommunications: complex, uncertain and path dependent), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (1994); and more specifically for an interesting application of this analysis to the communication technologies Johnson, LL Towards Competition in the Cable Industry MIT Press, Cambridge (1994).
35. See Arthur, B Increasing Returns and Path Dependence in the Economy Michigan University Press, Ann Arbor (1995); Rosenberg, N Exploring the Black Box (Chapter 11: Telecommunications: complex, uncertain and path dependent), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (1994); and more specifically for an interesting application of this analysis to the communication technologies Johnson, LL Towards Competition in the Cable Industry MIT Press, Cambridge (1994).
36. Baumol, WJ, Panzar, JC and Willig, RD Contestable Markets and the Theory of Industry Structure. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, New York (1982).
37. David PA 'Some new standards for the economics of standardization in the information age' in Dasgupta, P and Stoneman, P (eds), Economic Policy and Technological Performance Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (1987); David, PA and Greenstein, S 'The economics of compatibility standards: an introduction to recent research. Economics of Innovation and New Technology 1990 1 3-43; and Antonelli, C 'Localized technological change and the evolution of standards as economic institutions Information Economics and Policy, 1994 6 195-216
38. David PA 'Some new standards for the economics of standardization in the information age' in Dasgupta, P and Stoneman, P (eds), Economic Policy and Technological Performance Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (1987); David, PA and Greenstein, S 'The economics of compatibility standards: an introduction to recent research. Economics of Innovation and New Technology 1990 1 3-43; and Antonelli, C 'Localized technological change and the evolution of standards as economic institutions Information Economics and Policy, 1994 6 195-216
39. David PA 'Some new standards for the economics of standardization in the information age' in Dasgupta, P and Stoneman, P (eds), Economic Policy and Technological Performance Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (1987); David, PA and Greenstein, S 'The economics of compatibility standards: an introduction to recent research. Economics of Innovation and New Technology 1990 1 3-43; and Antonelli, C 'Localized technological change and the evolution of standards as economic institutions Information Economics and Policy, 1994 6 195-216
40. The notion of access deficit charge, implemented by OFTEL, the British regulator, rather than the BW (Baumol, WJ and Sidak, GJ Toward Competition in Local Telephony MIT Press, Cambridge (1994)) rule based upon the axiomatic assumption of vertical integration is relevant here. Access deficit charges are based upon the proportionate distribution of the fixed costs of the hard-network to all the users of the network according to their revenue (see Laffont, JJ and Tirole, J 'Access pricing and competition' European Economic Review 1994 37 1673-1710). This procedure makes it possible to spread the fixed costs of the network on the full range of products that are delivered using it as an intermediary imput, taking into account the levels of the demand for each specific product. If we assume that a variety of products can be delivered using the access to the same hard-network, the costs of the latter can be spread according to the conditions of a variety of markets, even those where the vertically integrated carrier is not active. The BW rule instead assumes the opportunity costs of the vertically integrated carrier as the basic reference to fix the access charges, independently of the alternative uses made by the providers of final services. See also Noam E, 'Beyond liberalization III reforming universal service', Telecommunications Policy 1994, 18, 687-704.
41. The notion of access deficit charge, implemented by OFTEL, the British regulator, rather than the BW (Baumol, WJ and Sidak, GJ Toward Competition in Local Telephony MIT Press, Cambridge (1994)) rule based upon the axiomatic assumption of vertical integration is relevant here. Access deficit charges are based upon the proportionate distribution of the fixed costs of the hard-network to all the users of the network according to their revenue (see Laffont, JJ and Tirole, J 'Access pricing and competition' European Economic Review 1994 37 1673-1710). This procedure makes it possible to spread the fixed costs of the network on the full range of products that are delivered using it as an intermediary imput, taking into account the levels of the demand for each specific product. If we assume that a variety of products can be delivered using the access to the same hard-network, the costs of the latter can be spread according to the conditions of a variety of markets, even those where the vertically integrated carrier is not active. The BW rule instead assumes the opportunity costs of the vertically integrated carrier as the basic reference to fix the access charges, independently of the alternative uses made by the providers of final services. See also Noam E, 'Beyond liberalization III reforming universal service', Telecommunications Policy 1994, 18, 687-704.
42. The notion of access deficit charge, implemented by OFTEL, the British regulator, rather than the BW (Baumol, WJ and Sidak, GJ Toward Competition in Local Telephony MIT Press, Cambridge (1994)) rule based upon the axiomatic assumption of vertical integration is relevant here. Access deficit charges are based upon the proportionate distribution of the fixed costs of the hard-network to all the users of the network according to their revenue (see Laffont, JJ and Tirole, J 'Access pricing and competition' European Economic Review 1994 37 1673-1710). This procedure makes it possible to spread the fixed costs of the network on the full range of products that are delivered using it as an intermediary imput, taking into account the levels of the demand for each specific product. If we assume that a variety of products can be delivered using the access to the same hard-network, the costs of the latter can be spread according to the conditions of a variety of markets, even those where the vertically integrated carrier is not active. The BW rule instead assumes the opportunity costs of the vertically integrated carrier as the basic reference to fix the access charges, independently of the alternative uses made by the providers of final services. See also Noam E, 'Beyond liberalization III reforming universal service', Telecommunications Policy 1994, 18, 687-704.
43. See Farrell, J 'Arguments for weaker intellectual property protection in network industries' in Kahin, B and Abbate, J (eds), Standards Policy for Information Infrastructure MIT Press, Cambridge (1995) pp. 368-377; Shurmer, M and Lea, G Telecommunications standardization and intellectual property rights: a fundamental dilemma?' in Kahin, B and Abbate, J (eds), Standards Policy for Information Infrastructure MIT Press, Cambridge (1995), pp. 378-404; and Antonelli, C 'New information technology and the evolution of the industrial organization of the production of knowledge' A Report to the European Union TSER Programme University of Torino (1996).
44. See Farrell, J 'Arguments for weaker intellectual property protection in network industries' in Kahin, B and Abbate, J (eds), Standards Policy for Information Infrastructure MIT Press, Cambridge (1995) pp. 368-377; Shurmer, M and Lea, G Telecommunications standardization and intellectual property rights: a fundamental dilemma?' in Kahin, B and Abbate, J (eds), Standards Policy for Information Infrastructure MIT Press, Cambridge (1995), pp. 378-404; and Antonelli, C 'New information technology and the evolution of the industrial organization of the production of knowledge' A Report to the European Union TSER Programme University of Torino (1996).
45. See Farrell, J 'Arguments for weaker intellectual property protection in network industries' in Kahin, B and Abbate, J (eds), Standards Policy for Information Infrastructure MIT Press, Cambridge (1995) pp. 368-377; Shurmer, M and Lea, G Telecommunications standardization and intellectual property rights: a fundamental dilemma?' in Kahin, B and Abbate, J (eds), Standards Policy for Information Infrastructure MIT Press, Cambridge (1995), pp. 378-404; and Antonelli, C 'New information technology and the evolution of the industrial organization of the production of knowledge' A Report to the European Union TSER Programme University of Torino (1996).
46. Access charges should be calculated centrally in order to avoid predatory, and discriminatory, pricing which might emerge in bilateral negotiation procedures with evident negative effects for less favoured regions and firms.