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Journal of Economic Theory
Volumn 72, Issue 2, 1997, Pages 282-305
Time consistent taxation by a government with redistributive goals
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EID: 0031068519     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.1996.2217     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (10)
References (23)
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* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.