Forensic psychiatry: The making-and breaking-of expert opinion testimony

Journal of Psychiatry and Law

Volumn 25, Issue 1, 1997, Pages 51-112

  Wilkinson, Allen P ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COUNSELING; COURT; CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR; EXPERT WITNESS; FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY; HUMAN RIGHTS; LAW SUIT; MENTAL HEALTH; PSYCHIATRIST; REVIEW;

EID: 0030821291     PISSN: 00931853     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/009318539702500105     Document Type: Review

References (166)

1. Arthur C. Roberts and Allen P. Wilkinson, Forensic Psychiatry: Painting a Positive Picture at Trial, 19 TRIAL 56 (Jan. 1983).
2. Crowston v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 521 N.W.2d 401 (N.D. 1994).
3. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY p. 649 (6th ed. 1991).
4. Booklet, Information for Applicants for Added Qualifications in Geriatric Psychiatry, Clinical Neurophysiology, Addiction Psychiatry, Forensic Psychiatry, The American Board of Psychiatry and Neurology, Inc. 14-15 (1997).
5. It has been suggested that the psychiatric term that comes closest to describing the legal term of insanity is "psychotic." See, e.g., Cecil v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, 888 S.W.2d 669 (Ky. 1994).
6. Sanders v. State, 585 A.2d 117 (Del. 1990).
7. 10 Clark & Finley 200, 8 Eng.Rep. 718 (1843).
8. Id. at 200, 8 Eng.Rep. at 722.
9. See, e.g., Sanders v. State, supra, 585 A.2d 117.
10. See, e.g., State v. Edmon, 28 Wash.App. 98, 105, 621 P.2d 1310, rev. denied 95 Wash.2d 1019 (1981).
11. The jurisdictions that applied the "irresistible impulse" test have since adopted the ALI test. See Sanders v. State, supra, 585 A.2d at 139 fn. 16 (listing the 11 states that recognize the volitional aspect of the M'Naghten test of insanity).
12. Durham v. United States, 94 App. D.C. 228, 214 F.2d 862 (1954), overruled by United States v. Brawner, 153 U.S. App. D.C. 1, 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (adopting ALI Model Penal Code standard). A version of the "product of mental disease or defect" test is still applied in New Hampshire. State v. Cegelis, 138 N.H. 249, 638 A.2d 783 (1994).
13. See Cecil v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, 888 S.W.2d 669 (Ky. 1994); Graham v. State, 547 S.W.2d 531, 543 (Tenn. 1977).
14. Sanders v. State, 585 A.2d 117 (Del. 1990); State v. Herrera, 895 P.2d 359 (Utah 1995).
15. 18 U.S.C. § 17(a).
16. United States v. Garcia, 94 F.3d 57 (2d Cir. 1996).
17. State v. Searcy, 118 Idaho 632, 798 P.2d 914 (1990); Montana Code Ann. 46-14-102; State v. Byers, 261 Mont. 17, 861 P.2d 860 (1993), cert. denied 511 U.S. _, 114 S.Ct. 1380, 128 L.Ed.2d 55 (1994), rev'd on other grounds; State v. Egelhoff, 272 Mont. 114, 900 P.2d 260 (1995), rev'd sub nom. Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. _, 116 S.Ct. _, 135 L.Ed.2d 361 (1996); State v. Korell, 213 Mont. 316, 690 P.2d 992 (1984); Nevada Revised Stat. 174.035; Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-305(1); State v. Mace, 921 P.2d 1372 (Utah 1996). Between 1910 and 1931, three states - Louisiana, Mississippi, and Washington - attempted to abolish their insanity defense. In each of those cases, however, the statutes were overturned by the respective state's supreme court. See State v. Searcy, 118 Idaho 632, 798 P.2d 914, 932 (1990) (McDevitt, J., dissenting); State v. Cowan, 260 Mont. 510, 861 P.2d 884, 889 (Trieweiler, J., dissenting), cert. denied 511 U.S._, 114 S.Ct. 1371, 128 L.Ed.2d 48 (1994).
18. State v. Herrera, 895 P.2d 359 (Utah 1995). A criminal act requires both an actus reus and a mens rea. Actus reus is the physical element of the crime, the "guilty act." Mens rea is the mental element, the "guilty mind." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 36, 985 (6th ed. 1991).
19. Nevada Revised Stat. 174.035; State v. Collier, 919 P.2d 376 (Mont. 1996); State v. Cowan, 260 Mont. 510, 861 P.2d 884, 889 (1993) (Trieweiler, J., dissenting), cert. denied 511 U.S. _, 114 S.Ct. 1371, 128 L.Ed.2d 48 (1994) ("[Montana] law prior to 1979 [when it abolished the insanity defense] provided that when a defendant is acquitted based on the defense of mental disease or defect, he or she must be committed to the custody of the superintendent of the Montana State Hospital for so long as they remain a threat to society. That procedural safeguard has been carried forward to our current statutory scheme.") (citations omitted); State v. Mace, 921 P.2d 1372 (Utah 1996) ("Although Utah has abolished the affirmative defense of insanity, it nonetheless allows a plea or verdict of guilty and mentally ill, which is intended to buffer 'some of the harsher consequences of eliminating an independent insanity defense' by allowing for medical treatment in place of or as a prelude to traditional incarceration.").
20. Delaware Code § 408; Sanders v. State, supra, 585 A.2d 117; Nevada Revised Stat. 174.035. See also State v. Worlock, 117 N.J. 596, 569 A.2d 1314 (1990) (stating that prison is to punish a convicted criminal, while the purpose of hospitalization of a person found not guilty by reason of insanity is treatment; "In brief, the insanity defense separates 'the sick from the bad.' ").
21. State v. Abbott, 127 N.H. 444, 503 A.2d 791 (1985).
22. Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 88 S.Ct. 2145, 20 L.Ed.2d 1254 (1968). See also Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 103 S.Ct. 3043, 77 L.Ed.2d 694 (1983); Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 72 S.Ct. 1002, 96 L.Ed. 1302 (1952).
23. See, e.g., Dillon v. Legg, 59 Cal.2d 295, 29 Cal.Rptr. 33, 379 P.2d 513 (1963) (permitting recovery for severe emotional distress suffered by mother who watched vehicle run over and kill her daughter, even though she herself was not in the "zone of danger" of being hit); compare with Williams v. Baker,_ D.C. App._, 572 A.2d 1062 (1990) (requiring that the plaintiff claiming damages for emotional distress must have been in the "zone of physical danger and as a result feared for his or her own safety").
24. Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, 27 Cal.3d 916, 929-930, 167 Cal.Rptr. 831, 837-838, 616 P.2d 313 (1980).
25. Johnson v. Ruark Obstetrics, 327 N.C. 283, 304, 395 S.E.2d 85, 97, reh'g denied, 327 N.C. 644, 399 S.E.2d 133 (1990).
26. Young v. Bank of America National Trust & Savings Ass'n, 141 Cal.App.3d 108, 114, 190 Cal.Rptr. 122, 126 (1970); Clark v. Perry, 114 N.C.App. 297, 442 S.E.2d 57 (1994).
27. See, e.g., Bennett v. City Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 549 P.2d 393 (Okl.App. 1976) (nervousness, headaches, inability to sleep, worry); Boyce v. Greeley Square Hotel, 228 N.Y. 106, 126 N.E. 647 (1920) (difficulty in sleeping and loss of appetite); Beasley v. Ford Motor Co., 237 S.C. 506, 117 S.E.2d 863 (1961) (nausea and nervousness).
28. Towns v. Anderson, 579 P.2d 1163 (1978) ("While psychiatry and psychology may not be exact sciences, they can now provide sufficiently reliable information concerning causation and treatment of psychic injuries, to provide a jury with an intelligent basis for evaluating a particular claim. In this light, we are confident that juries are capable of assessing whether a claim is concocted and fictitious or, in fact, real."). See also Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, 27 Cal.3d 916, 167 Cal.Rptr. 831, 616 P.2d 813 (1980) (rejecting the "artificial and often arbitrary classification scheme" of requiring physical manifestation of mental injuries to support recovery); Wallace v. Coca-Cola Bottling Plants, Inc., 269 A.2d 117 (Me. 1970).
29. Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 702.
30. Oberlander v. Oberlander, 460 N.W.2d 400, 402 (N.D. 1990); Cecil v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, 888 S.W.2d 669 (Ky. 1994).
31. Anderson v. A.P.I. Company of Minnesota, 559 N.W.2d 204 (N.D. 1997); Oberlander v. Oberlander, 460 N.W.2d 400, 402 (N.D. 1990).
32. People v. Morganti, 43 Cal.App.4th 643, 1579G, 50 Cal.Rptr.2d 837 (1996).
33. Bachmeier v. Wallwork Truck Centers, 544 N.W.2d 122 (N.D. 1996).
34. Bruner v. Hager, 547 N.W.2d 551, 554 (N.D. 1996).
35. Mann v. Cracchiolo, 38 Cal.3d 18, 37, 210 Cal.Rptr. 762, 772, 694 P.2d 1134 (1985); Miller v. Silver, 181 Cal.App.3d 652, 660-661, 226 Cal.Rptr. 479, 483-484 (1986).
36. In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings against Hollis W. Thompson, 180 Wis.2d 48, 508 N.W.2d 384 (1993).
37. Witherell v. Weimer, 148 III.App.3d 32, 499 N.E.2d 46, 101 III. Dec. 679 (1986), rev'd on other grounds 118 III.2d 321, 515 N.E.2d 68, 113 III.Dec. 259 (1987); Bartimus v. Paxton Community Hosp., 120 III.App.3d 1060, 458 N.E.2d 1072 (1983); Bremner v. Charles, 123 Or.App. 95, 859 P.2d 1148 (1993).
38. See, e.g., People v. Nelson, 92 I11.App.3d 35, 415 N.E.2d 688, 47 II1.Dec. 683 (1980), cert, denied 454 U.S. 900, 102 S.Ct. 404, 70 L.Ed.2d 217 (1981); State v. Bush, 260 N.W.2d 226 (S.D. 1977).
39. Atkins v. Thapedi, 166 I11.App.3d 471, 519 N.E.2d 1073, 116 I11.Dec. 858 (1988).
40. United States v. Davis, 772 F.2d 1339 (7th Cir. 1985), cert, denied 474 U.S. 1036, 106 S.Ct. 603, 88 L.Ed.2d 581.
41. Anderson v. A.P.I. Company of Minnesota, 559 N.W.2d 204 (N.D. 1997).
42. Calif. Health & Safety Code § 1799.110 (requiring expert medical witness testifying in a malpractice case involving a general acute care hospital emergency department to have had substantial experience in preceding five years to provide emergency medical coverage in such a setting); Sigala v. Goldfarb, 217 Cal.App.3d 658, 266 P.2d 96 (1990); Delaware Title 18 Sec. 6854.
43. Cal. Code of Civil Procedure § 2032(b).
44. Rev. Stats. Mo. § 632.005(18); Rev. Stat. Mo. § 552.020.2, .4.
45. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
46. Id. at 1014.
47. People v. Leahy, 8 Cal.4th 587, 612, 34 Cal.Rptr. 663, 679, 882 P.2d 321 (1994); State v. Copeland, 130 Wash.2d 244, 922 P.2d 1304 (1996).
48. 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993).
49. Federal Rules of Evidence Rule 702 states: If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.
50. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., supra, 509 U.S. at 588, 113 S.Ct. at 2794, 125 L.Ed.2d at 480.
51. Id. at 589, 113 S.Ct. at 2795, 125 L.Ed.2d at 480.
52. See. e.g., People v. Leahy, 8 Cal.4th 587, 34 Cal.Rptr. 663, 882 P.2d 321 (1994); State v. Copeland, 130 Wash.2d 244, 922 P.2d 1304 (1996).
53. See Larry E. Cohen, The Daubert Decision: Gatekeeper or Executioner, 32 TRIAL 52 (Aug. 1996).
54. Gentry v. Mangum, 195 W.Va. 512, 466 S.E.2d 171 (1995).
55. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592-93, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 2796, 125 L.Ed.2d 469, 482 (1993).
56. McCullock v. H.B. Fuller Co., 61 F.3d 1038, 1043 (2d Cir. 1995).
57. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., supra, 509 U.S. at 593-94, 113 S.Ct. at 2796-97, 125 L.Ed.2d at 482- 83.
58. See Daniel R. Fisher, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals: The Supreme Court Gives Federal Judges the Keys to the Gate of Admissibility of Expert Scientific Testimony, 39 S.D. L. REV. 141, 155 (1994).
59. State v. Bible, 175 Ariz. 549, 578, 858 P.2d 1152, 1181 (1993), cert, denied 511 U.S. _, 114 S.Ct. 1578, 128 L.Ed.2d 221 (1994) ("Because neither judge nor jury may be able to separate 'junk science' from good science, Frye helps guarantee 'that reliability will be assessed by those in the best position to do so: members of the relevant scientific field who can dispassionately study and test the new theory' "); State v. Copeland, 130 Wash.2d 244, 922 P.2d 1304 (1996).
60. See, e.g., Peter W. Huber, GALILEO'S REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM (1991); Anthony R. Roisman, 'Junk Law': Defense Attacks on Causation, 27 TRIAL 51 (Sept. 1991).
61. See, e.g., Peter W. Huber, GALILEO'S REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM (1991); Anthony R. Roisman, 'Junk Law': Defense Attacks on Causation, 27 TRIAL 51 (Sept. 1991).
62. See, e.g., United States v. Hall, 93 F.3d 1337 (7th Cir. 1996); David L. Faigman, The Evidentiary Status of Social Science Under Daubert: Is It "Scientific," "Technical," or "Other" Knowledge? 1 PSYCHOL. PUBL. POLICY & LAW 960 (1995); C. Robert Showalter, Distinguishing Science from Pseudo-Science in Psychiatry: Expert Testimony in the Post-Daubert Era, 2 VA. J. Soc. POLICY & LAW 211 (1995).
63. See, e.g., United States v. Hall, 93 F.3d 1337 (7th Cir. 1996); David L. Faigman, The Evidentiary Status of Social Science Under Daubert: Is It "Scientific," "Technical," or "Other" Knowledge? 1 PSYCHOL. PUBL. POLICY & LAW 960 (1995); C. Robert Showalter, Distinguishing Science from Pseudo-Science in Psychiatry: Expert Testimony in the Post-Daubert Era, 2 VA. J. Soc. POLICY & LAW 211 (1995).
64. State v. Copeland, 130 Wash.2d 244, 922 P.2d 1304 (1996); James T. Richardson et al., The Problems of Applying Daubert to Psychological Syndrome Evidence, 79 JUDICATURE 10 (July-Aug. 1995).
65. Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 701; Elliott v. Elliott, 372 So.2d 846 (Ala. 1979); Webb v. Lungstrum, 223 Kan. 487, 575 P.2d 22 (1978).
66. Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 702.
67. Schulz v. Celotex Corp., 942 F.2d 204, 208 (3rd Cir. 1991); Dallas v. Burlington Northern, 212 Mont. 514, 689 P.2d 273, 277 (1984); Shahan v. Hilker, 241 Neb. 482, 488 N.W.2d 577, 580 (1992).
68. Kunnanz v. Edge, 515 N.W.2d 167 (N.D. 1994).
69. Nunez v. Wilson, 211 Kan. 443, 507 P.2d 329, 332 (1973).
70. See, e.g., United States v. Partin, 493 F.2d 750 (5th Cir. 1974); State v. Gevrez, 61 Ariz. 296, 148 P.2d 829 (1944); Dougherty v. Boyken, 261 Iowa 602, 155 N.W.2d 488 (1968); Commonwealth v. Howard, 355 Mass. 526, 246 N.E.2d 419 (1969).
71. Federal Rules of Evidence Rule 703 states: The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to him at or before the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence. See also United States v. Williams, 447 F.2d 1285, 1290 (5th Cir. 1971) (en banc), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 954, 92 S.Ct. 1308, 31 L.Ed.2d 591 (1972).
72. United States v. Partin, 493 F.2d 750 (5th Cir. 1974); Smith v. State, 259 Ind. 187, 285 N.E.2d 275 (1972).
73. Nash v. Cosby, 574 So.2d 700 (Ala. 1990); see also United States v. Williams, 447 F.2d 1285, 1290 (5th Cir. 1971) (en banc), cert, denied 405 U.S. 954 (1972) ("[T]he opinion of expert witnesses must invariably rest, at least in part, upon sources that can never be proven in court. An expert's opinion is derived not only from records and data, but from education and from a lifetime of experience. Thus, when the expert witness has consulted numerous sources, and uses that information, together with his own professional knowledge and experience, to arrive at his opinion, that opinion is regarded as evidence in its own right and not as hearsay in disguise.").
74. Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 703.
75. United States v. Locascio, 6 F.3d 924, 938 (2d Cir. 1993), cert, denied, 511 U.S. _, 114 S.Ct. 1646, 128 L.Ed.2d 365 (1994); Cohen v. Albert Einstein Med. Ctr., 405 Pa.Super. 392, 592 A.2d 720 (1991); Cunningham v. Martin, 170 W.Va. 411, 294 S.E.2d 264 (1982).
76. United States v. Newman, 965 F.2d 206, 210 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied 506 U.S. _, 113 S.Ct. 470, 121 L.Ed.2d 377 (1992) ("[I]s psychology medicine? For purposes of [Rule 803 (4)], it is"); Fleener v. State, 648 N.E.2d 652 (Ind. App. 1995).
77. United States v. Yellow, 18 F.3d 1438, 1442 (8th Cir. 1994); United States v. Farley, 992 F.2d 1122, 1125 (10th Cir. 1993).
78. Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 704; Pape v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 231 Kan. 441, 647 P.2d 320 (1982).
79. Cecil v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, 888 S.W.2d 669 (Ky. 1994).
80. State v. Forrest, 578 A.2d 1066 (Conn. 1990).
81. See generally Annotation, Admissibility of expert testimony as to whether accused had specific intent necessary for conviction, 16 A.L.R.4th 666 (1982).
82. United States v. Dotson, 799 F.2d 189 (5th Cir. [Miss.] 1986); Fleener v. State, 648 N.E.2d 652 (Ind.App. 1995); Commonwealth v. Garcia, 403 Pa.Super. 280, 588 A.2d 951 (1991); Commonwealth v. Davis, 518 Pa. 77, 541 A.2d 315 (1988).
83. Commonwealth v. Seese, 512 Pa. 439, 443-444, 517 A.2d 920, 922 (1986); see also Commonwealth v. Garcia, 403 Pa.Super. 280, 588 A.2d 951 (1991) ("Jurors are human and may be unduly impressed by an expert, his credentials, and ultimately his opinion, 'even though, upon reflection, they would realize that in the particular field under discussion they are as much at home as the expert.' ").
84. Fleener v. State, 648 N.E.2d 652 (Ind.App. 1995) ("[S]o long as the opinion testimony does not 'take the direct form of "I believe the child's story," or "in my opinion the child is telling the truth," ' it is proper under the rule.").
85. Cohen v. Albert Einstein Med. Ctr., 405 Pa.Super. 392, 592 A.2d 720 (1991).
86. United States v. Shay, 57 F.3d 126 (1st Cir. 1995) ("Dr. Phillips would have testified that [defendant] suffered from a recognized mental disorder that caused him to make false statements even though they were inconsistent with his apparent self-interest. Thus, Dr. Phillips was prepared to offer specialized opinion testimony, grounded in his expertise as a psychiatrist, that could have 'explode[d] common myths' about evidence vital to the government's case.").
87. People v. Nelson, 92 III.App.3d 35, 415 N.E.2d 688, 47 III.Dec. 683 (1980), cert, denied 454 U.S. 900, 102 S.Ct. 404, 70 L.Ed.2d 217 (1981).
88. Corley v. Munro, 631 So.2d 708 (La.App. 1994). For examples of examination of a psychiatrist regarding his forensic examination, see Allen P. Wilkinson and Arthur C. Roberts, Insanity Defense, 41 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 2d 615 (1984); Allen P. Wilkinson and Arthur C. Roberts, Defendant's Competency to Stand Trial, 40 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 2d 171 (1984).
89. Corley v. Munro, 631 So.2d 708 (La.App. 1994). For examples of examination of a psychiatrist regarding his forensic examination, see Allen P. Wilkinson and Arthur C. Roberts, Insanity Defense, 41 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 2d 615 (1984); Allen P. Wilkinson and Arthur C. Roberts, Defendant's Competency to Stand Trial, 40 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 2d 171 (1984).
90. Baker v. United States, 226 F.Supp. 129, 132 (S.D. Iowa 1964); Gordon v. Milwaukee County, 370 N.W.2d 803, 807 (Wis.App. 1985).
91. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 81, 84 L.Ed.2d 53, 105 S.Ct. 1087 (1985); Brewer v. Reynolds, 51 F.3d 1519 (10th Cir. 1995); see Harris v. Vasquez, 949 F.2d 1497, 1517 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 910, 112 S.Ct. 1275, 117 L.Ed.2d 501 (1992); Silagy v. Peters, 905 F.2d 986, 1013 (7th Cir. 1990), cert, denied, 498 U.S. 1110, 112 L.Ed.2d 1106, 111 S.Ct. 1024 (1991).
92. See, e.g., State v. Bey, 129 N.J. 557, 610 A.2d 814 (1992), cert. denied 513 U.S. _, 115 S.Ct. 1131, 130 L.Ed.2d 1093 (1995); State v. Ondek, 584 So.2d 282 (La.App. 1991).
93. See generally Allen P. Wilkinson, Chapter XVIIA, "Psychiatric Malpractice," in Louiseil & Williams, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE (Matthew Bender & Co.).
94. State v. Pawlyk, 800 P.2d 338, 341 (Wash. 1990); Stephen A. Saltzburg, Privileges and Professionals: Lawyers and Psychiatrists, 66 VA. L. REV. 597, 635-42 (1980). Compare with State v. Potter, 68 Wash.App. 134, 842 P.2d 481 (1992) (opinion based upon forensic psychiatric examination conducted 14 years after the wrongful act was admissible).
95. Allen P. Wilkinson. Psychiatric malpractice: Failure to diagnose physical illness, 33 TRIAL 36 (May 1997).
96. 536 So.2d 231 (Fla. 1988).
97. In re Estate of Thorpe, 152 Ariz. 341, 732 P.2d 571, 576-77 (App. 1986). Contra, United States v. Lawson, 653 F.2d 299 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1150, 102 S.Ct. 1017, 70 L.Ed.2d 483 (1982); State v. Franklin, 318 S.C. 47, 456 S.E.2d 357, cert. denied, _ U.S. _,116 S.Ct. 160, _ L.Ed.2d (1995).
98. In the Matter of the Estate of Goldberg, 153 Misc.2d 560, 582 N.Y.S.2d 617 (1992).
99. Matter of Tanise B., 119 Misc.2d 30, 462 N.Y.S.2d 537 (1983); see Robert I. Simon, "Three's a crowd": The presence of third parties during the forensic psychiatric examination, 24 J. PSYCHIATRY AND LAW 3 (Spring 1996).
100. Koons v. Koons, 161 Misc.2d 842, 615 N.Y.S.2d 563 (1994); Matter of the Guardianship and Custody of Alexander L., 60 N.Y.2d 329, 457 N.E.2d 731, 469 N.Y.S.2d 626 (1983).
101. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149, 87 S.Ct. 1926 (1967).
102. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 105 S.Ct. 1087, 84 L.Ed.2d 53 (1985) (United States Supreme Court holding that when a defendant demonstrates to the trial judge that his sanity at the time of the offense is to be a significant factor at trial, "the State must, at a minimum, assure the defendant access to a competent psychiatrist who will conduct an appropriate examination and assist in evaluation, preparation, and presentation of the defense"); United States v. Crews, 781 F.2d 826, 833 (10th Cir. 1986) (indigent defendant raising an insanity defense entitled to aid of psychiatrist). See, also Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226, 227, 92 S.Ct. 431, 433, 30 L.Ed.2d 400 (1971) (stating that "the State must, as a matter of equal protection, provide indigent prisoners with the basic tools of an adequate defense or appeal, when those tools are available for a price to other prisoners").
103. See, e.g., Lynch v. Baxley, _ F.Supp. 378, 389 n.5 (N.D. Ala. 1974); Ughetto v. Acrish, 130 A.D.2d 12, 518 N.Y.S.2d 398 (1987), modifying 130 Misc.2d 74, 494 N.Y.S.2d 943 (Sup.Ct. 1985), appeal dismissed 70 N.Y.2d 871, 522 N.Y.S.2d 497 (1987); State ex rel. Hawks v. Lazaro, 202 S.E.2d 109, 126 (W.Va. 1974).
104. Calif. Code of Civil Procedure § 2032(g)(1).
105. Vinson v. Superior Court, 43 Cal.3d 833, 844-847, 239 Cal.Rptr. 292, 300-302, 740 P.2d 404 (1987).
106. Edwards v. Superior Court, 16 Cal.3d 905, 912, 130 Cal.Rptr. 14, 18, 549 P.2d 846 (1976).
107. Calif. Code of Civil Procedure § 2032(g)(2).
108. Brandenberg v. E1 A1 Israel Airlines, 79 F.R.D. 543 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
109. Zabkowicz v. West Bend Co., 585 F.Supp. 635 (E.D.Wis. 1984).
110. Lowe v. Philadelphia Newspapers, 101 F.R.D. 296 (E.D.Pa. 1983).
111. Fleener v. State, 648 N.E.2d 652 (Ind.App. 1995).
112. Nash v. Cosby, 574 So.2d 700 (Ala. 1990); Wolner v. Bogaev, 290 Ark. 299, 718 S.W.2d 942 (1986) ("[O]bviously the requirement of personal knowledge has no application to an expert witness who is, in many instances, testifying to an opinion based entirely on assumed facts.").
113. Coriell v. Industrial Comm'n, 83 I11.2d 105, 110, 413 N.E.2d 1279, 46 I11.Dec. 166 (1980); Leonardi v. Loyola Univ. of Chicago, 168 I11.2d 83, 658 N.E.2d 450, 212 I11.Dec. 968 (1995).
114. Rust v. Hammons, 929 S.W.2d 834 (Mo.App. 1996), quoting Wiley v. Pittsburgh & Midway Coal Min. Co., 729 S.W.2d 228, 233 (Mo.App. 1987).
115. Leonardi v. Loyola Univ. of Chicago, 168 I11.2d 83, 658 N.E.2d 450, 212 I11.Dec. 968 (1995); Coriell v. Industrial Comm'n, 83 I11.2d 105, 110, 413 N.E.2d 1279, 46 I11.Dec. 166 (1980).
116. Nichols v. Oregon Short Line R.R. Co., 25 Utah 240, 247, 70 P. 996, 998 (1902).
117. State v. Cash, 3 Neb.App. 319, 526 N.W.2d 447 (1995); Utah Dept. of Transp. v. 6200 Associates, 872 P.2d 462 (Utah App. 1994), cert, denied 890 P.2d 1034 (Utah 1994); Annotation, Propriety of hypothetical question to expert witness on cross-examination, 71 A.L.R.2d 6 et seq. (1960). Contra, State v. Cash, 3 Neb.App. 319, 526 N.W.2d 447 (1995).
118. People v. Williams, 214 I11.App.3d 499, 574 N.E.2d 62, 158 I11.Dec. 268 (1991); Sparks v. State, 1997 WL 124236 (Tex.App. 1997).
119. Sparks v. State, 1997 WL 124236 (Tex.App. 1997).
120. State v. Bacon, 337 N.C. 66, 446 S.E.2d 542 (1994).
121. Id.
122. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 1110, 39 L.Ed.2d 347, 354 (1974); Trower v. Jones, 121 I11.2d 211, 520 N.E.2d 297 (1988).
123. Elkins v. Syken, 672 So.2d 517 (Fla. 1996), adopting decision of district court of appeals, 644 So.2d 539 (Fla. 1994); Sparks v. State, 1997 WL 124236 (Tex.App. 1997).
124. Leonardi v. Loyola Univ. of Chicago, 168 I11.2d 83, 658 N.E.2d 450, 212 I11.Dec. 968 (1995); Piano v. Davison, 157 I11.App.3d 649, 510 N.E.2d 1066, 110 I11.Dec. 35 (1987), appeal denied 119 I11.2d 574, 522 N.E.2d 1256 (1988).
125. Baerwald v. Flores, 930 P.2d 816 (N.M. 1996).
126. Piotrowski v. Corey Hosp., 172 Ohio St. 61, 69, 173 N.E.2d 355, 360, 15 Ohio.Ops.2d 126, 130 (1961).
127. Stinson v. England, 69 Ohio St.3d 451, 633 N.E.2d 532 (1994); Garmon v. Cincinnati, Inc., 1993 WL 190923 (Tenn. App. 1993) ("Learned treatises can be used to impeach an expert but are not themselves admissible to prove the truth of their contents. No good reason exists to permit hearsay to be taken as true just because it is written in books. [Federal Rules of Evidence Rule] 803 (18) is contra.").
128. Smith v. Hulett, 182 Mich.App. 732, 453 N.W.2d 299 (1990) (trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow plaintiff's attorney to cross-examine defendant's expert witness through the use of statements contained in an allegedly learned treatise, as a proper foundation for the learned treatise had not been laid at trial).
129. Jacober v. St. Peter's Med. Ctr., 128 N.J. 475, 608 A.2d 304 (1992) ("An expert can demonstrate a text's authoritativeness by testifying that professionals in the field regard the text as trustworthy.").
130. Baerwald v. Flores, 930 P.2d 816 (N.M. 1996).
131. Chesterton v. Fisher, 655 So.2d 170 (Fla.App. 1995); Call v. Tirone, 522 So.2d 533, 534 (Fla.App. 1988).
132. In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings against Hollis W. Thompson, 180 Wis.2d 48, 508 N.W.2d 384 (1993).
133. Henry v. State, 574 So.2d 66 (Fla. 1991) (proper in a capital murder case for the state to point out the frequency with which a defense expert testifies for the defendant).
134. Ducharme v. United States, 850 F.2d 27, 31 (1st Cir. 1981).
135. Olinger v. Curry, 926 S.W.2d 832 (Tex.App. 1996); see also Allen v. Superior Court, 151 Cal.App.3d 447, 198 Cal.Rptr. 737 (1984) (in an attempt to obtain business and financial records to show extent of medical expert witness's practice for defense and insurance companies, evidence was submitted that the doctor had testified for the defense in 70 cases in the preceding five years).
136. State v. Bacon, 337 N.C. 66, 446 S.E.2d 542 (1994).
137. 31A Am.Jur.2d § 96 "Expert and Opinion Evidence."
138. Flores v. Cyborski, 257 I11.App.3d 119, 629 N.E.2d 74, 195 I11.Dec. 766 (1993) (medical expert was brother of attorney employed by law firm).
139. Sears v. Rutishauser, 102 I11.2d 402, 466 N.E.2d 210 (1984).
140. Walker v. Paker, 827 S.W.2d 833 (Tex. 1992).
141. State v. Bacon, 337 N.C. 66, 446 S.E.2d 542 (1994) ("[T]he State showed through the cross-examination of Dr. Royal that he lacked a board certification as a forensic psychiatrist, which could have caused the jury to question his credibility.").
142. Annotation, Propriety of questioning expert witness regarding specific incidents or allegations of expert's unprofessional conduct or professional negligence, 11 A.L.R.5th 1; see also Nastasi v. United Mine Workers of America Union Hosp., 209 I11.App.3d 830, 567 N.E.2d 1358, 153 I11.Dec. 900 (1991) (noting that the trial court should issue an in limine order preventing attorney from cross-examining medical expert as to whether he had ever been sued for malpractice and sums paid on his behalf to settle such claims, rather than waiting for the attorney to ask the question, striking it, then instructing the jury to disregard the question); Sparks v. State, 1997 WL 124236 (Tex.App. 1997); Thomas v. State, 897 S.W.2d 539, 542 (Tex.App. 1995).
143. State v. Fierer, 260 I11.App.3d 136, 631 N.E.2d 1214, 197 I11.Dec. 755 (1994).
144. People v. Price, 1 Cal.4th 324, 457, 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 106, 184, 821 P.2d 610 (1991).
145. Id. at 324, 457, 3 Cal.Rptr.2d at 106, 184, 821 P.2d 610 (1991); Cal. Evidence Code § 722(b) ("The compensation and expenses paid or to be paid to an expert witness by a party calling him is a proper subject of inquiry by any adverse party as relevant to the credibility of the witness and the weight of his testimony.").
146. State ex rel. Lichtor v. Clark, 845 S.W.2d 55 (Mo.App. 1992) ("It has been noted by various commentators and courts that the 'venality of some experts' has become a matter of 'deep concern.' A 'venal' expert is an expert whose opinions are available to the highest bidder - a mercenary. A mercenary with professional qualifications is likely to be a greater hindrance to a fair trial than a biased lay witness.").
147. Washington v. Yen, 213 I11.App.3d 797, 576 N.E.2d 61 (1991); Sears v. Rutishauser, 102 I11.2d 402, 466 N.E.2d 210 (1988).
148. Stinson v. England, 69 Ohio St.3d 451, 633 N.E.2d 532 (1994).
149. See, e.g., Matter of Arkansas Bar Ass'n (1985), 287 Ark. 495, 562, 702 S.W.2d 326, 371; Rules Regulating the Florida Bar, 494 So.2d 977, 1061 (Fla. 1986); MC:600.2169(4); New Jersey Stat. Ann. § 45:9-27.8 (expressly prohibiting contingent fee arrangements by physicians where the medical services to the client form any part of a legal claim for damages); Blair v. Washington State Univ., 108 Wash.2d 558, 740 P.2d 1379, 1387-88 (1987).
150. Mich. Stat. Ann. § 27A.2169(4) (misdemeanor for expert witness to testify on a contingent fee basis in an action involving medical malpractice).
151. AM. MED. ASSN. CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS, COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS 1996-1997 Edition, § 9.07. See also American Academy of Psychiatry & the Law, ETHICAL GUIDELINES FOR THE PRACTICE OF FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY (rev'd 1995), which states: "Contingency fees, because of the problems that these create in regard to honesty and efforts to obtain objectivity, should not be accepted."
152. AM. MED. ASSN. CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS, COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS 1996-1997 Edition, § 9.07. See also American Academy of Psychiatry & the Law, ETHICAL GUIDELINES FOR THE PRACTICE OF FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY (rev'd 1995), which states: "Contingency fees, because of the problems that these create in regard to honesty and efforts to obtain objectivity, should not be accepted."
153. Mich. Rules of Prof. Conduct, Rule 5.4; Dupree v. Malpractice Research, Inc., 179 Mich.App. 254, 445 N.W.2d 498 (1989); N.J. Rules of Prof. Conduct § 5.4; Polo By Shipley v. Gotchel, 225 N.J.Super. 429, 542 A.2d 947 (1987). See Merrell v. Stuart, 220 N.C. 326, 333, 17 S.E.2d 458, 463 (1941) (agreement with non-lawyer to investigate and produce evidence in exchange for percentage of the recovery held to be champertous and void as against public policy).
154. Dupree v. Malpractice Research, Inc., 179 Mich.App. 254, 445 N.W.2d 498 (1989).
155. Sherman v. Burton, 165 Mich. 293, 296-297, 130 N.W. 667, 668 (1911).
156. Wirth v. State Board of Tax Commissioners, 613 N.E.2d 874, 877 (Ind.Tax. 1993) ("The payment of a sum of money to a witness to 'tell the truth' is as clearly subversive of the proper administration of justice as to pay him to testify to what is not true.").
157. See Webb v. Hyman, 861 F.Supp. 1094 (D.D.C. 1994).
158. Wirth v. State Board of Tax Commissioners, supra, 613 N.E.2d at 877.
159. Blair v. Washington State Univ., 108 Wash.2d 558, 740 P.2d 1379 (1987).
160. Seigal v. Merrick, 619 F.2d 160 (2d Cir. 1980).
161. Dupree v. Malpractice Research, Inc., 179 Mich.App. 254, 445 N.W.2d 498 (1989); Polo By Shipley v. Gotchel, 225 N.J.Super. 429, 542 A.2d 947 (1987). Contra, Ojeda v. Sharp Cabrillo Hospital, 8 Cal.App.4th 1, 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 230 (1992) (contingent fee agreement with medical-legal service that located expert medical witnesses did not violate California public policy; however, combination of attorney's contingency fee and medical-legal service's contingency fee could not exceed statutory limitations on amount of contingency fee permissible in medical malpractice action); Schackow v. Medical-Legal Consulting Service, Inc., 46 Md.App. 179, 416 A.2d 1303 (1980) (upholding the validity of a medical-legal service's contingency fee agreement for locating expert medical witnesses, the court found that the medical-legal service "purported only to contact medical experts and that no attempt or guarantee was made to 'deliver' expert testimony in exchange for a contingent fee."). See generally Devlin, Medical-Legal Consulting Services and Expert Witnesses: Payment Controversies, 9 MED. PRACTICE MGMT. 141 (Nov./Dec. 1993); Dillon, Contingent Fees and Medical-Legal Consulting Services: Economical or Unethical? 11 J. LEGAL MED. 93 (1990).
162. Dupree v. Malpractice Research, Inc., 179 Mich.App. 254, 445 N.W.2d 498 (1989); Polo By Shipley v. Gotchel, 225 N.J.Super. 429, 542 A.2d 947 (1987). Contra, Ojeda v. Sharp Cabrillo Hospital, 8 Cal.App.4th 1, 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 230 (1992) (contingent fee agreement with medical-legal service that located expert medical witnesses did not violate California public policy; however, combination of attorney's contingency fee and medical-legal service's contingency fee could not exceed statutory limitations on amount of contingency fee permissible in medical malpractice action); Schackow v. Medical-Legal Consulting Service, Inc., 46 Md.App. 179, 416 A.2d 1303 (1980) (upholding the validity of a medical-legal service's contingency fee agreement for locating expert medical witnesses, the court found that the medical-legal service "purported only to contact medical experts and that no attempt or guarantee was made to 'deliver' expert testimony in exchange for a contingent fee."). See generally Devlin, Medical-Legal Consulting Services and Expert Witnesses: Payment Controversies, 9 MED. PRACTICE MGMT. 141 (Nov./Dec. 1993); Dillon, Contingent Fees and Medical-Legal Consulting Services: Economical or Unethical? 11 J. LEGAL MED. 93 (1990).
163. Elkins v. Syken, 672 So.2d 517 (Fla. 1996); Jones v. Bordman, 243 Kan. 444, 759 P.2d 953 (Kan. 1988); Russell v. Young, 452 S.W.2d 434 (Tex. 1970); Olinger v. Curry, 926 S.W,2d 832 (Tex.App. 1996). But see Walker v. Paker, 827 S.W.2d 833 (Tex. 1992) (rejecting "mechanical approach" of Russell v. Young in preventing wholesale discovery of the private records of a non-party witness where the sole purpose for discovery is to impeach the credibility of the non-party).
164. Elkins v. Syken, 672 So.2d 517 (Fla. 1996).
165. Allen v. Superior Court, 151 Cal.App.3d 447, 453, 198 Cal.Rptr. 737, 741 (1984).
166. Mohn v. Hahnemann Medical College & Hosp., 357 Pa.Super. 173, 515 A.2d 920, 924 (1986) (citation omitted), appeal discont'd 527 A.2d 542 (Pa. 1987).