Bargaining, risk and franchising coordination

Computers and Operations Research

Volumn 24, Issue 1, 1997, Pages 73-83

  Huang, Zhimin ^a  

^a ADELPHI UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COMPENSATION (PERSONNEL); ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL EFFECTS; GAME THEORY; MANUFACTURE; MATHEMATICAL MODELS; NUMERICAL ANALYSIS; RISK ASSESSMENT;

BARGAINING; COMPENSATION SCHEMES; FIXED LUMP SUM; FRANCHISEE RISK AVERSION PLAY; FRANCHISING CHANNEL;

OPERATIONS RESEARCH;

EID: 0030735838     PISSN: 03050548     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0305-0548(96)00024-X     Document Type: Article

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