The predicament of Russian liberalism: Evidence from the December 1995 parliamentary elections

Europe - Asia Studies

Volumn 49, Issue 2, 1997, Pages 191-220

  Fish, M Steven ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

DOMESTIC POLITICS; ELECTION (1995); ELECTORAL FAILURE; ELECTORAL GEOGRAPHY; GEOPOLITICAL STUDY; LIBERALISM;

RUSSIAN FEDERATION;

EID: 0030726246     PISSN: 09668136     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/09668139708412436     Document Type: Article

References (111)

1. Classifying Russia's political parties always represents something of a challenge. The parties here labelled 'liberal' are in Russia often dubbed 'democratic'. The author regards the former label as more precise and useful in the current Russian setting. The other categories used here to describe political camps or groups of parties are communist, nationalist and centrist. Communists are those that identify strongly with the previous regime and that emerged from the structures of the CPSU. Nationalists are those that assign greatest importance to ethnic-communal demands, great power status, and/or territorial expansion. Centrist parties are those that possess goals and agendas that are too eclectic, inconsistent or 'moderate' to place them in one of the other three camps. In Table 1, several minor groups that represented highly circumscribed special interests or that did not advance any identifiable, purposive programmes are classified as parties of 'unclear' orientation. While there is often some difference in the way tendencies are labelled (for example, the use of 'democratic' instead of 'liberal' or 'national-patriotic' instead of 'nationalist'), there is rough consensus in Russian and Western scholarship over the division of political forces into camps along the lines followed in this essay.
2. For analyses contrasting Russia's communists with those in Central and Eastern Europe, see 'Pobeda byvshego kommunista Kvas'nevskogo ne ostanovit stroitel'stva kapitalizma v Pol'she'; 'Levye v Vostochnoi Evrope prodolzhayut pravoe delo reform'; and 'Strannosti nostal'gii', Izvestiya, 21 November 1995. See also Zoltan Barany. 'The Return of the Left in East-Central Europe'. Problems of Post-Communism. January-February 1995, pp. 41-45; Alison Mahr & John Nagle, 'Resurrection of the Successor Parties and Democratization in East-Central Europe', Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 28, 4, 1995. pp. 393-409; Valerie Bunce, The Return of the Left and the Future of Democracy in Centra] and Eastern Europe' (paper prepared for presentation at the Tenth Annual Meeting of the Council for European Studies, March 1996).
3. For analyses contrasting Russia's communists with those in Central and Eastern Europe, see 'Pobeda byvshego kommunista Kvas'nevskogo ne ostanovit stroitel'stva kapitalizma v Pol'she'; 'Levye v Vostochnoi Evrope prodolzhayut pravoe delo reform'; and 'Strannosti nostal'gii', Izvestiya, 21 November 1995. See also Zoltan Barany. 'The Return of the Left in East-Central Europe'. Problems of Post-Communism. January-February 1995, pp. 41-45; Alison Mahr & John Nagle, 'Resurrection of the Successor Parties and Democratization in East-Central Europe', Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 28, 4, 1995. pp. 393-409; Valerie Bunce, The Return of the Left and the Future of Democracy in Centra] and Eastern Europe' (paper prepared for presentation at the Tenth Annual Meeting of the Council for European Studies, March 1996).
4. For analyses contrasting Russia's communists with those in Central and Eastern Europe, see 'Pobeda byvshego kommunista Kvas'nevskogo ne ostanovit stroitel'stva kapitalizma v Pol'she'; 'Levye v Vostochnoi Evrope prodolzhayut pravoe delo reform'; and 'Strannosti nostal'gii', Izvestiya, 21 November 1995. See also Zoltan Barany. 'The Return of the Left in East-Central Europe'. Problems of Post-Communism. January-February 1995, pp. 41-45; Alison Mahr & John Nagle, 'Resurrection of the Successor Parties and Democratization in East-Central Europe', Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 28, 4, 1995. pp. 393-409; Valerie Bunce, The Return of the Left and the Future of Democracy in Centra] and Eastern Europe' (paper prepared for presentation at the Tenth Annual Meeting of the Council for European Studies, March 1996).
5. For analyses contrasting Russia's communists with those in Central and Eastern Europe, see 'Pobeda byvshego kommunista Kvas'nevskogo ne ostanovit stroitel'stva kapitalizma v Pol'she'; 'Levye v Vostochnoi Evrope prodolzhayut pravoe delo reform'; and 'Strannosti nostal'gii', Izvestiya, 21 November 1995. See also Zoltan Barany. 'The Return of the Left in East-Central Europe'. Problems of Post-Communism. January-February 1995, pp. 41-45; Alison Mahr & John Nagle, 'Resurrection of the Successor Parties and Democratization in East-Central Europe', Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 28, 4, 1995. pp. 393-409; Valerie Bunce, The Return of the Left and the Future of Democracy in Centra] and Eastern Europe' (paper prepared for presentation at the Tenth Annual Meeting of the Council for European Studies, March 1996).
6. Basic information on parties is drawn from many sources, including various issues of OMRI Daily Digests: 'Vybory i obshchestvennoe soglasie', Moskovkie novosii, 19-26 November 1995; ' "Obshchee delo" namereno dobivat'sya "dialog s vlast'yu" ', Segodnya, 28 November 1995; 'Chego khotyat partii', Kapital (The Moscow Times), 29 November 1995; 'Za kogo golosovat' ', Argumenty i Fakty, 49 (790), December 1995; Michael McFaul & Nikolai Petrov (eds), Previewing Russia's 1995 Parliamentary Elections (Moscow, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1995); M. Steven Fish, 'The Advent of Multipartism in Russia, 1993-95', Post-Soviet Affairs, 4, 11, October-December 1995, pp. 348-353.
7. Basic information on parties is drawn from many sources, including various issues of OMRI Daily Digests: 'Vybory i obshchestvennoe soglasie', Moskovkie novosii, 19-26 November 1995; ' "Obshchee delo" namereno dobivat'sya "dialog s vlast'yu" ', Segodnya, 28 November 1995; 'Chego khotyat partii', Kapital (The Moscow Times), 29 November 1995; 'Za kogo golosovat' ', Argumenty i Fakty, 49 (790), December 1995; Michael McFaul & Nikolai Petrov (eds), Previewing Russia's 1995 Parliamentary Elections (Moscow, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1995); M. Steven Fish, 'The Advent of Multipartism in Russia, 1993-95', Post-Soviet Affairs, 4, 11, October-December 1995, pp. 348-353.
8. Basic information on parties is drawn from many sources, including various issues of OMRI Daily Digests: 'Vybory i obshchestvennoe soglasie', Moskovkie novosii, 19-26 November 1995; ' "Obshchee delo" namereno dobivat'sya "dialog s vlast'yu" ', Segodnya, 28 November 1995; 'Chego khotyat partii', Kapital (The Moscow Times), 29 November 1995; 'Za kogo golosovat' ', Argumenty i Fakty, 49 (790), December 1995; Michael McFaul & Nikolai Petrov (eds), Previewing Russia's 1995 Parliamentary Elections (Moscow, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1995); M. Steven Fish, 'The Advent of Multipartism in Russia, 1993-95', Post-Soviet Affairs, 4, 11, October-December 1995, pp. 348-353.
9. Basic information on parties is drawn from many sources, including various issues of OMRI Daily Digests: 'Vybory i obshchestvennoe soglasie', Moskovkie novosii, 19-26 November 1995; ' "Obshchee delo" namereno dobivat'sya "dialog s vlast'yu" ', Segodnya, 28 November 1995; 'Chego khotyat partii', Kapital (The Moscow Times), 29 November 1995; 'Za kogo golosovat' ', Argumenty i Fakty, 49 (790), December 1995; Michael McFaul & Nikolai Petrov (eds), Previewing Russia's 1995 Parliamentary Elections (Moscow, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1995); M. Steven Fish, 'The Advent of Multipartism in Russia, 1993-95', Post-Soviet Affairs, 4, 11, October-December 1995, pp. 348-353.
10. Basic information on parties is drawn from many sources, including various issues of OMRI Daily Digests: 'Vybory i obshchestvennoe soglasie', Moskovkie novosii, 19-26 November 1995; ' "Obshchee delo" namereno dobivat'sya "dialog s vlast'yu" ', Segodnya, 28 November 1995; 'Chego khotyat partii', Kapital (The Moscow Times), 29 November 1995; 'Za kogo golosovat' ', Argumenty i Fakty, 49 (790), December 1995; Michael McFaul & Nikolai Petrov (eds), Previewing Russia's 1995 Parliamentary Elections (Moscow, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1995); M. Steven Fish, 'The Advent of Multipartism in Russia, 1993-95', Post-Soviet Affairs, 4, 11, October-December 1995, pp. 348-353.
11. Basic information on parties is drawn from many sources, including various issues of OMRI Daily Digests: 'Vybory i obshchestvennoe soglasie', Moskovkie novosii, 19-26 November 1995; ' "Obshchee delo" namereno dobivat'sya "dialog s vlast'yu" ', Segodnya, 28 November 1995; 'Chego khotyat partii', Kapital (The Moscow Times), 29 November 1995; 'Za kogo golosovat' ', Argumenty i Fakty, 49 (790), December 1995; Michael McFaul & Nikolai Petrov (eds), Previewing Russia's 1995 Parliamentary Elections (Moscow, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1995); M. Steven Fish, 'The Advent of Multipartism in Russia, 1993-95', Post-Soviet Affairs, 4, 11, October-December 1995, pp. 348-353.
12. Interestingly, and in contradistinction to the expectations of many observers, the Chechen war, as salient as it might have been in the minds of many Russians, played little role in the election campaign. Most parties had an official stand on the war written into their programmes, but none of the major parties focused on the issue in their campaigns. See Laura Belin, 'Theme of Chechen War Practically Absent in Party Campaigns', OMRI Special Report, 5 December 1995.
13. See Michael McFaul, 'Eurasia Letter: Russian Politics after Chechnya', Foreign Policy, 99, Summer 1995, pp. 152-154.
14. See McFaul & Petrov, pp. 39-44; Fish, p. 352. For press accounts that help to illuminate the considerable differences between NDR and the DVR, see 'Grachev's Call Irks Deputies', Moscow Times, 23 November 1995; 'Esli dorog tebe...Zyuganov', Moskovskii Komsomolets, 3 December 1995; 'Demokraty zadumalis' o natsional'nom voprose', Nezavisimaya gazeta, 8 December 1995.
15. See McFaul & Petrov, pp. 39-44; Fish, p. 352. For press accounts that help to illuminate the considerable differences between NDR and the DVR, see 'Grachev's Call Irks Deputies', Moscow Times, 23 November 1995; 'Esli dorog tebe...Zyuganov', Moskovskii Komsomolets, 3 December 1995; 'Demokraty zadumalis' o natsional'nom voprose', Nezavisimaya gazeta, 8 December 1995.
16. See McFaul & Petrov, pp. 39-44; Fish, p. 352. For press accounts that help to illuminate the considerable differences between NDR and the DVR, see 'Grachev's Call Irks Deputies', Moscow Times, 23 November 1995; 'Esli dorog tebe...Zyuganov', Moskovskii Komsomolets, 3 December 1995; 'Demokraty zadumalis' o natsional'nom voprose', Nezavisimaya gazeta, 8 December 1995.
17. Such a view often springs from notions of Russian historical exceptionalism, which themselves have deep roots in Western scholarship and are currently widely embraced by Russian intellectuals. See the remarks by Sergei Kurginyan and Vladimir Menshov in Mikhail Gorbachev et al., 'Retrospectives at the Gorbachev Foundation', Demokratizatsiya, 4, 1, Winter 1996, pp. 17-19, 26; V. B. Pastukhov, 'Rossiiskoe demokraticheskoe dvizhenie: put' k vlasti', Polis, 1992, 1-2, pp. 8-16; V. B. Pastukhov, 'Budushchee Rossii vyrastaet iz proshlogo', Polis, 1992, 5-6, pp. 59-75; Shlomo Avineri, 'Setting Sun', New Republic, 20 March 1995, p. 13.
18. Such a view often springs from notions of Russian historical exceptionalism, which themselves have deep roots in Western scholarship and are currently widely embraced by Russian intellectuals. See the remarks by Sergei Kurginyan and Vladimir Menshov in Mikhail Gorbachev et al., 'Retrospectives at the Gorbachev Foundation', Demokratizatsiya, 4, 1, Winter 1996, pp. 17-19, 26; V. B. Pastukhov, 'Rossiiskoe demokraticheskoe dvizhenie: put' k vlasti', Polis, 1992, 1-2, pp. 8-16; V. B. Pastukhov, 'Budushchee Rossii vyrastaet iz proshlogo', Polis, 1992, 5-6, pp. 59-75; Shlomo Avineri, 'Setting Sun', New Republic, 20 March 1995, p. 13.
19. Such a view often springs from notions of Russian historical exceptionalism, which themselves have deep roots in Western scholarship and are currently widely embraced by Russian intellectuals. See the remarks by Sergei Kurginyan and Vladimir Menshov in Mikhail Gorbachev et al., 'Retrospectives at the Gorbachev Foundation', Demokratizatsiya, 4, 1, Winter 1996, pp. 17-19, 26; V. B. Pastukhov, 'Rossiiskoe demokraticheskoe dvizhenie: put' k vlasti', Polis, 1992, 1-2, pp. 8-16; V. B. Pastukhov, 'Budushchee Rossii vyrastaet iz proshlogo', Polis, 1992, 5-6, pp. 59-75; Shlomo Avineri, 'Setting Sun', New Republic, 20 March 1995, p. 13.
20. Such a view often springs from notions of Russian historical exceptionalism, which themselves have deep roots in Western scholarship and are currently widely embraced by Russian intellectuals. See the remarks by Sergei Kurginyan and Vladimir Menshov in Mikhail Gorbachev et al., 'Retrospectives at the Gorbachev Foundation', Demokratizatsiya, 4, 1, Winter 1996, pp. 17-19, 26; V. B. Pastukhov, 'Rossiiskoe demokraticheskoe dvizhenie: put' k vlasti', Polis, 1992, 1-2, pp. 8-16; V. B. Pastukhov, 'Budushchee Rossii vyrastaet iz proshlogo', Polis, 1992, 5-6, pp. 59-75; Shlomo Avineri, 'Setting Sun', New Republic, 20 March 1995, p. 13.
21. M. Steven Fish, Democracy from Scratch: Opposition and Regime in the New Russian Revolution (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1995), pp. 18-20, 84-86, 125-130, 170-172, 201-205, 215-218; Ken Jowitt, 'Undemocratic Past, Unnamed Present, Undecided Future', Demokratizatsiya 4, 3, Summer 1996, pp. 411-412.
22. M. Steven Fish, Democracy from Scratch: Opposition and Regime in the New Russian Revolution (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1995), pp. 18-20, 84-86, 125-130, 170-172, 201-205, 215-218; Ken Jowitt, 'Undemocratic Past, Unnamed Present, Undecided Future', Demokratizatsiya 4, 3, Summer 1996, pp. 411-412.
23. For good analyses of the 1993 elections, see Michael Urban, 'December 1993 as a Replication of Late-Soviet Electoral Practices', Post-Soviet Affairs, 10, 2, April-June 1994, pp. 127-158; Richard Sakwa, 'The Russian Elections of December 1993', Europe-Asia Studies, 47, 2, 1995, pp. 195-227; Matthew Wyman. Bill Miller, Stephen White & Paul Heywood, 'The Russian Elections of December 1993', Electoral Studies, 13, 3, September 1994, pp. 254-271; Timothy J. Colton & Jerry F. Hough (eds), The 1993 Russian Campaign and Election (Washington, DC, Brookings, forthcoming).
24. For good analyses of the 1993 elections, see Michael Urban, 'December 1993 as a Replication of Late-Soviet Electoral Practices', Post-Soviet Affairs, 10, 2, April-June 1994, pp. 127-158; Richard Sakwa, 'The Russian Elections of December 1993', Europe-Asia Studies, 47, 2, 1995, pp. 195-227; Matthew Wyman. Bill Miller, Stephen White & Paul Heywood, 'The Russian Elections of December 1993', Electoral Studies, 13, 3, September 1994, pp. 254-271; Timothy J. Colton & Jerry F. Hough (eds), The 1993 Russian Campaign and Election (Washington, DC, Brookings, forthcoming).
25. For good analyses of the 1993 elections, see Michael Urban, 'December 1993 as a Replication of Late-Soviet Electoral Practices', Post-Soviet Affairs, 10, 2, April-June 1994, pp. 127-158; Richard Sakwa, 'The Russian Elections of December 1993', Europe-Asia Studies, 47, 2, 1995, pp. 195-227; Matthew Wyman. Bill Miller, Stephen White & Paul Heywood, 'The Russian Elections of December 1993', Electoral Studies, 13, 3, September 1994, pp. 254-271; Timothy J. Colton & Jerry F. Hough (eds), The 1993 Russian Campaign and Election (Washington, DC, Brookings, forthcoming).
26. For good analyses of the 1993 elections, see Michael Urban, 'December 1993 as a Replication of Late-Soviet Electoral Practices', Post-Soviet Affairs, 10, 2, April-June 1994, pp. 127-158; Richard Sakwa, 'The Russian Elections of December 1993', Europe-Asia Studies, 47, 2, 1995, pp. 195-227; Matthew Wyman. Bill Miller, Stephen White & Paul Heywood, 'The Russian Elections of December 1993', Electoral Studies, 13, 3, September 1994, pp. 254-271; Timothy J. Colton & Jerry F. Hough (eds), The 1993 Russian Campaign and Election (Washington, DC, Brookings, forthcoming).
27. There exists a rich and rapidly growing literature on public attitudes and opinion in Russia and other post-socialist countries. See, for example, Stephen Whitefield & Geoffrey Evans, 'The Russian Election of 1993: Public Opinion and the Transition Experience', Post-Soviet Affairs, 10, 1, January-March 1994, pp. 38-60; Jerry Hough, 'The Russian Election of 1993: Public Attitudes Toward Economic Reform and Democratization', Post-Soviet Affairs, 10, 1, January-March 1994, pp. 1-37; James L. Gibson, 'The Resilience of Mass Support for Democratic Institutions and Processes in the Nascent Russian and Ukrainian Democracies', and Jeffrey W. Hahn, 'Changes in Contemporary Russian Political Culture', both in Vladimir Tismaneanu (ed.), Political Culture and Civil Society in Russia and the New States of Eurasia (Armonk, NY, M. E. Sharpe, 1995), pp. 53-111 and 112-136, respectively; Donna Bahry, 'Society Transformed? Rethinking the Social Roots of Perestroika', Slavic Review, 52, 3, Fall 1993, pp. 512-554. The present article is not based on public opinion surveys and does not enter the survey-based empirical debate over the breadth and depth of popular support in Russia for liberalism, democracy, socialism or other values or systems. The point offered here with regard to public preferences is simply that the results of a particular election (in this case the parliamentary election of 1995), given the volatility of electoral behaviour during the past half-decade, cannot be attributed to a firm mass commitment to anti-liberal values. The articles cited above do not deal with the 1995 election, but their conclusions are not incompatible with the argument made in the present article.
28. There exists a rich and rapidly growing literature on public attitudes and opinion in Russia and other post-socialist countries. See, for example, Stephen Whitefield & Geoffrey Evans, 'The Russian Election of 1993: Public Opinion and the Transition Experience', Post-Soviet Affairs, 10, 1, January-March 1994, pp. 38-60; Jerry Hough, 'The Russian Election of 1993: Public Attitudes Toward Economic Reform and Democratization', Post-Soviet Affairs, 10, 1, January-March 1994, pp. 1-37; James L. Gibson, 'The Resilience of Mass Support for Democratic Institutions and Processes in the Nascent Russian and Ukrainian Democracies', and Jeffrey W. Hahn, 'Changes in Contemporary Russian Political Culture', both in Vladimir Tismaneanu (ed.), Political Culture and Civil Society in Russia and the New States of Eurasia (Armonk, NY, M. E. Sharpe, 1995), pp. 53-111 and 112-136, respectively; Donna Bahry, 'Society Transformed? Rethinking the Social Roots of Perestroika', Slavic Review, 52, 3, Fall 1993, pp. 512-554. The present article is not based on public opinion surveys and does not enter the survey-based empirical debate over the breadth and depth of popular support in Russia for liberalism, democracy, socialism or other values or systems. The point offered here with regard to public preferences is simply that the results of a particular election (in this case the parliamentary election of 1995), given the volatility of electoral behaviour during the past half-decade, cannot be attributed to a firm mass commitment to anti-liberal values. The articles cited above do not deal with the 1995 election, but their conclusions are not incompatible with the argument made in the present article.
29. There exists a rich and rapidly growing literature on public attitudes and opinion in Russia and other post-socialist countries. See, for example, Stephen Whitefield & Geoffrey Evans, 'The Russian Election of 1993: Public Opinion and the Transition Experience', Post-Soviet Affairs, 10, 1, January-March 1994, pp. 38-60; Jerry Hough, 'The Russian Election of 1993: Public Attitudes Toward Economic Reform and Democratization', Post-Soviet Affairs, 10, 1, January-March 1994, pp. 1-37; James L. Gibson, 'The Resilience of Mass Support for Democratic Institutions and Processes in the Nascent Russian and Ukrainian Democracies', and Jeffrey W. Hahn, 'Changes in Contemporary Russian Political Culture', both in Vladimir Tismaneanu (ed.), Political Culture and Civil Society in Russia and the New States of Eurasia (Armonk, NY, M. E. Sharpe, 1995), pp. 53-111 and 112-136, respectively; Donna Bahry, 'Society Transformed? Rethinking the Social Roots of Perestroika', Slavic Review, 52, 3, Fall 1993, pp. 512-554. The present article is not based on public opinion surveys and does not enter the survey-based empirical debate over the breadth and depth of popular support in Russia for liberalism, democracy, socialism or other values or systems. The point offered here with regard to public preferences is simply that the results of a particular election (in this case the parliamentary election of 1995), given the volatility of electoral behaviour during the past half-decade, cannot be attributed to a firm mass commitment to anti-liberal values. The articles cited above do not deal with the 1995 election, but their conclusions are not incompatible with the argument made in the present article.
30. There exists a rich and rapidly growing literature on public attitudes and opinion in Russia and other post-socialist countries. See, for example, Stephen Whitefield & Geoffrey Evans, 'The Russian Election of 1993: Public Opinion and the Transition Experience', Post-Soviet Affairs, 10, 1, January-March 1994, pp. 38-60; Jerry Hough, 'The Russian Election of 1993: Public Attitudes Toward Economic Reform and Democratization', Post-Soviet Affairs, 10, 1, January-March 1994, pp. 1-37; James L. Gibson, 'The Resilience of Mass Support for Democratic Institutions and Processes in the Nascent Russian and Ukrainian Democracies', and Jeffrey W. Hahn, 'Changes in Contemporary Russian Political Culture', both in Vladimir Tismaneanu (ed.), Political Culture and Civil Society in Russia and the New States of Eurasia (Armonk, NY, M. E. Sharpe, 1995), pp. 53-111 and 112-136, respectively; Donna Bahry, 'Society Transformed? Rethinking the Social Roots of Perestroika', Slavic Review, 52, 3, Fall 1993, pp. 512-554. The present article is not based on public opinion surveys and does not enter the survey-based empirical debate over the breadth and depth of popular support in Russia for liberalism, democracy, socialism or other values or systems. The point offered here with regard to public preferences is simply that the results of a particular election (in this case the parliamentary election of 1995), given the volatility of electoral behaviour during the past half-decade, cannot be attributed to a firm mass commitment to anti-liberal values. The articles cited above do not deal with the 1995 election, but their conclusions are not incompatible with the argument made in the present article.
31. In terms of the allocation of seats, the 5% threshold did greatly advantage the four parties that cleared the barrier and created a substantial deviation from proportionality, with each of the four successful parties receiving roughly twice the percentage of seats that it received as a percentage of the vote (Yabloko enjoyed a slight advantage, gaining 2.03 times more, while the KPRF, LDPR and NDR each gained 1.97 times more). The overall deviation from proportionality, using the Gallagher least-squares index, totalled 20.9-in relative terms, a very high figure. For the equation used here to compute the deviation from proportionality and tables showing indices of disproportionality in other countries, see Arend Lijphart, Electoral Systems and Party Systems: A Study of Twenty-Seven Democracies, 1945-90 (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. 61, 160-162. The rules did not, however, greatly advantage or disadvantage any one camp, though the communists did reap modest advantages and the liberals and the centrists mild disadvantages in the allocation of seats. Calculating the advantage ratio, defined as percentage of seats divided by percentage of votes for each party (with 1.0 representing perfect proportionality), shows that the liberal and centrist parties were slightly disadvantaged (0.84 and 0.82 respectively). The nationalists received no significant advantage or disadvantage (1.01), while the communists were the beneficiaries of liberal and centrist disadvantage, receiving a percentage of seats 1.44 times their percentage of votes. The result represents a modest change from the 1993 elections, when the analogous figures were 1.02 for the liberals; 0.85 for the centrists; 1.15 for the nationalists; and 1.16 for the communists. On proportionality and advantage ratio, see Rein Taagepera & Matthew Soberg Shugart, Seats and Votes (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1989), p. 68.
32. In terms of the allocation of seats, the 5% threshold did greatly advantage the four parties that cleared the barrier and created a substantial deviation from proportionality, with each of the four successful parties receiving roughly twice the percentage of seats that it received as a percentage of the vote (Yabloko enjoyed a slight advantage, gaining 2.03 times more, while the KPRF, LDPR and NDR each gained 1.97 times more). The overall deviation from proportionality, using the Gallagher least-squares index, totalled 20.9-in relative terms, a very high figure. For the equation used here to compute the deviation from proportionality and tables showing indices of disproportionality in other countries, see Arend Lijphart, Electoral Systems and Party Systems: A Study of Twenty-Seven Democracies, 1945-90 (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. 61, 160-162. The rules did not, however, greatly advantage or disadvantage any one camp, though the communists did reap modest advantages and the liberals and the centrists mild disadvantages in the allocation of seats. Calculating the advantage ratio, defined as percentage of seats divided by percentage of votes for each party (with 1.0 representing perfect proportionality), shows that the liberal and centrist parties were slightly disadvantaged (0.84 and 0.82 respectively). The nationalists received no significant advantage or disadvantage (1.01), while the communists were the beneficiaries of liberal and centrist disadvantage, receiving a percentage of seats 1.44 times their percentage of votes. The result represents a modest change from the 1993 elections, when the analogous figures were 1.02 for the liberals; 0.85 for the centrists; 1.15 for the nationalists; and 1.16 for the communists. On proportionality and advantage ratio, see Rein Taagepera & Matthew Soberg Shugart, Seats and Votes (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1989), p. 68.
33. The perils of 'disunity' within the liberal camp, and the attribution of the liberals' political doldrums to this problem, are a frequent refrain in the literature and commentary on political competition during the post-Soviet period. See, for example, 'Fiasko Gaidara eshche ne oznachaet triumfa Yavlinskogo', Kommersant (Daily), 23 May 1995; Laura Belin, 'Bonner Begs Small Democratic Parties to Drop Out', OMRI Daily Digest, 14 December 1995; McFaul & Petrov, p. 21.
34. The perils of 'disunity' within the liberal camp, and the attribution of the liberals' political doldrums to this problem, are a frequent refrain in the literature and commentary on political competition during the post-Soviet period. See, for example, 'Fiasko Gaidara eshche ne oznachaet triumfa Yavlinskogo', Kommersant (Daily), 23 May 1995; Laura Belin, 'Bonner Begs Small Democratic Parties to Drop Out', OMRI Daily Digest, 14 December 1995; McFaul & Petrov, p. 21.
35. The raw data on parties' expenditures on which the present analysis (including Figure 1) is based are drawn from 'Izbiratel'nye ob"edineniya (bloki). Platnaya pryamaya politicheskaya reklama, 1 noyabrya-15 dekabrya 1995 g.' (report prepared by Analitik Ltd, Moscow). The author is indebted to Andrei Berezkin for supplying these data. Press sources that discuss the effect (or lack thereof) of advertising expenditure on electoral outcomes include 'Den'gi reshayut ne vse', Nezavisimaya gazeta, 27 December 1995; 'Nazad, v budushchee', Vek, 1 January 1996.
36. The raw data on parties' expenditures on which the present analysis (including Figure 1) is based are drawn from 'Izbiratel'nye ob"edineniya (bloki). Platnaya pryamaya politicheskaya reklama, 1 noyabrya-15 dekabrya 1995 g.' (report prepared by Analitik Ltd, Moscow). The author is indebted to Andrei Berezkin for supplying these data. Press sources that discuss the effect (or lack thereof) of advertising expenditure on electoral outcomes include 'Den'gi reshayut ne vse', Nezavisimaya gazeta, 27 December 1995; 'Nazad, v budushchee', Vek, 1 January 1996.
37. Opinion surveys conducted after the elections seemed to reinforce the argument being advanced here. Several weeks after the elections, the All-Russian Centre for the Research of Public Opinion (VTsIOM) reported that just 13% of voters surveyed reported that television advertisements had decisively influenced their decision at the polls. See 'Vybory: Peizazh posle bitvy i pered nei', Izvestiya, 11 January 1996.
38. For example, Vladimir Chekalkin, Osobennosti otechestvennoi izbiratel'noi kampanii', Vlast', 1995, 7, pp. 13-18; Nikolai Bukharin, 'Novyi sub"ekt politicheskoi zhizni', Vlast', 1995, 7, pp. 19-21.
39. For example, Vladimir Chekalkin, Osobennosti otechestvennoi izbiratel'noi kampanii', Vlast', 1995, 7, pp. 13-18; Nikolai Bukharin, 'Novyi sub"ekt politicheskoi zhizni', Vlast', 1995, 7, pp. 19-21.
40. 'KRO khochet zamenit' KPSS', Nezavisimaya gazeta, 22 November 1995; 'Aleksandr Lebed' i ego predvybornaya kampaniya', Segodnya, 28 November 1995; 'Pravo na oshibku', Vek, 1 January 1996.
41. 'KRO khochet zamenit' KPSS', Nezavisimaya gazeta, 22 November 1995; 'Aleksandr Lebed' i ego predvybornaya kampaniya', Segodnya, 28 November 1995; 'Pravo na oshibku', Vek, 1 January 1996.
42. 'KRO khochet zamenit' KPSS', Nezavisimaya gazeta, 22 November 1995; 'Aleksandr Lebed' i ego predvybornaya kampaniya', Segodnya, 28 November 1995; 'Pravo na oshibku', Vek, 1 January 1996.
43. 'Gaidaru v Dume byt' ', Moskovskii Komsomolets, 9 December 1995. Not all observers missed the possibility that the relatively extensive LDPR organisation might help it avoid early demise. See D. V. Balakirev, 'Brosok v Rossiyu, ili s novym godom!', Kentavr, 1995, 2, pp. 121-126.
44. 'Gaidaru v Dume byt' ', Moskovskii Komsomolets, 9 December 1995. Not all observers missed the possibility that the relatively extensive LDPR organisation might help it avoid early demise. See D. V. Balakirev, 'Brosok v Rossiyu, ili s novym godom!', Kentavr, 1995, 2, pp. 121-126.
45. The assumption of the primacy of personality was only one of the many condescending - and faulty - notions that informed the analyses and predictions of many Muscovite intellectuals and Western observers. Many assumed that the presence on the ballot of more than one party that used the hammer and sickle as its emblem would confuse simple voters and perhaps hinder the prospects of the KPRF. Pity the poor babushki who would vote for the first hammer and sickle that they saw, which might not be that of the party for which they intended to vote (Zyuganov's KPRF), but rather that of Viktor Anpilov's neo-Stalinist rabble-rousers (KTR), or even Arkadii Volsky and Mikhail Shmakov's Trade Unions and Industrialists-Union of Labour (whose logo also included a hammer and sickle, albeit a stylised one that formed the letters of the party's acronym). What is more, the overestimation in pre-election predictions of the vote that the Women of Russia party would capture was due in part to the assumption that the party's place on the ballot-by chance of a lottery, it appeared first in the list of 43 parties-would accord it significant advantages. According to such thinking, some voters would be so overwhelmed and confused by the long list of parties that they would simply vote for the first party they saw and be done with it. The author's observations are based in part on extensive attendance at seminars, meetings of political discussion groups, and press conferences held in Moscow during November and December of 1995.
46. Fish, Democracy from Scratch, pp. 102-105.
47. On the LDPR and the KPRF, see 'Nikakikh vyborov ne budet' and 'Net eshche yasnosti', Pravda, 27 June 1995; Vladimir Aleksandrov, 'Krasnodarskii krai: Ekonomika, partii, lidery', Vlast', 1995, 7, pp. 39-47; Balakirev, 'Brosok v Rossiyu'. pp. 121-126.
48. On the LDPR and the KPRF, see 'Nikakikh vyborov ne budet' and 'Net eshche yasnosti', Pravda, 27 June 1995; Vladimir Aleksandrov, 'Krasnodarskii krai: Ekonomika, partii, lidery', Vlast', 1995, 7, pp. 39-47; Balakirev, 'Brosok v Rossiyu'. pp. 121-126.
49. On the LDPR and the KPRF, see 'Nikakikh vyborov ne budet' and 'Net eshche yasnosti', Pravda, 27 June 1995; Vladimir Aleksandrov, 'Krasnodarskii krai: Ekonomika, partii, lidery', Vlast', 1995, 7, pp. 39-47; Balakirev, 'Brosok v Rossiyu'. pp. 121-126.
50. 'Perevorot imeni Gaidara'. Moskovskii Komsomolets, 10 July 1993.
51. Fish, 'The Advent of Multipartism', pp. 360-362.
52. See Stefane Bartolini, 'The Membership of Mass Parties: The Social Democratic Experience, 1889-1978', in Hans Daalder & Peter Mair (eds), Western European Party Systems: Continuity and Change (Beverly Hills, CA, Sage, 1983), pp. 177-220; Maurice Duverger, Political Porties (London, Methuen, 1978), pp. 61-132.
53. See Stefane Bartolini, 'The Membership of Mass Parties: The Social Democratic Experience, 1889-1978', in Hans Daalder & Peter Mair (eds), Western European Party Systems: Continuity and Change (Beverly Hills, CA, Sage, 1983), pp. 177-220; Maurice Duverger, Political Porties (London, Methuen, 1978), pp. 61-132.
54. William E. Paterson, 'West Germany: Between Party Apparatus and Basis Democracy', in Alan Ware (ed.), Political Parties: Electoral Change and Structural Response (Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1987), p. 163.
55. The problem is scarcely unique to present-day Russia. As Duverger noted in his classic study, 'the membership of a party can be the subject of interesting numerical analyses. Unfortunately these are confronted by two kinds of difficulty: parties do not always publish their membership figures; the figures that are available are not always based on sound methods' (Duverger, p. 79). Data offered by the offices of parties themselves are often the only sources available, but party leaders sometimes grossly exaggerate the magnitude of their organisations. For example, the French Communist Party claimed 700 000 members in the 1980s, but informed independent estimates placed the actual number at about one-third of that figure. See Byron Criddle, 'France: Parties in a Presidential System', in Ware (ed.), Political Parties: Electoral Change and Structural Response, p. 154. The present author's estimates of membership numbers of Russian parties are based on a variety of estimates issued by Russian analysts and social scientists. They are, for the most part, consistent with those that appear in Sergei Markov, 'Izbiratel'nye ob"dineniya v Rossii v preddverii parlamentskikh vyborov 1995 goda', in Igor' Klyamkin et al., Analiz elektorata politicheskikh sit Rossii (Moscow, Komtex and Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1995), pp. 62-91.
56. The problem is scarcely unique to present-day Russia. As Duverger noted in his classic study, 'the membership of a party can be the subject of interesting numerical analyses. Unfortunately these are confronted by two kinds of difficulty: parties do not always publish their membership figures; the figures that are available are not always based on sound methods' (Duverger, p. 79). Data offered by the offices of parties themselves are often the only sources available, but party leaders sometimes grossly exaggerate the magnitude of their organisations. For example, the French Communist Party claimed 700 000 members in the 1980s, but informed independent estimates placed the actual number at about one-third of that figure. See Byron Criddle, 'France: Parties in a Presidential System', in Ware (ed.), Political Parties: Electoral Change and Structural Response, p. 154. The present author's estimates of membership numbers of Russian parties are based on a variety of estimates issued by Russian analysts and social scientists. They are, for the most part, consistent with those that appear in Sergei Markov, 'Izbiratel'nye ob"dineniya v Rossii v preddverii parlamentskikh vyborov 1995 goda', in Igor' Klyamkin et al., Analiz elektorata politicheskikh sil Rossii (Moscow, Komtex and Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1995), pp. 62-91.
57. During the summer and autumn of 1995 Zhirinovsky claimed a membership of some 170 000, but a figure roughly half that size probably was closer to the actual total. 'Nikakikh vyborov ne budet', Pravda, 27 June 1995.
58. Television news programme broadcast on RTR, 11 pm Moscow time, 18 December 1995; 'Vlad's Clan Seeks Duma Seats', Moscow Times, 22 November 1995.
59. The APR claim of some quarter-million members was probably an exaggeration, and was based largely on counting not only the directors of the large collective and state farms who actually made up the mainstay of the party, but also many of the agricultural workers who toiled under their direction but whose actual membership of the party was questionable.
60. See Markov, pp. 69, 71.
61. The relationship between party organisation and electoral performance is harder to assess in the case of the centrist NDR. Founded by Chernomyrdin six months before the elections, its actual size was unknown. But there is little evidence that it developed a mass membership, and despite the enormous resources it commanded and the loyalty it enjoyed among a portion of officialdom, it gained only one-tenth of the vote in list balloting and 10 seats in the districts.
62. Of the 2700 candidates who contested races in the single-member districts in 1995, 59.3% were put forward by parties. This figure reflects a trend toward 'partiisation' of electoral politics since the 1993 elections, when candidates unaffiliated with any party made up 54.8% of those running for seats in the districts. Furthermore, while nearly 70% of the winners in the district races in 1993 were at the time unaffiliated with any party, the analogous figure in 1995 was 34%. See Nikolai Petrov, 'Analiz rezul'tatov vyborov 1995 g. v Gosudarstvennuyu dumu RF po okrugam i regionam' (ms, 1996), p. 4; Wyman et al., 'The Russian Elections of December 1993', p. 260. For a good treatment of the trend toward partiisation of political competition within the context of the Duma during 1993-95, see Thomas F. Remington & Steven S. Smith, 'The Development of Parliamentary Parties in Russia', Legislative Studies Quarterly, 20, 4, November 1995, pp. 457-489.
63. Of the 2700 candidates who contested races in the single-member districts in 1995, 59.3% were put forward by parties. This figure reflects a trend toward 'partiisation' of electoral politics since the 1993 elections, when candidates unaffiliated with any party made up 54.8% of those running for seats in the districts. Furthermore, while nearly 70% of the winners in the district races in 1993 were at the time unaffiliated with any party, the analogous figure in 1995 was 34%. See Nikolai Petrov, 'Analiz rezul'tatov vyborov 1995 g. v Gosudarstvennuyu dumu RF po okrugam i regionam' (ms, 1996), p. 4; Wyman et al., 'The Russian Elections of December 1993', p. 260. For a good treatment of the trend toward partiisation of political competition within the context of the Duma during 1993-95, see Thomas F. Remington & Steven S. Smith, 'The Development of Parliamentary Parties in Russia', Legislative Studies Quarterly, 20, 4, November 1995, pp. 457-489.
64. Of the 2700 candidates who contested races in the single-member districts in 1995, 59.3% were put forward by parties. This figure reflects a trend toward 'partiisation' of electoral politics since the 1993 elections, when candidates unaffiliated with any party made up 54.8% of those running for seats in the districts. Furthermore, while nearly 70% of the winners in the district races in 1993 were at the time unaffiliated with any party, the analogous figure in 1995 was 34%. See Nikolai Petrov, 'Analiz rezul'tatov vyborov 1995 g. v Gosudarstvennuyu dumu RF po okrugam i regionam' (ms, 1996), p. 4; Wyman et al., 'The Russian Elections of December 1993', p. 260. For a good treatment of the trend toward partiisation of political competition within the context of the Duma during 1993-95, see Thomas F. Remington & Steven S. Smith, 'The Development of Parliamentary Parties in Russia', Legislative Studies Quarterly, 20, 4, November 1995, pp. 457-489.
65. 'Za golosa izbiratelei sopernichayut ne tol'ko partiinye spiski', Nezavisimaya gazeta, 14 December 1995.
66. Author's interview with Anatolii Luk'yanov, 19 December 1995, Moscow.
67. Alan Ware's discussion of the persistent importance of party organisation in the age of television campaigning may be particularly apt for the case under discussion. Ware warns against a perspective that 'ignores the functions which members [of parties] perform and which the [new communications] technologies cannot'. He holds that 'television may be no match for communities and small groups in forming and moulding opinions - the absence of active party supporters in a community may mean that its case is never really heard in discussions or conversations'. Alan Ware, Citizens, Parties and the State: A Reappraisal (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1987), p. 135. The importance of organisation on the local level may have been enhanced by the growing localisation of communications in Russia. Survey data reported in February 1996 suggested that more than half of the population at that time read only local newspapers and watched only local television. The trend toward 'denationalisation' of information consumption may shed light on why extensive and skilful organisation on the local level mattered as much or more in determining election results than national television advertising campaigns. See Laura Belin, 'Most Russians Prefer Local Media', OMRI Daily Digest, 16 February 1996.
68. Alan Ware's discussion of the persistent importance of party organisation in the age of television campaigning may be particularly apt for the case under discussion. Ware warns against a perspective that 'ignores the functions which members [of parties] perform and which the [new communications] technologies cannot'. He holds that 'television may be no match for communities and small groups in forming and moulding opinions - the absence of active party supporters in a community may mean that its case is never really heard in discussions or conversations'. Alan Ware, Citizens, Parties and the State: A Reappraisal (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1987), p. 135. The importance of organisation on the local level may have been enhanced by the growing localisation of communications in Russia. Survey data reported in February 1996 suggested that more than half of the population at that time read only local newspapers and watched only local television. The trend toward 'denationalisation' of information consumption may shed light on why extensive and skilful organisation on the local level mattered as much or more in determining election results than national television advertising campaigns. See Laura Belin, 'Most Russians Prefer Local Media', OMRI Daily Digest, 16 February 1996.
69. Description and analysis are based on the author's viewing of news programmes, political debates and talk shows that were broadcast on national and Moscow television stations during the period 15 November-15 December 1995, as well as on comprehensive review of all advertisements broadcast by all political parties.
70. Author's interview with Vyacheslav Igrunov and Vladimir Averchev, 6 January 1996, Moscow.
71. The vehemence, aggressiveness and negativity of Fedorov's campaign earned him the label of 'the Zhirinovsky of the intellectuals' ('Segodnya' evening news programme broadcast on NTV, 7 pm Moscow time, 2 December 1995). Given the substance of his message and the lack of any real extremism in his proposals (or in the brand of 'patriotism' that he attempted to advance), the appellation was inapt, but its widespread use did suggest that Fedorov's approach struck many as harsh and shrill.
72. Some liberal leaders admitted as much to the author in private conversation after the election campaign. Also see note 18 above.
73. The KPRF strategy of relying on a variety of leaders in its public relations was also reflected in its post-electoral decision to put forward not Zyuganov, but rather the smooth and well-spoken Gennadij Seleznev, as speaker of the Duma.
74. Egor Gaidar, Zapiski iz zala (Moscow, Evraziya, 1995).
75. Boris Fedorov, Vpered, Rossiya! (Krasnogorsk, Krasnogorskaya tipografiya, 1995).
76. Reformy dlya bol'shinstva (Moscow, Pervaya Obraztsovaya tipografiya, 1995).
77. 'Vremya sotsial-demokratov eshche nastupit', Nezavisimaya gazeta, 23 November 1995.
78. 'Rossiya mezhdu vyborami', Segodnya, 27 December 1995.
79. For example, A. I. Podberezkin, Pochemu ya budu golosovat' za KPRF (Moscow, RAU-Korporatsiya, 1995).
80. See, for example, Igor' Klyamkin, 'Elektorat demokraticheskikh sil', in Klyamkin et al., Analiz elektorata, pp. 9-31; V. N. Kudryavtsev et al., 'Rossiiskii sotsium v pervom polugodii 1995 goda: Politiko-konfliktologicheskaya ekspertiza', Vlast', 1995, 9, pp. 57-61. Some analysts of public opinion have argued that some stabilisation of voter preferences had begun to manifest itself in Russia as early as the 1993 parliamentary elections and that parties were beginning to show 'clear social and attitudinal bases'. Matthew Wyman, Stephen White, Bill Miller & Paul Heywood, 'Public Opinion, Parties and Voters in the December 1993 Russian Elections', Europe-Asia Studies, 47, 4, 1995, p. 611. See also Fish, 'The Advent of Multipartism in Russia', pp. 366-377. The argument that interest-based voting has begun to appear is a far cry, however, from the claim that the population may be clearly divided up into fixed segments. Klyamkin's article, cited above, for example, claimed the 'electorate of the democrats' consisted of 21 % of all voters, and that this figure could be regarded as 'very stable' (p. 12). For their part, Kudryavtsev et al. stated that the 'left-populist' segment of the electorate - that portion that could be counted on to support the communists and nationalists such as Zyuganov's KPRF and Zhirinovsky's LDPR - made up 20% of all voters (p. 58). Such portraits of the electorate often invest more faith in public opinion surveys than may be justified during times of rapid transition, and they leave little room for shifts in mass voter preferences arising from parties' and politicians' organisations, campaigns and performance in office.
81. See, for example, Igor' Klyamkin, 'Elektorat demokraticheskikh sil', in Klyamkin et al., Analiz elektorata, pp. 9-31; V. N. Kudryavtsev et al., 'Rossiiskii sotsium v pervom polugodii 1995 goda: Politiko-konfliktologicheskaya ekspertiza', Vlast', 1995, 9, pp. 57-61. Some analysts of public opinion have argued that some stabilisation of voter preferences had begun to manifest itself in Russia as early as the 1993 parliamentary elections and that parties were beginning to show 'clear social and attitudinal bases'. Matthew Wyman, Stephen White, Bill Miller & Paul Heywood, 'Public Opinion, Parties and Voters in the December 1993 Russian Elections', Europe-Asia Studies, 47, 4, 1995, p. 611. See also Fish, 'The Advent of Multipartism in Russia', pp. 366-377. The argument that interest-based voting has begun to appear is a far cry, however, from the claim that the population may be clearly divided up into fixed segments. Klyamkin's article, cited above, for example, claimed the 'electorate of the democrats' consisted of 21 % of all voters, and that this figure could be regarded as 'very stable' (p. 12). For their part, Kudryavtsev et al. stated that the 'left-populist' segment of the electorate - that portion that could be counted on to support the communists and nationalists such as Zyuganov's KPRF and Zhirinovsky's LDPR - made up 20% of all voters (p. 58). Such portraits of the electorate often invest more faith in public opinion surveys than may be justified during times of rapid transition, and they leave little room for shifts in mass voter preferences arising from parties' and politicians' organisations, campaigns and performance in office.
82. See, for example, Igor' Klyamkin, 'Elektorat demokraticheskikh sil', in Klyamkin et al., Analiz elektorata, pp. 9-31; V. N. Kudryavtsev et al., 'Rossiiskii sotsium v pervom polugodii 1995 goda: Politiko-konfliktologicheskaya ekspertiza', Vlast', 1995, 9, pp. 57-61. Some analysts of public opinion have argued that some stabilisation of voter preferences had begun to manifest itself in Russia as early as the 1993 parliamentary elections and that parties were beginning to show 'clear social and attitudinal bases'. Matthew Wyman, Stephen White, Bill Miller & Paul Heywood, 'Public Opinion, Parties and Voters in the December 1993 Russian Elections', Europe-Asia Studies, 47, 4, 1995, p. 611. See also Fish, 'The Advent of Multipartism in Russia', pp. 366-377. The argument that interest-based voting has begun to appear is a far cry, however, from the claim that the population may be clearly divided up into fixed segments. Klyamkin's article, cited above, for example, claimed the 'electorate of the democrats' consisted of 21 % of all voters, and that this figure could be regarded as 'very stable' (p. 12). For their part, Kudryavtsev et al. stated that the 'left-populist' segment of the electorate - that portion that could be counted on to support the communists and nationalists such as Zyuganov's KPRF and Zhirinovsky's LDPR - made up 20% of all voters (p. 58). Such portraits of the electorate often invest more faith in public opinion surveys than may be justified during times of rapid transition, and they leave little room for shifts in mass voter preferences arising from parties' and politicians' organisations, campaigns and performance in office.
83. See, for example, Igor' Klyamkin, 'Elektorat demokraticheskikh sil', in Klyamkin et al., Analiz elektorata, pp. 9-31; V. N. Kudryavtsev et al., 'Rossiiskii sotsium v pervom polugodii 1995 goda: Politiko-konfliktologicheskaya ekspertiza', Vlast', 1995, 9, pp. 57-61. Some analysts of public opinion have argued that some stabilisation of voter preferences had begun to manifest itself in Russia as early as the 1993 parliamentary elections and that parties were beginning to show 'clear social and attitudinal bases'. Matthew Wyman, Stephen White, Bill Miller & Paul Heywood, 'Public Opinion, Parties and Voters in the December 1993 Russian Elections', Europe-Asia Studies, 47, 4, 1995, p. 611. See also Fish, 'The Advent of Multipartism in Russia', pp. 366-377. The argument that interest-based voting has begun to appear is a far cry, however, from the claim that the population may be clearly divided up into fixed segments. Klyamkin's article, cited above, for example, claimed the 'electorate of the democrats' consisted of 21 % of all voters, and that this figure could be regarded as 'very stable' (p. 12). For their part, Kudryavtsev et al. stated that the 'left-populist' segment of the electorate - that portion that could be counted on to support the communists and nationalists such as Zyuganov's KPRF and Zhirinovsky's LDPR - made up 20% of all voters (p. 58). Such portraits of the electorate often invest more faith in public opinion surveys than may be justified during times of rapid transition, and they leave little room for shifts in mass voter preferences arising from parties' and politicians' organisations, campaigns and performance in office.
84. 'Egor Gaidar: "Na sleduyushchikh parlamentskikh vyborakh pobedyat liberaly" ', Nezavisimaya gazeta, 5 January 1996.
85. See, for example, 'Yavlinsky Romances Russia's Heartland', Moscow Times, 8 December 1995; Debate between Grigorii Yavlinsky and Nikolai Ryzhkov on the television programme 'Geroi dnya', broadcast on NTV, 7:30 pm Moscow time, 15 December 1995.
86. See, for example, 'Yavlinsky Romances Russia's Heartland', Moscow Times, 8 December 1995; Debate between Grigorii Yavlinsky and Nikolai Ryzhkov on the television programme 'Geroi dnya', broadcast on NTV, 7:30 pm Moscow time, 15 December 1995.
87. For the results of survey research that traces such a trend, while nevertheless showing that overall public support for democratic principles remains relatively high, see Arthur H. Miller, William M. Reisinger & Vicki L. Hesli, 'Understanding Political Change in Post-Soviet Societies: A Further Commentary on Finifter and Mickiewicz', American Political Science Review, 90, 1, March 1996, pp. 153-166.
88. Gottried Dietze, Liberalism Proper and Proper Liberalism (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985), p. 1.
89. See Ariel Cohen, 'Reexamining Russia: Crime without Punishment', Journal of Democracy, 6, 2, April 1995, pp. 34-45.
90. For the clearest statement of this strain of liberal thinking, which starts with the Hobbesian assumption that individuals are motivated above all by fear of harm, but which ends with the anti-Hobbesian argument that individuals have far more to fear from the state than from any other entity and that individuals perceive their situations as such, see Judith N. Shklar, 'The Liberalism of Fear', in Nancy L. Rosenblum (ed.), Liberalism and the Moral Life (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1989), pp. 21-38.
91. In many surveys carried out in 1995, only fear of inflation topped crime as a source of public anxiety. Crime typically was the cause of greater concern than unemployment, the non-payment of wages, the fall in production, and public health. Sources: 'Bud' proshche - i k tebe potyanutsya lyudi', Kommersant (Daily), 18 July 1995; 'Predvybornyi opros VTsIOM, 29 noyabrya-5 dekabrya 1995' (All-Russian Centre for the Research of Public Opinion, mimeo, January 1996, Moscow).
92. In many surveys carried out in 1995, only fear of inflation topped crime as a source of public anxiety. Crime typically was the cause of greater concern than unemployment, the non-payment of wages, the fall in production, and public health. Sources: 'Bud' proshche - i k tebe potyanutsya lyudi', Kommersant (Daily), 18 July 1995; 'Predvybornyi opros VTsIOM, 29 noyabrya-5 dekabrya 1995' (All-Russian Centre for the Research of Public Opinion, mimeo, January 1996, Moscow).
93. Laura Belin, 'How a Convicted Criminal Was Elected to the Duma', OMRI Daily Digest, 31 January 1996.
94. For a penetrating analysis of the economic situation that Gaidar and his associates inherited and their responses to it, see 'Egor Gaidar v istoricheskom kontekste', Novoe vremya, 47 (2626), November 1995.
95. The frequent public declarations of some liberal leaders to the effect that economic reform must take precedence over all other types of reform, even at the expense of a rise in public disorder, did little to enhance the liberals' political appeal. Gaidar, for example, stated on numerous occasions during 1995 that Russia's 'capitalist revolution', launched in 1991, had been 'won'. Gaidar pro-claimed that 'the capitalism we have is terrible, criminal, and unjust' but that it could not be anything else given the current phase of development. See 'Gaidar: Capitalist Revolution Has Been Won', Monitor (the Jamestown Foundation), 22 May 1995. Even if Gaidar's words contained a grain of truth, it is not difficult to see how many citizens might have interpreted them as signs of brazen neglect toward crime and mafiaisation of the economy, and as indicators that the reform programme favoured by many liberals placed the rapidity of 'capitalist victory' over all other concerns, including those of elementary fairness and public safety.
96. For example, interview with Grigorii Yavlinsky on the television programme 'Vybor 95', broadcast on OFT, 7 pm Moscow time, 21 November 1995.
97. Robert Orttung, 'Gaidar Calls for Unified Democratic Bloc', OMRI Daily Digest, 13 February 1995.
98. John Locke, The Second Treatise of Government (Indianapolis, Bobbs-Merrill, 1952), pp. 72-73, 84-91 (quoted passage p. 72).
99. Wilhelm von Humboldt, The Limits of State Action (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1969), pp. 42-44, 82-83, 107-121.
100. See J. S. Mill, Utilitarianism, in J. S. Mill, Utilitarianism, On Liberty, and Considerations on Representative Government, ed. H. B. Acton (London, Dent, 1988), p. 56; L. T. Hobhouse, Liberalism (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1964), pp. 50-51.
101. See J. S. Mill, Utilitarianism, in J. S. Mill, Utilitarianism, On Liberty, and Considerations on Representative Government, ed. H. B. Acton (London, Dent, 1988), p. 56; L. T. Hobhouse, Liberalism (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1964), pp. 50-51.
102. Mill, p. 56.
103. von Humboldt, p. 43.
104. Richard Rose, 'Mobilizing Demobilized Voters in Post-Communist Societies', Party Politics, 1, 4, 1995, pp. 557-559.
105. See Stephen Holmes, Passions and Constraint (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1995), pp. 23-24.
106. Josephine Andrews & Kathryn Stoner-Weiss, 'Regionalism and Reform in Provincial Russia', Post-Soviet Affairs, 11, 4, 1995, pp. 384-406, esp. p. 392; Boris Kapustin & Igor' Klyamkin, 'Liberal'nye tsennosti v soznanii rossiyan', Polis, 1994, 2, pp. 69-71. See also the results of a survey released in early 1996 by the Russian Institute of Social and National Problems and sponsored by the Friedrich Eben Foundation, a German organisation. The survey found little support for the notion that Russians reject a market economy or economic stratification. It found that rising dissatisfaction with the political system was due to fears over rising crime, the injustices involved in the privatisation programme, embarrassment over continued political instability, and feelings of political inefficacy, rather than to rising income equalities and socioeconomic stratification per se. Findings of the survey are summarised in Robert Orttung, 'Political Camps Prefer Different Institutions', OMRI Daily Digest, 20 February 1996.
107. Josephine Andrews & Kathryn Stoner-Weiss, 'Regionalism and Reform in Provincial Russia', Post-Soviet Affairs, 11, 4, 1995, pp. 384-406, esp. p. 392; Boris Kapustin & Igor' Klyamkin, 'Liberal'nye tsennosti v soznanii rossiyan', Polis, 1994, 2, pp. 69-71. See also the results of a survey released in early 1996 by the Russian Institute of Social and National Problems and sponsored by the Friedrich Eben Foundation, a German organisation. The survey found little support for the notion that Russians reject a market economy or economic stratification. It found that rising dissatisfaction with the political system was due to fears over rising crime, the injustices involved in the privatisation programme, embarrassment over continued political instability, and feelings of political inefficacy, rather than to rising income equalities and socioeconomic stratification per se. Findings of the survey are summarised in Robert Orttung, 'Political Camps Prefer Different Institutions', OMRI Daily Digest, 20 February 1996.
108. Josephine Andrews & Kathryn Stoner-Weiss, 'Regionalism and Reform in Provincial Russia', Post-Soviet Affairs, 11, 4, 1995, pp. 384-406, esp. p. 392; Boris Kapustin & Igor' Klyamkin, 'Liberal'nye tsennosti v soznanii rossiyan', Polis, 1994, 2, pp. 69-71. See also the results of a survey released in early 1996 by the Russian Institute of Social and National Problems and sponsored by the Friedrich Eben Foundation, a German organisation. The survey found little support for the notion that Russians reject a market economy or economic stratification. It found that rising dissatisfaction with the political system was due to fears over rising crime, the injustices involved in the privatisation programme, embarrassment over continued political instability, and feelings of political inefficacy, rather than to rising income equalities and socioeconomic stratification per se. Findings of the survey are summarised in Robert Orttung, 'Political Camps Prefer Different Institutions', OMRI Daily Digest, 20 February 1996.
109. As Tocqueville noted, 'By means of the idea of rights men have defined the nature of license and of tyranny'. Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, trans. George Lawrence (Garden City, Doubleday, 1969), p. 238.
110. The argument put forth here differs from analyses that have characterised El'tsin's victory as a successful effort at bribing the electorate with 'pork'. For a statement of such an argument, see Daniel Treisman, 'Why Yeltsin Won', Foreign Affairs, 75, 5, September-October 1996, pp. 64-77. In the post-electoral setting, El'tsin has, predictably, freely reneged on his promises when they run up against budgetary constraints. See Penny Morvant, 'Yeltsin Orders Improvement in the Socioeconomic Situation', OMRI Daily Digest, 11 September 1996.
111. The argument put forth here differs from analyses that have characterised El'tsin's victory as a successful effort at bribing the electorate with 'pork'. For a statement of such an argument, see Daniel Treisman, 'Why Yeltsin Won', Foreign Affairs, 75, 5, September-October 1996, pp. 64-77. In the post-electoral setting, El'tsin has, predictably, freely reneged on his promises when they run up against budgetary constraints. See Penny Morvant, 'Yeltsin Orders Improvement in the Socioeconomic Situation', OMRI Daily Digest, 11 September 1996.