Thin markets, asymmetric information, and mortgage-backed securities

Journal of Financial Intermediation

Volumn 6, Issue 1, 1997, Pages 64-86

  Glaeser, Edward L ^a   Kallal, Hédi D ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

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Indexed keywords

EID: 0030642414     PISSN: 10429573     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jfin.1997.0209     Document Type: Article

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