Dynamic consistency and reference points

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 72, Issue 1, 1997, Pages 208-219

  Segal, Uzi ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WESTERN ONTARIO   (Canada)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0030637293     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.1996.2204     Document Type: Article

References (25)

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