Learning of equilibria by a population with minimal information

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Volumn 32, Issue 1, 1997, Pages 1-18

  Dawid, Herbert ^a  

^a VIENNA UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY   (Austria)

Author keywords

Evolutionary learning; Markov process; Nash equilibrium

Indexed keywords

EID: 0030637262     PISSN: 01672681     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/s0167-2681(96)00016-9     Document Type: Article

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