Optimal allocation and backup of computer resources under asymmetric information and incentive incompatibility

European Journal of Operational Research

Volumn 91, Issue 2, 1996, Pages 411-426

  Cheng, Hsing K ^a   Freimer, Marshall ^b   Richmond, William B ^c   Sumita, Ushio ^d  

^a Dept of Economics and Thomas Jefferson Program in Public Policy at the College of William and Mary   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER   (United States)

^c GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^d INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF JAPAN   (Japan)

Author keywords

Asymmetric information; Computer backup strategy; Game theory; Linear programming; Mechanism design; Resource allocation

Indexed keywords

ALGORITHMS; COMPUTER SYSTEMS; DATA PROCESSING; GAME THEORY; LINEAR PROGRAMMING; MATHEMATICAL MODELS;

ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION; COMPUTER BACKUP STRATEGY; INCENTIVE INCOMPATIBILITY; MECHANISM DESIGN;

RESOURCE ALLOCATION;

EID: 0030573495     PISSN: 03772217     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/0377-2217(94)00349-1     Document Type: Article

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